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Document 1115 Addendum 
Threat assessment 
ADDENDUM 1 TO THE REPORT 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
by Mr. Stokes, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
REVISED DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on threat assessment 
ADDITIONAL EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Stokes, Rapporteur 
APPENDIX 
9th May 1988 
NATO/Warsaw Pact battle tank and artillery comparison in Europe - 1970 and 
1987 
I. Adopted in committee by 9 votes to 5 with 1 abstention. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Kittelmann (Chairman); MM. de Beer, Fourre (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle (Alternate: 
Baumel), Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Cariglia, Cox (Alternate: Lord Newa/1), De Decker, De Rycke, Fiandrotti, Fioret, Hardy, 
Irmer, Jung, Konen, de Kwaadsteniet, Mrs. Lalumiere, MM. Lemmrich, Matraja, Pecchioli (Alternate: Cannata), Scheer, Sinesio, 
Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Speed, Steiner, Steverlynck, Stokes. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Revised draft recommendation 
on threat assessment 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recognising that any assessment of the threat which the Atlantic Alliance faces from the Soviet 
Union requires first an informed political assessment of the Soviet Union's e~ternal policy and 
behaviour, and its presumed intentions, as well as realistic comparison of the military capabilities of 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact; 
(ii) Underlining the importance of verifiable conventional arms control measures leading to a more 
stable and secure balance offorces at lower levels (for which assessment of the threat is an essential fore-
runner); 
(iii) Aware that friendly relations cannot develop adequately while the Soviet Union pursues directly 
or by proxy a policy of repression, both military and by other means, in a number of countries, 
including Afghanistan and the Baltic states (although the Assembly welcomes particularly the recent 
decision to begin withdrawing Soviet troops from Afghanistan); 
(iv) Welcoming recent moves towards greater openness in the Soviet Union and urging removal of 
one of the last stumbling-blocks to further East-West agreement: the free movement of people across 
Soviet borders; 
(v) Reiterating the importance of public support for the necessary allied defence effort, which must be 
seen to be based on a credible comparison of the forces of a potential adversary with those of the 
alliance; 
(vi) Deeply concerned about the numerical superiority of Soviet conventional for<res in the northern 
and central European region dating from the immediate post-war period, noting that 'qualitatively these 
forces have been continuously improved since then and that geography here favours t~e Soviet Union; 
(vii) Noting also the continuing growth in Soviet nuclear, chemical and maritime forces in the last 
twenty-five years, and noting in particular the submarine threat to the vital transa~lantic sea routes; 
(viii) Aware that the agreed NATO force comparisons on which consistent official statements can be 
based could be more comprehensive and issued more regularly; 
(ix) Believing that a joint European programme for technical sources of defence intelligence would be 
cost-effective, which the three independent national programmes in WEU countries cannot be, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Impress on member governments the need for defence policy to be based on a credible, objective 
and consistent assessment of the threat as a whole, both political and military: 
(a) which takes account of both allied and Soviet security requirements; 
(b) which takes account of both qualitative and numerical factors and the reinforcement capabi-
lities of each alliance; 
(c) which compares the forces of the Soviet Union and its allies with allied forces; 
2. Urge allied governments: 
(a) to draw as far as possible on the agreed NATO force comparisons in theifl public statements, 
so as to present a more consistent picture of the size and capabilities of Soviet and Warsaw 
Pact forces; 
(b) to press for further improvements in the comprehensiveness of the agreed force comparisons 
published by NATO, and for an urgent resolution of the dispute currently preventing their 
publication; 
(c) to encourage the Soviet Government to follow up its newly-declared attitudes towards 
openness and the reduction in international tension by matching words with further deeds; 
3. Co-ordinate the present disparate programmes of three member countries by initiating a joint 
European programme for technical sources of information such as observation and signals intelligence 
satellites and electronic listening posts. 
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Additional Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Stokes, Rapporteur) 
1. Since the issue of the committee's report 
on " Threat assessment" 1 in November 1987 
provoking a flurry of interest in the whol~ 
question of the balance of force between East and 
West, two important, although unconnected, 
reports have also been issued. 
2. The first is an update of part of the 1984 
NATO document " NATO and the Warsaw Pact: 
force comparisons", issued by the Federal 
German Press and Information Office, Bonn, in 
December 1987, and entitled "Force Compar-
isons 1987 ". 
3. The second document is " Beyond the 
Bean Count - Realistically Assessing the Con-
ventional Military Balance in Europe ", issued 
by Senator Carl Levin, Chairman of the Senate 
Armed Services Subcommittee on Conventional 
Forces and Alliance Defence, on 20th January 
1988. 
4. Senator Levin's report elaborates and adds to 
the attempts at objectivity expressed in recent reports 
on threat assessment by the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments and its analysis will prove 
invaluable for the follow-up report planned by the 
committee for early 1989. 
5. One aspect of force comparison has been 
highlighted especially over recent months and 
that concerns the numbers of tanks and artillery 
pieces on each side. The report by the Federal 
German Press and Information Office concen-
trates on this issue, which is why what is said is 
worth reproducing here, together with the two 
accompanying tables which illustrate so graphi-
cally the latest figures available: 
"Looking back, it can be seen that the 
Warsaw Pact's present superiority over 
NATO in land forces stationed in Europe 
has grown steadily. This is true for the 
total number of available weapons systems 
and as a percentage of qualitatively similar 
equipment. 
Since 1970, the number of NATO battle 
tanks has risen by about 7 300 and the 
Warsaw Pact has procured 22 000 addi-
tional armoured vehicles, almost three 
times more. 
The trend in artillery potential is even 
more disturbing. Whereas, during the 
same period, the number of guns 
(including multi-barrelled rocket 
launchers) has remained practically the 
same on the NATO side, the number on 
the Warsaw Pact side has risen by 24 500. 
I. "Threat assessment", Document 1115, 2nd November 
1987. Rapporteur: Mr. Stokes. (Adopted in committee by 
15 votes to 0 with 4 abstentions.) 
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So far, NATO has tried to offset the 
Warsaw Pact's numerical superiority by 
the superior quality of its own weapons 
systems. Until the late seventies, this 
seemed possible. In 1970, for instance, it 
could be considered that about 30% of its 
battle tanks were modem compared with 
12% for the Warsaw Pact, which left about 
the same number in real terms. Although 
- considering the overall potential -
NATO has since increased the percentage 
of its modem battle tanks in Europe to 
more than 50% (equipping them inter alia 
with firing stabilisers, automatic 
rangefinders and integrated fire control 
systems) and the Warsaw Pact to more 
than 40%, i.e. slightly less, this never-
theless means that compared with the 
9 700 modem tanks deployed by NATO in 
Europe, the Warsaw Pact has about 22 800 
of comparable quality. 
For artillery, since 1970 the balance of 
· forces in Europe has deteriorated consid-
erably to the detriment of NATO. Thus, 
Warsaw Pact superiority, which was then 
1. 5 to 1, is now 3 to 1. This strengthening 
of artillery has affected every command 
level of the Warsaw Pact land forces. For 
instance, the number of pieces of ordnance 
available to units at that time (battalions) 
has increased by 25% and practically all 
the tank regiments have been equipped 
with new artillery. 
The two alliances are still using a relatively 
large number of old artillery systems. In 
this connection, it should be specified that 
pieces of ordnance are among the 
equipment which, on the whole, remains 
the longest in service with the armed 
forces. In 1970, the two alliances had 
almost the same number of artillery 
systems in the category of qualitatively 
modem weapons. At present about 20% of 
their respective artillery potentials can be 
considered modem. Absolute figures thus 
show the general superiority of the 
Warsaw Pact, including for modem 
artillery. This is mainly due to the fact 
that, since the second half of the seventies 
the Warsaw Pact has brought into servic~ 
far more pieces of ordnance - for instance 
122 mm and 152 mm howitzers and other 
self-propelled guns - than NATO. In par-
ticular, this has improved tactical 
mobility, the protection of gunners and the 
support efficiency of armoured units. 
Warsaw Pact artillery is now better able to 
assemble forces at all levels at short notice 
and to deploy them at equally short notice 
when necessary. 
The qualitative advance that NATO 
artillery still had in the early seventies, 
from the standpoint of tactical mobility 
and immediate battle support capability in 
particular, no longer exists. " 
6. There remains a great deal to be discussed 
in further reports on threat assessment, which is 
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obviously a highly dynamic subject, occupying as 
it does hundreds of experts, both officials and 
academics, whether in Geneva or Vienna, or the 
various institutions or universities. 
7. The common aim for all, as it has been for 
this report, is to reach understanding and 
agreement so that, through realistic arms control 
measures, lives may be saved and the world 
become a slightly safer place in which to live. 
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-~ 
APPENDIX 
NATO /Warsaw Pact 
battle tank comparison in Europe- 1970 and 1987 
(forces on the spot, excluding reserves at depots) 
BATTLE TANKS 
(main weapon 90 mm or more) 
modern battle tanks 
32000 
11 500 
1970 
APPENDIX 
54300 
of which: 
22 800 
1987 
NATO WARSAW PACT 
a. including France. 
b. including France and Spain. 
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NATO/Warsaw Pact 
artillery comparison in Europe- 1970 and 1987 
(forces on the spot, excluding reserves at depots) 
1!. 0 i' 
47 500 
ARTILLERY /MORTARS 
(100 mm or more, including rocket launchers) 
modern weapons 
23000 
15400 15400 
1970 1987 
NATO WARSAW PACT 
a. including France. 
b. including France and Spain. 
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Document 1129 22nd March 1988 
AGENDA 
of the first part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session 
Paris, 6th-9th June 1988 
I. Report of the Council 
Thirty-third annual report of the Council 
(second part) 
11. Political questions 
1. Organisation of European security -
reply to the reports of the Council 
2. Co-operation between Europe and the 
United States and Canada in security 
matters 
Ill. Defence questions 
1. Disarmament 
2. Naval aviation 
3. Threat assessment 
IV. Technical and scientific questions 
European co-operation in armaments 
research and development - guidelines 
drawn from the colloquy 
V. Budgetary and administrative questions 
Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial 
organs of Western European Union for the 
financial year 1987 (revised) and 1988 
VI. Rules of procedure and privileges 
Revision and interpretation of the Rules 
of Procedure 
VII. Parliamentary and public relations 
Impact of the WEU Assembly's activities 
on parliaments and public opinion 
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Report tabled by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of 
the General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Pontillon on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Tummers on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments 
Report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments 
Report tabled by Mr. Stokes on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments 
Report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Morris on behalf of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administra-
tion 
Report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf 
of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Priv-
ileges 
Report tabled by Mr. Chenard on behalf of the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions 
Document 1130 2nd June 1988 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the first part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session 
Paris, 6th-9th June 1988 
MONDAY, 6th JUNE 
Morning 
Meetings of political groups 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
4 p.m. 
1. Opening of the first part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session by the provisional president. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Election of the President of the Assembly. 
4. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
6. Adoption of the draft order ofbusiness ofthe first part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session. 
7. Action by the Presidential Committee: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Sarti, Vice-President of the Assembly. 
Debate. 
8. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU. 
9. Address by Mr. Serra, Minister of Defence of Spain and Chairman-in-Oftice of the Indepen-
dent European Programme Group. 
10. European co-operation in armaments research and development - guidelines drawn from the 
colloquy: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
TUESDAY, 7th JUNE 
Morning 10 a.m. 
11 a.m. 
1. European co-operation in armaments research and development - guidelines drawn from the 
colloquy: 
Resumed debate. 
2. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands. 
3. European co-operation in armaments research and development - guidelines drawn from the 
colloquy: 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
4. Threat assessment: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Stokes on behalf of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
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Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Address by Mr. Mellor, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the 
United Kingdom. 
2. Naval aviation: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
WEDNESDAY, 8th JUNE 
MominglO a.m. 
11 a.m. 
1. Organisation of European security: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs 
Committee. 
2. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the finan-
cial years 1987 (revised) and 1988: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Morris on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration. 
Joint debate. 
3. Presentation of the second part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council by Mr. van 
den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Coun-
cil. 
4. Organisation of European security; Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of West-
em European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988: 
Resumed joint debate. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
I. Address by Mr. Schafer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs ofthe Federal Republic of Ger-
many. 
2. Organisation of European security; Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of West-
em European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988: 
Resumed joint debate. 
Votes on the draft recommendations. 
3. Co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada in security matters: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Pontillon on behalf of the General Affairs Commit-
tee. 
Debate. 
THURSDAY, 9th JUNE 
Morning 10 a.m. 
I. Co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada in security matters: 
Resumed debate. 
11 a.m. 
2. Address by Mr. Manzolini, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy. 
3. Co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada in security matters: 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
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4. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure: 
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Committee on 
Rules of Procedure and Privileges. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft decision. 
5. Disarmament: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Kittelmann on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Disarmament: 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. Impact of the WEU Assembly's activities on parliaments and public opinion: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Chenard on behalf of the Committee for Parliamen-
tary and Public Relations. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft order. 
CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH ORDINARY SESSION 
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Communications from the Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
concerning the meetings of senior officials from 
the ministries for foreign affairs and defence 
of WEU member states on the situation in the Gulf 
held in The Hague on 14th October and 7th December 1987 
The Hague, 20th October 1987 
Dear President, 
During the talks that my defence colleague, Mr. van Eeke1en, and I had with the Presidential 
Committee in The Hague on 13th October, I announced that a third meeting of senior officials on the 
Gulf would be held the following day, 14th October. 
Like the meetings held on 20th August and 15th September, this third meeting allowed guidelines 
for the press to be drawn up for the presidency, a copy of which is enclosed. 
I assure you once again how much I appreciated our exchange of views on 13th October. 
Mr. Charles Goerens, 
President of the Assembly 
of Western European Union 
Guidelines for the press 
Yours sincerely, 
Hans van den Broek 
Senior officials from the ministries for foreign affairs and defence of the WEU member states met 
in The Hague on 14th October 1987 to continue their consultations on the situation in the Gulf region. 
They noted that the naval forces of five member states are to be deployed in the region. They dis-
cussed means of improving contacts between them so as to enhance practical and technical 
co-ordination with full respect for the national nature of their respective activities. 
They decided to pursue their consultations. 
The Hague, 9th December 1987 
Dear President, 
In order to keep you up to date with activities in the framework of WEU relating to the Gulf, I 
wish to inform you that a fourth meeting of senior officials from the ministries for foreign affairs and 
defence of WEU member states was organised in The Hague on 7th December 1987 to exchange views 
on the situation in that region. 
The meeting also provided an opportunity for the senior officials to pursue their discussion on 
co-ordinating minesweeping activities by the naval forces of various WEU countries operating in the 
Gulf. It was also agreed to consider the possibility of some degree of rationalisation of presence in the 
region. 
Furthermore, I wish to take the opportunity of saying how much I appreciated the particularly 
fruitful exchange ofviews that I had with the WEU Assembly at its plenary session on 1st December. 
Mr. Charles Goerens, 
President of the Assembly 
of Western European Union 
20 
Yours sincerely, 
Hans van den Broek 
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Communication from the Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
concerning the meeting of senior officials from 
the ministries for foreign affairs and defence 
of WEU member states on the situation in the Gulf 
held in The Hague on 15th February 1988 
Press guidelines for the Presidency 
2nd March 1988 
High officials from the ministries of foreign affairs and defence of the member states of the 
Western European Union met on 15th February 1988 in The Hague. They again underlined the need to 
maintain solidarity. 
They reviewed developments in the Gulf region since their last meeting on 7th December 1987 
and reaffirmed their intention to further deepen their consultation process and to consider possibilities 
for rationalisation, fully respecting the national character of their respective missions. 
They reviewed the activities of the naval points of contact for intensifying co-ordination in mine 
counter measure activities between WEU member nations in the Gulf. 
The next meeting of the naval points of contact will be held in Paris. 
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Communication from the Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
concerning the meeting in The Hague on 27th A.pril1988 
between senior officials from Belgium, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom on co-operation between their navies 
in the Gulf and possibilities of improving co-operation 
17th May 1988 
The Hague, 28th April 1988 
Dear President, 
I have the honour to inform you that a high-level meeting was held on 27th April 1988 between 
the United Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands to examine present arrangements for co-operation 
between their navies in the Gulf and possibilities of improving it. The following communique was 
issued the same day: 
"In the context of the WEU decisions over recent months and following the ministerial statement 
of 19th April 1988, a high-level meeting took place at The Hague today between officials and 
naval staffs of Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to review the co-operation 
between their naval forces in the Gulf against the background ofthe renewed mining in the Gulf. 
They noted with satisfaction the speedy and effective response by their forces, resulting in the 
clearance of recently-laid mines. 
They reaffirmed their desire to continue to contribute to the safety of shipping and freedom of 
navigation in the Gulf. 
They reviewed how the present arrangements between their three countries within the framework 
of Western European Union could be further strengthened. In this respect they discussed means 
by which the integration of their respective forces could be achieved. " 
Mr. Charles Goerens, 
President of the Assembly of WEU 
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Hans van den Broek 
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Communication from the Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
concerning the meeting in The Hague on 11th May 1988 
between senior officials from the ministries for foreign affairs 
and defence of WEU member states on the situation in the Gulf 
30th May 1988 
The Hague, 19th May 1988 
Dear President, 
Further to my previous communications on the subject, I have the honour to inform you that sen-
ior officials from WEU countries met again in The Hague on 11th May 1988 to discuss developments in 
the Gul£ 
On that occasion, they adopted press guidance for the presidency which is appended to this letter. 
I would draw your attention in particular to the third paragraph of this press guidance in which, 
for the first time, WEU member countries maintaining a naval presence in the Gulf have set out publicly in 
a joint text their will to assist shipping in distress. 
Mr. Charles Goerens, 
President of the Assembly 
of Western European Union 
Press guidance for the presidency 
Yours sincerely, 
Hans van den Broek 
Following the statement adopted by the Ministerial Council of Western European Union at its 
meeting of 19th April 1988 at The Hague, high officials from the ministries of foreign affairs and defence 
of member states met on 11th May 1988 at The Hague to discuss recent developments in the Gul£ 
They reiterated the importance of maintaining the freedom of navigation and safety of shipping in 
the Gulf. 
They noted that the WEU members which maintain a naval presence in the Gulf provide, in 
accordance with long-standing time-honoured maritime traditions, assistance to shipping in distress, in 
application of established international rules. 
They expressed appreciation for all measures which could contribute to achieving those aims and 
they noted with great interest the recent statement of the United States Government in this respect. 
They will continue their diplomatic efforts, particularly within the EPC framework, to support all 
endeavours towards the full and early implementation of Resolution 598 of the Security Council, which 
is the. only framework for an overall solution to the problems raised by the Iraq-Iran conflict. 
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Public relations activities of the WEU Secretariat-General 
Letter from Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, 
to Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly 
13th January 1988 
London, 16th December 1987 
During the very interesting debates held by the Assembly on 3rd December on the report by 
Mr. Burger on security and defence matters in WEU member countries, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg raised a 
number of questions concerning the secretariat's public relations and related tasks. As President of the 
Assembly, you told Sir Geoffrey that you wished to be able to provide an early answer to the questions 
he had raised and that you therefore wished the Secretariat-General to give you information on the 
subject as soon as possible. 
I hasten to give you the following information. 
My colleagues in the Secretariat-General and I are keenly aware of the importance oftasks linked 
with keeping the press and public informed. These tasks form a large part ofthe activities carried out by 
staff of the secretariat on behalf of the Council. 
I intend to accord them growing importance. My proposals to the Council concerning the 
reorganisation of the administrative structures of Western European Union are directed in this sense, 
moreover, since they provide for a strengthened press and information section. 
As soon as the Council has been able to finalise its decisions on this reorganisation, I shall, with 
its agreement, proceed to the necessary appointments. In this context, you will perhaps be surprised to 
learn that I have not yet appointed the grade A4 official already included in the present organogram. In 
point of fact, I considered it wiser to wait for the restructuring of the ministerial organs to have been 
completed so that I might recruit in an overall context allowing me to choose the best candidates while 
respecting the national balance. I would add that this restructuring of the ministerial organs might 
provide an opportunity for certain budgetary adaptations enabling me - even in the framework of the 
zero growth principle - to make available to the public relations section of the Secretariat-General the 
minimum financial resources without which such a section cannot really operate satisfactorily, thus 
making it of little use. 
This being so, the Secretariat-General, acting on behalf and in accordance with the instructions of 
the Council, has been far from inactive in this connection, as the following should prove: 
(a) A grade A official has been seconded from the political division to work wholly on press, infor-
mation and public relations matters. He and his secretary form a small unit for this purpose and I am 
happy to say that it is giving me full satisfaction. Its work is sustained and amplified by the whole ofthe 
political division to whose services it may resort and also, when necessary, to those of the agencies for 
security questions. 
(b) The small unit responsible for press, information and public relations matters answers the many 
requests for information from research institutes, firms, groups or interested persons. Information and 
explanations are given orally or by sending documentation. The information sent generally includes the 
WEU treaty, communiques issued after ministerial meetings, a brief background document, articles on 
the reactivation of WEU that I have drafted for various reviews and, finally, a complete set of interna-
tional press cuttings on certain events or aspects ofWEU. We have received many letters of thanks, thus 
showing that in general those concerned are satisfied with this material. 
(c) The same unit prepares a daily international press review intended first of all for the permanent 
representations to WEU but also for the various circles showing an interest in it. This press review is 
generally very much appreciated by its readers. I must specify that for budgetary reasons I unfortunately 
have to limit its circulation in spite ofthe growing number of requests for it received by my staff. Special 
issues of the review were circulated on particular occasions such as the adoption of the platform on 
European security interests by the Council of Ministers in The Hague on 26th and 27th October. 
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(d) An increasingly dense network of relations has been set up with the international press, including, 
but not exclusively, the press of WEU member countries. This network is the result of constant action 
by the press, information and public relations unit and the Deputy Secretary-General, members of the 
political division and myself. This involves a considerable amount of preparation, organisation and fol-
low-up work which produces increasingly satisfactory results, as testified by the growing number of 
articles and commentaries on Western European Union and references to it in the spoken and written 
media. 
(e) Noting the importance for the organisation of more intensive public relations action, I follow 
directly everything that is done in this area and am endeavouring in this connection to develop the fol-
lowing activities in person: 
- more and more lectures in the various member states (see list at appendix), articles written 
either for specialised reviews or for the daily press (see list at appendix) and various contacts, in 
particular with the press with which I am careful never to refuse an interview, whether the jour-
nalists are from WEU member states or not. (In this connection, to quote only a few examples, 
I have been interviewed by the Portuguese, Spanish, Turkish, United States, Canadian and Jap-
anese press.) 
I very much hope that you, the Presidential Committee and the Assembly as a whole will be con-
vinced of my awareness of the need to develop, on behalf of the Council and on its instructions, the 
public relations action that I have embarked upon with my colleagues in the Secretariat-General and of 
my will to pursue it. 
By acting in this way, I can assure you that I am responding to the will ofthe governments of the 
seven member states as expressed at Council level. Further testimony to this is that the Council wishes a 
booklet to be prepared on the stages in the reactivation ofWestern European Union. This project is now 
being studied and should very soon be brought to fruition, thus forming a further element in the public 
relations effort. 
I trust that the information contained in this letter will meet the desire for information of you 
yourself, Sir Geoffrey, the Presidential Committee and the Assembly as a whole. 
(Signed) Alfred CAHEN 
Articles 
«La defense europeenne: perspectives nouvelles ouvertes par la reactivation de l'Union de !'Europe 
occidentale », pub lie dans L 'annuaire europeen, Vol. XXXIII, 1985, sous les auspices du Conseil de 
!'Europe, Strasbourg. 
« L'UEO pour quoi faire ? », publie dans Studia dip/omatica, Vol. XXXVIII, 1985, no 6, Bruxelles. 
« La cooperation politique europeenne et la securite », pub lie dans L 'Europe et la securite europeenne 
par le European Political Studies Group. 
"The WEU and NATO", publie dans Estrategia, no 1, printemps 1986, Lisbonne. 
« U n role nouveau pour l'UEO ? », publie dans L 'Europe en formation, numero special sur« L'Initiative 
de defense strategique : guerre ou paix des etoiles? », no 262 bis, hiver 1986, Paris. 
"Western European Union", published in NATO's Sixteen Nations of June 1986, volume 31, no 3. 
« Le processus d'integration europeenne et sa dimension de securite ; remarques introductives », publie 
dans Revue d'integration europeenne, 1986, IX, nos 2-3, Canada. 
"Relaunching Western European Union - Implications for the Atlantic Alliance", published in La 
Revue de /'OT AN, no 4, August 1986, Brussels. 
« Quelle place pour l'Union de !'Europe occidentale? », publie dans Le Monde At/antique, September 
1986, no 36, Brussels. 
«La cooperation politique europeenne et la securite », publie dans « Textes et Documents» - Col-
lection Idees et Etudes, 1986, no 334 du ministere des affaires etrangeres, Bruxelles. 
« L'Europe et «sa dimension securite »: l'heure est-elle venue?», publie dans Le Soir, 27 November 
1986. 
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"Possibilities for an Independent European Defence", publie dans Vite, 15 April 1987 (Congress Bro-
chure). 
«Dimension europeenne de la securite et solidarite atlantique - L'Union de !'Europe occidentale 
reactivee peut-elle rencontrer ces deux exigences?», publie par l'Agencia EFE, Madrid. 
« L'Europe et sa securite », publie dans La fibre Belgique, March 1987, Brussels. 
« La dimension europeenne de la securite : les experiences de la cooperation politique a Douze et de la 
reactivation de !'Union de l'Europe occidentale, » a publier dans Les melanges Gorielly, Bruxelles. 
« L'Europe et sa securite: le grand debat », publie dans La fibre Belgique, July 1987. 
"Western European Union- An essential part of the building of Europe", publie dans The European, 
September-October 1987, United Kingdom. 
"Why a reactivated Western European Union? What is Western European Union?" to be published in 
The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, United Kingdom. 
Conferences 
1985 
14 October - Brussels 
« Pourquoi l'UEO ? » a l'Institut royal de relations internationales. 
23 October- Brussels 
« L'IDS et l'UEO », colloque organise par le Centre d'etudes de defense. 
26-27 October - Lisbon 1 
« L'UEO et la securite europeenne » a l'Institut des etudes strategiques du Portugal. 
8 November - Brussels 
« Securite, relations Est-Ouest et identite europeenne » a Realites europeennes du present. 
10 November - Brussels 
« Le role de l'UEO dans le contexte de la construction europeenne et de la solidarite atlantique » 
(conference Olivaint). 
21 November- Brussels 
« Quel role pour l'UEO ? » a l'Institut royal de defense. 
6 December - Brussels 
« L'UEO et la construction europeenne », au Mouvement socialiste europeen. 
17 December - London 
" WEU : where is it going ? " au Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House. 
1986 
23 January - Bruges 
« Dimension europeenne de la defense », au College d'Europe. 
28 January- Madrid 
« L'UEO vue dans la perspective du processus de construction europeenne et de 1' Alliance 
atlantique » a l'Institut diplomatique de Madrid. 
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13 March -Liege 
« La securite de l'Europe, les technologies nouvelles et l'U nion de l'Europe occidentale » a Etudes 
et expansion. 
18 April- Monaco 
« La dimension europeenne de la securite » a 1' Academie de la paix. 
23 April- London 1 
« L'Union de l'Europe occidentale: problemes et perspectives», a l'International Institute for 
Strategic Studies. 
5 May- Paris 
« L'UEO », a la Maison de l'Europe de Paris et Foyer de rencontres internationales. 
16 May- Brussels 
« L'Europe et sa securite. QueUes options ? » a 1' American and Common Market Club. 
21 May- SHAPE 1 
« L'UEO dans l'Europe et dans !'Alliance atlantique », a !'Association des officiers du 
SHAPE. 
26 May- Lisbon 
"The Western European Union", a l'lnstitut de defense nationale. 
27 June - Rome 
« La securite europeenne et l'UEO », a l'Istituto affari internazionali. 
18 September - Leicester 
"Creating a European Defence Union: the role of WEU ", a l'Universite de Leicester. 
20 September - Brussels 
«La dimension securite dans l'Europe de demain », au Cercle du Champ de Mars. 
25 September - London 
"WEU, the European construction and the Atlantic solidarity", au Mid-Atlantic Club. 
9 October - Brussels 
"The security of Europe: challenges and options", a !'Association anglo-belge de Belgique. 
13-23 October- Etats-Unis 2 
Washington 
- Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs - Center for Strategic and International Studies 
- School of Advanced International Studies de l'Universite John Hopkins 
New York 
- Council on Foreign Affairs 
- Institute on Western Europe de l'Universite de Columbia 
Cincinnati 
- Council on World Affairs 
Boston 
- Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 
- Center for European Affairs et Center for International Affairs de l'Universite de Harvard. 
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Pittsburgh 
- World Affairs Council 
- University Center for International Studies de l'Universite de Pittsburgh. 
6 December - Toledo 
"Fora on discussion on Western Defence Policy", a l'Associacion de Periodistas Europeos. 
1987 
6 January- Rome 
" European unification and the European security dimension ", au College de defense de l'OTAN. 
10 April - Brussels 
« Perspectives de l'UEO », a la Maison de l'Europe a Bruxelles. 
23 May- Amersfoort 
"WEU en het Europese Veiligheidsbeleid in het kader van de Atlantische solidariteit" pour 
Stichting Vredespolitiek (SVP). 
15 June- The Hague 
"Europees Veiligheidsbeleid na Reykjavik" pour Young Europeans for security. 
30 June - London 1 
« L'Europe et sa securite : a quoi sert l'UEO ? », a la Belgo-Luxembourg Chamber of com-
merce. 
3 September - Steyning 
"The contribution of WEU to the defence of Europe", a Wilton Park Conferences. 
11 September - Cambridge 
"The WEU and the European arms cooperation process", a la Standing Conference of Atlantic 
Organizations. 
25 September - Brussels 
" The security of Europe in the framework of an evolving transatlantic relationship - what role 
for the WEU? ", au Centre for European Policy Studies. 
18 October - Bocholt 
" International organizations and the defence of Europe : the role of the WEU in arms pro-
curement and control", au Europa Institut Bocholt pour Young Europeans for security. 
23 October- Maastricht 
"Western Europe's quest for security: a 'Third Force' or a viable partner?", a l'Institut europeen 
d'administration publique. 
28 October - Utrecht 
"De rol van de gereactiveerde WEU ", a la Utrechtse Studentenvereniging voor Internationale 
Betrekkingen. 
25 November - Bonn 
"Die WEU im Dienst Europas und der Atlantischen Solidaritat ",a la Deutsche Gesellschaft fur 
auswartige Politik. 
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28 November- London 
"The revival of Western European Union and the process of European integration", au 
European Movement. 
11 December - Brussels 
«La dimension europeenne de la politique de securite » a la table ronde du Groupe d'etudes 
politiques europeennes de la Fondation universitaire. 
14 December- Newcastle upon Tyne 
"The emergence and the role of the WEU ", au Fulbright Colloquium, a l'Universite de New-
castle. 
Forthcoming conferences in 1988 
4 January - Rome 
« L'unification europeenne et la dimension de la securite europeenne », au College de defense de 
l'OTAN. 
12 January - Brussels 
« Etat actuel des efforts pour une reforme de l'UEO », a l'Union europeenne democrate 
chretienne et au Parti populaire europeen. 
11 February- Birmingham 
A l'International Affairs Society de l'Universite de Birmingham. 
26 February- Dayton (Ohio)2 
A un symposium sur les relations Est-Ouest organise par l'Universite de Dayton. 
13-16 March - Washington 2 
"WEU and West European perspectives on strategic and theater defence" pour un colloque 
marquant le cinquieme anniversaire de l'IDS organise par !'Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. 
I. Although the title appearing on this list is in French, the conference was given in English. 
2. Due to the limitations of the WEU budget, the cost of the round trip London-United States-London and expenses, was borne 
by the organisations which had invited me to speak. 
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Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges 2 
by Sir Geoflrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFf DECISION 
on the revision of Rules 33, 34, 40, 48 and 51 of the Rules of Procedure 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur 
1. Adopted in committee by 14 votes to 0 with l abstention. 
1st March 1988 
2. Members of the committee: Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (Chairman); Mr. Lacour (Vice-Chairman); MM. Andre (Alternate: Bohl), 
Antretter, Bordu, Caccia (Alternate: Stegagnim), Cerexhe, Filetti (Alternate: Fassino), Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Mr. Jessel, Lord 
Kirkhill, MM. Maris (Alternate: van der Sanden), Pasquino, Pecriaux, Scheer, von Schmude (Alternate: Niegel), Sirgue, Stoffelen, 
Thompson, Taramelli, Unland. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
30 
DOCUMENT 1133 
Draft Decision 
on the revision of Rules 33, 34, 40, 48 and 51 of the Rules of Procedure 
The Assembly 
DECIDES 
To amend Rules 33, 34, 40, 48 and 51 as follows: 
1. Rule 33 
At the beginning of paragraph 1, leave out" The Assembly shall vote by sitting and standing" and 
insert "The Assembly shall vote by show of hands". 
2. Rule 34 
Replace sub-paragraph (a) by the following text: 
" on the one hand, for the adoption of amendments to the Charter, for the adoption of a motion 
to disagree to the annual report or to any part of the report or for the adoption of a request for 
urgent procedure without prior reference to committee and, on the other hand, for acceptance of a 
draft budget that does not conform with the Council's opinion: a number of representatives or 
substitutes equal to more than half the number of representatives to the Assembly; " 
3. Rule 40 
At the end of paragraph 4 (b), add: 
"However, even if this quorum is not obtained, the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi-
leges may vote on a report as a whole provided all the national delegations are represented and 
there is no opposition when the vote is taken. " 
4. Rule 48 
At the end of paragraph 3, add "which shall express a prior opinion". 
Add the following new paragraphs after paragraph 3: 
" 4. When the prior opinion of the Council includes reductions in appropriations, the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs and Administration may, in consultation with the Presidential Committee, 
present a draft budget to the Assembly which does not conform with the prior opinion of the 
Council. Acceptance of such a draft budget shall require the votes of a number of representatives 
or substitutes equal to more than half the number of representatives to the Assembly. 
5. If the Council refuses to adopt the draft budget accepted by the Assembly in these conditions, 
the Presidential Committee shall be responsible for settling the dispute with the Council and ask 
for a joint meeting to this end. The Presidential Committee shall report to the Assembly on the 
results of any such meeting and, if necessary, propose that it ratify whatever action it had to take, 
including acceptance of the budget as amended by the Council. " 
Renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly. 
5. Rule 51 
Insert a new paragraph 1: 
" The Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges may at any time consider the expediency 
of revising the Rules ofProcedure. At its request, the Presidential Committee shall include in the 
agenda of the Assembly a report by the committee on the revision of the Rules of Pro-
cedure." 
Former paragraph 1 becomes paragraph 2, the first sentence being drafted as follows: 
" Furthermore, motions for decisions to amend the Rules of Procedure may be tabled by ten or 
more representatives. " 
Renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
Rule 33 
1. The introduction of voting cards allows 
the Assembly to vote clearly without resorting to 
the irksome procedure of sitting and standing. It 
is thus possible to bring the Rules of Procedure 
of the WEU Assembly into line with those ofthe 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
Rules 34 and 48 
2. The proposal to amend the Charter tabled 
by Mr. Pannella and others allows a dialogue to 
be organised between the Council and the 
Assembly in the context of procedure for 
adopting the draft budget of the Assembly and, 
in the event of disagreement, strengthens the lat-
ter's authority by stressing the value the majority 
of members of the Assembly attach to main-
taining appropriations included in the budget. 
3. However, the Assembly cannot obtain 
appropriations without the agreement of the 
Council. It should therefore be specified that the 
draft budget is accepted, not adopted, by the 
Assembly, since the Assembly's vote is not an 
enforceable decision. Consequently, the provi-
sions of Article VIII of the Charter should be 
retained. It is Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure 
that should be amended. 
4. Because the Assembly may make transfers 
not only between sub-heads but also, in the 
context of its budgetary autonomy, between 
heads of its budget not relating to permanent 
staff, if the Assembly wishes to demonstrate its 
disagreement with reductions made by the 
Council, a vote by roll-call should be taken on 
the initial draft budget as a whole (the only way 
to show that there is an absolute majority) rather 
than only on the sub-heads including appropria-
tions modified by the Council. 
5. After an absolute majority of the Assembly 
has accepted a draft budget that maintains 
credits refused by the Council, procedure for set-
tling disputes should be introduced. It is the 
Presidential Committee that should be respon-
sible for asking for a joint meeting with the 
Council to negotiate a solution likely to meet the 
Assembly's requests. 
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Rule 37 
6. The purpose of the motion tabled by Mr. 
Pannella and others is to form a joint group of all 
representatives and substitutes who do not 
belong to a political group. Inter alia, this group 
would share the funds now divided between four 
political groups. Conversely, it would be repre-
sented on the Presidential Committee not by a 
de jure member but by two observers without the 
right to vote. 
7. The aim of political groups is to 
co-ordinate the action and representation of the 
ideas of parliamentarians who share certain 
political views. A heterogeneous group such as 
the one proposed could ensure neither 
co-ordination nor representation, nor could any 
members selected be sure of being able to rep-
resent the group's views or agree to any 
decision. 
8. However, the Presidential Committee, 
before taking a decision concerning members of 
the Assembly as a whole, whatever their political 
tendencies, consults in an adequate manner an 
appropriate number of representatives belonging 
or not belonging to a political group. This would 
meet the democratic requirement that allows all 
tendencies in the Assembly to make themselves 
heard. 
Rule 40 
9. It is proposed to facilitate the adoption of 
basically technical amendments to the Rules of 
Procedure that are endorsed by all the delega-
tions or arouse no opposition, all the delegations 
being represented. 
Rule 51 
10. It appeared necessary to complete the pro-
visions of the Rules of Procedure on amend-
ments to the Rules of Procedure. At present, the 
most current practice is to include in the agenda 
of the Assembly a report on the amendment of 
the Rules of Procedure at the request ofthe com-
mittee concerned. 
Document 1134 22nd March 1988 
PETITION I 
from Mr. Hintermann, former Assistant Secretary-General of WEV, 
to Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly 
(Rule 46 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly) 
Paris, 25th February 1988 
I the undersigned, Eric HINTERMANN, former Assistant Secretary-General of Western 
European Union, domiciled at 95, rue des Morillons, 75015 Paris, have the honour to submit the 
petition "Ten proposals for WEU" in accordance with Rule 46 of the Rules of Procedure of WEU. 
The aim of this petition, after having examined the working of WEU, is to make a group of pro-
posals to make this European organisation, the only one responsible for defence matters, more efficient 
and offer it important prospects in the framework of its task which is to" encourage the progressive inte-
gration of Europe " in its own area. 
Having served WEU for more than five years and being deeply attached to its European aims, I 
thought it was my duty to make proposals in a constructive spirit and to submit them for debate. 
Mr. Charles GOERENS, 
President of the Assembly 
of Western European Union 
Eric HINTERMANN 
Message to the WEU Assembly 
Ten proposals for Western European Union 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I am 
addressing this petition - ten proposals for 
Western European Union - to you as a citizen 
and a European who has recovered his freedom 
after five years of high-level responsibilities in 
WEU as Assistant Secretary-General, Vice-Chair-
man and Head of the international secretariat of 
the Standing Armaments Committee, Director of 
the Agency for Armaments Development and 
Co-operation and finally as Co-ordinating 
Director of the agencies for disarmament studies, 
security and co-operation. 
I am doing this because of my European 
conviction and with a view to being useful to 
WEU. Such an experience must contribute to the 
unification of Europe, in particular its security 
dimension, where WEU is the only organisation 
now having responsibilities. It can be placed at 
the service of parliamentarians members of the 
Assembly of Western European Union with a 
view to making the organis~tion more efficient 
and important throughout Europe and the 
West. 
The WEU crisis 
I chose to address myself to the Assembly 
because the parliamentarians have shown how 
interested they were in the future of WEU. The 
Assembly can play a decisive role in removing 
WEU from the deadlock in which its executive, 
the Permanent Council, is in the process of 
enclosing itself. 
WEU is indeed in a state of crisis without 
its own parliamentarians being informed. Instead 
of tackling the major problems of Europe's 
security, at a time when the politico-strategic 
environment is changing, the Permanent Council 
is joyously devoting itself to permanent bureau-
cratic restructuring and endless clashes over the 
place of collocation. 
I. This petition was declared in order and referred to the General Affairs Committee. 
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Is it known that, meeting right in the 
'middle of the Reagan-Gorbachev summit 
meeting, the Permanent Council did not spend 
one second discussing Europe's role and 
security? It spent its time discussing how to 
reduce the staff in WEU's Paris office and sack 
its officials! 
At a time when Western Europe's security 
should be the subject of in-depth reflection 
among Europeans, those mostly concerned by 
" discriminate deterrence " and other forms of 
American " decoupling " being considered on the 
other side of the Atlantic, the Permanent Council 
deliberately struck a blow at WEU's Paris office 
and the organisation's three study agencies res-
ponsible respectively for disarmament, security 
and co-operation in armaments matters. 
The Permanent Council having decided 
on 18th December 1987 to put an end on 31st 
December 1987 to the duties of the directors of 
the Paris study agencies, WEU's Paris office is 
now without a head apart from the " correspon-
dents " chosen by the Secretary-General in 
London. The agencies are given no more tasks as 
if London did not wish to give them any work so 
that they can then say that they are doing 
nothing. 
A twofold blockage 
Above all, WEU has no great European 
ambition at a point in history at which the non-
existence of a united Europe at security level -
its division goes as far as its concepts of its 
defence, armaments and disarmament - is 
allowing the United States and the Soviet Union 
to decide on its fate in its absence. Is it right to 
hold a meeting of ministers for foreign affairs 
and defence in The Hague in April without any 
plans of importance in order to settle WEU's 
internal organisational problems that the Per-
manent Council has not been able to solve? The 
role now imposed on WEU by certain authorities 
is one of mediocrity. 
These five years of high-level responsibil-
ities have led me to the conclusion that WEU is 
suffering from a twofold blockage on two dif-
ferent levels: the absence of European political 
will and inefficient executive structures. The aim 
of this petition is to find a remedy by proposing 
on the one hand more efficient structures and on 
the other major European political goals. This 
step is being taken in a positive spirit. 
1. A new Council 
The first proposal is to change the compo-
sition of the Permanent Council, the WEU exec-
utive that has its seat in London. It consists at 
present, apart from a United Kingdom Under-
Secretary at the Foreign Office, of member coun-
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tries' ambassadors to London. These are gen-
erally remarkable diplomats. That is not the 
problem. But they are overburdened with 
bilateral questions. They do not have time to 
spare for WEU. Nor do their governments give 
them the necessary authority to take decisions. 
It took them a whole year, for lack of 
instructions, to accept our proposal to transmit 
to the Assembly, in a declassified form, our study 
on defence policy and the Japanese armaments 
industry. They have been placed in the position 
of having to hold lengthy discussions on the 
status of a chauffeur, etc. 
It should be noted that in the present dis-
cussions on structures no mention is made ofthe 
Permanent Council. Yet it is here that the most 
serious operating problems arise. If the Council 
had shown the slightest interest in serious things, 
this petition would have been addressed to it and 
it alone. In the present context, this text would 
have been immediately buried like all the 
others. 
In five years as Assistant Secretary-
General, we did not once manage, in spite of 
numerous attempts, to hold an in-depth dis-
cussion to advance Europe's defence dimension, 
for instance through co-operation in the arma-
ments sector. 
That is why the Secretary-General, Mr. 
Alfred Cahen, former Political Director at the 
Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, introduced 
meetings of representatives from the capitals. 
The only document of importance drawn 
up by WEU, the security platform adopted in 
The Hague in October 1987, was a result of these 
intergovernmental meetings. 
Our proposal is that the Permanent 
Council should henceforth be composed of those 
responsible for WEU in the ministries for foreign 
affairs of member countries. If one really thinks 
about it, this solution has only advantages. These 
very senior officials, being by definition the best 
informed of national policies towards WEU, 
would be capable of taking decisions and finding 
compromises between delegations. The Council 
would rediscover its prerogatives, now lost where 
the major files are concerned to make way for 
intergovernmental missions. Moreover, there is 
nothing to prevent political directors or their 
assistants replacing those responsible for WEU 
from the ministries for foreign affairs if a 
Council meeting were to be held at a higher level. 
Since the enhanced Council would take on the 
political executive role, the Assembly for its part 
could exercise its supervisory powers. Finally, 
the formula proposed is not as expensive as 
would be the appointment of ambassadors 
responsible solely for WEU on the lines of the 
representatives to the Atlantic Alliance. 
2. A political secretary-general 
The second proposal concerns the Secre-
tary -General. 
Since with its present structure the 
Secretariat-General has no authority, the Per-
manent Council administers in its place. Fur-
thermore without invoking the persons them-
selves who are remarkable, the appointment of amba~sadors to the Secretariat-General does not 
give political authority to the function. The Sec-
retary-General is reduced to bein~ an .ambas-
sador meeting among his peers. It Is as If some 
were afraid of a strong personality taking over in 
the Secretariat-General and, by so doing, 
ensuring that Western European Union had 
influence. 
Our proposal is that the Secretariat-
General of WEU should henceforth be assumed 
by a political personality. This is already ~he case 
in NATO and the European Commumties. The 
two organisations and the governments have had 
no reason to complain. 
It would be logical for WEU to be placed 
on the same level. It must hold a certain rank 
among the Atlantic and European organisa-
tions. 
From the point of view of the running of 
WEU the Secretariat-General could, if it were 
given' sufficient authority, effectively administ~r 
the organisation. It is in the greatest need oft~Is. 
The Council for its part would stop devotmg 
itself(badly) to administration in order to devote 
itself (well) to the major problems of Europe's 
security. 
3. The Standing Armaments Committee 
The third proposal is to bring back !nto 
operation the Standing Armaments Committee 
that has its seat in Paris since WEU cannot 
expect to fill the space reserved _for Europe's 
defence while showing no interest m the means 
necessary for its defence. 
Yet, since September 1985 the Council has 
condemned the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee to inaction in spite of our repeated 
requests to meet, backed by a~ agenda. V!e were 
forbidden to convene a meetmg. Knowmg how 
interested the Assembly was in this body, on 
17th November 1986 the Council answered 
Written Question 271 as follows:" The SAC will 
meet in the not too distant future. " 
Would it not have been more elegant and 
honest to tell the parliamentarians that no 
meeting was planned, thus provoking a debate 
which might have allowed the latter to express 
their opinions? 
The Standing Armaments Com~it~~e is the 
only European body with responsibihty for 
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co-operation which has the benefit of a li~k with 
parliamentarians. The Liaison Subcommittee on 
the joint production of armam.ents allows the 
Standing Armaments Corp.mittee to .hold 
meetings with parliamentarians duly appomted 
for this purpose by the WEU Assembly. 
From the simple point of view of 
democracy, it is important fel)r parliamen~arians 
to be associated with developments m co-
operation in the armaments sector. Is it not 
logical for co-operation to be debated by the only 
European assembly with responsibility for 
defence matters? There should also be links 
between the WEU Standing Armaments Com-
mittee and the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group which is comp~sed ~f all the 
member countries of the Atlantic Alhance. In 
this way, the parliamentarians could be !nf~rmed 
of developments in European co-operatiOn m the 
widest sense. 
4. Agencies to carry out high-level studies 
The fourth proposal is that the agenc~es 
responsible for studying disarm~ment, secunty 
and co-operation in WEU's Pans offic~ should 
start work again in order to promote high-level 
European thinking on all .. Europe's . defence 
problems in the new pohtico-strategtc envi-
ronment. 
WEU's Paris agencies had great merit. 
They managed to produce forty-four stud~es af~er 
their creation on 1st January 1986 covenng dis-
armament the trend of the threat, resource man-
agement, 'technology transfe_rs, .technological 
policy a review of co-operatiOn m the arma-
ments' sector, etc., in spite of the incessant 
obstacles placed in their way. For lack of una-
nimity in the Permanent Co~ncil, ~he agency o~ 
co-operation even had to wait for Its tasks untll 
November 1986, ten months after it was set up! 
The agencies were ill- ~nd under-used. The 
agency on disarmament had to sp~nd months 
recording Soviet declarations on disarmament. 
Since it was led by a remarkable man, a former 
chief-of-staff of the Italian alillly and former mil-
itary attache in Moscow, it could have used his 
talent and that of his staff to propose European 
concepts on disarmament. The a.genCJ: . on 
security proposed to conduct a pubhc opmwn 
poll on Europeans and defence. This ~as r~fused. 
The third proposed that co-operatwn m the 
armaments sector should start at the research 
stage. It contacted industrialists in sec~ors of high 
technoloogy in the European countnes. It was 
told to proceed no further. 
The studies were intended for govern-
ments. Some of them should be transmitted to 
the Assembly in a declassified form. They were 
usually filed away, in spite of our l?roposals. To 
make things easier, we voluntanly produced 
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studies, such as the review of armaments 
co-operation and the study of technological pol-
icies in member countries, without classification. 
To no avail! The parliamentarians will have no 
possibility of debating them before European 
public opinion. 
Let us take an example to show the use-
fulness of transferring certain studies to the 
Assembly. The agency for the development of 
armaments co-operation produced the first 
review of co-operation since 1954. Would it not 
have been useful to have a wide-ranging debate 
between the parliamentarians of member coun-
tries on this review? If it had been considered 
weak from the standpoint of member countries' 
total production of armaments or in comparison 
with requirements, such a discussion would have 
helped to induce governments and public 
opinion to give impetus to co-operation. This 
example shows how the study agencies and the 
Assembly could be complementary in the ser-
vices they render Europe. 
Finally, ifWEU intends to play its full role 
in concerting the positions of European countries 
in order to achieve a consensus on the various 
defence problems, it will need preparatory high-
level thinking. Produced by experts from 
member countries, working together in a 
European spirit, the studies on disarmament, 
security and co-operation in armaments matters 
would help the rise of WEU. They would raise 
the level of the organisation and propel it into 
the future. 
5. Collocation if possible 
The fifth proposal is that WEU, now 
divided between two capitals, London and Paris, 
should if possible be collocated. 
Everyone agrees on the principle, be it the 
governments or the Assembly. Conversely, there 
is complete disagreement on the choice of a city: 
Paris on the one hand, Brussels on the other. 
Paris has the advantage of being the 
capital of a country very favourable to WEU, of 
being the seat of the Assembly whose authority 
would be enhanced by its proximity to the 
Secretariat-General and of offering the most eco-
nomical solution. The organisation's present pre-
mises, where there are many empty offices, could 
easily accommodate staff now in London. 
Is the advantage of Brussels, proposed 
because the Belgian capital is the seat of both 
NATO and the European Communities, not 
rather a disadvantage? Squashed in between 
these two " monsters ", little WEU, already 
weakened by its present crisis, would have 
obvious difficulties in surviving. Its absorption 
by NATO would run counter to the affirmation 
of a European Europe, of Europe as the second 
pillar of the alliance. Is this the aim sought? 
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However this may be, the question of col-
location has assumed too much importance. It 
has reached the point of dominating present dis-
cussions in WEU to such an extent that it is 
paralysing the entire organisation. It is dividing 
countries instead of uniting them. It is concen-
trating attention on a single point. WEU must 
have more important aims than restructuring. 
If collocation were to prove impossible, it 
would be better to accept the situation as it has 
been since 1954, with WEU based partly in 
London and partly in Paris. Multinational firms 
work perfectly well on several continents. It is 
hard to see why WEU could not do so on each 
side of the Channel. It has done so since 1954 
without problem. 
6. Enlarging WEU 
The sixth proposal is that WEU should be 
enlarged to include European countries which 
accept the modified Brussels Treaty instituting it 
and the European platform of October 1987. 
Portugal has officially applied for mem-
bership, Spain unofficially and other countries, 
such as Norway, are pondering on the matter. To 
date, WEU has given them dilatory answers 
which are in the long run detrimental to the rise 
of the organisation. 
No one is taken in by the flippancy of the 
answer that WEU must first be restructured. The 
first effect of a country's accession would, 
moreover, be to force WEU to change its 
organogram to make room for nationals of that 
country. 
WEU's refusal to expand has created 
unnecessary tension between the seven member 
countries and the other European countries 
which together belong to the Independent 
European Programme Group (IEPG) and the 
Atlantic Alliance. If WEU were to show drive 
and openness, Europe would admittedly be 
moving at several speeds from a defence point of 
view. The dynamism of the countries the most 
determined to unify Europe would prevail as 
always. Progressively, WEU, the IEPG and 
Eurogroup, without forgetting FINABEL, would 
cover the same nations. This is the goal to be 
attained. Once gathered together, the European 
defence organisation would become a pillar of 
the alliance on the same basis as the United 
States. Everything starts with the enlargement of 
WEU. 
7. Think disarmament 
The seventh proposal is that Europeans 
use the framework of WEU - the only one 
available - to reflect on disarmament which 
should not be a matter exclusively for the United 
States and the Soviet Union. 
How could this old continent, so often 
devastated by war, lose interest in disarmament? 
And do not the conditions for disarmament 
concern Europe to the highest degree? It was 
quite clear during the Reagan-Gorbachev 
summit meetings in Reykjavik and then in 
Washington: Europe is at the hub of discus-
sions. 
Because of its geographical position, 
Europe necessarily has areas of security that are 
not exactly the same as those of the United 
States. We will endorse these words of President 
Mitterrand: " Europe must not be a silent witness 
and the passive stake in East-West relations. 
Europe's personality must be expressed strongly, 
if only because Europe's security interests can be 
only imperfectly identified with those of the two 
blocs confronting each other. " 1 
Europe is, however, in a stupefying state of 
unpreparedness vis-a-vis the various arms limi-
tation options that concern it. This is because it 
has until now - and this includes WEU - bowed 
to American pressure. For instance, the WEU 
study agencies did not tackle the fundamental 
problems of disarmament in Europe although 
one of them was specifically responsible for 
doing so. Europe urgently needs to define a dis-
armament philosophy of its own in relation with 
its security requirements. 
WEU must serve at one and the same time 
the aims of detente and security in Europe. The 
two are as closely linked as the two sides of a 
coin. 
8. Think security 
The eighth proposal is that WEU should 
give continuous thought to the facts of European 
security in the new politico-strategic envi-
ronment. 
The Americans have reached a point that 
General de Gaulle described as follows to Pres-
ident Dwight Eisenhower: " You, Eisenhower, 
you would wage nuclear war for Europe because 
you know the interests that are at stake. But as 
and when the Soviet Union develops its ability 
to strike the cities ofNorth America, one of your 
successors will undertake to wage nuclear war 
only in order to counter an attack of the same 
kind against North America. " 2 
New American concepts, including " dis-
criminate deterrence", confirm the view of that 
great European. " Decoupling " was already in 
transatlantic minds where strategic nuclear 
weapons were concerned. The Americans quite 
I. Francois Mitterrand, interview on East German television 
on 6th January 1988. quoted in Le Monde. 8th January, 
page 5. 
2. Quoted b) Yernon :\. Waiters m .. Services D1screts ", 
Pion, page 256. 
37 
DOCUMENT 1134 
naturally think first of their own security in a 
world in which they exercise global responsibil-
ities not confined to Europe. 
As the United States establishes a new 
balance in the direction of the Pacific because of 
its population, investment and trade, it feels 
Europe to be the part of the world in which there 
are the most risks. It is the only area where a con-
flict can degenerate and rise to the extremes. It 
must therefore be kept within limits that make 
any escalation impossible. This paves the way 
for political blackmail by the Soviet Union 
because of its conventional superiority and geo-
graphical proximity. 
In the recent Ikle-Wohlstetter report, 
Europe appears to be merely an object and not 
an actor in a policy in which Japan and China 
are hailed as the rising powers. 
Europe will exist when it is united, 
including its security dimension. WEU offers an 
appropriate framework for reflection. 
9. Think armaments co-operation 
The ninth proposal is for WEU to give 
decisive impetus to co-operation in the arma-
ments sector. 
In this respect, the decisions taken by the 
ministers for foreign affairs and defence in Bonn 
and Rome have remained a dead letter. 
The existence of a European armaments 
industry is a fundamental necessity, not only 
because it creates employment and industrial 
activity and makes regions live. It avoids having 
to spend defence budgets abroad. It facilitates the 
adoption of military budgets. It contributes to 
the spirit of defence. 
It ensures the maintenance of an industrial 
and technological base in Europe. Europe's 
future depends on the existence of advanced 
technology on its territory. If it had to depend on 
the outside world, its industrial base, the life of 
the regions and employment would be affected. 
Without the most sophisticated technology for 
military purposes, it would be weakened in the 
concert of nations. 
" The paradox of Europe these days is that 
it invented science and is spending twice as 
much on research and development as Japan, 
but it is still lagging in the high-technology race 
to the future ... it is not thinking on the scale of 
the world, let alone the continent. " 3 Its national 
frontiers jeopardise its growth. This is particu-
larly true in the armaments sector where Europe 
remains more partitioned off than in civil 
sectors. 
3. James Reston, International Herald Tribune, lstJune 1987. 
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Decisive mttlattves are necessary: 
co-operation at the research stage, establishment 
of a common armaments market, cross-parti-
cipation between industries across frontiers, 
etc. 
WEU, which groups countries with a com-
parable level of development, is certainly the 
best placed to start this process even if it then has 
to be extended as quickly as possible to other 
European nations. 
10. A European political will 
My whole is a European political will. 
Without it WEU reforms would serve no purpose. 
Europe is moving towards economic unifi-
cation even if it is having difficulties. At political 
level, Europeans elect their parliament, even if 
its powers and audience are limited. In the 
defence area, that of WEU, it is stagnating and 
falling behind. At this rate, the European edifice 
will resemble a building without a facade. 
Europe is mainly preparing for the " great 
market " of 1992. But can it be just a commercial 
area? Would it be this, moreover, if it did not 
include armaments? 
Europe's inexistence at defence level is 
most alarming at a decisive time in history when 
the United States and the Soviet Union are set-
tling, as far as possible bilaterally, without 
Europe, the fate of the world. 
If Europe is just a vast common market, 
without real political structure or military unity, 
it cannot influence world developments. It is 
consulted as a matter of form but plays no real 
part in defining the new peace being worked out 
between East and West. This will continue as 
long as Europe is composed of different rival 
nations. 
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How much weight does Western Europe 
carry today in the Middle East, the source of its 
energy supplies, or in Afghanistan, where the 
rights of human beings and a nation are being 
violated by the Soviet occupant, to take two 
examples on different levels? 
A European Community is not con-
ceivable at economic level alone. Have we ever 
seen a federation of peoples be independent and 
master of its own destiny, including its economy, 
without having the means of defending itself? 
The great historian Fernand Braudel said: 
" Europe cannot really be built culturally unless 
there is a political framework, unless there is a 
European government, unless there is a 
European parliament with wide powers, unless 
there is joint European defence. "4 
In their wisdom, those who drafted the 
birth certificate of WEU, the modified Brussels 
Treaty, signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954, 
specified in the preamble that the high con-
tracting parties were resolved " to promote the 
unity and to encourage the progressive inte-
gration of Europe". Thirty-three years have now 
passed without WEU doing anything to this end. 
Without common European political will, 
WEU is just a poor little shrunken territory 
offered up to national rivalries. That is the 
reason for its present crisis. Inspired by a great 
European ambition, enlarged WEU could play a 
major role in the unification of Europe by con-
tributing its defence dimension. Thirty-three 
years after being created, it is time it devoted itself 
to the "progressive integration of Europe". 
It is because we have a passion for Europe 
that we submit to the parliamentarians and gov-
ernments and, beyond them, public opinion, 
these ten proposals for WEU. 
4. Le Monde, 13th December 1983. 
Document 1135 
Impact of the WEU Assembly's activities 
on parliaments and public opinion 
REPORT' 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations 2 
by Mr. Chenard, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
27th April 1988 
DRAFT ORDER 
on the impact of the WEU Assembly's activities on parliaments and public opinion 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Chenard, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
11. The role of WEU in the work of national parliaments 
(i) National committees and the WEU Assembly 
(ii) Use of WEU Assembly reports in the political activities of parliaments 
(iii) National delegation information reports on Assembly sessions 
(iv) Use of the orange booklet in national parliaments 
(v) Requests for information on WEU in national parliaments 
Ill. Action taken in parliaments on texts adopted by the WEU Assembly 
IV. Special information action taken in member parliaments by the Committee for 
Parliamentary and Public Relations 
V. Public relations activities of the WEU Council and Secretariat-General 
VI. Conclusions 
APPENDICES 
I. Questionnaire for secretaries of national delegations 
11. Order 44 on national parliaments and the WEU Assembly 
Ill. Resolution 78 on public information activities on security and defenoe matters 
in WEU member countries 
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Lady Jill Knight (Chairman); Mr. Tummers (Vice-Chairman); MM. Buchner, Burger. de 
Chambrun, De Bondt, De Hoop Scheffer (Alternate: Worrell), Faulds (Alternate: She/ton), Fiandrotti, Mrs. Fischer (Alternate: 
Lenzer), Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, MM. Salvi (Alternate: Caccia), Seitlinger (Alternate: Chenard), Vreven. 
N.B. The names of those takmg part in the vote are printed in italics. 
39 
DOCUMENT 1135 
The Assembly, 
Draft Order 
on the impact of the WEU Assembly's activities 
on parliaments and public opinion 
(i) Recalling Order 44 and Resolution 78; 
(ii) Welcoming the special information action taken by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public 
Relations in all member parliaments; 
(iii) Concerned, however, at the persisting difficulty of adequately following up the work of the 
Assembly in member countries, even at a time· when the importance of WEU is growing, 
INSTRUCTS ITS COMMITTEE FOR PARLIAMENTARY AND PuBLIC RELATIONS 
1. By establishing contact with national delegations, to ensure that national parliamentary com-
mittees responsible for matters handled by the Assembly accord greater attention to its reports; 
2. In permanent co-operation with national delegations, to encourage more representatives to speak 
in their parliaments on the basis of texts adopted; 
INVITES ALL ITS COMMITTEES 
1. To apply scrupulously Rule 39(2) of the Rules of Procedure ofthe Assembly by examining action 
taken on texts adopted on the basis of their reports; 
2. To draft their reports so that they may be easily used in debates at national level. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Chenard, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. When the WEU Assembly was set up by 
the modified Brussels Treaty, the contracting 
parties were aware that WEU's responsibilities 
were squarely within areas where member states 
still had full sovereignty. No consideration was 
therefore given to forming the Assembly of 
members elected by direct universal suffrage at 
European level, the signatory countries pre-
ferring it to consist of members of their parlia-
ments. 
2. Furthermore, in Article IX of the treaty, 
the contracting parties provided that the 
Assembly would be composed of representatives 
of the Brussels Treaty powers to the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 
which has no security or defence responsibilities. 
This does not facilitate the formation of national 
delegations or the task of members who must 
follow up the work of the WEU Assembly. 
3. At the information meeting organised by 
the Committee for Parliamentary and Public 
Relations at the Second Chamber of the States-
General in The Hague on 23rd February 1988, a 
Netherlands member of the North Atlantic 
Assembly asked what influence WEU Assembly 
recommendations had on decisions taken by 
ministers who are members of the Council. This 
question went straight to the heart of the 
problem since recommendations addressed to 
the WEU Council can be effective and influence 
governments only if there is pressure at the 
national parliamentary level. 
4. In view of the importance of parlia-
mentary participation in crucial decisions on 
security and defence matters in a democratic 
European system, it must constantly be shown 
that the current system for forming the WEU 
Assembly, even if not ideal, nevertheless ensures 
that its activities are followed up effectively 
through political action in member countries and 
that it exercises a direct influence on government 
decisions. If that is not so, we must not be sur-
prised if questions are put about the Assembly's 
effectiveness. 
5. In the present report, therefore, a detailed 
examination will be made of the technical and 
political conditions in which the work of the 
WEU Assembly can be included in the process of 
reflection and decision by those politically 
responsible for defence and security matters in 
Western European countries. To this end, a ques-
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tionnaire was sent to national delegations on 
27th January 1988 1• 
II. The role of WEU in the work 
of national parliaments 
(i) National committees and the WEU Assembly 
6. Undeniably, much of the dialogue between 
parliaments and governments on foreign policy 
- and particularly security and defence policy -
takes place at meetings of the appropriate 
national committees. Matters of interest to WEU 
are handled mainly by the foreign affairs and 
defence committees and, more rarely, other com-
mittees. Without underestimating the impor-
tance of other national committees, it must be in 
the interests of the WEU Assembly's work for a 
large number of members of national delegations 
to the Assembly to be represehted on the foreign 
affairs and/or defence committees of member 
parliaments. 
7. Members of the WEU Assembly are now 
represented in the abovementioned committees 
as follows: 
Represen- Represen- Represen-
Seats tatlon tattOO talion 
mWEU in national in national m the two 
Assembly oretgn affitirs defence committees 
committee committee combmed 
Belgium ....... 14 11 9 20 
(Senate and 
Chamber) 
France ........ 36 11 3 14 
(National 
Assembly 
and Senate) 
Federal Republic 
of Germany ... 36 20 8 28 
(Bundestag) 
Italy .......... 36 13 4 17 
(Chamber 
and Senate) 
Luxembourg ... 6 2 2 4 
(Chamber) 
Netherlands ... 14 9 7 16 
(First and 
Second 
Chambers) 
United Kingdom 36 0 1 1 
(House of 
Commons) 
l. See Appendix I. 
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8. This table shows that members of the 
WEU Assembly are best represented in national 
committees in Belgium and the Netherlands. 
Conversely, in the House of Commons, the 
United Kingdom Delegation has only one 
member in the Defence Committee and is not 
represented in the Foreign Affairs Committee. 
However, the situation in the United Kingdom is 
rather different to that in other parliaments since 
the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committees 
have only eleven members each and it is not pos-
sible to belong to both committees at the same 
time. 
9. In parliaments where members of the 
WEU Assembly are well represented in the 
foreign affairs and defence committees, account 
must also be taken ofthe proportion of members 
of the WEU Assembly compared with the total 
number of members of those committees. Three 
examples may be quoted: 
- In the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee 
has seventy-four titular members and 
alternates, including twenty members of 
the German Delegation to the WEU 
Assembly, which is a satisfact~ry per-
centage. But the proportion is less 
favourable in the Defence Committee, 
which has fifty-eight titular members 
and alternates, only eight of whom, 
however, are members of the dele-
gation. 
- In the Netherlands, the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the Second Chamber now 
has forty-seven titular members and 
alternates, of whom five are members of 
the delegation. In the First Chamber, 
the corresponding committee has 
twenty-four titular members and alter-
nates of whom four are members of the 
delegation. 
The Defence Committee of the Second 
Chamber has forty-six titular members 
and alternates, two of whom are 
members of the delegation, while the 
corresponding committee of the First 
Chamber has twenty-four titular 
members and alternates, three of whom 
are members of the delegation. 
- In France, the Senate Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Armed Forces Committee 
has fifty-two members, four of whom 
are members of the delegation to the 
WEU Assembly. The National 
Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee 
has seventy-two members ofwhom nine 
are members of the delegation; the 
Defence and Armed Forces Committee, 
which also has seventy-two members, 
includes only one member of the dele-
gation. 
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10. In four member parliaments, the dele-
gation chairmen are members of the 
abovementioned committees (in Belgium, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Luxem-
bourg). In the circumstances, it is therefore 
mainly up to members of those committees who 
are on the delegation to WEU to take personal 
steps to ensure that the Assembly's work is fol-
lowed up but, in reality, this aim proves difficult 
to attain. 
11. On 4th December 1974, the WEU 
Assembly adopted Order 44 inviting national 
delegations " to promote relations between the 
Assembly of WEU and national parliamentary 
committees, inter alia by rapporteurs of the 
Assembly of WEU being heard by these com-
mittees when matters are being discussed which 
have been dealt with in reports submitted to the 
Assembly of WEU ". Luxembourg is the only 
member country in which this order is occa-
sionally applied for matters of particular 
interest. 
12. No delegation has reported that such 
hearings are forbidden by its parliament's rules 
of procedure. The appeal made in Order 44 
should therefore be renewed. 
13. Another proposal made a long time ago 
was received favourably in several parliaments, 
i.e. that, if a national parliamentary committee 
was preparing to discuss a matter already 
debated in the WEU Assembly, it could ask the 
secretariat of the Committee for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations a few weeks in advance to 
send it a file containing our Assembly's reports, 
debates and texts adopted on the subject. 
However, if the committees concerned do not 
take the initiative of contacting the Office of the 
Clerk of the Assembly early enough, it will be dif-
ficult for the latter to guess what the programmes 
of work of these committees will be since in most 
countries their debates are confidential. 
14. Nevertheless, advance information about 
the work of national committees can certainly be 
improved. The United Kingdom Delegation, for 
instance, has recently started to send the Office 
of the Clerk press communiques issued by the 
House of Commons Foreign Affairs and Defence 
Committees which describe the current work and 
programmes of visits of those committees. Thus, 
we learn that the House of Commons Foreign 
Affairs Committee is now studying the political 
consequences of the arms control and disarm-
ament process and in the context of that study it 
is planning to visit several European capitals and 
NATO headquarters. After consulting the United 
Kingdom Delegation, the Office of the Clerk of 
the Assembly sent the Assembly's latest report 
on disarmament to that committee's secretariat 
for information. 
15. It would be useful if similar contacts could 
be established with committees in other parlia-
ments. It would also be useful to give further 
consideration to plans for organising joint 
meetings between the appropriate committees of 
the WEU Assembly and the corresponding com-
mittees in national parliaments. 
(ii) Use of WEU Assembly reports 
in the political activities of parliaments 
16. If parliamentarians are to use WEU 
Assembly reports in political debates in their 
country, they must first be able to read them 
while they are still topical. Reports are published 
in two stages, the first being just after they have 
been adopted in committee. 
17. Reports adopted by Assembly committees 
are printed immediately and then distributed to 
members of the Assembly and secretariats of 
national delegations. But it is already difficult, if 
not impossible, to work on these documents in 
Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy 
and the Netherlands because they are not - or 
only partly - translated into the official language 
or languages of these countries; in the Nether-
lands, they are translated only on request. Fur-
thermore, in none of the parliaments are these 
documents distributed automatically to 
members of the foreign affairs and defence com-
mittees. 
18. The situation in the various parliaments is 
as follows. The staff of the German Delegation 
usually translate only draft recommendations 
and resolutions. Explanatory memoranda are 
translated only if they are of special interest to 
the German Delegation or if the· rapporteur is 
German. Translated texts are circulated regularly 
to members of the German Delegation before 
each session. Untranslated parts of reports may 
be communicated to interested members of par-
liament, but only on request. 
19. In Belgium, reports are not translated into 
Flemish or sent automatically to non-member 
parliamentarians but a list of texts adopted is 
sent to all members of the Chamber and the 
Senate. The French text of these documents may 
be obtained on request. 
20. In France, texts are sent to interested par-
liamentarians only on request and this is also the 
case in Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
However, in these countries the delegation secre-
tariat draws up a list of reports which is sent to 
all committees. In the United Kingdom, reports 
are available only on request. 
21. Problems of transmission are therefore 
added to linguistic problems. Only in Belgium 
and the Netherlands can all members of par-
liament take cognisance of matters dealt with in 
reports adopted by Assembly committees thanks 
to a list sent by the secretariats of their respective 
delegations. 
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22. The second stage of publication occurs 
after texts have been adopted by the WEU 
Assembly in plenary session. In accordance with 
Rule 42 of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Assembly, during the session the Committee for 
Parliamentary and Public Relations selects from 
the texts adopted by the Assembly those which, 
in its opinion, should be debated in parlia-
ments. 
23. Immediately after each session, the Pres-
ident of the WEU Assembly sends texts selected 
by the committee (recommendations proper 
without their explanatory memoranda) to the 
presidents of all member parliaments in the hope 
that " these texts will be of interest to your par-
liament and will be the subject of speeches or 
questions ". 
24. In Belgium, this letter is translated into 
Flemish and published in the country's two 
official languages at appendi~ to the summary 
record of the first subsequent meeting of the 
Chamber and Senate. This pul:Hication, however, 
does not explain why the texts were trans-
mitted. 
25. In Luxembourg, the )>resident of the 
Chamber announces in public sitting that he has 
received the letter from the President of the 
WEU Assembly, while in the Netherlands this 
letter is included - without translation - in the 
list of documents received and deposited with 
the Clerk during plenary sittings of the Second 
Chamber. In the First Chamber, the letter from 
the President of the Assembly is sent to the 
appropriate committees in its original version. 
26. In none of the other four parliaments -
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy 
and the United Kingdom - is it ensured that par-
liamentarians are informed of the contents of 
this letter. For that reason, it 'has practically no 
impact at present. 
27. In the Federal Republic of Germany, 
however, all the texts adopted by the Assembly 
are printed in German after each session and dis-
tributed automatically to alL members of the 
Bundestag, but only for information. The same 
procedure is followed in Italy. 
(iii) National delegation infonnation reports 
on Assembly sessions 
28. It is gratifying that six of the seven delega-
tions distribute regular information documents 
on the activities of the Assembly and its delega-
tions. It is of course for each delegation to decide 
in what form and by what means such docu-
ments are to be prepared and distributed. 
However, your Rapporteur ventures to make the 
following suggestions for improving the impact 
of these reports. 
29. Since they are widely distributed in parlia-
ments, it is suggested that alll delegations pub-
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lishing such information reports add a paragraph 
informing readers of: 
- the specific texts selected by the com-
mittee, emphasising the reasons for the 
choice, i.e. that they should be the 
subject of debates; 
- the content of the letter in which the 
President of the WEU Assembly 
transmits selected texts after each 
session. 
30. Since the United Kingdom Delegation is 
the only one not to prepare a special document, 
your Rapporteur suggests that it consider pos-
sible ways of drawing the attention of the United 
Kingdom Parliament to the texts selected by the 
committee and to the content of the letter from 
the President of the Assembly. 
(iv) Use of the orange booklet 
in national parliaments 
31. After each part-session, the WEU 
Assembly publishes an orange booklet con-
taining texts adopted and a brief account of the 
session in the five official languages of WEU, a 
specific number being sent to the secretariat of 
each delegation. 
32. In Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, del-
egations distribute the booklets automatically to 
all parliamentarians while in France and the 
United Kingdom they are sent only to delegation 
members, other interested persons having to ask 
for copies. In the Federal Republic of Germany 
and Luxembourg, the booklets are not dis-
tributed automatically. 
33. Your Rapporteur believes that these 
booklets should be distributed automatically in 
all parliaments - and not on request - at least to 
members of the foreign affairs and defence com-
mittees. It is a useful document for anyone 
wishing to learn about the texts adopted and 
what was said in the debates. Information docu-
ments prepared by delegations cannot replace 
this booklet since a document is required which 
all WEU parliamentarians can take as a basis. 
34. No effort should be spared to ensure the 
circulation of this booklet within a reasonable 
lapse of time. However, it is difficult to make 
this text available quickly since it has to be trans-
lated into all the official languages ofWEU. This 
might be facilitated if the delegations concerned 
could have it translated by their own staff. 
(v) Requests for information on WEU 
in national parliaments 
35. Three of the seven delegations have 
notified an increase in requests for information. 
In France, requests for information on the acti-
vities of WEU and its Assembly are sometimes 
sent to the French Delegation to the Assembly. 
They often emanate from parliamentary corn-
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mittees; students preparing university theses also 
put questions to the delegation. The document 
that has been consulted most often recently is the 
address by Mr. Chirac, Prime Minister of France, 
to the WEU Assembly in December 1986, advo-
cating that a European security charter be drawn 
up. 
36. In Italy, the secretariats of the Senate and 
Chamber have recently noted renewed interest in 
WEU. In particular, the platform adopted in The 
Hague on 27th October 1987 has been the 
subject of many requests for information from 
parliamentarians and others. The Netherlands 
Delegation also reported an increase in requests 
for information, but gave no details. 
37. No delegation has notified any special 
interest by parliamentarians or the public in 
Assembly documents, the special interest shown 
by the press and public in Mr. Stokes's report on 
threat assessment (Document 1115) being an iso-
lated case. This lack of interest is very disturbing 
and cannot be ignored by the Assembly at a time 
when parliaments, media and the public seem to 
have been showing more interest in the evo-
lution of WEU in general, particularly since the 
adoption of the platform in The Hague. Does it 
mean that most of the Assembly's reports are 
practically confined to the area of its members' 
activities and are not effectively circulated to 
other circles concerned (see Chapter 11 (ii) 
above)? 
Ill. Action taken in parliaments 
on texts adopted by the WEU Assembly 
38. At its meeting in Paris on 3rd December 
1987, the Committee for Parliamentary and 
Public Relations decided to draw the attention of 
parliaments of member countries to the fol-
lowing recommendations: 
- 449 on the political activities of the 
Council - reply to the thirty-second 
annual report of the Council; 
- 450 on the military use of computers -
towards a joint European defence 
research programme; and 
- 452 on disarmament. 
39. In a letter dated 12th January 1988, Lady 
Jill Knight, Chairman of the committee, sent 
committee members draft questions relating to 
subjects covered in the selected recommenda-
tions, emphasing that " in order to strengthen the 
impact of the Assembly's work in our national 
parliaments, it is essential for as many members 
as possible to put questions on the basis of the 
texts adopted or to use them for speeches or 
interventions in parliament". 
40. Furthermore, on 3rd December 1987 the 
Assembly adopted Resolution 78 inviting 
national delegations " to ensure that debates on 
defence and security... are organised so as to 
bring the greatest possible attention to the work 
of the WEU Assembly". 
41. It is to be noted that the role ofWEU and 
the activities of its Council are now often dis-
cussed in parliaments. However, in regard to 
work based on texts adopted by the Assembly, 
only three parliaments have sent in information. 
On 1Oth March 1988, Mr. Hill made a speech on 
WEU in the House of Commons, recommending 
that members interested in Europe's defence 
should study the abovementioned reports. He 
also put several questions on Recommendations 
449 and 453. Other questions on WEU were put 
by Mr. Knowles, Sir John Biggs-Davison, Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Martin and Sir Anthony 
Grant. 
42. On 12th November 1987, the Bundestag 
held a debate on the platform adopted in The 
Hague, with speeches by Mr. Mechtersheimer, 
Mr. Lippelt, Mr. Soell, Mr. Klejdzinski, Mrs. 
Schoppe and Mrs. Kelly. On 21st January 1988, 
a debate was held in plenary session in the Bun-
destag on the basis of oral questions put by Mr. 
Soell and Mr. Klejdzinski on Recommendations 
449 and 452. The Federal German Government 
also answered written questions put by Mr. 
Bohm, Mr. Antretter and Mr. Scheer on the 
abovementioned recommendations. 
43. On 3rd and 15th March 1988, the Luxem-
bourg Minister for Foreign Affairs answered 
written questions put by Mr. Burger, Mr. Konen 
and Mr. Hengel in the Chamber of Deputies on 
Recommendations 449 and 452. 
IV. Special information action taken 
in member parliaments by the Committee 
for Parliamentary and Public Relations 
44. The action taken by the Committee for 
Parliamentary and Public Relations in April 
1985 to organise information meetings in all 
member parliaments in order to familiarise par-
liamentarians with the Assembly's work was 
completed with the meetings held in The Hague 
on 23rd February and in Brussels on 24th 
February 1988. 
45. The committee held the following 
meetings: 
- in Paris, at the Senate, on 17th April 
1985; 
- in Rome, at the Senate, on 11th June 
1985; 
- in Bonn, at the Bundestag, on 20th 
February 1986; 
- in London, at the House of Commons, 
in the presence of Mr. Cahen, Secretary-
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General of WEU, on 17th November 
1986; 
- in Luxembourg, at the Conference 
Centre, on 28th April 1987; 
- in The Hague, at the Second Chamber 
of the States-General, on 23rd February 
1988; 
- in Brussels, at the Chamber of Repre-
sentatives, on 24th February 1988. 
46. The recent meetings in The Hague and 
Brussels were based on briefings by Mr. She/ton 
on Western European Union, Mr. Burger on the 
WEU Assembly and Mr. Tummers and Mr. De 
Bondt on WEU, the Atlantic Alliance and the 
European institutions. In both parliaments, the 
interest shown by the parliamentarians invited 
and their participation proved very encouraging, 
and a lively discussion was held on a number of 
subjects raised by the speakers. 
47. It is interesting to review the subjects 
raised by external participant~. Inter alia, they 
put questions on: 
- the influence of recommendations on 
government decisions; 
- co-ordinating the activities of the WEU 
Assembly with those of the North 
Atlantic Assembly; 
- alliance concepts following the INF 
agreement and WEU's position on the 
denuclearisation of Europe; 
- the extension of Franco-German 
co-operation in defence matters to other 
interested countries; 
- the enlargement of WEU; 
- co-operation between European insti-
tutes conducting research on security 
and defence matters; 
- the future composition of the WEU 
Assembly. 
48. While several United Kingdom and 
German members of the committee and one 
Belgian parliamentarian deplored their parlia-
ments' meagre knowledge of or interest in WEU 
matters, there was no such complaint by Nether-
lands participants. On the contrary, two of them 
considered that WEU was now well known, par-
ticularly since the adoption ofthe platform, and 
that it had assumed greater importance thanks to 
the Gulf crisis. At the meeting in Brussels, the 
interest of Belgian parliamentarians was demon-
strated by the large number of participants in 
spite of the difficult position of the Belgian Par-
liament at the time following the recent elec-
tions. 
49. A general review of this special action 
shows that there was an encouraging response to 
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the meetings organised in Belgium, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands while the 
response to the meetings organised in the Federal 
Republic and the United Kingdom was disap-
pointing. 
50. However, the meeting in the Bundestag 
was the only one which aroused the interest of 
Soviet journalists, and the meeting in the House 
of Commons was particularly interesting because 
of the questions put to the Secretary-General of 
WEU by a journalist from a leading British daily 
newspaper. 
51. Among the questions raised at the last two 
information meetings, two perhaps deserve 
special mention. First, the influence of recom-
mendations on government decisions. Parlia-
mentarians' dialogue with governments on the 
basis of recommendations might be easier if the 
texts were more succinct and concentrated on a 
few well-defined subjects on which firm pro-
posals were made. This goal is admittedly dif-
ficult to attain since, if a large majority is to be 
obtained, account has to be taken of the posi-
tions of all the political tendencies represented in 
the Assembly. 
52. Second, several members of the committee 
have underlined the growing importance of the 
dialogue between Western Europe and the 
alliance partners across the Atlantic, and above 
all with representatives of the United States. 
Several members therefore said they were in 
favour of the committee being authorised to visit 
the United States for talks with congressmen. 
V. Public relations activities 
of the WEU Council and Secretariat-General 
53. At the time of writing, the second part of 
the thirty-third annual report of the Council has 
not yet been transmitted to the Assembly. The 
first part, covering the period January to June 
1987, includes a very brief paragraph on 
informing the press and public, although nothing 
very specific is said. 
54. Conversely, the communication from Mr. 
Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, to the Pre-
sident of the Assembly, dated 17th December 
1987, on the public relations activities of the 
WEU Secretariat-General (Document 1132) 
gives some details. 
55. It is gratifying that the Secretary-General's 
proposals to the Council on reorganising the 
administrative structures of WEU include pro-
vision for a stronger press and information 
section. It is now important to know what this 
involves. 
56. Also gratifying is the Secretary-General's 
statement that such a section cannot really work 
satisfactorily and usefully without a minimum of 
financial resources. 
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57. The impressive public relations activities 
of the Secretary-General personally should also 
be acknowledged. However, he cannot assume 
entire responsibility for this task himself. A more 
open Council information policy should be 
worked out for implementation by member gov-
ernments. 
58. The committee notes with interest that a 
booklet on the various stages in the reactivation 
of WEU is to be published in the near future by 
the Secretariat-General. Would it not be possible 
to issue a regular bulletin, too? 
VI. Conclusions 
59. At a time when the importance of WEU 
has visibly increased thanks to the Council's 
recent activities, it must be ensured that due 
account is taken of the Assembly's views in 
centres of reflection and decision on defence and 
security matters, i.e. in member governments 
and parliaments. 
60. These views are expressed specifically in 
Assembly reports and recommendations, but the 
response to this work at national level is still too 
feeble. With the present composition of delega-
tions, the WEU lobby in national parliamentary 
committees responsible for matters handled by 
the WEU Assembly is not strong enough in most 
parliaments. 
61. Moreover, Assembly reports are generally 
distributed only on request and, in four parlia-
ments, the situation is worsened by the problem 
of having to translate reports into the official lan-
guage or languages of the country concerned. 
62. The appeal made by the President of the 
Assembly and the Committee for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations after each session that the 
texts selected by the committee form the subject 
of interventions or questions remains a dead 
letter in the majority of parliaments. 
63. If the Assembly fails to increase member 
countries' interest in its work, the governments 
will have no impelling reason to speed up pro-
cedure in the Council for concerting answers to 
recommendations or to make special efforts to 
ensure that the Council follows up the substance 
of recommendations; on the other hand, the 
arguments of those who advocate a more 
" European " composition for the Assembly 
might be helped by the fact that its present com-
position has not proved itself. 
64. It is therefore essential for the encouraging 
example set in recent months by members ofthe 
German, Luxembourg and United Kingdom 
Delegations, who have endeavoured to start a 
discussion with their governments on the basis 
of recommendations adopted, to be followed by 
the other delegations. 
APPENDIX I DOCUMENT 1135 
APPENDIX I 
Questionnaire 
for secretaries of national delegations in preparation for the report by 
the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations 
on the impact of the WEU Assembly's activities 
on parliaments and public opinion 
(Paris, 28th January 1988) 
1. Which members of your delegation to the 
WEU Assembly are at present members of: 
(a) the foreign affairs committee; 
(b) the defence committee 
of your parliament? 
2. The Office of the Clerk of the WEU 
Assembly regularly receives parliamentary bul-
letins and reports of debates in plenary sitting in 
member parliaments. Conversely, it has very 
little information on the activities of national 
foreign affairs and defence committees since, in 
most parliaments, their discussions are not 
public. 
To improve information on matters dis-
cussed by the foreign affairs and defence com-
mittees of your parliament, would it be possible 
henceforth to receive their agendas on a regular 
basis? 
3. Reports prepared by WEU Assembly com-
mittees contain a draft recommendation fol-
lowed by an explanatory memorandum and are 
printed immediately after their adoption in com-
mittee for subsequent distribution to members of 
the Assembly and secretariats of national delega-
tions. 
What procedure does your secretariat 
follow on receipt of these reports? 
(a) (This question does not concern the 
French and United Kingdom Parlia-
ments.) 
Are reports translated by your staff 
into the official language(s) of your 
parliament? 
(b) When and to what extent are inter-
ested parliamentarians who are not 
members of the WEU Assembly able 
to study the full texts of these 
reports? 
(c) Are reports or their translations made 
available to members of the foreign 
affairs, defence or other interested 
committees in your parliament? 
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(d) Are they also made available to 
political groups in your parliament? 
(e) Are they sent by your services to the 
press or other institutions or persons 
outside parliament? 
If so, please give details. 
4. Immediately after each session of the 
WEU Assembly, its President transmits a 
selection of texts adopted (recommendations 
proper without their explanatory memoranda) to 
the presidents of all member parliaments in the 
hope that " these texts will be of interest to your 
parliament and will be the subject of speeches or 
questions ". 
What is the procedure in your parliament 
for following up the texts transmitted by the 
President of the WEU Assembly? 
(a) (This question does not concern the 
French and United Kingdom Parlia-
ments.) 
Are the letter from tne President of the 
WEU Assembly and its appendices 
translated by your staff into the official 
language(s) of your parliament? 
(b) To what extent are all interested 
members of your parliament informed 
as quickly as possible of this commu-
nication from the President of the 
WEU Assembly? 
5. Have you any proposals or suggestions for 
making the transmission of the texts adopted to 
your parliament more effective and improving 
means of bringing these texts to the attention of 
members of your parliament without delay? 
6. Is it customary in you;r parliament for 
committees to organise hearings of members of 
the WEU Assembly (rapporteurs, for instance) 
when discussing matters dealt with in reports 
submitted to the WEU Assembly, as proposed in 
Order 44 adopted on 5th December 1974? 
7. After sessions of the WEU Assembly, does. 
your parliament receive regular written, pub-
lished information reports prepared by your del-
egation? 
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(a) If so, please send us the text of the 
most recent information report. 
(b) Are information reports prepared by 
the delegation discussed and approved 
formally by the appropriate com-
mittees or at a plenary sitting of your 
parliament? 
(c) If the reports are published, how are 
they distributed? 
(d) If they are not published, how is your 
parliament informed of the activities 
of members of your delegation to the 
WEU Assembly? 
8. Does your delegation to the WEU 
Assembly organise working meetings between 
Assembly sessions? 
If so, how often and for what purpose? 
9. After each session, the WEU Assembly 
publishes a booklet containing texts adopted and 
a brief account of the session, a specific number 
of which are sent to the secretariat of each dele-
gation. 
Are these booklets distributed by your ser-
vices automatically or on request: 
(a) to members of the delegation? 
(b) to members of the foreign affairs and 
defence committees? 
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(c) to other interested parliamentarians? 
(d) to the press? 
(e) to other institutions or persons outside 
parliament? 
If so, please give details. 
10. Are the booklets requested often? 
11. Have requests to your parliament for 
information on WEU and the activities of its 
Assembly increased in recent years? 
If so, please give details of the types of 
request you receive and say how you answer 
them. 
12. How does your country's government 
inform your parliament of the activities of 
WEU? 
(a) in regular written reports? 
If so, please send us the most recent 
report. 
(b) by regular hearings of members of the 
government: 
- in plenary sitting? 
- in committee? 
(c) only sporadically or on request? 
(d) by other means? 
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ORDER 44 1 
on national parliaments and the WEU Assembly 2 
The Assembly, 
Regretting that the work of WEU is little known in the parliaments of member countries; 
Anxious to develop a sense of European solidarity in the parliaments of member countries, 
INVITES THE MEMBERS OF EACH NATIONAL DELEGATION 
1. To take steps for parliaments to ask governments to present a report, during djebates on foreign 
policy, on their position on matters considered by the Council or Assembly ofWEU atltd the action they 
intend to take on Assembly recommendations; 
2. To promote relations between the Assembly of WEU and national parliamentary committees, 
inter alia by Rapporteurs of the Assembly of WEU being heard by these committees .when matters are 
being discussed which have been dealt with in reports submitted to the Assembly of WEU. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1974 during the second part of the twentieth ordinary session (11th sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
(Document 653). 
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APPENDIX Ill 
RESOLUTION 78 1 
on public information activities on security and defence matters 
in WEU member countries 2 
The Assembly, 
APPENDIX Ill 
(i) Anxious to make public and parliamentary opinion more aware of the European dimension of 
security and the specific aims of WEU in this context; 
(ii) Stressing that it is of the utmost importance for more members of the Assembly to intervene in 
their national parliaments on the basis of texts adopted in order to draw the attention of government 
authorities and public opinion to the work of the WEU Assembly; 
(iii) Welcoming the initiative taken by the Netherlands Government in communicating to the Second 
Chamber of the States-General its position on the future prospects of WEU under Netherlands presi-
dency; 
(iv) Regretting nevertheless that the remarkable efforts made by certain member governments to keep 
the public - and in particular the younger generation - in their countries informed of security and 
defence problems only exceptionally give adequate information on the role of WEU, 
INVITES NATIONAL DELEGATIONS 
1. To ensure that debates on defence and security in parliaments, in the political groups and with 
governments and the public are organised so as to bring the greatest possible attention to the work of the 
WEU Assembly; 
2. To urge governments to improve the co-ordination, with the appropriate WEU bodies, of their 
national activities in keeping the public informed, and in particular the younger generation. 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1987 during the second part of the thirty-third ordinary session (12th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Burger on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions (Document 1112). 
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Replies of the Council to Recommendations 449 to 454 
RECOMMENDATION 449 1 
on the political activities of the Council -
reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Counci/ 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that developments in the Atlantic Alliance make it essential to strengthen its 
European pillar and that at the present juncture WEU is still the only organisation capable of forming 
this pillar; 
(ii) Considering that the way to achieve this result is through the early implementation of the Rome 
declaration and welcoming the fact that the adoption of the platform on European security interests 
marks the starting point in the effective reactivation of WEU; 
(iii) Noting with satisfaction that the platform on European security interests adopted by the Council 
on 27th October 1987 responds, in the main, to Assembly Recommendations 420, 429, 432, 438, 441, 
442 and 446; 
(iv) Welcoming the development of consultations between member countries in the framework of 
WEU and expressing its satisfaction that the Council implemented Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the 
modified Brussels Treaty for the first time in summer 1987 in the context of the Gulf crisis; 
(v) Regretting, however, that co-ordination of the action taken by member countries in that region 
was limited; 
(vi) Noting that the thirty-second annual report ofthe Council gives only a very inadequate account of 
the Council's activities in 1986; 
(vii) Regretting the Council's slowness in answering the Assembly, the ever-later dates on which it 
transmits its reports and the very inadequate information it gives; 
(viii) Noting that the informal procedure increasingly practised by the Council is not likely to alleviate 
this shortcoming; 
(ix) Stressing that the Assembly's own needs are wholly independent of those of the ministerial organs 
and that restructuring must not affect the independence of either the Assembly or the Office of the Clerk 
vis-a-vis the ministerial organs, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Speed up its procedure to allow quicker transmission to the Assembly of the substantial infor-
mation it needs in order to exercise its responsibility of supervising the Council's activities under Article 
IX ofthe modified Brussels Treaty, respect a time-limit, under normal circumstances, of eight weeks for 
answering questions and adopt a normal schedule of dates so that the Assembly might receive its half-
yearly reports in time for preparing useful replies; 
2. Ensure the immediate implementation of the intentions expressed in paragraph Ill (a) 4 of the 
platform which it adopted on 27th October 1987; 
3. While respecting the time-limit of 31st December 1987, take the measures to restructure the 
organs of WEU allowing these new requirements to be met and, in pursuan~e of this, invite the 
Assembly to comment on the draft organogram being prepared by the Secretary-General before its sub-
mission to the Council for approval; 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 1st December 1987 during the second part of the thirty-third ordinary session (8th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Docu-
ment 1117). 
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4. Pursue the full implementation of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, and in particular 
its paragraph 3; 
5. Examine carefully the development of bilateral co-operation between its members on security 
matters with a view to extending this co-operation to all member countries without thereby diluting the 
results of bilateral co-operation; 
6. In consultation with the Presidential Committee, ensure satisfactory co-ordination ofthe presence 
of ministers at Assembly sessions, and in particular the participation of the presidency in all debates on 
the Council's reports; 
7. Ensure that the permanent structure of the ministerial organs allows the establishment of a unit 
responsible solely for implementing an active policy for informing the public and the press and continue 
to give and improve information to the Assembly and the public on meetings of the WEU Council at the 
level of the enlarged Council; 
8. Keep the Assembly regularly informed of meetings and the results of the work of the special 
working group and its sub-groups; 
9. Accord the Assembly without delay the funds and staff necessary for restructuring the Office of 
the Clerk; 
10. Ensure that the Secretariat-General is in a position to assist the Council in all its activities. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 449 
1. The request of the Assembly to speed up transmission of substantial information, in order to 
enable it to exercise its activities under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, is a point well taken 
up by the Council. The Council endeavours to send all relevant information as soon as possible to the 
Assembly. It should however be borne in mind that the drafting of reports and written answers which 
need the agreement of all seven members of WEU requires a certain amount of time. Nevertheless, in 
order to accommodate the Assembly as much as possible, the Council has been examining this problem, 
and has been looking for improvements in the procedure for answering recommendations and ques-
tions, and for drafting the bi-annual reports. Direct telecommunications between the capitals were 
envisaged as an important means to this end. The WEU member states have therefore now set up a net-
work of direct communications. 
2. The intentions expressed in paragraph Ill (A) 4 of the platform on European security interests 
constitute a basis on which further discussions are being held within the WEU framework, in particular 
in the Special Working Group. They are certainly not to be seen as distant goals set out by the member 
states, but on the contrary indicate commitments which the WEU countries are already fulfilling. For 
instance, improvement of consultation and co-ordination in defence and security matters has been 
brought about, as well as a stronger involvement of defence ministers and their representatives at WEU 
meetings. The concertation of policies on crises outside Europe is another case in point where consider-
able progress has been achieved. 
3. Pursuant to the decisions taken at the Ministerial Council meeting in The Hague, the Council has 
continued its discussion on the restructuring of the ministerial organs, in particular of the three Agencies 
for Security Questions. The Council did not finalise this restructuring process at the end of 1987 and this 
subject is still being considered. It is the Council's view that matters concerned with the internal func-
tioning of the ministerial organs are the responsibility of the Council itself and the Assembly has there-
fore not been invited to comment on the draft organigramme before its submission to the Ministerial 
Council for approval. 
4. Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty was implemented for the first time 
when a series of meetings took place between high-level representatives of the ministries of foreign 
affairs and defence of the WEU countries on matters pertaining to the situation in the Gulf area. These 
meetings brought about a process of exchange of information, consultation and concertation, fully in 
line with the intention expressed by the ministers in Rome in October 1984 to consider whenever appro-
priate the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world. As stated in the platform, the 
WEU member countries have committed themselves to concert their policies on crises outside Europe 
in so far as they may affect their security interests. 
5. Bilateral forms of co-operation in the field of security between West European countries have 
formed an important aspect of the common defence within the Atlantic Alliance in the post war period. 
At the Ministerial Council meeting in The Hague in October 1987, the French and German ministers of 
defence briefed their colleagues on the actual state of affairs in their bilateral co-operation, thereby 
pointing out its non-exclusive character. They stressed that the partners would be k!ept informed of new 
developments concerning their co-operation. These developments are being followed with great interest 
by the Council. 
6. The Council will co-ordinate as far as possible, together with the Presidential Committee of the 
Assembly, the presence of ministers at the plenary sessions ofthe Assembly. In this respect, the Council 
would like to underline that the increased presence of ministers at Assembly meetings over recent years 
reflects the great interest that the Council takes in these sessions. The Presidency of the Council normal-
ly attends all plenary sessions of the Assembly during which the Council's reports are being debated. 
7. A separate press and information unit in the Secretariat is under consideration as part of the 
Council's continuing review of the restructuring of the ministerial organs. 
8. The Special Working Group and its sub-groups, consisting of representatives from capitals, have 
been set up under the responsibility of the Council as instruments for consultation on security matters. 
In order to facilitate their discussions, however, these consultations between senior members of the ~in-
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th April 1988 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 12th April 1988. 
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istries of foreign affairs and defence, which form a valuable addition to those in the Council and 
between the political directors, must remain confidential. Bearing this in mind, the Assembly, in accord-
ance with Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, will be kept duly informed of the activities of the 
Council and its working groups in the biannual reports of the Council. 
9. As stated in the letters from the President of the Council to the Assembly, of 15th July 1987, and 
from the Secretary-General to the President of the Assembly, of 23rd November 1987, the proposals 
concerning the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk cannot be tackled separately from the overall 
review of the reorganisation of the ministerial organs. The possible establishment of new posts in partic-
ular can therefore only be envisaged within the framework of this overall reorganisation. The outcome 
of the total restructuring process will enable the Council to determine whether the requests for the cre-
ation of new functions in the Office of the Clerk could be met. 
10. In the framework of the reorganisation ofthe ministerial organs, a strengthening ofthe Secretariat 
is envisaged so as to enable this body adequately to assist the Council in its activities. 
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RECOMMENDATION 450 1 
on the military use of computers -
towards a joint European defence research programme 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering the converging views observed at European level on more active participation in the 
East-West dialogue and any disarmament initiatives; 
(ii) Considering the results of work conducted in the IEPG recalling the interest of a European 
defence market; 
(iii) Considering that an essential prerequisite for a modem and competitive European defence 
industry is Europe's mastery of the whole range of microelectronics; 
(iv) Considering the conclusions drawn in the report "Towards a stronger Europe", indicating 
Europe's relatively weak position as compared with its main competitors in certain areas of defence 
electronics and specifically microelectronics; 
(v) Considering the close relationship in research and development between military and civilian 
microelectronics; 
(vi) Noting the striking contrast between the repeated public announcements of the WEU member 
countries' determination to take the necessary steps in the European Community to strengthen Europe's 
own technological capability and achieve the creation of a technological community on the one hand 
and the endless bickering leading to an unsatisfactory agreement on a European framework programme 
for 1987-91 on the other hand; 
(vii) Considering that the early harmonisation of national operational requirements and the 
interoperability of the military computer systems are of primordial importance, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Stop making solemn statements on the determination of the WEU member countries to create a 
technological community for as long as their action is turned in the opposite direction, and instead: 
(a) attach higher priority to IEPG co-operative technology projects than has been the case 
hitherto; 
(b) convince member countries of the need to increase the budget for the European framework 
programme and for Esprit in particular; 
(c) pay attention to the risks stemming from the protection of American and Japanese markets 
which calls in question the rules of international trade and threatens Europe's legitimate 
interests; 
(d) make a major effort to harmonise national operational requirements for military computer 
systems; 
2. Initiate a joint European defence research programme associating round the WEU member coun-
tries all the Western European countries wishing to take part. 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1987 during the second part of the thirty-third ordinary session (9th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Fourre on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions (Document 1118). 
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to Recommendation 450 
1. WEU member countries remain convinced of the need for Europe to have at its disposal a mod-
ern and competitive defence industry, to which end the creation of a technological community is indis-
pensable, as reaffirmed by the foreign and defence ministers at their meeting in Bonn in April1985. The 
IEPG is the main forum in which WEU members and other European allies devote attention to the sub-
ject under consideration. 
2. At their meeting in June 1987, IEPG ministers of defence underlined the importance of greater 
co-ordination of national research and technology efforts in Europe. They specifically directed that 
efforts be made to increase the number of co-operative technology projects (CTPS). They also agreed 
that research co-operation should be developed on a systematic basis, concentrating upon areas of tech-
nological priority. Within this context, special attention is given to related technological research in the 
civilian sector. The Council fully supports the approach ofthe IEPG which will be worked out in future 
discussions at expert and political level. The colloquy arranged by the WEU Assembly on European 
co-operation in armaments research and development, to be .held in London in March of this year, may 
also contribute towards furthering European defence research as envisaged by the Assembly. As far as 
the funding of European defence research and development is concerned, IEPG ministers recommended 
during their June 1987 meeting that financial arrangements for stimulating co-operative research be 
considered, including the earmarking of funds from national budgets and arrangements similar to those 
employed in Eureka. 
3. Civilian programmes, such as Esprit, may have a military spin-off. However, at this stage, there 
are no direct links between civilian programmes and the application of their results in the defence field. 
4. The IEPG and its member countries have on many occasions asked for the removal of legal and 
other impediments to free trade and will continue to do so. The Council firmly believes that competi-
tiveness is the sole basis for international technological co-operation. 
5. Within the framework of the IEPG's co-operative projects, considerable attention is given to the 
harmonisation of operational requirements of the military systems involved. This also applies to the 
operational requirements of military computer systems. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th February 1988 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 1st March 1988. 
56 
DOCUMENT 1136 
RECOMMENDATION 451 1 
replying to the thirty-second annual report of the Counci/ 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the Council's continued close consultation on European security and disarmament 
questions and its determination not to allow Europe to be sidelined in the present strategic debate; 
(ii) Welcoming the commitment in the platform on European security interests adopted by the 
Council on 27th October 1987 to build a European union; 
(iii) Welcoming in particular the active role of the presidency of the Council in initiating consultation, 
including the first consultation on a threat to peace arising outside Europe; 
(iv) Welcoming also the establishment of the Council's high-level special working group to improve 
co-operation between Ministries for Foreign Affairs and Defence in all member countries; 
(v) Stressing the need for a decision in 1988 on the eo-location and restructuring of all Council organs 
and WEU institutions; 
(vi) Calling for an early decision thereafter on the accession of the countries which have expressed a 
wish to join WEU; 
(vii) Recalling the continued importance of the long-standing institutional responsibilities of the 
Council concerning troop levels and the remaining internal arms control, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Continue its discussions on all aspects of European security and disarmament and ensure that 
European interests are safeguarded in the present strategic debate; 
2. Decide to eo-locate all Council bodies and WEU institutions and to define the new tasks of the 
agencies for security questions; 
3. Reinstate in its annual reports the information previously given on the number of control mea-
sures carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1987 during the second part of the thirty-third ordinary session (1Oth sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Scheer on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments (Document 1116). 
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1. The platform on European security interests, adopted at The Hague on 27th October 1987, consti-
tutes an important element in European security co-operation. Further harmonisation of views on spe-
cific conditions of security in Europe continues to take place within WEU on the basis of the platform. 
The high level Special Working Group has been requested to elaborate upon different aspects of it. Reg-
ular discussions also continue both in this group, in the Permanent Council and between political direc-
tors and their counterparts in ministries of defence in the framework of the reinforced Council, on cur-
rent developments and the major issues in European security. With regard to the situation in the Gulf, 
the member states of WEU are continuing their concertation at all the appropriate political and opera-
tional levels. 
2. At the ministerial Council meeting ofThe Hague on 26th-27th October 1987, all WEU countries 
expressed their agreement with the principle of collocation. It was decided to merge the three Agencies 
into one, under the authority of the Secretary-General. No agreement was reached on the future location 
of the WEU ministerial organs. 
3. On the basis of the Council's decisions, a draft organigramme has been presented by the Secretary-
General to the Council defining a rationalised, collocated and cost-effective unit capable of flexible oper-
ation and better equipped to fulfil its future tasks in support of the Council and the working groups. This 
is now being considered by the Council. 
4. The information concerning the number of control measures, which are still being carried out as 
part of the residual tasks of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, will be provided in the report on 
the activities of the Council over the second half of 1987. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 18th March 1988 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 13th April 1988. 
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RECOMMENDATION 452 1 
on disarmament 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Calling for the collective defence effort to be maintained at all times at the level necessary to 
ensure the security of all countries ofthe alliance, while negotiations are actively pursued on the mutual 
reduction of forces and armaments to the lowest levels compatible with that essential security, in full 
accordance with the long-standing policy of the alliance; 
(ii) Welcoming the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union based on zero-zero 
proposals agreed by the alliance as a whole which it believes must be in the long-term security interests 
of countries both ofthe alliance and the Warsaw Pact, and noting that the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments will report fully on all aspects of the anticipated agreement when the text is pub-
lished; 
(iii) Welcoming also the approach to a bilateral agreement to reduce strategic nuclear weapons; 
(iv) Stressing the importance of respect for the existing ABM treaty and notional limitations of the 
SALT accords which can be modified only by agreement between the parties to them, and recalling in 
this connection the reply of the Council to Recommendation 413; 
(v) Noting with satisfaction the improved prospects for the conclusion of a multilateral treaty to ban 
all chemical weapons and a bilateral agreement to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons 
tests; 
(vi) Noting both the similarities and the differences between the security policy declared by NATO 
most recently in Reykjavik and the military strategy enunciated by the Warsaw Pact in Berlin, and wel-
coming the positive aspects of the Berlin proposals for consultations between the two alliances to discuss 
military doctrine and a search for ways of removing imbalances and asymmetries in different arma-
ments and forces; 
(vii) Noting in this connection that in Prague on lOth April 1987 General Secretary Gorbachev con-
firmed the existence of such imbalances and asymmetries for historical and other reasons; 
(viii) Calling in general for the councils of both alliances to give careful consideration to all arms 
control proposals of the other, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Press for the earliest opening of negotiations on conventional stability mandated to discuss asym-
metrical reductions of conventional forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals so as to 
establish a stable and non-threatening military balance in Europe and the various regions concerned at 
the lowest possible levels; 
2. Express full support for a verifiable bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet 
Union to reduce the strategic warheads of each party to 6 000, and continue to ensure that any such 
bilateral agreement imposes no restrictions on the forces of European countries, who are not parties 
to it; 
3. · Urge on the two parties the importance of fully respecting the existing ABM treaty and notional 
limitations of the SALT accords, which can be modified only by agreement between them; 
4. Call on the North Atlantic Council to consider positively the Berlin proposal of the Warsaw Pact 
for consultations between the two alliances to compare military strategy, and to find ways of removing 
asymmetries in types of armaments and forces through reductions to the lower level in each case, and in 
general to give proper consideration to all arms control proposals of the Warsaw Pa<rt countries with a 
view to identifying those elements which may provide a fruitful basis for mutually-advantageous negoti-
ations; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1987 during the second part of the thirty-third ordinary session (1Oth sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Scheer on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments (Document 1116). 
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5. Call on the Warsaw Pact to renounce its offensive military and technical doctrine and give its 
armed forces a structure clearly designed for defensive purposes and which does not allow it to 
undertake an offensive against other countries; 
6. Call on NATO and the Warsaw Pact to renounce offensive technical capacities in favour of the 
creation of mutual non-provocative, confidence-building defence structures; 
7. In the framework of disarmament, ensure that in each case both sides make reductions to the 
lowest level. 
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to Recommendation 452 
1. The Council underlines the importance of verifiable conventional arms control measures leading 
to a more stable and secure balance offorces at lower levels. The WEU countries as members of the Alli-
ance will actively pursue the launching of new negotiations leading to the elimination of disparities and 
of the capability for surprise attack as well as large-scale offensive action in the whole of Europe. These 
negotiations on conventional stability from the Atlantic to the Urals should be opened at the earliest 
possible time. It is expected that they will begin later this year. However, since these negotiations will 
take place within the framework of the CSCE process, it has to be recognised that their mandate has to 
be part of a balanced and substantial outcome of the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting. 
2. The WEU countries pursue an active arms control and disarmament policy aimed at the enhance-
ment of stability and security. In this context, the WEU countries not only welcome the INF agreement, 
but also attach great importance to rapid progress towards reductions in the field of strategic nuclear 
weapons and support the objective of the United States and the Soviet Union to achieve 50% reductions 
in their strategic arsenals. 
3. In this connection, the agreement in principle between the United States and the Soviet Union 
not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a period to be determined is welcomed by the Council. The 
Council hopes that this development will facilitate reaching an agreement on strategic nuclear weapons. 
4. The WEU countries have clearly stated in the platform they adopted on European security inter-
ests that arms control is an integral part of their security policy. In their search for stability and openness 
through effective arms control measures, proper consideration is given by them to all proposals in this 
field. 
5. The WEU member states do not consider that military doctrines can form the subject of negotia-
tions. On the other hand, they believe that greater transparency in this field could throw light, particu-
larly on the levels, structures and deployment of conventional forces in Europe. Hence they consider 
that the future negotiations on confidence-building and security measures between the 35 states partici-
pating in the CSCE process could provide an opportunity of emphasising this idea of transparency in the 
sphere of military doctrines. An exchange of views within the 35 framework could, in addition, only be 
beneficial to the negotiations among the 23 on conventional stability. It is in this context that the discus-
sions on military doctrines should take account of the capabilities and the structures of the armed forces 
which have direct influence on the fundamental conditions of security in Europe. 
6. The Council fully supports all measures which can contribute to increased openness and stability 
in Europe. 
1. Communicated to the Council on 12th April 1988 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 12th April 1988. 
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RECOMMENDATION 453 1 
on recent developments in Soviet external policy 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that, if confirmed and pursued, the policy of reform and openness undertaken by the 
Soviet Union opens the way for a far-reaching change in relations between Eastern and Western Europe, 
important disarmament measures and a consolidation of international peace; 
(ii) Noting that the prospects for "reality and guarantees for a secure world" expressed by Mr. 
Gorbachev on 17th September 1987 very largely respond to Western Europe's aspirations, but consid-
ering that Soviet practice should correspond more to these words; 
(iii) Considering that the CSCE is the framework in which the conditions for new relations between 
the two parts of Europe can be worked out, provided adequate progress is accomplished in each of the 
three baskets; 
(iv) Welcoming the progress achieved in the limitation of medium-range nuclear weapons but noting 
that Western Europe's security also requires agreements on the verified limitation of strategic weapons, 
on a balance of conventional weapons and on banning the use of chemical weapons with the progressive 
destruction of existing stocks; 
(v) Noting that the principal threats to international peace now originate in regions outside the area 
covered by the North Atlantic Treaty; 
(vi) Stressing that a concern of the WEU Council should be to concert the action of member countries 
to restore peace by the application of United Nations Security Council Resolution 598 and to ensure 
freedom of navigation in the Gulf; 
(vii) Welcoming the fact that the Assembly has been able to start a dialogue with the Supreme Soviet of 
the Soviet Union on the conditions of European security and hoping that it will be possible to continue 
these exchanges of views, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Examine regularly the evolution of relations between Eastern and Western Europe; 
2. Urge both the United States and the Soviet Union to implement any Soviet-American agreements 
on the limitation of medium-range nuclear weapons, while assuring Europe that there will be a deter-
mined and vigorous effort to achieve an early, satisfactory outcome to negotiations on other categories 
of weapons; 
3. Through close consultations, seek to uphold joint positions in all meetings held in the framework 
of the CSCE in order to obtain substantial, balanced results in negotiations held in the context of each of 
the thrs:e baskets, including: 
(a) the early conclusion of an agreement on the limitation of conventional weapons restoring the 
balance of forces in Europe and including a satisfactory system of verification; 
(b) the liberalisation of exchanges of ideas and the free movement of persons between Eastern and 
Western Europe; 
(c) the definition of the obligations of each country taking part in the conference, particularly in 
regard to human rights and the environment; 
(d) the development of economic, scientific and cultural relations between the two parts of 
Europe; 
(e) respect for the sovereignty and independence of all states. 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1987 during the second part of the thirty-third ordinary session (11th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Pecriaux on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 
1111 ). 
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1. The situation in Eastern Europe and the evolution of its relationship with the West are being fol-
lowed carefully by the Atlantic Alliance and within European political co-operation. The WEU, both at 
the level of the Council and in the Special Working Group, focuses its attention on the politico-military 
aspects of East-West relations and on their implications for European security. 
2. At the North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels on 11th December 1987, ministers welcomed 
and fully supported the Washington INF treaty and urged its early entry into force. This result was made 
possible thanks to the solidarity and resolve shown by the alliance as a whole. The treaty is all the more 
meaningful because it sets precedents which will be useful in negotiations on other areas of arms control. 
3. Joint positions on various aspects of the Helsinki process, in particular regarding the Vienna fol-
low-up meeting and the document which it is hoped will emanate from this meeting, are being devel-
oped both through the European political co-operation framework and within the Atlantic Alliance. The 
WEU countries thereby actively strive for substantial and balanced progress in the CSCE framework, in 
line with the goals set out in the Assembly's recommendation. 
1. Communicated to the Council on 26th February 1988 and received at the Office of the Clerk on l st March 1988. 
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RECOMMENDATION 454 1 
on European armaments co-operation -
reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Counci/ 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Noting that ever since the Rome declaration in October 1984 the Council as a whole and its 
members individually have stated that WEU should provide political impetus to the development of 
European co-operation in armaments matters; 
(ii) Dissatisfied that during the three years that have elapsed since October 1984 the Council has 
failed to provide proof of this much-vaunted political impetus, notwithstanding the primordial role of 
the WEU countries in the IEPG, their geographical and military position and the size of their defence 
industry; 
(iii) Welcoming the organisation in 1988 of a first European defence study session to advance 
knowledge of the European dimensions of security matters; 
(iv) Recalling the final communique of the IEPG ministers' meeting held in Seville on 22nd June 
1987, in which the ministers endorsed the long-term objectives ofthe European defence industry study 
(EDIS) report and expressed their determination to develop an action plan for a step-by-step approach 
towards an open European market for defence equipment; 
(v) Considering that neither the division of work between the Standing Armaments Committee and 
the IEPG, dating from 1978, nor the agreement regarding co-operation between the presidency of the 
IEPG and the Secretary-General of WEU, dating from 1986, are being observed; 
(vi) Considering that the IEPG ministers have declined to establish an international secretariat for the 
IEPG, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Take the lead in implementing the action plan for an open European market for defence 
equipment as recommended by the EDIS report by committing its members to reach agreement on 
common operational requirements for each major piece of defence equipment they will need from 
now on; 
2. Conclude its three-year reflections and deliberations on the reorganisation, future role and tasks 
of the SAC and Agency Ill and instruct the new ministerial organs to conduct studies connected with the 
IEPG ministers' decision to develop an action plan for a step-by-step approach towards an open 
European market for defence equipment; 
3. Increase its efforts to guarantee that appropriate international bodies and national administra-
tions provide all the information needed by the body which takes over to conduct its studies; 
4. Ensure that the division of work between the SAC and the IEPG dating from 1978, if considered 
obsolete, is replaced by an up-to-date agreement and that the 1986 co-operation agreement between the 
presidency of the IEPG and the Secretary-General of WEU is observed; 
5. Arrange for the presidency of the IEPG to address the Assembly once a year to inform it about 
developments in European armaments co-operation; 
6. Instruct the Secretariat-General to ensure periodical meetings of European defence study sessions 
and to co-ordinate national initiatives in this connection with a view to setting up a European defence 
research institute as soon as possible. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1987 during the second part of the thirty-third ordinary session (12th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Bassinet on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions (Document 1119). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
to Recommendation 454 1 
1. In order to enhance effective European armaments co-operation, the Council attaches great 
importance to the relationship between WEU and the IEPG. 
2. The different fora of European armaments co-open~tion could be used in a complementary way. 
Therefore, the IEPG action plan for an open European market for defence equipment as recommended 
by the EDIS report should be drawn up by the organs of the IEPG, in accordance with the Seville deci-
sions of June 1987. However, the possibility of the WEU conducting studies for the IEPG could be 
examined by the Council if the IEPG makes such a request. In general, the contacts between the WEU 
and the IEPG should be further developed. In this context the Council would support an invitation by 
the Assembly to the Chairman of the IEPG to address the Assembly in order to exchange views. 
3. As far as point 6 of the Assembly's recommendation is concerned, it should be mentioned that, 
for the time being, instead of striving towards establishing a European Defence Research Institute, the 
Council's action is directed towards encouraging co-operation between existing institutes, and towards 
encouraging the organisation by such institutes of seminars on European security aspects, the first of 
which is to be held at the IHEDN in Paris, in November 1988. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 2nd March 1988 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 7th March 1988. 
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(i) Considering that the determination of the WEU member countries to contribute, by reactivating 
the organisation, to the building of Europe means tightening links between Europe and its American 
allies, as stated in the platform adopted in The Hague; 
(ii) Welcoming the confirmation of a consensus in this respect between the two sides ofthe Atlantic, as 
testified by the President of the United States' public approval of the reactivation ofWEU and the plat-
form adopted in The Hague; 
(iii) Convinced that the maintenance of a large American force on the territory of Western Europe is a 
factor of deterrence essential to the security of all the members of the Atlantic Alliance; 
(iv) Noting with satisfaction that the United States Government does not intend to call in question its 
conventional and nuclear military commitment in Europe; 
(v) Aware of the need to show the authorities and public opinion in the member countries of the 
alliance that the existence of a European pillar is necessary for strong, balanced transatlantic co-operation; 
(vi) Reaffirming the need for equitable burden-sharing accompanied by a better sharing of political 
responsibilities in the Atlantic Alliance and in any event underlining the need for regular political consul-
tations and a real European-American partnership; 
(vii) Anxious that the development of negotiations on security and co-operation in Europe, disarma-
ment or the limitation of armaments, which it trusts can be started in 1988 and lead to positive results, 
should not call in question the political and military bases of joint defence; 
(viii) - Also convinced that European co-operation in security matters and the interests of the alliance 
mean taking account of the risks that might arise from events outside the North Atlantic Treaty area; 
- Welcoming the mutual understanding regarding operations undertaken by various countries to 
ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf; 
- Noting that these operations demonstrate the need for continuous and close co-operation 
between the member nations; 
(ix) Wishing to develop, increase the regularity of and institutionalise its exchanges with the United 
States Congress and Canadian Parliament, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Keep the governments and parliaments of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance regularly 
informed of its activities; 
2. Provide adequate information on a regular basis to the American media and public regarding the 
nature, scope and aims of the reactivation ofWEU, the specific constraints of the WEU countries in secu-
rity matters and European co-operation in that area; 
3. With the assistance of the WEU agency, study views on the future of the Atlantic Alliance published 
in the United States; 
4. Include burden-sharing in the agenda of its forthcoming meetings, taking account ofthe concerns 
and contradictory analyses being presented in the United States and in Europe on this question; 
5. Instruct the agency to prepare a study of every factor to be taken into account in assessing the bur-
dens incumbent upon each member of the alliance for ensuring joint security and communicate this study 
to the Assembly before the end of 1988; 
6. Examine the consequences for the security of Western Europe as a whole ofOanada's decision to 
transfer to the Federal Republic the brigade now deployed in Norway; 
67 
DOCUMENT 113 7 
7. Continue to study the implications of the platform of 27th October 1987 with a view to defining the 
disarmament and arms control aspects of European security requirements: 
(i) in particular, specify the importance for Western European security of conventional disarma-
ment establishing a balance at the lowest level in that field without which any agreement to 
reduce short-range weapons would worsen the consequences of the present imbalance; 
(ii) urge the early conclusion of a fully satisfactory agreement on chemical disarmament, i.e. pro-
viding for stringent verification procedure; 
(iii) urge the United States Government not to reduce the levels of American troops stationed in 
Europe without a satisfactory agreement on duly-verified conventional disarmament; 
8. Regularly exchange information as necesssary with the United States Government on the aims and 
action of forces of member countries and the United States in the Gulf; 
9. Extend its own exchanges of views to include all threats to international peace. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Pontillon, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. Paragraph 1.4 of the platform on European 
security interests adopted by the WEU Council 
on 27th October 1987 defines relations between 
Europe and the United States in security matters 
as follows: 
" ... the security of the Western European 
countries can only be ensured in close asso-
ciation with our North American allies. 
The security of the alliance is indivisible. 
The partnership between the two sides of 
the Atlantic rests on the twin foundations 
of shared values and interests. Just as the 
commitment of the North American 
democracies is vital to Europe's security, a 
free, independent and increasingly more 
united Western Europe is vital to the secu-
rity of North America. " 
Such words· would certainly have met with the 
approval ofthe signatories ofthe 1949 Washing-
ton Treaty setting up the Atlantic Alliance and, 
moreover, the preamble to that treaty includes 
very similar statements. They convey perfectly 
well the convictions behind the development of 
NATO, the establishment of the European Com-
munities and the modification of the Brussels 
Treaty in 1954 and circumscribe a situation that 
has been undeniable for more than three decades 
and still dominates international life today. The 
question is perhaps whether it will continue to 
dominate the world of tomorrow and in any event 
in what manner. 
2. There are a number of reasons for ques-
tioning the permanency of that situation and for 
wondering to what extent the United States will 
consider for much longer that " a free, indepen-
dent and increasingly more united Western 
Europe is vital to the security ofNorth America". 
During their visit to Washington from 11th to 
13th April 1988, the Assembly's General Affairs 
Committee and Presidential Committee certainly 
heard soothing remarks from representatives of 
the present administration. There is some satis-
faction in this but it must not be forgotten that the 
proximity of presidential elections does not 
encourage the expression of views that might not 
be orthodox. Conversely, the members of Con-
gress the committee met made no secret of the 
fact that the American public's views of United 
States participation in joint defence were evolv-
ing very rapidly, particularly because ofthe finan-
cial burden involved. 
3. In the economic area, it very soon became 
clear to the Americans that the emergence of a 
European Community organised round a Corn-
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mon Market had serious drawbacks for the 
United States, particularly because, as from about 
1970, its balance of paymerj.ts deficit became a 
permanent factor. Europeans! are continually urg-
ing the United States to restore order in the inter-
national financial system by reducing its deficit 
and re-establishing confidence in the dollar 
through a balanced budget. However, the imbal-
ance in the balance of payments and the budget-
ary deficit provide the United States with a way to 
finance its military and political commitments in 
the world and in Europe in particular. Asking 
them to restore a healthier financial situation 
implies that Europe will take over a share of the 
burden. Is Europe prepared to do so? 
4. Furthermore, while the progressive estab-
lishment of a European Common Market, which 
should, in 1992, lead to the complete abolition of 
obstacles to trade within the European Commu-
nity, is viewed by its supporters as a move 
towards free trade and the unification of Europe, 
the United States sees it from a quite different 
angle since it implies the emergence of a powerful 
economic entity capable of protecting itself 
against competition from American products and 
gaining an important place fqr itself on the world 
market at the expense of tho~e products. The fall 
in the exchange rate of the dollar in 1986-87 
allowed the United States to avoid some of the 
disadvantages of this competition. A stable or, a 
fortiori, higher exchange rate for the dollar would 
strengthen Europe's trade positions. Moreover, 
the introduction of a Europ~an currency might 
affect the power that the near-monopoly of the 
dollar gives the United States in creating means of 
payment. American public opinion is therefore 
constantly tempted to consider the emergence of a 
European power to be dangerous for the United 
States and its world role. 
5. In recent years, many observers have 
noted, however, that Europe was no longer, as in 
the past, the privileged commercial and economic 
partner of the United States. Increasingly, a shift 
in American external trade from East to West, 
accompanied by the move ·of many industrial 
activities, particularly among the most advanced 
sectors, from the Atlantic to tlhe Pacific front, has 
had a growing effect on the course followed by the 
United States. It is therefore inevitable that the 
place attributed to Western Europe in thoughts on 
the security of the United States is less important 
than ten, twenty or thirty years ago. 
6. These various considerations largely 
explain the trend of American public opinion in 
viewing Europe's place in the security of the 
United States. Although there has always been a 
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tendency towards isolationism, i.e. unwillingness 
to accept commitments abroad, this tendency 
seems to have strengthened in recent years due to 
disillusionment with Europeans and significant 
setbacks in American policy in other parts of the 
world, for instance in Vietnam and, more 
recently, Iran. It should be added that, justified or 
not, some parts of American public opinion were 
quite bitter about the attitude of certain European 
governments which did not wish to show solidar-
ity with the United States, in particular in 1986 
when Tripoli was bombed in retaliation to 
Libyan-backed terrorist acts. 
7. Whatever the United States administration 
may have said, President Reagan's speech of 17th 
March 1983 announcing the strategic defence ini-
tiative which was to give new impetus to prepara-
tory research on the deployment in space of a sys-
tem of defence against any ballistic nuclear 
missiles that an enemy might launch against 
American territory was designed to show the 
world and American public opinion that the gov-
ernment intended to give the country a defensive 
shield making its security independent of forces 
deployed abroad. It has indeed been rightly said 
that the less vulnerable the United States is the 
more credible will be its commitment to use every 
means at its disposal, even nuclear, to defend 
Western Europe. But it is difficult to believe that 
the choice of such an expensive, long-term under-
taking as the SDI is intended for any purpose 
other than to lay new foundations for the coun-
try's security and that it can be pursued to its con-
clusion at the same time as the deployment of 
other elements of American forces is strength-
ened. The fact that so far the SDI budget has been 
about 50% of what was estimated in 1983 indi-
cates that the United States is not trying to rush 
the completion of a defence system which sepa-
rates it from Europe. But the continuity of the 
effort and the steady refusal to allow it to be taken 
into account in negotiations with the Soviet 
Union on disarmament, even so far as to risk 
breaking off negotiations, clearly illustrate how 
intent the President of the United States is on pro-
tecting American territory. 
8. Developments in American-Soviet disarm-
ament negotiations also revealed some disturbing 
signs for Europe's security. One of them was the 
text on which the October 1986 Reykjavik sum-
mit meeting eventually foundered because the 
European members of the alliance then weighed 
up the risk they might run due to an American 
decision taken rapidly and without prior consul-
tation. Others stem from present uncertainty 
regarding the firmness of the intentions now 
being expressed by the United States Govern-
ment in certain areas such as short-range missiles, 
chemical weapons and conventional forces and 
the fact that they might be called in question after 
the 1988 elections. In view of the part played by 
the United States in the system that ensures 
Europe's security, it may be wondered to what 
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extent Western Europe can tie its security to an 
American guarantee that is in fact the very subject 
ofthese negotiations. In this COQnection, the plat-
form adopted in The Hague gives useful pointers 
to the place of deterrence and nuclear arms in 
European security requirements. 
9. What is in point offact at stake, even if nei-
ther the European governments nor that of the 
United States wish to admit it, is the maintenance 
of American forces in Europe. There are known to 
be many Congressmen, and a section of public 
opinion which is difficult to assess, in favour of at 
least a partial withdrawal of these forces. Their 
arguments are based, in particular, on financial 
considerations and their views are apparently 
borne out by the need to correct the balance of 
payments and balance the budget. The call for a 
better sharing of the financial burden of western 
defence between the United States and its allies 
has become a major topic in debates in Congress 
on security matters. One way or another, it shows 
that a large section of American public opinion 
feels that the United States does too much and 
pays too high a price in economic terms, while its 
allies take advantage of the situation to improve 
their financial and commercial positions in the 
world. 
10. Moreover, the decision to destroy 
medium- and shorter-range ground-based nuclear 
weapons implied by the signing of the agreement 
of 7th December 1987, the prospect of the with-
drawal or destruction of short-range weapons and 
the withdrawal, prior to any agreement on 
destruction by both sides, of American chemical 
weapons stockpiled in Europe will quickly affect 
the significance of maintaining American forces 
in Europe. Until now, this clearly showed any 
possible aggressor that they would play an active 
part in defending Western Europe by using weap-
ons appropriate to any challenge that might arise. 
But if they are left with only conventional weap-
ons when Soviet forces are numerically far 
superior to NATO forces as a whole, they might 
soon be reduced to a position in which the United 
States Government has to choose between using 
strategic nuclear weapons or sacrificing its expedi-
tionary force. In this case, the deterrent value of 
the American presence in Europe would be con-
siderably lessened. Above all, American public 
opinion would find it increasingly difficult to 
accept the maintenance of a relatively large force 
in Europe that might become hostage to a power-
ful aggressor. Addressing the Wehrkunde meeting 
in Munich on 7th February 1988, Mr. Carlucci, 
new United States Secretary of Defence, said: 
"I'd have to look at whether we should keep our 
forces here " in the event of American tactical 
nuclear weapons being withdrawn from 
Europe. 
11. These remarks are not based on your 
Rapporteur's personal impressions but stem 
clearly from many statements by leading Europe-
ans and Americam. !'le vera! of whom are not at all 
in favour of such a withdrawal. Here mention 
may be made of Henry Kissinger, former Secre-
tary of State, and Admiral Sir James Eberle, 
Director of the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, in the Independent of 6th January 1988. 
It is essential for European public opinion to be 
aware of these warnings so that, should such 
events occur, it would not panic but be prepared, 
at the appropriate time, to assume its due respon-
sibilities. 
12. There must obviously be no question of 
anticipating events or taking measures that might 
encourage a trend that no European wants. The 
idea often put forward of a European officer being 
appointed as Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe (SACEUR), for instance, is in no way 
commensurate with the requirement for Europe 
to do its utmost to ensure the continued presence 
of American forces on its territory. Conversely, 
the decision taken by our seven governments to 
revive WEU, the way they have, in this context, 
increased consultations on security and disarma-
ment matters and, finally, the adoption of the 
platform on European security interests on 27th 
October 1987, without prejudicing the future, 
help to prepare Western Europe for anything that 
may happen. 
13. Clearly, that is how the United States inter-
preted these facts: proof is to be found in Presi-
dent Reagan's speech to the world on Worldnet 
television on 4th November 1987 since, after 
introducing the future treaty on intermediate 
nuclear forces and announcing that there was no 
question of the United States going back on the 
SDI, he recalled that "the commitment of the 
United States to the alliance and to the security of 
Europe - INF treaty or no INF treaty - remains 
unshakeable ". In the same speech he then wel-
comed the affirmation by the WEU member 
countries of their identity in collective security 
matters, while maintaining their commitments to 
NATO, and expressed his satisfaction at the new 
defence co-operation between France and Ger-
many and also between France and the United 
Kingdom as nuclear powers. These statements 
were subsequently confirmed by Mr. Carlucci in 
Paris on 11th January 1988. 
14. It is thus quite clear that the United States 
Government considers that the development of 
continuing European consultations on security 
matters is neither a reason nor a pretext for 
restricting the American presence in Europe. If, 
however, such a measure were to be taken, the 
reactivation ofWEU would have helped to allow 
Europeans to prepare themselves realistically and 
effectively. 
15. The General Affairs Committee's visit to 
the United States and Canada in April 1988 
allowed it to improve its understanding of the 
American point of view in this connection. It had 
interesting talks at the Department of State and 
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the Pentagon and obtained useful indications 
regarding the will ofthe present administration to 
pursue a policy in which the defence of Europe 
continued to be given priority. Thanks to the 
Atlantic Council, it met several persons who 
examine the long-term aspects of security. In 
Congress, it held talks with the subcommittee of 
the House of Representatives that is preparing a 
report on burden-sharing and is thus able to 
assess the seriousness of the movement that is 
emerging in United States public opinion on this 
subject. The present report will try to draw con-
clusions from these meetings. 
16. The committee's visit to Canada was also 
of value because that country, so different from 
Europe because of its geographical situation, the 
nature of the dangers it has to face and the means 
at its disposal, has recently adopted a defence pol-
icy that brings it close to Europe in many respects. 
Admittedly, having no nuclear weapons, Canada 
cannot expect to play a role in the alliance compa-
rable to that of the United States, but in the con-
text of a defence policy based on deterrence its 
active participation in the alliance has a special 
role and your Rapporteur will devote a chapter to 
analysing what he learned while in Canada, 
where, in addition to Mr. Perrin Beatty, Minister 
of National Defence, the committee also met 
members of parliament, senior officials and rep-
resentatives of universities with whom it was able 
to have particularly detailed discussions thanks to 
the remarkable way the visit was organised. 
II. Questioning America• commitments 
17. Since the Vietnam war and the acknowl-
edgement by United States public opinion and 
the administration that United States policy in 
South-East Asia did not have the support of its 
European allies, a large section of well-informed 
public opinion in the United States seems, like 
Mr. Kissinger, to consider that there is a deep-
rooted difference between United States policy, 
an overall, worldwide one, and that of the West-
em European countries, a regional one, domi-
nated by theatre preoccupations in security mat-
ters. This interpretation of relations between 
Europe and the United States was endorsed in 
January 1988 by a commission set up by Mr. 
Weinberger, then Secretary of Defence, to advise 
the government on defence policy matters. For 
the first time, its report to the President of the 
United States brought out the strategic implica-
tions of these views. 
18. Certain European countries have taken an 
active interest in one or other region outside 
Europe in the last twenty years, but many Ameri-
cans consider this interest is attributable to erst-
while colonial activities and not to a view of the 
world balance of forces. The United States wel-
comed action that coincided with its own views, 
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as was the case in Lebanon and now in Chad and 
particularly in the Gulf. It also endorsed Euro-
pean initiatives that did not affect Washington's 
idea of the balance, such as the British Falklands 
expedition. But it saw the refusal of certain Euro-
pean countries to co-operate in American opera-
tions, in particular in the Middle East, Latin 
America and Libya, as cracks in western solidar-
ity. Whatever such actions may have been, the 
United States was unable to consider them as 
expressions of Europe's worldwide vocation since 
they were always undertaken by one or several 
countries, never by Europe as such. On the other 
hand, attempts to co-ordinate action by WEU 
member countries in the Gulf, although so far too 
modest, have nevertheless helped considerably to 
give those responsible for American external pol-
icy a favourable opinion of the reactivation of 
WEU. They probably also largely explain the cor-
dial tone of President Reagan's statement on 4th 
November 1987. 
(a) Financial aspects 
19. It is not surprising that it is often wondered 
in the United States whether the breakdown of 
the American military and budgetary effort does 
not lean too much in favour of Europe, where the 
prospect of an armed conflict seems hardly proba-
ble, to the detriment of areas where there is a 
greater threat and which are also important for 
American interests such as the Far East, the Gulf 
area and even certain parts of Africa and Latin 
America. It is naturally very difficult to assess 
what share of the United States defence budget is 
earmarked for each theatre, but some believe that 
Europe benefits from more than 50% of the bud-
get. It is easier to indicate the number of forces 
stationed there: of 540 000 men stationed outside 
United States territory, 324 000 are in Europe. 
Of 771 000 ground forces, 217 000 are stationed 
in Europe. Some consider this deployment exces-
sive. For instance, in January 1987 Mr. 
Brzezinski proposed to the Senate Armed Forces 
Committee that 100 000 men stationed in Europe 
be repatriated to the United States. However, a 
realistic assessment of the military challenges that 
American forces might have to face shows that, 
even if there is at present no serious crisis in 
Europe, it is there that the greatest numbers and 
best-equipped enemy forces would be deployed in 
the event of hostilities, even if the situation were 
the result of confrontations in other regions. 
Almost two-thirds of the Soviet army is deployed 
opposite Western Europe, not to speak of the 
armed forces of the people's democracies. 
20. This tendency to consider American partic-
ipation in Europe's security excessive is not a new 
one: for the last ten years, Senator Mansfield has 
regularly tabled amendments to the United States 
defence budget calling for the partial withdrawal 
of American forces from Europe in response to 
what he considered to be the inadequate share 
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Europeans assumed in their own defence. In July 
1984, when Senator Sam Nunn took up this pro-
posal, he failed by only one vote in the Senate. 
This shows the strength gained by the school of 
thought he represented due to a number of new 
circumstances, the most important of which are 
economic and financial. 
21. While, after he was first elected President 
of the United States, Mr. Reagan obtained a con-
siderable increase in the defence budget, which 
rose from $173 300 million in 1981 to $286 800 
million in 1985, particularly under heads relating 
to research and development on the one hand and 
equipment procurement on the other where the 
amount doubled, there have been no increases 
since 1986 due to the financial concerns in United 
States policy. The country's budget deficit and its 
balance of payments have deteriorated simultane-
ously. The following figures speak better than 
words. 
$ billion 
Trade balance Balance Financial year Budget deficit deficit of payments deficit 
1982 - 127.9 - 33.4 - 8.7 
1983 - 207.8 - 67.8 - 46.2 
1984 - 185.3 - 112.5 - 107.0 
1985 - 212.3 - 122.1 - 116.4 
1986 - 220.7 - 144.3 - 141.4 
1987 - 147.5 - 171.2 - 159.2 
(estimate) 
1988 - 123.3 
(estimate) 
22. While the United States GNP may be esti-
mated at about $4 000 billion, it must be noted 
that the budget deficit is close to 5% of GNP, that 
the national debt, which exceeds $2 000 billion, 
represents 50% and that the external debt, about 
$300 billion, is increasing considerably. The fall 
in the dollar exchange rate has done nothing to 
improve this trend. In December 1985, an agree-
ment between the President and Congress pro-
vided for automatic measures to reduce each head 
of public expenditure so as to reduce the budget 
deficit in stages until it disappeared in 1991. 50% 
of this decrease would have applied to the mili-
tary budget. A Supreme Court verdict in July 
1986 annulled the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act 
that had resulted from the agreement, declaring it 
unconstitutional, which means that, although the 
intentions of the President and Congress remain, 
reductions are no longer automatic. The 1987 def-
icit admittedly dropped to $148 billion, but this 
was due to a series of circumstances which had 
not been foreseen at the time of the adoption of 
the budget whose deficit was $187 billion, not all 
ofwhich will recur. In September 1987, the Presi-
dent and Congress agreed to delay by two years 
application of the measures planned in 1985, thus 
deferring their effects until after the 1988 presi-
dential election. 
23. Having had the public debt ceiling 
removed, President Reagan can therefore, in 
1988, again confine himselfto steps to reduce the 
budget deficit by limited savings allowing him to 
increase the defence budget to slightly above its 
1985 level, although expenditure authorisations 
started to fall in 1986, while avoiding a further 
increase in taxation. However, the rise in the defi-
cit in the balance of external accounts, which pro-
duces lower dollar rates, the impossibility of sig-
nificant cuts in interest rates and some inflation 
continue to make recovery measures necessary 
and there is every reason to think that the next 
administration, whether Republican or Demo-
crat, will have to make major cuts in all heads of 
the budget, including defence, which was not 
reduced by much in the financial year 1988. 
24. However, the new administration will 
probably wish to take spectacular measures with 
speedy results if only to take maximum advan-
tage of the authority that will have been conferred 
on it by the recent elections in order to ensure 
acceptance of lower home consumption and to 
show that the sacrifices citizens are required to 
make are not without effect. Expenditure voted 
on an annual basis will be affected first, i.e. 
expenditure on research, training and staff, 
whereas appropriations for expenditure on 
investment, in particular in the SDI, are commit-
ments covering several years and cannot be 
decreased very considerably at short notice. They 
increased by 54% between 1980 and 1985 and cur-
rent programmes will have to be continued so as 
not to waste the initial outlay and provision will 
have to be made for maintenance of the equip-
ment acquired. 
25. Hence it is, to say the least, very probable 
that from the beginning of 1989 the United States 
administration will have to make a considerable 
reduction in its defence budget over a period of 
several years and that, in this budget, expenditure 
for the maintenance of American forces in Europe 
will be among the easiest to reduce. The fact that 
the United States spends 6.7% of its GNP on 
defence, whereas its European allies spend only 
3.7% on average and many ofthem have not ful-
filled their 1984 undertaking to increase their mil-
itary expenditure by 3% per annum, can but bring 
grist to the mill of those who advocate reducing 
American expenditure on the defence of 
Europe. 
(b) Burden-sharing 
26. This is the background to the question of 
burden-sharing to which the United States is now 
paying close attention, and any analysis of future 
prospects shows that the problem will become 
even more acute in the next few years. The people 
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the committee met in the United States did not 
hide the fact that, apart from objective considera-
tions, the problem was mainly a political one, 
since the administration feared Congress's reac-
tions and the latter was very sensitive to pressure 
from public opinion to ensure a better sharing of 
defence efforts among the allies. 
27. There is in fact nothing more difficult to 
assess than the true effort each country makes for 
joint defence. It is convenient to compare the 
defence budget with the gross national product 
but this is of only very relative value in view of 
the fact that when calculating GNP account is not 
always taken of all economic data, that certain 
defence expenditure may not be included in the 
military budget and that it is impossible to sepa-
rate expenditure on the defence of special inter-
ests from expenditure intended for joint defence, 
particularly in regard to strategic nuclear forces 
and forces deployed outside the NATO area. 
Then there are all the arguments about the burden 
on the economy of compulsory military service, 
maintaining reserves, the regllllar army and the 
respective efficiency of one or the other in mili-
tary systems with weapons of very varying 
degrees of sophistication. Your Rapporteur does 
not intend to go into the arguments raised by this 
problem of assessing efforts made for joint 
defence. He will confine himself to a few remarks. 
28. It is evident that allocating 1% of GNP 
more or less for defence purposes, representing 
between 2. 5% and 5% of tax levied depending on 
the country, makes a considerable difference, par-
ticularly if it is continued for several decades in 
the form of productive investment. There is no 
doubt that the economic progress of Japan, the 
percentage of whose GNP allocated to defence 
has constantly been less than 1%, has been 
boosted by its low military expenditure, while the 
United States' heavy defence budget partly 
explains why its expansion has slowed down. 
While the European countries all fall between 
these two extremes, certain inequalities in the 
expansion of some of them may also be due to 
similar considerations. Argum~nts based on such 
differences cannot therefore be entirely refuted. 
29. A country's ability to resist, and hence to 
participate in a policy of collective deterrence, 
depends largely on the nature of its social consen-
sus. A sharp rise in fiscal pressure is liable to 
endanger this consensus. This implies on the one 
hand that Europe must remain attentive to the 
reactions of American society and on the other 
that no European country can entertain a sharp 
increase in military expenditure. When NATO 
decided on an annual increase of 3% in member 
countries' defence budgets many of them were 
unable to fulfil this undertaking. 
30. There is inevitably a price to pay for play-
ing a leading role in an alliance. This means that 
there is necessarily a link between United States 
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leadership, which it wishes to retain, and the bur-
den incumbent upon it. Further to that, any 
change in burden-sharing should lead to a new 
sharing of responsibilities. 
31. The fact that some of the United States' 
allies, which are admittedly not members of 
WEU, are trying rather cynically to evade the bur-
dens and responsibilities of a defence of which 
they intend to have the benefit, moreover, is on 
the one hand completely immoral and on the 
other hand helps American public opinion to 
grow weary of efforts to defend all its allies. The 
adoption by the Danish Parliament in April 1988 
of measures to ban nuclear weapon-carrying ves-
sels from Danish waters - while Soviet subma-
rines can in fact pass unimpeded through the 
Danish straits - is an act of this kind. 
32. The inequality in exchanges of defence 
equipment between Europe and the United States 
to a certain extent- admittedly difficult to assess 
with accuracy - restores the balance of burdens 
on either side of the Atlantic. 
33. For all these reasons, your Rapporteur con-
cludes that, while it seems impossible to find a 
perfectly satisfactory solution to the burden-
sharing problem, it is essential in present circum-
stances for Europe to make an effort, even lim-
ited, to prove its good will and also its 
determination to achieve a better sharing of the 
burden. It must also make clear that it requires 
political compensation for its efforts in the form 
of increased consultation in NATO and more 
information about the various operations outside 
the NATO area. It is also essential for Europe to 
endeavour to explain its views to its American 
allies, and in particular to public opinion and 
Congress. The WEU Assembly has taken useful 
steps in this direction by attempting to develop its 
relations with the United States Congress and the 
Canadian Parliament. Such exchanges must 
henceforth be made as permanent as possible. 
Everyone the committee met in America, 
whether in the government or parliament or pri-
vate individuals, expressed their full support, but 
this is an area in which there is often a great dis-
tance between good intentions and their imple-
mentation. 
34. However this may be, your Rapporteur 
believes that any dialogue on the matter requires 
a detailed knowledge of all the relevant facts. He 
therefore wishes agency experts to be asked to 
submit a technical report setting out all the facts 
which might serve as a basis for discussing these 
questions at the colloquy that the General Affairs 
Committee is organising in spring 1989. This 
means that the report must be transmitted to the 
Assembly before its December 1988 session. 
35. Speaking to the General Affairs Commit-
tee, Mr. Taft, the United States Deputy Secretary 
of Defence, stressed that he was to visit European 
capitals in spring 1988 in preparation for a report 
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on burden-sharing that was to be submitted to 
Congress before the end of the year. This visit 
should allow European and American members 
of the alliance to explain what they mean by the 
term burden-sharing and where the necessary 
effort should be made so as to avoid the misun-
derstandings that now seem to be emerging, at 
least at the level of public opinion and in the 
United States Congress. It is essential to avert any 
measures that might threaten the unity of the 
alliance. 
(c) Strategic aspects 
36. This prospect certainly did not escape the 
Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy 
set up by Mr. Weinberger, the former United 
States Secretary of Defence, to reflect on the 
future of American defence policy after 2000. 
This commission, chaired by Mr. Fred Ikle, then 
Under-Secretary of Defence, and Mr. Albert 
Wohlstetter, had eleven other members including 
Mr. Henry Kissinger, Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
General Vessey and General Goodpaster. After 
fifteen months' work, it submitted a report some 
sixty pages long to President Reagan on 13th Jan-
uary 1988 entitled "Discriminate deterrence". 
The committee was able to hold detailed talks 
with one of the authors of the report, General 
Goodpaster, in Washington on 12th April 
1988. 
37. This report is in no way a government text 
but merely gives an opinion. Nevertheless, the 
authority of the members of the commission and 
the fact that they have had important responsibil-
ities in both Democrat and Republican adminis-
trations, on the one hand, and the way this opin-
ion meets the current concerns of American 
public opinion, on the other, indicate that the text 
will carry considerable weight in United States 
defence policy in coming years, or more accu-
rately that it reflects ideas that are destined to play 
a considerable role during that period. Further-
more, a Pentagon official told the committee that 
the United States Government had paid $1.8 mil-
lion for this document to be prepared, which 
shows the value it attached to this work. In the 
Times of 18th January 1988, Mr. David Hart said 
the new Secretary of Defence, Mr. Carlucci, " has 
said on television that the Pentagon is already 
proceeding with some of the report's recommen-
dations, including the development of new tech-
nologies, and that it will study the report and pro-
ceed with those recommendations it considers 
appropriate". Similarly, in a lecture to the 
National Press Club in Washington, reported by 
Jane's Defence Weekly of 23rd January 1988, 
Mr. James Webb Jr., then United States Secretary 
ofthe Navy, endorsed most ofthe contents of the 
report "Discriminate deterrence", inter alia by 
contrasting the static defence strategy adopted by 
NATO with the need for units that can be 
deployed and fight wherever needed without it 
being necessary to negotiate stationing rights and 
having to become involved in local disputes 
implied by such stationing rights. The Secretary 
of the Navy admittedly decided to resign from the 
government a few weeks later as a protest at the 
reductions in the navy's budget forced upon him. 
38. In any event, the authors ofthe report were 
well aware that this text, intended for publication, 
would go not only to the American authorities but 
also to the leaders of the entire world, in particu-
lar those of the United States' allies, for whom it 
was admittedly not to be an expression of Ameri-
can policy but a useful indication of a tendency. 
Your Rapporteur does not know whether the 
WEU Council has used indications given in the 
report as a guideline for its own reflections. 
39. The starting point for that commission's 
deliberations is the fact that the United States is a 
world power whose interests lie at one and the 
same time in the Pacific region and that of the 
Atlantic, and also the Mediterranean, the Indian 
Ocean and the Gulf. It considers that this means 
that American defence must be based on a global 
strategy. It is not a matter of calling in question 
American commitments towards the Atlantic 
Alliance and Europe but merely of viewing these 
commitments in the context of global strategy. 
Hitherto, American strategy sought to meet two 
challenges: an attack by strategic nuclear weapons 
and a large-scale conventional attack in Central 
Europe. Both seem to him very improbable in the 
immediate or foreseeable future, whereas there 
are now true threats to United States interests in 
other regions of the world, and even on the Amer-
ican continent. 
40. A number of new factors seem liable to 
change radically the conditions in which United 
States security can be ensured: 
(a) the emergence of new military powers, 
important at global or regional level, 
such as China and Japan; 
(b) the strengthening of secondary powers, 
particularly in Asia and the Middle 
East; 
(c) the development of new technologies 
and new armaments industries in coun-
tries which had hitherto not been very 
large producers, such as India, Korea, 
Egypt and Brazil; 
(d) the upsetting of traditional balances of 
forces due to these new technologies; 
(e) the emergence of new nuclear powers; 
(f) the United States' growing difficulty in 
reaching agreement with friendly coun-
tries for obtaining or maintaining 
American bases on their territory, par-
ticularly in Asia and the Middle East, 
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but also in Europe, where Denmark, 
Spain, Portugal and Greece are proving 
to be increasingly difficult partners, 
thus limiting American intervention 
capability in the event of crisis; 
(g) the reluctance of the United States' 
European allies to be of assistance 
when American forces have to be 
deployed. In this connection, the report 
refers to France's refusal to allow 
American aircraft to fly over its terri-
tory when Tripoli was bombed in 1986. 
41. These are not new preoccupations: they 
have been expressed several times since the inva-
sion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and the 
Iranian revolution. The Americans then held that 
it was in the interests of the West as a whole for 
them to have means of intervention in the Gulf 
region, even if this meant redeploying for this 
purpose part of their forces in Europe, and they 
asked their European allies to arrange to replace 
these forces in the event of crisis. But the Euro-
pean members of the alliance, like the Americans 
responsible for the defence of Europe, quickly 
pointed out that, if there were to be a Soviet-
American confrontation in the Middle East or 
elsewhere, this would increase the threat to West-
ern Europe by encouraging the Soviet Union to 
take advantage of the weakening of the American 
presence to try to force a decision in a particularly 
sensitive region. The Canadian 1987 defence 
white paper makes the same remark, moreover. 
The United States Government endorsed this 
view in 1984. What is new in the American com-
mission's report is that it rejects this hypothesis 
and considers that possible success, in the Gulf 
for instance, " would confer a major economic 
and geostrategic advantage on the Soviet Union 
and deal a possibly decisive blow to the unity of 
the western alliances. History and common sense 
both suggest that if indeed they attacked, the 
Soviets would try to limit the war to one or a few 
of the Gulf states". It adds:" In the Gulf and else-
where, the Soviet Union will generally prefer to 
limit its operations to a region which it can win 
while minimising the risk of a wider war. The 
United States should not want to fight only at a 
time and place selected by the enemy. We should 
plan both on defending in the region attacked, 
with the defence including deep conventional air 
and missile strikes, and on conducting naval 
operations elsewhere. " But this retaliation would 
involve no escalation either at world level or at 
nuclear level. 
42. Studying the possible consequences of this 
strategy for Europe, Mr. Lothar Riihl, German 
Deputy Defence Minister, points out in a major 
article reviewing the American plan published by 
Die Welt of 19th January 1988 that the report 
raises neither the question of Europe's security 
nor that of maintaining sea links between Europe 
and North America which would be of vital 
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importance in time of crisis. But he notes that the 
text answers these questions indirectly by refer-
ring to the limits which will necessarily affect the 
American defence budget in the next few years: 
" The challenge will be to defend our interests in 
many different places, although we lack the 
resources necessary to give our allies and friends 
more support in peacetime. It is clear that the 
Pentagon will have to give priority to mobile 
forces that can be deployed anywhere and can 
counter aggressions through their capacity to 
retaliate quickly and at an appropriate level to a 
wide range of attacks. " 
43. From these considerations stems the con-
cept of discriminate deterrence, i.e. deterrence 
that adapts its means and the aims assigned to the 
weapons at its disposal to the possibilities and 
risks of each specific situation, which calls for 
greater strategic flexibility and mobility for Amer-
ican forces of all kinds. This means maintaining a 
maximum of nuclear options, be it offensive 
armaments or defensive armaments to be devel-
oped in the context of the SDI, the development 
of air and naval transport means or obtaining 
bases near regions where peace is threatened, par-
ticularly in the Middle East. 
44. It is clear that this course runs counter to 
the one followed by NATO for so long and 
endorsed by the governments of most European 
members of the alliance since, for them, it is a 
matter of deterring any form of aggression in 
Europe by a stance which gives maximum credi-
bility to intervention with American strategic 
nuclear weapons. Taking the results of the NATO 
summit meeting in March 1988 as a basis, the 
General Affairs Committee's interlocutors in the 
United States stressed the continuity of this pol-
icy. It may indeed be considered that it is the 
deployment agreed by members of the Atlantic 
Alliance in Europe that makes such an aggression 
improbable: to weaken the close link between the 
defence of Europe and certain mutual destruction 
might be a destabilising factor in Europe itsel£ In 
any event, as Lothar Riihl notes, it would mean 
that the United States must ask its European 
allies " to assume more responsibility for defend-
ing Western Europe with their own forces in order 
to allow the United States, a world power, to use 
its military resources in a more economic man-
ner". 
45. One possible expression of the policy advo-
cated in the report on discriminate deterrence 
might be for the United States to reserve the right 
to redeploy forces stationed in Europe to theatres 
of operations outside the NATO area, without 
prior consultation. The governments of the Euro-
pean member countries of the alliance would find 
it particularly difficult to oppose this since they 
have no interest in NATO being seen as more of 
an obstacle to the mobility of American forces, 
but they will have to make arrangements to be 
able to replace the redeployed American forces 
immediately. 
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(d) The defence of Europe 
46. Another trend had been looming up for 
some time in American strategic thinking, how-
ever, which Europeans have every reason to be 
concerned about, i.e. the idea that nuclear escala-
tion is no longer considered as a means of deter-
rence designed to associate American strategic 
nuclear arms with Europe's security but as an 
instrument for fighting and winning against a pos-
sible aggressor. It states: " The alliance should 
threaten to use nuclear weapons not as a link to a 
wider and more devastating war - although the 
risk of further escalation would still be there- but 
mainly as an instrument for denying success to 
the invading Soviet forces. The nuclear weapons 
would be used discriminately in, for example, 
attacks on Soviet command centres or troop con-
centrations", i.e. behind the enemy's lines. This 
means the United States must have short-range 
precision-guided weapons with nuclear warheads, 
i.e. sophisticated tactical nuclear weapons. Fur-
thermore, the role assigned to French and British 
nuclear weapons would no longer be one of global 
deterrence but of selective deterrence against 
Soviet nuclear strikes in Europe. An attempt 
would first be made to stop the aggressor by 
means of purely conventional weapons whose 
performance would have to be similar to those of 
nuclear weapons so as to benefit to the maximum 
from the West's technological superiority. This 
would imply heavy investment in the develop-
ment of such weapons, particularly stealth air-
craft and missiles, smart munitions, anti-ballistic 
defence systems and better space capability. It 
would also mean resorting very quickly to tactical 
nuclear weapons. It is also known that those tak-
ing part in the Atlantic summit meeting in March 
1988 were far from unanimous on the question of 
modernising theatre nuclear weapons. 
47. In the article quoted above, Lothar Riihl, 
the German Deputy Defence Minister, points out 
that NATO deployment, unlike Soviet deploy-
ment, is not intended to wage a war combining 
the use of both conventional and nuclear weap-
ons, in particular because it has only a limited 
number of command posts and air bases, which 
would make it easier for the Soviet Union to take 
rapid, effective and discriminate (including 
nuclear) action against alliance forces. He also 
says that NATO deployment is purely defensive, 
which limits its possibilities for discriminate 
offensive actions as envisaged by the authors of 
the report and he notes that concern to avoid 
recourse to extremes of nuclear war should lead 
the West to avoid reaching Soviet territory with 
nuclear missiles. This " would mean, in fact, a 
conception oflimited nuclear war in Europe with-
out the umbrella of American strategic weap-
ons". "The consequences of such a strategy for 
Western Europe's security would be as fatal as 
returning to the summary alternative between a 
nuclear artillery duel on the battlefield and mas-
sive retaliation with thermonuclear weapons of 
mass destruction in the event of an attack on 
Western Europe", concludes Lothar Riihl, who 
considers the American proposals to be the ruin 
of the flexible response doctrine which is the basis 
of NATO strategy. The mistrust regularly voiced 
in France about the words " flexible response " 
shows the same concern, forcefully expressed 
inter alia by President Mitterrand, not to accept 
any hypothesis involving a risk of nuclear war in 
Europe. 
48. In any event, for many years there has been 
a tendency towards a reorientation of defence pol-
icy in the United States. Europe should take this 
tendency even more seriously since new circum-
stances have given it greater credit. 
49. (a) The economic and financial position of 
the United States, which indicates that the United 
States will not be able to associate support for a 
defence policy based on NATO doctrine with the 
choice of discriminate deterrence proposed by the 
commission. 
50. (b) The platform on European security 
interests adopted by the WEU Council on 27th 
October 1987 is a prior response but is appropri-
ate to a possible evolution of American policy: 
(i) because it provides for Europeans to 
assume a larger share of the defence of 
Europe, which meets the American 
concern and probably explains its 
warm reception by President Reagan 
and Mr. Carlucci, Secretary of 
Defence; 
(ii) because it stresses the value the Euro-
pean members of the alliance attach to 
deterrence based on both the nuclear 
and the conventional arms of the 
allies; 
(iii) because it is associated with a reactiva-
tion ofWEU whose aim is to give Eur-
ope the means of expressing and put-
ting over its views on security and 
defence matters. 
51. (c) The Washington summit meeting on 
7th December 1987 which led to the INF agree-
ment being signed and started or revived a series 
of negotiations on arms reductions. This may be 
turning United States defence policy in different 
directions from those advocated in the report 
since it seems difficult to pursue at one and the 
same time disarmament applying inter alia to tac-
tical nuclear weapons and a defence policy based 
on a concept of discriminate deterrence which, on 
the contrary, implies improving and possibly 
using such weapons. Furthermore, the report on 
discriminate deterrence advocates pursuing the 
SDI, considers verification of a possible chemical 
disarmament agreement difficult but also pro-
poses a large reduction in stocks of strategic 
nuclear weapons and the dismantlement - and 
hence not simply the withdrawal - of American 
77 
DOCUMENT 113 7 
and Soviet conventional units stationed in 
Europe. These questions concern first and fore-
most Europe's security and it would be highly 
desirable for the United States' European allies to 
be asked to give their views on the subject. 
52. The question obviously arises of whether 
or not the measures which may be taken by the 
European members of the Atla~tic Alliance to 
compensate for a possible withdrawal of Ameri-
can forces from Europe may not lead to or speed 
up withdrawal measures. The fact that the Ameri-
can authorities speak encouragingly about any 
efforts towards the joint organisation of European 
security is ambiguous in this connection. It cer-
tainly means these efforts suit the United States 
Government. But, insofar as that government 
seems to be leaning increasingly towards a new 
redeployment of its forces, it may be thought that 
any step towards Europeans taking over from 
them will suit them whereas, for Europeans, the 
continued presence of the American umbrella is a 
factor of security that is difficult to replace. 
53. However, it is quite clear that the American 
decisions were taken and will continue to be taken 
in the light of considerations in which Europe 
occupies only a very secondary place. There is 
certainly no question of decoupling America from 
Europe politically, and no American specialist 
proposes this. The aim is to defemd as well as pos-
sible American interests in the world and the 
security of United States terri~ory. Europeans 
must obviously emphasise the importance of the 
European theatre in the world balance and the 
fact that, were there to be a major conflict, Europe 
would be the main theatre of operations. They 
should also recall as strongly as possible the value 
they attach to a strategy of deterrence and their 
fear of any strategy of confrontation. They have, 
moreover, considerable support from a section of 
well-informed public opinion in the United States 
and, in particular, on the part of military leaders 
in NATO. However, it is to be feared that their 
lack of cohesion may facilitate a change in Ameri-
can strategy just as much as their co-operation 
may provoke a change. 
54. It therefore seems that Europe can try to 
convince its ally to continue to deploy its forces so 
as to ensure a deterrence to protect Europe and at 
the same time itself take all necessary steps to 
maintain an adequate level of deterrence, even in 
the event of the departure of American forces, so 
as to avoid such withdrawals resulting in Western 
Europe being discouraged, leading to political and 
military dispersion and the weakening of its will 
to defend itself, which is an essential factor in 
deterrence. The reactivation of WEU and the 
adoption of the platform in The Hague were 
mainly intended to strengthen European partici-
pation in Europe's security and to overcome the 
moral crisis which followed the twofold NATO 
decision of December 1979. If they become the 
effective foundations of a European defence pol-
icy, they can therefore help to inform the Ameri-
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cans of European views on security matters and 
prepare Europe to assume greater responsibility 
for its own defence. 
55. In this connection, it may be regretted that 
the Franco-British summit meeting held in late 
January 1988 failed to produce results in the 
essential field of co-operation in the production 
and use of nuclear weapons in spite of the princi-
ple accepted by the seven governments in The 
Hague that bilateral co-operation had a place in 
European security policy. The question of a 
return ofFrench forces to NATO integrated com-
mand should, today, be even less of a prior condi-
tion for Franco-British understanding since the 
Seven had nothing like this in mind when they 
drew up the platform. Discussions about the 
future of NATO, which have become very wide-
spread in the United States and consequently in 
Europe in the last few weeks, make such a return, 
that French public opinion apparently finds unac-
ceptable, most unlikely. Conversely, all observers 
can see that there has been a firm and steady rap-
prochement in recent years between France and 
the other European members of the alliance on 
security matters. During the London talks, 
France, moreover, took another step in this direc-
tion by agreeing to consider the use of its sea ports 
by its allies in the event of an emergency. Con-
versely, France's entire technological and finan-
cial effort in the last thirty years, first to develop 
independent nuclear weapons and then to pro-
cure the wherewithal to come swiftly to the assist-
ance of its allies in the event of a crisis while 
retaining the capability of intervening if necessary 
outside the NATO area, would lose much of its 
significance if these forces were to be brought 
back under integrated command. The conditions 
in which British nuclear weapons were consti-
tuted are quite different, but it is time considera-
tion was given to whether these differences still 
preclude any form of co-operation. 
56. The French proposal for Franco-British 
co-operation in nuclear matters corresponded to 
the platform adopted in The Hague and took its 
place in the context of the decisions taken by 
NATO in Montebello in 1983, at the request of 
the United States, to modernise all categories of 
weapons deployed in Europe. The Soviet-
American treaty on intermediate nuclear forces in 
no way alters this decision. On the contrary, it 
makes its application even more urgent because 
American intermediate-range land-based nuclear 
weapons are probably destined to be eliminated 
in the near future and deterrence will then be 
exercised only by other weapons which some 
believe should consequently be as sophisticated 
as possible, whether equipped with nuclear war-
heads or conventional explosives. Mrs. Thatcher, 
United Kingdom Prime Minister, insisted 
strongly on this point when addressing the North 
Atlantic Council in Brussels on 17th February 
1988, remarking that disarmament related to the 
number and not the quality of weapons of the two 
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categories. Progress in recent years, moreover, 
has tended increasingly towards the same means 
of delivery being used for both categories. The 
Soviet Union is deploying new weapons such as 
the SS-25 and the committee was told in the 
United States that no reduction in the Soviet mili-
tary effort could yet be discerned. 
57. One of the aims of the dialogue between 
Europeans and Americans would certainly be to 
allow the European members of the Atlantic Alli-
ance to gain a clearer perception of the American 
view of the implications of the worldwide dimen-
sion of United States responsibilities. For 
instance, it is not illogical for the United States to 
consider using the troops it maintains in Europe 
as a reserve that could be used elsewhere if 
required, and Europe has too great a need for 
these forces to be kept in Europe, in view of their 
deterrent role, to object to their being made more 
mobile to meet the requirements ofUnited States' 
worldwide strategy. Hence, arrangements should 
be made for them to be replaced by European 
forces in the event of an emergency making it nec-
essary to redeploy them quickly outside the 
NATO area. 
58. On the other hand, the General Affairs 
Committee's talks in Washington showed that the 
Americans still needed to be convinced that 
attempts such as the reactivation of WEU were 
not intended only to strengthen the alliance's mil-
itary action and to support American policy but 
that European union was still considered a major 
objective. WEU cannot be encouraged when it 
holds consultations in the Gulf and discouraged 
when it wishes to discuss disarmament because 
both contribute to the search for unity of reflec-
tion and action among Europeans. In certain 
cases, this search may hamper American policy. 
This is a drawback that the United States will 
have to accept if, finally, it wishes the Europeans 
to be a strong ally in whom it can have confi-
dence. 
Ill. Disarmament 
59. The signing on 8th December 1987 of a 
treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and the United States on the destruc-
tion of their medium- and shorter-range missiles 
was clearly a milestone in the evolution of rela-
tions between the two great powers, but also 
between Europe and the United States. By adopt-
ing Resolution 77, our Assembly on the one hand 
showed that it approved this agreement and on 
the other asked the United States Senate to ratify 
it. The adoption of this resolution, before the 
treaty was signed, confirmed a fundamental 
Assembly position in favour of disarmament and 
conveyed the view that the INF agreement did 
not endanger Western European security. For 
some, perhaps it also showed fundamental hostil-
ity to all nuclear weapons. Others, on the con-
trary, consider that Europe's security is ensured 
mainly by the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons 
but that the contribution of ground-based 
medium-range missiles is not decisive for such 
deterrence. The latter had been worried about the 
turn taken in the Soviet-American summit meet-
ing in Reykjavik in October 1986 and in particu-
lar the American proposal to destroy all ballistic 
missiles before 1996. The 1987 treaty had no such 
drawbacks and above all did not jeopardise the 
bases on which Europe's security has been based 
for almost forty years. Finally, it had been the 
subject of exchanges ofviews between the Ameri-
cans and their allies. Everyone is aware, however, 
that the INF treaty has given rise to discussion in 
both Europe and the United States as can be seen 
from the discussions in the relevant United States 
Senate committee and the testimonies it receives, 
particularly from military staff who have served 
in NATO commands. As the Assembly voted 
clearly on this matter and there is every reason to 
believe that the United States Senate will ratify 
the treaty without amendment, otherwise further 
negotiations on the amended texts would be nec-
essary, your Rapporteur feels he has no need to go 
into the discussion further. 
60. However, the Washington meeting led 
President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev to examine 
the prospect of further negotiations on various 
aspects of disarmament and to envisage either 
giving new impetus to negotiations which have 
already been under way for a long time - such as 
those on chemical weapons - or starting new 
negotiations in areas where nothing had yet been 
done - short-range nuclear weapons, for instance. 
Since January 1987, in fact, the Soviet Union had 
been making many proposals in this sense and, 
since the Washington meeting, it and the United 
States have continued to work out and present 
proposals aimed at extending disarmament to 
other sectors. 
61. It is therefore more than probable that in 
future years a number of separate negotiations 
will be held, not always with the same partici-
pants, since the European members of the alliance 
will be participating in some of them, in particu-
lar those on conventional forces, while others will 
remain on a bilateral level between the United 
States and the Soviet Union and not necessarily 
for the same period of time. If Western Europe 
wishes its interests to be defended everywhere, it 
must spell out what its interests are in due time 
and inform its American allies accordingly, other-
wise it cannot hope to have its views taken into 
proper account. 
62. At the moment it may be said that the 
WEU countries' positions on disarmament are 
not identical. All certainly agree that disarma-
ment must be tackled in such a way as to give 
them maximum security at the lowest possible 
level of armaments in every area. They would 
probably also agree that the abolition of chemical 
weapons should be achieved as soon as possible, 
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that the abolition of nuclear weapons can be a 
long-term aim and that peace in Europe is linked 
with a degree of respect for human rights and dis-
armament that also ensures peace in the rest of 
the world. But there are fairly wide differences in 
points of view on the application of these princi-
ples and, in particular, on the pltiority to be given 
to each sector of disarmament. Geographical rea-
sons and the fact that certaillt countries have 
weapons not available to others also explain these 
differences, which were reflected in the discus-
sions in committee. Some members wish absolute 
priority to be given to nuclear disarmament and 
do not agree to French and British weapons being 
included in alliance deterrence. 
63. On the Soviet side, and whatever opinion 
one may have of Mr. Gorbachev's motivation, 
sincerity and aims, it is inevitable that his coun-
try's security interests should be taken into 
account in the proposals made or positions 
defended on disarmament matters. Conse-
quently, apart from the advantage the Soviets, 
like everyone else, may derive from limiting 
expenditure on armaments, it is already clear that 
the aim of the Soviet Union is: 
(a) to bring Europe's interests into opposi-
tion with those of the United States 
insofar as possible so as to weaken 
Europe's confidence. in NATO for 
ensuring its security. from this point of 
view, any withdrawal of American 
forces from NATO would be a vic-
tory; 
(b) to obtain the denuclearisation of 
Europe which would be of benefit to 
Soviet conventional superiority; 
(c) to bring out differences of views among 
Europeans so as to paralyse any prog-
ress towards the unification ofWestern 
Europe and above all to prevent it 
becoming a political, military and 
nuclear power. 
64. This threefold aim is quite clear from the 
remarks made by Mr. Honecker in October 1987 
and then by Mr. Shevardnadze in Bonn in Janu-
ary 1988. Their purpose was to exploit the Ger-
mans' legitimate fear of their territory becoming 
the battlefield in a nuclear war ,and their equally 
legitimate wish to develop re~tions with Ger-
mans in the GDR in order to rally public opinion 
at least, if not the government, to their views. 
Conversely, the Soviet Union is constantly 
criticising France for wishing to maintain nuclear 
deterrence. For instance, during Mr. Chirac's visit 
to Moscow on 14th May 1987, Mr. Ryzhkov, 
Soviet Prime Minister, said: " Today the Soviet 
Union is naturally wondering about the role that 
France can and should play at this turning point 
in the destinies ofEurope and the world. Unfortu-
nately, we do not see France among those who are 
against mutual nuclear deterrence, who wish to 
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stop the roulette of nuclear peril in Europe and 
lower the risk of self-destruction. There are dis-
turbing aspects to the policy of the French Gov-
ernment, particularly where nuclear missiles are 
concerned. " The intention behind these words, 
intended to turn the Federal Republic and France 
against each other, is quite clear. The aims are in 
no way new but the fact that the situation in 
Europe seemed less stable than in the past was 
encouragement to the Soviet Union to take 
advantage of this to advance its cause. 
65. Again, on the American side, the same rea-
sons for querying the scale, nature and trend of 
overseas commitments lead to positions being 
adopted towards disarmament that are not neces-
sarily those of Europe: 
(a) there is a strong anti-nuclear current 
flowing through American public opin-
ion which wishes the United States to 
stop linking its security with the threat 
to use nuclear weapons; 
(b) this current joins the opinion of those 
who fear American territory may be 
threatened with mass destruction 
because of matters that do not concern 
it directly. 
66. These two attitudes of opinion can but 
encourage American leaders to seek to protect 
United States territory either by weapons of a new 
type or through disarmament and to try to keep 
any confrontation in Europe at a conventional 
level. Yet so far the American authorities have 
never given up the principle of deterrence and 
have opposed the idea of denuclearising Europe, 
just as they have rejected proposals to withdraw 
American forces from Europe. 
67. While the negotiations to reduce long-
range ballistic missiles by 50% seem to be pro-
gressing quite satisfactorily, although it does not 
seem possible to reach an agreement in spring 
1988 because of verification problems, other 
negotiations, whether under way or only planned, 
seem destined to be long drawn out in view ofthe 
complexity of the problems to be solved. Your 
Rapporteur is not in a position to say what prog-
ress has been made in each series but merely 
wishes to try to define where Europe's interests lie 
in the various areas. In doing this, he realises that 
European views are far from identical on such 
matters and he will try to describe the differences 
that exist and seek positions on which they might 
be overcome. 
68. Prospects for true disarmament must obvi-
ously be examined in strategic terms and present 
uncertainty about the doctrine for the use of 
American forces can but make it more difficult to 
obtain a clear view of the next stages. Even the 
signing of the INF agreement is giving the United 
States problems which are now being discussed by 
the Senate Armed Forces Committee, such as 
what to do with the nuclear warheads mounted on 
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the missiles that are to be destroyed. Will they be 
mounted on short-range missiles just when nego-
tiations are to be opened on reducing such mis-
siles? Will they be mounted on ship- or airborne 
medium-range missiles not subject to limitation 
or destruction agreements? Will they be 
destroyed? What will become of the Trident pro-
gramme on which depends the necessary 
modernisation of British nuclear weapons? The 
fate of these nuclear warheads is clearly not just a 
technical matter, but above all a matter for strate-
gic decisions. It will therefore be a means of 
assessing the United States Government's inten-
tions. 
69. Because of the development of disarma-
ment negotiations, on the one hand, and the 
changes taking shape in American security con-
cepts, on the other, there is now a European stra-
tegic area governed by European considerations. 
It is the subject of separate disarmament negotia-
tions. It will be outside the SDI protective system 
to be deployed to cover the United States. In any 
event, it will continue to be the area most threat-
ened in the event of hostilities because it has the 
densest concentration of forces and weapons and 
the populations are the most vulnerable. It is 
therefore essential for Europe to be able to make 
its voice heard in disarmament matters and on 
alliance strategy. The platform adopted in The 
Hague is an acknowledgment of this situation and 
it must now be carried into effect both in WEU 
and in NATO. Just as the latter has decided that 
its weapons should be modernised, it should also 
define its plans for disarmament so that many 
aspects of this undertaking do not remain the pre-
rogative of Soviet proposals and American con-
cessions. 
(a) Strategic nuclear weapons 
70. Negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons 
are still purely bilateral. At the present stage, the 
purpose is only to reduce by 50% the number of 
Soviet and American strategic missiles. Since 
there is a relative balance between the two great 
powers in this area, with a number of missiles that 
far exceeds the requirements of maintaining a sec-
ond strike capability for a country already devas-
tated by a first nuclear attack, such a reduction 
would admittedly not have very great strategic 
consequences, i.e. it would not call in question the 
reciprocal deterrent capability. This situation 
would change only if the deployment of an anti-
missile defence system became effective enough 
to have to saturate it by firing far more missiles 
than it could cope with in order to pierce it and 
attain enemy territory. It is therefore either the 
start of second negotiations on a larger reduction 
in the number of means of delivery or the devel-
opment and early success ofthe SDI which would 
call in question the principle of mutual assured 
destruction (MAD), the basis of mutual deter-
rence. Information now available about the 
development of the SDI and its budgetary pros-
pects indicates that there is no immediate risk. 
71. The Soviet Union has stated several times, 
however, that it would not agree indefinitely to 
British and French nuclear forces being left out of 
negotiations. But the number of strategic ballistic 
missiles held by the United Kingdom and France 
is kept to the minimum necessary to be deterrent. 
Whereas the United States and the Soviet Union 
possess between 10 000 and 12 000 strategic mis-
siles each, France has only 300 and the United 
Kingdom even less. To include European means 
of delivery in the inventory of western missiles 
which have to retain parity with the number of 
Soviet missiles would amount to renouncing 
what gives these forces a deterrent value, i.e. the 
independence of the authorities required to 
decide on their use. To insist on a proportional 
reduction in these forces, or a fortiori a reduction 
equal to that made by the two great powers, would 
remove most of their effectiveness. 
72. Your Rapporteur is aware that there are 
strong currents hostile to any deployment of 
national nuclear weapons in Europe either for 
radically anti-nuclear reasons or because of the 
inequality that the coexistence of nuclear and 
non-nuclear powers creates among European 
countries. But he notes that in the platform 
adopted in The Hague the seven WEU member 
governments accepted that Europe's security was 
ensured by deterrence and that the latter 
depended above all on nuclear weapons. At the 
present juncture, keeping French and British stra-
tegic nuclear forces at a level which makes them 
sufficiently credible is the corollary of this, partic-
ularly at a time when the United States is wonder-
ing about the role of deterrence in its own strat-
egy. In the event of a drastic reduction in the 
strategic arsenals of the two great powers, this 
obviously does not prevent the United Kingdom 
and France taking part in global disarmament 
aimed at the elimination of nuclear weapons. But 
that day is still a long way away. 
(b) Short-range nuclear weapons 
73. Starting with the negotiations that led to 
the Washington agreement on the double zero 
option, the question arose as to whether this 
should not be turned into a treble zero option 
which would have led to the elimination of 
nuclear weapons with a range ofless than 500 km. 
Finally, the American negotiators postponed this 
proposal for examination at a later stage. Further-
more, the Soviet Union seems to have accepted 
that the elimination of short-range nuclear weap-
ons in Europe could not be achieved without a 
significant, controlled reduction in conventional 
forces and armaments ensuring a satisfactory bal-
ance in this area beforehand. However, the estab-
lishment of a conventional disarmament pro-
gramme to be negotiated in Vienna in a 
multilateral framework is running into serious 
difficulties because of the many factors that have 
to be taken into account and the necessary verifi-
cation measures. The number and complexity of 
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the questions that have arisen suggest that these 
negotiations will be very lengthy. The list of items 
to be included in the agenda is still being drawn up. 
74. The specific problem of short-range 
nuclear weapons was the main subject of discus-
sion at the Wehrkunde meeting in Munich on 7th 
February 1988. It led to Mr. Caducei, United 
States Secretary of Defence, adopting a clear 
position against any denuclearisation of Europe 
and in favour of the modernisation of tactical air-
to-surface missiles and nuclear artillery in order 
to protect the flexible response strategy once the 
INF agreement came into force. 
75. It must be noted that this is a matter which 
divides the Western European countries most, and 
in particular France and the Federal Republic. The 
German positions were expressed very clearly by a 
former member of our Assembly and former 
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the 
Federal Republic, Peter Corterier, now Secretary-
General of the North Atlantic Assembly, in an arti-
cle entitled " After double zero " in Le Monde of 
4th February 1988. He said" many West Germans 
are tempted to turn the double zero into a treble 
zero by accepting the Soviet proposal to do away 
with theatre nuclear weapons in Europe ". If 
account is taken of " the idea that weapons rather 
than political tension are the cause of insecurity, it 
has to be noted that this is what is shared the best by 
ppblic opinion in Germany ", which leads to Ger-
man political forces " evolving towards a consensus 
on this question ". Mr. Corterier considers that 
"this political fact has consequences far more seri-
ous than the neutralism that Parisian circles suspect 
are tempting the Federal Republic". He concludes 
that " a categorical no to negotiations on nuclear 
weapons would have disastrous effects for the alli-
ance because public opinion would not understand 
it". The obvious consideration that German terri-
tory- both the Federal Republic and the GDR-
would inevitably be where short-range nuclear 
weapons would find their target is a perfectly plausi-
ble explanation for the slogan he quotes: " The 
shorter the range of the nuclear weapon, the deader 
the German. " The zero-zero option seems to a cer-
tain extent to protect Europe's western and eastern 
fringes (i.e. the Soviet Union) from nuclear destruc-
tion by a possible first strike: the nuclear threat is so 
to speak concentrated on German territory, which 
is obviously not at all pleasant. It should be recalled, 
however, that the number of medium-range ship-
or airborne nuclear weapons is far greater than the 
number of surface-based weapons that are to be 
destroyed in both East and West, which means that 
all European countries are still threatened by such 
weapons, in both East and West, and that, after the 
INF agreements, the threat to German territory 
would be no greater except insofar as the level of 
deterrence is reduced by these agreements. 
76. In an interview granted to the Nouvel 
Observateur on 19th December 1987, President 
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Mitterrand said French nuclear weapons were not 
targeted on German territory. These weapons 
were not a means of combat but of deterrence 
wh~se role was pre-strategic, i.e. intended solely 
to give the enemy a final warning before strategic 
nuclear weapons were used. " The ultimate warn-
ing is intended for anyone who might constitute a 
threat. This is not the role of short-range weap-
ons", he specified. But Mr. Corterier considers 
that this distinction, which eliminates constraints 
linked with th~ weapons themselves, is not 
enough to convmce the Germans that the weap-
ons turned in their direction are not intended to 
be used but only to deter a third power. However, 
the French view that the aim of any European 
security policy is not only to avoid nuclear war 
but to prevent any form of war in Europe remains 
fully valid. The withdrawal from Europe of weap-
ons that the Americans call tactical and the 
French pre-strategic would weaken the deterrent 
capability of the forces of the Atlantic Alliance 
and make conventional war more likely. The con-
sequences for Germany and for Europe as a whole 
might be just as tragic as nuclear war. 
77. Mr. Corterier therefore proposes a number 
of measures to overcome this Franco-German 
difference. 
78. (a) He recalls that" for the West German 
Government nuclear disarmament must con-
tinue to be linked with conventional disarma-
ment and go hand in hand with it". The United 
States and the Soviet Union now seem to share 
this view. It is indeed perfectly logical in the con-
text of a strategy of confrontation in which there 
is recourse to tactical weapons when it becomes 
obvious that the enemy offensive has not been 
~ontaine~ by t~e use of conventional weapons. It 
IS less smtable m a strategy in which pre-strategic 
weapons play the role of warning the attacker that 
strategic nuclear weapons will be used. Neverthe-
l~ss, a reduction in .conventional capability suffi-
Cient to avert the nsk of a surprise attack would 
make .the nuclear warning afforded by pre-
strategtc weapons less necessary and conse-
quently negotiations linking the two considera-
tions might be acceptable to all. 
79. (b) He considers that the situation makes it 
'' more or less inevitable that ceilings on theatre 
nuclear forces will soon be negotiated " since " the 
maintenance of nuclear deterrence based on the 
transatla~tic relationshi~ " is, in his view, " a 
more satisfactory solutiOn than a third zero 
option". Your Rapporteur can but endorse this 
view: from the moment short-range nuclear 
weapons are designed only to enhance deterrence 
through the possibility of a last warning, there is 
no need to deploy very many of them to obtain 
~his e~ec~. This would not be so in a strategy giv-
mg pnonty to a fighting capability. However 
nuclear ordnance and missiles with a range ofles~ 
than 500 km number in the tens of thousands on 
both sides. This adds nothing to their deterrent 
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effect but helps to convince a potential enemy 
that the West would not resort to strategic weap-
ons. Conversely, the total elimination of these 
weapons " would be dangerous because it would 
further weaken the American guarantee and the 
credibility of flexible response", Mr. Corterier 
adds. 
80. (c) While considering the withdrawal of 
French forces from the NATO integrated military 
structure to be irreversible, Mr. Corterier asks 
French leaders to convince the Germans "that 
the French would become involved without hesi-
tation at the outset of hostilities on the eastern 
frontiers of the Federal Republic". This concords 
perfectly with the modified Brussels Treaty and 
the platform adopted in The Hague which com-
mit the French Government. But when he 
criticises French political circles for" tending too 
much .to concentrate on the possibility of France 
affordmg the Federal Republic nuclear cover in 
the event of a disaster", your Rapporteur consid-
ers he is overlooking the reality that France is 
doing its utmost to prevent any such disaster. 
When he asks for " the greatest possible equality 
between the French and German level of secu-
rity",. he is in direct line with the constant preoc-
cupatiOns of France which cannot imagine its 
security being dissociated from that of the Federal 
Republic. 
81. (d) Your Rapporteur sees only one of 
Mr. Corterier's proposals as a problem, i.e.: 
" Gestures would be useful at the level of 
nuclear planning, but they are found rather 
in information and consultation: target 
identification of French short-range surface 
missiles would be a major step towards 
establishing full confidence between the 
two countries' leaders. " 
The targets of short-range surface missiles are 
inevitably military targets in the person of an 
enemy on the move and it is hard to see how they 
could be defined beforehand. 
82.. (e) Mr. Cortetjer's most important propo-
sal Is the last one, which should be quoted in full: 
" However, we must go further at political 
level. At a time when the tendency in East-
West relations is towards the reduction of 
armaments, the western allies should 
define a position in this area or at least a 
series of points beyond which they do not 
intend the superpowers to venture. How-
ever ~el.come, the platform on European 
secunty mterests adopted by WEU in Octo-
ber 1987 is not enough. In regard to con-
ventional disarmament in particular an 
alliance policy must be worked out 'that 
takes account ofthe specific interests of its 
European members. " 
The very purpose of the WEU Council's work is 
to draw consequences from the platform in vari-
ous areas. Your Rapporteur for his part is trying 
to do so within the framework of his subject. 
83. Chancellor Kohl's position at the 
Wehrkunde meeting seems quite close to the one 
described by Mr. Corterier in Le Monde: aware of 
the danger involved in the complete withdrawal 
of tactical weapons, the Federal Chancellor 
stressed his wish for negotiations on short-range 
nuclear weapons to be started without delay- but 
he did not insist that they be concluded before 
other negotiations. The aim should be to reduce 
but not necessarily eliminate such weapons. In 
view of the large number of tactical weapons 
deployed in Central Europe by both sides, this is 
perfectly reasonable and leaves ample scope for 
negotiation between the Federal Republic and its 
American and French allies who are all more anx-
ious to improve the accuracy and range of their 
weapons than to increase their number. 
(c) Chemical weapons 
84. On chemical disarmament, all the parties 
concerned fully agree that the aim should be to 
ban the production of such weapons and destroy 
stocks. Negotiations are now being held in 
Geneva to define satisfactory verification condi-
tions. Another problem arises from the time the 
two powers with large stocks of chemical weapons 
say they need to destroy them, i.e. ten years as 
from the coming into force of the agreement. 
With the slow pace of the negotiations, we shall 
probably have to wait at least thirteen years 
before destruction is completed. This is a long 
time during which the Soviet Union alone would 
have chemical weapons on the European conti-
nent. This situation would be tolerable if it could 
be guaranteed that these thirteen years would be a 
period of detente, continued disarmament and 
promotion of confidence-building measures. But 
no one can guarantee this, not even Mr. 
Gorbachev. That is why France has made legal 
provision for starting production of chemical 
weapons but without starting production, how-
ever. Your Rapporteur considers all the European 
members of the alliance should be able to agree to 
call upon the two great powers to speed up the 
negotiations and ratification of the future agree-
ment and to reduce to the minimum the time 
needed to implement the destruction of stocks as 
agreed. For the same reasons, it seems to your 
Rapporteur very risky to initiate a drastic reduc-
tion in short-range nuclear weapons as long as the 
Soviet Union has a near-monopoly of chemical 
weapons in Europe since the latter would be far 
more valuable if they were to remain the only 
instruments of mass destruction deployed on 
European territory. 
(d) Conrentional weapons 
85. At first sight, no negotiations seem as diffi-
cult to bring to a successful conclusion as those on 
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conventional weapons. The discussion triggered 
in the international press by the report submitted 
to the Assembly by our colleague, Mr. Stokes, on 
behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments, which was not adopted by the 
Assembly because it was referred back to the com-
mittee, underlines the difficulties encountered in 
an objective assessment of lthis aspect of the 
threat. It also reveals that there is no way out of 
this discussion in the context of a strategy of con-
frontation because of the difficulty of defining a 
balance which would take account of the number 
of troops, the standard of their training, their 
devotion to the cause they are supposed to be 
defending and also the number, quality and age of 
armaments, offensive or defensive, their sophisti-
cation, etc. Your Rapporteur has no means of giv-
ing a verdict on this discussion but feels it more 
useful to try to define what the alliance's conven-
tional forces are intended for in order to deduce 
Western Europe's requirements in that field. 
86. The role of conventional forces is, in any 
event, not to win a hypothetical victory in a war 
in Europe which, for the sake of argument but 
most improbably, would be kept to the conven-
tional level. In his very recent book entitled 
"Blundering into disaster", Mr. Robert 
McNamara, who was for seven years Secretary of 
Defence under the administr&tions of Presidents 
Kennedy and Johnson, underlined that Europe 
would always be the cornerstone ofUnited States 
strategy but, while it is possible to envisage purely 
conventional defence in other regions of the 
world, demography, the fragile way of life, the 
concentration of economic activity and the 
degree of urbanisation in Western Europe make 
both conventional and nuclear war inconceiva-
ble. Several hundred sensitive points (sources of 
water and energy, and first and foremost nuclear 
power stations, oil installations and communica-
tions centres) might be destroyed outright by a 
purely conventional strike, which would con-
demn to death a large part of the population of 
Europe without it being necessary to use nuclear 
weapons. " In other words, a conventional war in 
Europe would be lost before it started", con-
cluded French General Buis in his report on Mr. 
McNamara's book in Le Monde Diplomatique of 
February 1988. 
87. Moreover, while some might have had the 
illusion that the West could win a conventional 
war in the centre of Europe, it is enough to look at 
the two flanks, with Norway, whose continued 
presence in the western camp is vital for the 
defence of sea and air lanes across the North 
Atlantic, hence for the air bridge that the United 
States would have to maintain with Western 
Europe in the event of crisis, or with Turkey, the 
threshold of the Mediterranean and Middle East, 
to realise the stupidity of such a hypothesis. 
Moreover, the reticence of our governments 
about accepting as members ofWEU- and hence 
allowing them to accede to Article V of the modi-
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fied Brussels Treaty - countries which are not in 
the centre of Western Europe shows clearly that 
they cannot undertake to defend such a country if 
it were attacked. As General Gallois notes in an 
article entitled" Europe-United States: the file on 
a great departure", published in the spring 1987 
issue of Politique Internationale: " In Europe, 
NATO's conventional forces will never have any 
power to intimidate because, if they had to fight, 
they would have no chance of winning. " 
88. However, this does not mean that conven-
tional weapons are useless if they are assigned 
their due place in a system of deterrence as pro-
vided for in the platform of 27th October 1987, 
but it is quite different from the one referred to in 
the Ikle-Wohlstetter plan and the so-called air-
land battle strategy which is now the United 
States defence doctrine in Europe. 
89. Its first role seems to have been well 
defined by General Fricaud-Chagnaud in an arti-
cle entitled " How to rearticulate European secu-
rity and American power " published in Le 
Monde Diplomatique of February 1988. He 
wrote: " Through reorganisation, conventional 
forces ... can show their ability to refuse to submit; 
in fact, it is a question of not 'leading into tempta-
tion' a possible aggressor by allowing him to 
believe that any encroachment could be made 
without starting a war. " On the one hand, it is 
clear that nuclear deterrence does not work 
against minor aggressive operations - it did not 
prevent the Berlin blockade in 1947- and on the 
other hand it leaves too much leeway regarding 
the limits beyond which we are determined to use 
nuclear weapons. Conventional forces therefore 
fit perfectly into a strategy of deterrence, as 
stressed in the platform adopted in The Hague, 
moreover. 
90. A second role, closely linked with the first, 
is to give a warning in the event of crisis and 
before nuclear weapons are used. As General Buis 
wrote, referring to the use of a conventional threat 
at the time of the Cuban crisis: " Such manage-
ment of the quarrel, in the calming, omnipresent 
shadow of the megatons, could be ensured only by 
an adequate conventional instrument. It is there-
fore essential to have it for this purpose, but for 
this purpose alone. " It is in this context that one 
can understand the importance Europeans attach 
to the presence of American conventional forces 
in Europe, where they provide this very " shadow 
of the megatons". 
91. In these conditions, it becomes possible to 
say what Western Europe can hope from negotia-
tions on conventional weapons: 
(i) that they will put an end to speculation 
which, under the pretext of shifting the 
war to enemy territory, advocates 
offensive strategic action which might 
induce the potential enemy to antici-
pate such action by prior conventional 
or nuclear attacks on allied lines and 
84 
its rear positions. The purpose would 
be to prevent nuclear disarmament 
leading to over-armament in the con-
ventional sector, which would be espe-
cially dangerous for peace because it is 
not very deterrent in itself; 
(ii) that, without leading to a withdrawal 
of all American forces stationed in 
Europe, they will allow their partial 
withdrawal to be offset by propor-
tional withdrawals of Soviet forces 
from territories they occupy west of 
the Soviet Union; 
(iii) that the level of forces and conven-
tional weapons, as well as theatre 
nuclear weapons, on both sides in 
Central Europe will be limited to a 
low-enough level to exclude any sur-
prise attack, which implies very reli-
able, strictly applied verification pro-
cedures; 
(iv) that, in view of the ease with which 
Soviet reinforcements can be brought 
into Central Europe and the difficulty 
of bringing in American forces in case 
of crisis or hostilities, the overall level 
of forces on both sides will be kept 
within specific and verifiable limits; 
(v) that the link between conventional 
deployment and nuclear deterrent 
forces will be clearly shown. 
(e) Security and co-operation in Europe 
92. Although so far the only aspects of defence 
questions to be tackled in the framework of the 
CSCE have been confidence-building measures, 
which consist mainly of declaring manoeuvres of 
a certain scale and inviting observers from the 
other side to attend them, henceforth they may be 
of far greater importance in view of the decision 
taken in Vienna in 1987 to handle conventional 
disarmament in that framework, and perhaps tac-
tical nuclear weapons also. However, the Euro-
pean members of the Atlantic Alliance believe 
that the main aim of that conference should be to 
promote conditions for true detente which alone 
can create the mutual confidence necessary for 
the success of duly verified disarmament. For 
them, it is not therefore a matter of beating an 
enemy but of fostering an evolution in the Soviet 
Union and among its allies towards a more open, 
freer society and the development of East-West 
exchanges of all kinds. 
93. However, work at the Vienna negotiations, 
which are being held at a time when the Soviet 
Union is moving noticeably in the desired direc-
tion, indicates that there have been differences 
between Europeans and Americans over what 
was to be expected of the conference, as Senator 
Pecriaux noted in the report on recent develop-
ments in Soviet external policy that he presented 
on behalf of the General Affairs Committee in 
December 1987, the draft recommendation in 
which the Assembly then adopted. These differ-
ences relate to the fact that, even at a time when 
the disarmament negotiations are particularly 
active, the United States does not really seem to 
believe in the possibility of a deep-rooted change 
in the political, economic and social organisation 
of the Soviet Union. It seems to view disarma-
ment negotiations and agreements merely as rela-
tions between one great power and another, with-
out bearing in mind that the lasting nature of their 
possible success depends specifically on the 
nature of the society in whose name the Soviet 
negotiators are acting. Without wishing to revert 
to Senator Pecriaux's apposite remarks on this 
subject in his report, your Rapporteur has to note 
that the views conveyed to the committee in the 
United States were not significantly different 
from those of the WEU parliamentarians. 
94. After reviewing all the disarmament nego-
tiations under way or about to be opened, the 
principles Europe should wish to be respected in 
this context might be recapitulated as follows: 
(i) The immediate aim of disarmament 
should be to establish a nuclear balance at the 
lowest possible level, i.e. at a level sufficient to 
exercise deterrence. As Robert McNamara 
explained in his book already mentioned, the 
safety catch still has a role to play in our societies, 
and nuclear warheads - a few hundred and not 
fifty thousand as at present - will unfortunately, 
for many more years, be mounting their deterrent 
guard. 
(ii) Europe's geographical situation precludes 
any thought of disarmament, particularly nuclear 
disarmament, limited to our part of the continent. 
The parallel withdrawal of American and Soviet 
forces would be better than a unilateral with-
drawal of American forces but would create an 
imbalance that might encourage surprise attacks. 
The denuclearisation of Europe alone would 
boost Soviet conventional preponderance and, 
above all, weaken deterrence, which has so far 
safeguarded peace. 
(iii) The fact that two European countries have 
nuclear weapons is at the present juncture an 
essential guarantee of Europe's security and these 
weapons must not be called in question. On the 
contrary, they need to be adapted to European 
security requirements. 
(iv) For the same reasons, the parallelism 
between conventional and nuclear disarmament 
must be respected. Elimination of nuclear weap-
ons can be considered only ifthe level of conven-
tional weapons has fallen low enough to preclude 
an attack. 
(v) The time-scale for chemical disarmament 
is too long to give Europe the security it needs in 
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this area. As long as chemical disarmament has 
not been completed, the prospect of eliminating 
short-range nuclear weapons will be disturbing 
for Europe, already ill-preparep to face the chemi-
cal weapons accumulated by !the Soviet Union. 
(vi) Disarmament has a chance oflasting only if 
it is accompanied by detente allowing the past 
forty years of confrontation to be replaced by the 
development of East-West relations and a move 
towards more justice and freedom of societies. 
Furthermore, the development of confidence-
building measures such as those agreed at the 
Stockholm meeting of the CSCE in 1986 is a 
major factor of detente. 
95. The fact that disarmament is now on the 
agenda of meetings held in the framework of the 
WEU Council offers hope of our governments 
reaching an understanding on the basis of princi-
ples close to those which have just been listed 
since they conform wholly with the provisions of 
the platform adopted in The Hague. But they will 
have a chance of being carried into effect only 
insofar as they are accepted by the United States 
Government. The fact that they are based largely 
on views held by Robert McNamara indicates 
that they meet the concerns of certain influential 
people in the United States. During its visit to the 
United States, the committee saw that on these 
matters there was apparently no serious differ-
ence between its views and those of the United 
States administration. This means the situation is 
favourable for exchanges of views between Euro-
peans and Americans in order to ensure that the 
Atlantic Alliance presents a united front in all 
negotiations on disarmament. It is not by avoid-
ing often thorny consultations on the subject that 
Europeans will manage to do so but by pursuing 
and developing the exchanges that now take place 
in the framework of WEU. But the WEU Coun-
cil's silence on this point and the absence of a 
communique after the ministerial meeting on 
19th April 1988 make one wonder whether the 
Council was able to make real progress in this 
direction. 
IV. Outside the NATO area 
96. Questions raised by events occurring out-
side Europe and the area covered by the North 
Atlantic Treaty cannot be overlooked when 
examining relations between Western Europe and 
its North American allies. The balance that has 
long existed in Europe itself between the North 
Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact gives great 
stability to the states, frontiers and regimes which 
emerged after the second world war and this 
seems to preclude a major conflict starting in 
Europe, at least for some time to come. Con-
versely, because of decolonisation, the formation 
of a large number of new states and the political 
uncertainty prevailing in many of them, there are 
many unstable areas in the rest of the world where 
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hostilities have increased since 1945 and it is 
mainly in Asia, Africa or even Latin America that 
crises may arise which, in the long run, might 
undermine stability in Europe. Europe could not 
be spared in a war in which the two great powers 
took part and there would be every chance of it 
being the main battlefield. 
97. Furthermore, whereas difficulties encoun-
tered in direct relations between Europe and the 
United States in economic and defence matters 
raise serious problems which it has always been 
possible to tackle in an appropriate framework 
and find solutions that were more or less accepta-
ble to all concerned, this has not always been so 
for matters arising outside Europe where every-
one acts in accordance with his views and inter-
ests, generally without prior consultation. 
Although the European countries sometimes hold 
exchanges of views or even consultations in the 
framework of political co-operation or, more 
recently, in the WEU Council, they are not united 
when overseas problems arise. Each country has 
its own interests, different resources and specific 
constraints. When several of them have been 
involved in the same problems, as in Lebanon, 
each one has made a point of emphasising that it 
was acting on its own account. In most cases, as in 
Chad and the Falklands, the European states have 
carefully avoided prior consultations although 
the measures they were taking might have had 
consequences for European security as a whole. 
98. The American public certainly feels that 
the United States constantly has to face subver-
sive operations against international order which 
are to various degrees armed, inspired and 
directed by the Soviet Union. Since the Cuban 
crisis, it has felt that Latin America has become 
the theatre for such operations under the heading 
of indirect strategy. Since the Korean war, it has 
also considered the Soviet Union was pursuing an 
operation aimed at taking over Asia against which 
the United States was directly involved in Viet-
nam and continues to be involved in Afghanistan. 
Similarly, the presence of Soviet or Cuban advis-
ers in many African and Middle East countries 
meant that disturbances in those regions fitted 
into an East-West confrontation stretching well 
beyond the local aspect of the problems. 
99. To a large section of the American public, 
this means that there is continuity between 
United States participation in the defence of 
Europe and NATO and its action in Korea, Cen-
tral America, Vietnam and the Middle East to 
counter communism. In the circumstances, any 
sign of ill-will on the part of the United States' 
European partners is taken to be a form of 
betrayal of the joint cause of western security. The 
Vietnam war clearly showed that Western Europe 
was not prepared to stand firmly shoulder to 
shoulder with the United States in all circum-
stances. More recent events, including the crisis 
in relations between Iran and the United States 
and then, in 1986, the bombing of Tripoli in 
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response to a terrorist operation in which Ameri-
can citizens had been casualties have again illus-
trated the different attitudes of partners in the 
Atlantic Alliance and kept alive the American 
public's mistrust of the European members of the 
alliance. 
100. Such events naturally did not affect directly 
an alliance which contains no mutual undertak-
ing in regard to action outside the area defined by 
the North Atlantic Treaty. However, they started 
a trend in American external policy and commit-
ments of which the Ikle-Wohlstetter report is the 
most recent expression and they explain the 
apparently well-rooted feeling in the United 
States that Europe has a parochial approach to 
events whereas the United States tackles them 
from a worldwide standpoint. They also help to 
make the question of western security burden-
sharing particularly complex. 
101. There is thus no doubt that any re-exami-
nation of the functioning of the alliance should 
include a review of mutual commitments outside 
the NATO area, failing which possible misunder-
standings may jeopardise the cohesion of the alli-
ance, including cases involving the defence of 
Europe. On the other hand, there can be no ques-
tion of Europe automatically endorsing American 
views, particularly as the Americans are the first 
to recognise that in certain cases European coun-
tries are best placed to take effective action with-
out extending the conflict as might be the case if a 
great power intervened. Thus, several French 
interventions made necessary by crises in Africa 
were welcomed or even discreetly assisted by the 
Americans. 
102. At present, the United States is most con-
cerned about the Middle East, be it the Palestin-
ian affair or the war between Iraq and Iran. The 
close relations between the state of Israel and the 
United States ever since the former's creation 
explain the steady support it has had from the 
United States. The proximity of the American 
elections and events in Israeli-occupied territories 
in recent months, with the harder line adopted by 
the Israeli Government, have not allowed the Sec-
retary of State to advance the proposal to convene 
a conference between the two great powers and 
the nations directly concerned to try to define the 
bases for lasting peace. 
103. The Gulf war is now of even greater con-
cern to the United States for several reasons: the 
Soviet Union is a neighbour of the countries at 
war, the revolutionary strength of Shiite funda-
mentalism is a threat to most regimes in the Mus-
lim world and, above all, developments in the oil 
market. When the 1973 crisis made oil prices 
shoot up, the OPEC countries having restricted 
their output, the United States had to develop its 
own production capacity to ensure its essential 
requirements. But it was in a saturated oil market 
in which prices were already falling, amplified by 
the weakened dollar, that war broke out between 
two major oil-producers. Now, eight years later, 
Iran and Iraq have been forced to use their 
income from oil to pay for the war which has 
accelerated the fall in prices, forcing the United 
States to close many of its own wells and prevent-
ing OPEC from taking any effective measures to 
limit output and halt the fall in their income. 
104. However, estimates of oil reserves show 
that American resources are running out. Experts 
estimate that output at the current level could be 
maintained for seven to ten years. If, therefore 
the United States does not wish to find itself i~ 
the near future at the mercy of the whims of the 
Middle East producer countries, it will soon have 
to stoi? drawing on its own reserves and, through 
peace m the Middle East, reconstitute a world oil 
market before it is too late. Its first aim is there-
fore to stabilise the political and economic situa-
tion in the Gulf region, starting by ensuring free-
dom of navigation in the Gulf, at least for ships 
sailing to non-belligerent countries. Thus, the 
American fleet in the Indian Ocean has been con-
stantly strengthened in recent years and in 1987 
the protection of the American flag was iranted t~ 
Kuwaiti ships. Several Iranian attacks on these 
ships have been averted by the United States 
navy and air force. 
105. The decision taken by the WEU member 
countries in summer 1987 to take part in various 
ways in mine-sweeping operations in the Gulf to 
ensure respect for freedom of the seas was there-
fore in line with the views of the United States 
Government which welcomed the convergence of 
European and United States operations. The 
committee witnessed this favourable response 
which should, moreover, help the Americans to 
take a more flexible view of the share of the joint 
defence burden borne by the members of 
WEU. 
106. Development oftension in the Gulf region 
nevertheless led the United States Government to 
wonder about the expediency of deploying 
ground forces as well as naval and air forces. The 
idea was not to station large numbers of Ameri-
can forces near the Gulf but to equip forces sta-
tioned in Europe or in the United States for rapid 
deployment in the event of a serious crisis in the 
Gulf region. In this connection, the proposals in 
the Ikle-W ohlstetter report merely confirm ideas 
already announced several years ago whose 
implementation had been started. The report con-
firms the very special attention the United States 
is now paying to the Gulf region. It indicates that 
American intentions might not be confined to 
defending the freedom of the seas but also involve 
defending a number of Arab countries if they were 
threatened by Iranian imperialism or if the Soviet 
Union, which has so far been most discreet in the 
region, were to intervene. Mr. Gorbachev's 
announcement in February 1988 of a programme 
leading up to the evacuation of Afghanistan by 
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Soviet forces in the second half of 1988 and then 
the signing of the Geneva agreement on this with-
drawal may indeed result in greater Soviet free-
dom of action in the Middle East. 
107. From Europe's point of view, the interest 
sh~wn by the United States in the Gulf region 
ra1ses a number of questions. As indicated in 
Chapter 11 of this report, the first relates to the 
~ermall:ency of the America1n contingent sta-
tioned m Europe, part of which might in time of 
crisis be sent at very short notice to the Middle 
East, thus weakening the western system in 
Europe just when there was a threat to peace and 
necessitating the redeployment of European con-
tingents in NATO. The second concerns Europe's 
involvement, in one way or another, in American 
action outside the NATO area causing tension in 
the alliance as in the case ofthe bombing of Trip-
oli in 1986. The third relates to the aims of action 
either might take: although in agreement with the 
United States to defend freedom of navigation in 
the Gulf, would Europe also agree to combat the 
Iranian revolution? It is doubtful. 
108. The United States and Europe admittedly 
have the same interests in the Middle East: to 
ensure freedom of navigation iJn the Gulf, prevent 
the development of local imperialism, counter 
international terrorism, ensure world oil supplies, 
avoid wild fluctuations in oil prices and, finally, 
work to restore peace between Iraq and Iran, all of 
which are in the general interest. Several Euro-
pean countries have specific interests in the 
region, yet not all necessarily share the United 
States' views on how to take effective action. It is 
not therefore possible for them to adhere syste-
matically and continuously to the view that there 
is just one western interest and that the United 
States alone is responsible for safeguarding it. 
109. The adoption by the Security Council in 
July 1987 of Resolution 598 favouring a return to 
peace on the basis of the status quo ante bellum 
was the sign of a broad convergence ofviews, not 
only European and American:but also Soviet, for 
finding a reasonable solution to the conflict. Since 
this resolution was accepted by Iraq but not Iran, 
which persists in insisting on the removal of the 
Iraqi leaders, the question of applying sanctions 
to Iran to induce it to revis~ its approach then 
arose. The Soviet Union has so far been against 
applying sanctions but information that many 
western countries, including the United States 
and also several European countries, have contin-
ued to supply arms to Iran in J!ecent years, in spite 
of all the decisions announced earlier, makes one 
wonder whether it is possible to apply a true pol-
icy of sanctions and to isolate Iran. Nevertheless, 
a British text intended to define conditions for an 
embargo on sales of arms to Iran is now being 
studied by the five permanent members of the 
Security Council. 
110. The Soviet Union for its part is now 
believed to link its participation in sanctions, 
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which is essential if they are to be effective, with a 
proposal to set up a United Nations naval force to 
patrol the Gulf. This would allow the Soviet navy 
to enter the region, which might be somewhat 
embarrassing for the United States. 
111. The Gulf question is therefore becoming a 
major international matter necessitating both 
intra-European consultations, such as those held 
in the WEU Council, and also exchanges of views 
between western allies, if we are to avoid unilat-
eral measures being taken that might disturb the 
mutual confidence needed for the smooth run-
ning of the alliance in Europe itself. There seems 
to be little reason to bring the United States, a 
world power, into opposition with Europe, a 
regional power, over the Gulf region. The partici-
pation of warships from several WEU countries 
in surveillance and minesweeping operations in 
the Gulf alongside the United States fleet implies 
consultations between allies on matters that con-
cern the alliance as a whole. 
112. Analysing overall United States policy out-
side the NATO area, David Owen, former British 
minister and leader of the Social Democrat Party, 
notes in an article in The Times of 29th January 
1987 that: 
" Reagan outside Europe neither speaks 
nor plays for the West. There is a serious 
gap in the co-ordination of western foreign 
policy, not because the key foreign minis-
ters - George Shultz, Sir Geoffrey Howe, 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Jean-Bernard 
Raimond - do not get on together, but 
because whereas Shultz has managed to 
bring Reagan's policies in range of his allies 
over Europe, he has nowhere near as much 
influence over Reagan's policies to the rest 
of the world. Nor does he even appear to 
devote much time to trying to achieve such 
co-ordination. This means that the Soviet 
Union is presented with innumerable 
opportunities, not only to exploit western 
divisions over the third world, but also to 
capitalise on western mistakes. " 
113. There is no need to recapitulate here all 
these mistakes in the Far East, Africa, Latin 
America and Palestine. It is enough to note that 
Mr. Gorbachev is far better armed than his prede-
cessors to exploit them and, as Mr. Owen says, 
capitalise on them. It is for the European mem-
bers of the Atlantic Alliance to seek, not necessar-
ily new institutions, but a dialogue with the 
United States on all these questions within ade-
quate frameworks. It is not evident that the 
United States is at present prepared for such a 
dialogue, unless it is about a few matters in which 
the European countries are actively involved, 
such as in the Gulf. 
114. One committee member rightly stressed 
the concern of both the United States and the 
Soviet Union to extricate themselves from ven-
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tures outside the NATO area. The recent Geneva 
agreement on Afghanistan is the latest demon-
stration of this. It should be recalled, however, 
that rarely have the great powers deliberately 
embarked upon military ventures of this kind and 
the fact that they cannot keep control of a situa-
tion, as is now the case in the Near and Middle 
East, is not necessarily reassuring locally or even, 
in the medium term, for detente. 
V. Canada 
115. Canada is one of the earliest members of 
the Atlantic Alliance and has constantly kept 
forces on the European continent. However, in 
the last few years it has been faced with a new situ-
ation and new dangers, mainly because of the 
development of Soviet naval and submarine 
power, obliging it to pay more attention to 
security-related matters which had been some-
what neglected heretofore. Canada has no nuclear 
forces and its defence, like that of Western 
Europe, is closely linked with the deterrence exer-
cised by United States nuclear power. However, 
its territory and territorial waters lie on the route 
taken by Soviet submarines or missiles on the 
way to United States territory and, whether it 
likes it or not, it is the northern rampart for the 
defence of the United States. It is responsible for 
controlling the North-West Passage between 
Greenland and Labrador, the shortest route for 
submarines passing under the ice cap from Soviet 
Arctic Ocean bases towards the United States east 
coast and the North Atlantic route, Europe's vital 
security artery in time of crisis. It also shares con-
trol of the North Pacific and sea lanes from Amer-
ica to the Far East. Finally, although its immense 
northern territories would probably not be the 
route for a large-scale invasion of the American 
continent from the north, they nevertheless have 
to be monitored very closely - a difficult task in 
view oftheir area and climate - to ensure that an 
enemy does not install surveillance, guidance or 
military posts there. 
116. From a strictly military point of view, 
Canada's security is thus largely merged with that 
of the United States and there is little fear of a 
United States disengagement. On the other hand, 
its population and armed forces are too limited to 
cope with this security and leave it with but lim-
ited political possibilities. A Canadian com-
mented to the committee that faced with a Euro-
pean pillar of the alliance Canada had little to 
expect of an American pillar which would leave it 
alone at the side of the United States. Canada is 
therefore at one and the same time in favour of 
restructuring the alliance to bring about a better 
balance between America and Europe and afraid 
of being isolated by a bi-polar organisation of the 
alliance, which would make it more dependent on 
the United States. This is why Canada welcomes 
the reactivation of WEU but strives to maintain 
and develop relations of all kinds with Western 
Europe- and also with Japan. During its visit to 
Ottawa, the General Affairs Committee benefited 
from this concern of the Canadian Government 
and Parliament and drew the conclusion that the 
WEU Assembly should develop its exchanges 
with the Canadian Parliament. 
117. The defence white paper entitled" Challenge 
and commitment - A defence policy for Canada " 
published by the Canadian Government in June 
1987, followed in March 1988 by a booklet entitled 
" Defence update 1988-89 ", complete the informa-
tion given to the General Affairs Committee during 
its stay in Ottawa. These publications are a turning 
point in the determination of the Canadian Govern-
ment to abandon a certain complacency and negli-
gence of its security requirements and to make a seri-
ous effort to play its part in an undertaking that 
Canada cannot envisage outside close Atlantic soli-
darity. 
118. The first sign of this recovery is a signifi-
cant increase in the country's defence budget. 
This had fallen from 3.5% to 1.7% of the GNP 
between 1962 and 197 4 and, after a slight recov-
ery since 1980, it is now 2.2%, one of the lowest 
percentages among the alliance countries. It 
should be noted that most of this increase was 
allocated to essential investments to replace 
weapons that had become obsolete and the Cana-
dian forces now have modem weapons. Invest-
ment programmes in the next few years should 
make them among the best equipped armed 
forces in the world. The main programmes are for 
the development of naval and submarine forces. 
Overall, Canada has spent $7 400 million on 
defence, thus placing it in sixth place among the 
NATO countries. Its troop levels remain low, 
however: 85 000 men plus 21 000 first reserves 
and the same number of second reserves. 
119. Two Canadian army brigades are now sta-
tioned in Europe, one in Norway, the other in the 
southern Federal Republic. The fact that its forces 
were dispersed in Europe exceeded Canada's 
logistic resources and it has therefore decided to 
group the two brigades in a division in the south 
of Germany at the end of 1989. The ensuing 
weakening ofNATO's northern sector raises very 
serious problems for the allied commander, but is 
in no way a reduction of Canada's participation in 
joint defence, it is even to be increased. A battal-
ion stationed in Canada is also to be assigned to 
the NATO mobile force for possible deployment 
in Northern Europe, and a strong air force is to be 
assigned to Europe or to the rapid transport of 
this battalion or reserve units to Europe in case of 
crisis. These facts illustrate the statement made to 
the committee by several Canadians, including 
the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Perrin 
Beatty, that the Canadian Government is con-
vinced that the defence of Europe forms part of 
the defence of Canada. 
120. Similarly, the European members of the 
alliance should consider that the Canadian Gov-
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emment's efforts to modernise its naval force by 
speedily building twelve new frigates specially 
equipped for anti-submarine warfare and procur-
ing nuclear-propelled attack submarines will 
make a major contribution to joint security, in 
particular by allowing a better watch to be kept on 
the North-West Passage, which is essential for the 
protection ofNATO's supply lines. Furthermore, 
the build-up and modemisatiom of the air forces 
and installing a new surveillance system on both 
sides and to the north of Canada will add greatly 
to the defence of the American continent and 
hence of the United States nuclear forces against 
possible attack. 
121. The strengthening of Canadian defence will 
help to promote military co-operation between 
Europe and Canada, already considerable in the 
land sector with the adoption of the Leopard 11 
tank by the Canadian army and in the naval sec-
tor with the production of new frigates. Canada's 
decision to procure nuclear-propelled submarines 
may become an important part of this 
co-operation since, because the United States will 
not agree to supply nuclear engines to its neigh-
bour, the United Kingdom and France are com-
peting for this market. 
122. Although a few years ago Canada could be 
criticised for not playing its full part in the west-
em security system, the effort made in the last 
five years, which is described in the 1987 white 
paper, is in the process of solving the problem 
raised by the existence of a vast, inadequately 
defended area to the north of the United States 
and north-west ofthe Atlantic. On the other hand, 
Europe must respond to the Canadians' concern 
that they should not be marginalised by the devel-
opment of a European pillar of the alliance, this 
problem being more political than military. This 
is particularly important since Canada pursues an 
active policy outside the NATO area through the 
high level of development assistance it grants and 
its participation in several international forces, 
mostly under the aegis of the United Nations, in 
the Middle East in particular. In other words, con-
sultations with Canada should not be confined to 
NATO but also include matters relating to Africa 
and Asia. Obviously this in no way affects the 
reactivation of WEU, of which Canada is very 
much in favour, but it must be kept closely 
informed of all that is done there. 
123. Canada's place in the alliance is also of con-
siderable interest because, although geographi-
cally speaking the country is American, it has 
many interests that bring it close to Western 
Europe. It can do much to ensure that the build-
ing of a European pillar of the alliance does not 
lead to a clash between European and American 
allies. This is a major reason for Europe to take 
the utmost account of Canadian concerns, which 
were described very frankly to the General Affairs 
Committee during its visit to Ottawa on 14th and 
15th April 1988. Inter alia, there are signs of a sig-
nificant convergence between European and 
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Canadian views in that it was clearly acknowl-
edged in presence of the committee in Ottawa 
that, if there were to be a major conflict, whatever 
its origins, it would be waged mainly in Europe. 
At a time when the United States seems more 
than ever hesitant to admit this fact, it is highly 
satisfactory for the European members of the alli-
ance to find support from Canada. 
VI. Conclusions 
124. In an article entitled "NATO's middle 
course " in the winter 1987-88 issue of Foreign 
Policy, Professor David P. Calleo of the United 
States analyses the various trends of thought that 
divide American public opinion over American 
commitments in NATO. He first notes some 
weakening in the American position in the world 
in the last thirty years which he attributes not to 
any decline in the United States- and even less to 
a strengthening of the Soviet Union - but to the 
very success of the policy adopted by the United 
States following the second world war: a halt to 
Soviet expansion, the recovery of Western 
Europe, the development of Japan and the emer-
gence of a number ofthird world countries mean 
that henceforth the idea of a bi-polar world on 
which American performances are still based has 
now been overtaken by events. The Soviets " are 
threatened more by the rising new powers than by 
the United States, and it is not their moribund 
economy that challenges America's pre-emi-
nence. Instead, the world is no longer susceptible 
to anyone's hegemony. The danger is not a Pax 
Sovietica but global anarchy. The post-war insti-
tutions have so depended upon American pre-
dominance that the whole system seems likely to 
collapse without it". 
125. However, Professor Calleo considers the 
United States administration has been unable to 
cope with this phenomenon and is still attempt-
ing to play the same geopolitical role it played in 
the fifties, although it no longer has the political, 
military, economic or financial means, thus con-
demning the United States to either exhaustion or 
isolation. He thus blames those who wish transat-
lantic relations to retain the political, military and 
strategic bases they had until now, even if this 
means constantly adapting the doctrines for 
the use of weapons that underlie flexible response 
which is, in fact, no longer what it was when Rob-
ert McNamara defined it. 
126. Professor Calleo notes the emergence of 
increasing criticism in the United States of this 
trend which burdens it with most of the political, 
military and financial weight of international 
order and the maintenance of peace in Europe at 
the cost of monetary disorder that is detrimental 
to all and crises in the alliance each time the 
United States changes its strategy, intervenes out-
side Europe or encounters a turning point in its 
relations with the Soviet Union. The excessive 
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role played by the United States provokes criti-
cism in Europe, but above all in America, which 
generally leads to proposals for more or less total 
disengagement. " A hegemony-or-nothing men-
tality drives American thinking." Nationalist 
neo-conservatives now join isolationists in calling 
for disengagement based on condemnation of 
Western Europeans' attitude of always being 
ready to seek accommodation, particularly eco-
nomic, with the Soviet Union and its allies, flee-
ing before the prospect ofburden-sharing in joint 
defence and ill-prepared to endorse American 
policy outside the NATO area. They are in con-
flict with the present administration and those 
who favour maintaining the status quo and who 
would like better burden-sharing to allow other 
aspects of the American commitment in NATO 
to be preserved. 
127. The author proposes what he calls devolu-
tion, which might be described as a new way of 
sharing both the burden and responsibility. Con-
sidering the wealth ofWestern Europe, its interest 
in developing peaceful relations with Eastern 
Europe, its relations with the third world, its mili-
tary capability, its democratic regimes and its 
desire for peace, he asks the United States to con-
tinue to support it but at the same time allow it to 
assume more responsibility. The purpose would 
be to: 
(i) maintain NATO and the United 
States' nuclear guarantee in Europe; 
(ii) reduce American forces assigned to 
NATO by more than half so as to leave 
Europe most of the responsibility for 
its defence, while demonstrating the 
continuity of the American guarantee; 
(iii) assign the duties of SACEUR to a 
European, leaving his American dep-
uty powers over the use of American 
nuclear weapons; 
(iv) encourage and even assist the develop-
ment of European nuclear forces; 
(v) develop political and military consul-
tations in the framework of NATO. 
128. Your Rapporteur is far from considering 
that these proposals meet Europe's present inter-
ests. Europe does not have the nuclear means to 
ensure adequate deterrence. It is still desirable to 
keep an American SACEUR and relatively large 
United States forces in Europe, inter alia because 
of political differences between Western Euro-
pean countries over security matters. Early devo-
lution might split Europe up, which is certainly 
not intended by the author of the proposals who, 
like many Americans, does not take enough 
account of the fact that European union is still an 
objective for many Europeans but is far from 
being a fact. Perhaps too he has not paid due 
attention to the relative fragility of European soci-
eties on which it would be difficult to impose any 
great increase in military expenditure without 
provoking serious internal crises which would 
jeopardise any prospect of European defence. 
129. Your Rapporteur feels, however, that 
Europe must be prepared for an inevitable evolu-
tion in the alliance and what Professor Calleo 
advocates is not the worst solution. It would be 
better to have the devolution he envisages than 
the revision of United States global strategy pro-
posed in the Ikle-W ohlstetter report or disengage-
ment, because it is the only solution allowing 
every aspect of the international house to be put 
in order: economic, financial, political and mili-
tary. To be prepared for it in no way means pro-
voking or precipitating it. But the risk of a far 
more dangerous solution being forced upon us is 
such that, if necessary, Europe should foster the 
adoption of this one. Reactivation of consulta-
tions in the framework ofWEU between our gov-
ernments on all matters relating to joint security 
can be an excellent means ofhandling this matter, 
provided the governments really wish to deal 
with this matter and stop putting their heads in 
the sand and trying to evade the danger by refus-
ing to think about it. Your Rapporteur noted that 
on this point some members of the General 
Affairs Committee did not share these views and 
did not consider the evolution he foresees to be 
inevitable. 
130. Naturally, consultations in WEU would 
not be enough since the main discussion must be 
with the Americans themselves and hence in the 
North Atlantic Council to which all the members 
of WEU belong. The first thing to be obtained is 
for the Americans to express their intentions 
clearly and agree to discuss every aspect of them 
with their European partners before locking 
themselves up in decisions already taken and in 
the process of implementation, whether in mat-
ters relating to defence policy, disarmament or 
the division of their commitments throughout the 
world. The problems to be solved are the same for 
everyone and solutions are needed to which more 
than lip-service is paid while retaining all kinds of 
mental reservations. They must be truly accepted 
by everyone following a cool assessment of reali-
ties and possibilities. 
131. The General Affairs Committee's visit to 
the United States probably did not allow it to 
measure the breadth of the Americans' reassess-
ment oftheir defence policy overall. The fact that 
it was made during a pre-electoral period when 
the true or expected reactions of American public 
opinion to matters of direct concern to it, such as 
burden-sharing in the alliance, probably veiled 
other aspects of the true situation. Perhaps the 
committee managed to give the Americans a bet-
ter idea of Europe's concerns and to pave the way 
for subsequent, more frequent, exchanges of 
views, particularly between European and Ameri-
can parliamentarians, so as to define a possible 
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security policy for Europe in the coming decades 
and to pursue a valid dialogue with our govern-
ments on this vital subject. 
132. One of the most remarkable aspects of 
American society is the openness of the discus-
sion about all matters that are essential for the 
future of the United States and ~he world. To an 
outside observer, the obvious result is an impres-
sion of uncertainty and incoherence. He has to 
sort out what is essential or of s~condary impor-
tance, fundamental or of passing interest, binding 
on the future or hot air. Your Rapporteur has 
attempted to find his way in this labyrinth of 
ideas and theories and regrets that in Europe he is 
unable, in spite of the freedom that exists there, to 
find the same will to go to the heart of problems 
and express ideas on this subject which do not fol-
low the orthodox line. He would like the present 
text to give the WEU Assembly an opportunity of 
doing so in order to help Europe to think about 
the future of its security in realistic terms. 
133. Internal developments in the Soviet Union 
and its new external policy, on the one hand, and 
questions raised in the United States, in particu-
lar about the economic and financial implications 
of its defence policy, on the other, place Western 
Europe in a new situation: the reactivation of 
WEU gives it an instrument for examining the 
consequences for its security. But it must want 
and know how to use it. The results of the minis-
terial meeting in The Hague on 19th April, as far 
as the Assembly has been able to ascertain, make 
one wonder whether this is really the case. Yet it is 
essential to strengthen European co-operation if 
the alliance is to be reorganised so as to improve 
transatlantic co-operation in areas affecting joint 
security. 
134. Some committee members rightfully 
emphasised the considerable progress made in the 
first months of 1988 towards detente in relations 
between the two great powers. This feeling is 
based first of all on the development of a dialogue 
through increased meetings between the two 
countries' leaders at all levels, including the high-
est. This offered the prospects of an early start to 
new negotiations on many aspects of disarma-
ment or the limitation of armaments and the 
completion of negotiations that had long been 
marking time on other aspects of the same ques-
tion. A rapprochement of views on problems in 
the Middle East and Cambodia is clear. Negotia-
tions on security and co-operation in Europe have 
taken a new turn, at least where conventional dis-
armament is concerned. Negotiations on the 
evacuation of Afghanistan have reached a suc-
cessful conclusion. Europe can but welcome this 
evolution ifit is confirmed. It will inevitably have 
a role to play while ensuring that its security is not 
thereby jeopardised. The reactivation of WEU 
and consultations between its members on 
defence and disarmament matters must therefore 
take a place in a period of detente just as it did 
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when international confrontations made it neces-
sary to give priority to defence measures. The 
need for a European pillar of the alliance is not 
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due to East-West tension but the natural result of 
the emergence of a European presence in interna-
tional life. 
Document 1137 
Amendment 1 
Co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada 
in security matters 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Soell 
6th June 1988 
1. Leave out paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert: 
" Convinced that the negotiations on security and co-operation in Europe, disarmament and the 
limitation of armaments should help to strengthen the basis of joint defence; " 
Signed: Soell 
1. See 6th sitting, 9th June 1988 (amendment amended and agreed to). 
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Amendments 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 
Co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada 
in security matters 
AMENDMENTS 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 1 
tabled by Mr. Pontillon 
6th June 1988 
2. Leave out paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert: 
"Noting with satisfaction that the United States and Canadian Governments do not intend to call 
in question their conventional and nuclear military commitment in Europe; " 
3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, before "American" add "North". 
4. At the end of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, add "and Canada". 
5. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "the United States" and insert 
" North America ". 
6. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " deployed " and insert " ear-
marked for deployment ". 
Signed: Pontillon 
l. See 6th sitting, 9th June 1988 (amendments agreed to). 
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Organisation of European security 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 2 
by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on the organisation of European security 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
11. The European pillar of the alliance 
Ill. Political activities of the Council 
(a) The platform adopted in The Hague 
(b) Security and disarmament 
(c) WEU and the Gulf 
(d) Co-operation in armaments matters 
(e) Informing the Assembly 
IV. Restructuring 
(a) The Council 
(b) The chairmanship-in-office and the Secretariat-General 
(c) The agency 
(d) Collocating the ministerial organs 
V. Enlargement 
VI. Relations between the Council and the Assembly 
VII. Conclusions 
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
9th May 1988 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); Mr. Burger (Vice-Chairman); MM. Aarts (Alternate: Eisma), Bassinet, 
Baume/, van der Biest, Coleman, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Foschi, Hill, Hitschler, Koehl, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Martino, 
Mechtersheimer, Muller, Natali, Pecriaux, Pieral/i, Pontillon, Reddemann, Ruet, van der Sanden, Sarti, She/ton, Mrs. Staels-
Dompas, Mr. Sto.ffe/en. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the organisation of European security 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the progress made towards the reactivation ofWEU under Netherlands presidency, in 
particular the adoption ofthe platform on 27th October 1987, the co-ordinated action of member coun-
tries to ensure freed? m of navigation in the Gulf and the invitation to Portugal and Spain to join WEU; 
(ii) Regretting, however, that the WEU ministerial organs have not yet been collocated and that their 
restructuring has not been completed; 
(iii) Also regretting the impossible position of the Assembly because ofthe tardy communication of the 
annual report of the Council to the Assembly, deploring the Council's reluctance to inform the Assembly 
of its activities through the channels provided for in the treaty and the Charter of the Assembly and, 
finally, insisting that ministers see to it that their officials comply with the time-scale agreed with the 
Council; 
(iv) Noting that international public opinion is still hardly aware that WEU is being reactivated; 
(v) Considering that reactivation implies not only increased intergovernmental activity but also a 
redefinition of the specific role of the organisation's permanent structures; 
(vi) Noting that the number ofbudgetary posts still vacant in the WEU ministerial organs would allow 
the Assembly's requirements to be met without waiting for the restructuring of the WEU ministerial 
organs to be completed; 
(vii) Also noting the petition addressed to the Assembly on 22nd March 1988 by Mr. Hintermann, for-
mer Assistant Secretary-General of WEU, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Continue to study the various implications of the platform adopted in The Hague and transmit the 
results to the Assembly; 
2. Ensure the maintenance of a co-ordinated naval presence of its members in the Gulf as long as free-
dom of navigation is not guaranteed and, at the same time, take new steps to promote the application of 
Resolution 598 of the Security Council; 
3. Inform international public opinion more adequately of the nature and scale of its operations in 
that area; 
4. Pursue urgently the negotiations on the accession of Portugal and Spain to the modified Brussels 
Treaty and their effective participation in the Western European security system; 
5. Specify how it intends to implement the political impetus it decided to give, in the Rome declara-
tion, to co-operation in armaments matters; 
6. Define an active role for the Secretariat-General in the procedure for consultations between mem-
ber countries that it has just introduced and in the regular communication of information to the Assembly 
and the public on its activities, including the transmission on time of the annual report of the Council; 
7. Describe forthwith the status and tasks of the WEU agency and transmit to the Assembly the text of 
the studies it has undertaken to communicate to it; 
8. Start or pursue, in the appropriate framework and with the possible assistance of the agency, con-
sultations on burden-sharing in the alliance, disarmament or the verified limitation of armaments and 
problems facing Western Europe's security because of measures taken by its allies which might modify the 
deployment of NATO forces and, finally, inform the Assembly of the results of these consultations; 
9. Accord the Assembly here and now the wherewithal to restructure the Office of the Clerk in accord-
ance with its 1987 memorandum. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. The fortieth anniversary of the signing of 
the Brussels Treaty was recalled fairly discreetly 
on 17th March 1988. Some observers stressed the 
importance of the event by drawing a parallel 
with the reactivation ofWEU. Others, on the con-
trary, took this as an opportunity to point out that 
the present crisis in the restructuring of the WEU 
ministerial organs was calling in question the task 
started forty years ago by the founders of the first 
European security system. It is still a moot point 
whether the Brussels Treaty was the start of a slow 
process leading to the definition of a European 
defence policy or merely the first step towards 
what was to become, in 1949, the Atlantic Alli-
ance. 
2. Your Rapporteur is again prevented from 
answering an annual report from the Council that 
had not reached the Office of the Clerk on 9th 
May, the time-limit fixed by the Rules of Proce-
dure of the Assembly for the adoption of reports 
by committees. It would appear that there has 
been no response to the Assembly's repeated 
complaints about the delays that prevent any seri-
ous dialogue between the WEU organs. 
3. In truth, since the last session, the Assem-
bly has received very few official communica-
tions on the Council's activities, but certain infor-
mation culled from the press or from various 
other more or less reliable sources gives some idea 
ofthe situation ofWEU. Even after the minister-
ial meeting in The Hague on 18th and 19th April 
no communique was issued, as used to be after 
the official spring ministerial meetings. Only two 
brief notes, one on enlargement and the other on 
the Gulf, were communicated to the Assembly 
and the press. Your Rapporteur was unable to 
attend the joint meeting following the ministerial 
meeting because the time of the meeting was 
brought forward without the Office of the Clerk 
being given enough time to warn members of the 
change. He has therefore received only indirect 
information about what was said on that occa-
sion. 
4. Furthermore, the Assembly has received a 
petition from Mr. Eric Hintermann, former 
Assistant Secretary-General of WEU and Direc-
tor of Agency Ill until 31st December 1987, the 
date on which his contract expired. The Council 
having failed to take a unanimous decision on 
renewing the contracts of the agency directors, he 
then found himself without a post. His petition 
covers all the activities of WEU and, at its meet-
ing on 17th March 1988, the Presidential Com-
mittee therefore agreed to refer it to the General 
Affairs Committee. 
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5. This petition sets out considerations on the 
reactivation of WEU and thus comes within the 
scope of the present report. Tihe main elements 
are therefore included in the substance and con-
sidered in the corresponding chapters of the 
report. Conversely, the parts of the petition that 
may be considered to relate to particular prob-
lems are not covered in this report. 
6. The questions put by public opinion about 
the reactivation of WEU have in effect already 
been the subject of comment and discussion in 
the press, including an article by Mr. Joseph 
Fitchett in the International Herald Tribune of 
14th March. The reactions of the Secretary-
General, Mr. Cahen, are moreover known from 
two interviews he granted to Defense News on 7th 
March and The Times on 15th March and were 
clarified in his explanations to members of the 
Presidential Committee at its meeting in The 
Hague on 17th March. Although this was not a 
public meeting, your Rapporteur has been given 
some idea of what the Secretary-General said. 
Finally, the Secretary-General has been invited to 
answer the General Affairs Committee's ques-
tions in Paris on 9th May 1988. 
7. The discussion in fact is concerned with the 
reality and nature of the reactivation of WEU. 
According to some observers, the organisation's 
work was seriously jeopardised because any deci-
sion by the Permanent Council was blocked by 
the clash between member countries over where 
to collocate the WEU ministerial organs, there 
being insufficient political will among the govern-
ments to overcome what, after all, are minor dif-
ferences. Although the Secretary-General does 
not deny this blocking action, he believes it 
affected only matters of secondary importance 
and not the truly political activities of WEU. 
8. Your Rapporteur wishes to point out that 
these two views are not so contradictory as they 
may seem. Intergovernmental consultations on 
the Gulf, how to follow up the platform adopted 
in The Hague and other truly political matters 
were pursued normally. Conversely, everything 
relating to the restructuring of WEU has been 
completely paralysed since the end of 1987. The 
question, therefore, is what is meant when WEU 
is referred to. Does it mean the meetings between 
representatives of the seven governments, or an 
international organisation which should have its 
own personality, so to speak separate from the 
action of each of its member governments, just as, 
in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Contrat social, to 
conform to the requirements of reason the general 
will must be distinct from the sum of individual 
wills? Hence, the question is how far are 
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Rousseau's words about human societies valid 
for an international organisation. 
9. Your Rapporteur considers it evident that 
the answer to such a question cannot be clear and 
unequivocal. On the one hand, the very text of the 
modified Brussels Treaty, and particularly Article 
IX on which our Assembly is based, plainly shows 
that it does not consider that European society 
already exists and it does not detract from the 
sovereignty of states. On the other hand, the doc-
trine constantly upheld by our Assembly, as testi-
fied by the report on WEU, European union and 
the Atlantic Alliance prepared by Mr. Masciadri, 
Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, in 
1984, is that the organisation as such should be 
able to take certain initiatives, if only to help to 
bring the government's views closer together 
when necessary and to give them the impetus nec-
essary to apply the treaty in the way defined in the 
preamble. This was, for instance, the significance 
of the call for a political Secretary-General. 
10. Undoubtedly in this connection the trend 
since the Rome declaration of October 1984 has 
been towards a weakening of the role of the 
organisation in favour of that of intergovernmen-
tal activities as witnessed by the successive 
changes in the agencies with the elimination of all 
their independent activities, no meetings of the 
Standing Armaments Committee since 1985, the 
fact that the Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments whose statutory tasks have been virtually 
reduced to nought has not been recuperated so 
that the experts it employed could help to prepare 
a treaty on conventional disarmament, the prom-
inent role played by the chairmanship-in-office 
and the proliferation of meetings for which the 
Secretariat-General does not provide the secretar-
iat. This trend has been accentuated by the crisis 
in the restructuring of the ministerial organs since 
the end of 1987. It is a major concern of your 
Rapporteur that developments towards a more 
clearly intergovernmental organisation could 
have a negative influence on the strength and 
cohesion ofWEU. To make this point quite clear, 
your Rapporteur wishes to underline that the Per-
manent Council, as well as the Secretary-General, 
will be more or less " away " from the forums in 
which discussions are prepared and decisions 
taken. He fears that progress in the restructuring 
of WEU will become fully dependent on the 
bureaucracy that is available to the Chairman-in-
Office and that therefore the know-how of the 
organisation as a whole will no longer have a fixed 
position in the Permanent Council and the 
Secretariat-General. Moreover, the position of 
the Assembly is at stake as well. As your 
Rapporteur stated before, the Assembly is depen-
dent on information from the Council of Minis-
ters, the Permanent Council and the Secretary-
General. These organs are the backbones of the 
organisation not only for its effectiveness but also 
for relations with the Assembly. When these 
organs are hampered in their functioning or when 
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one organ does not know what the others are 
doing, the constant flow of information to the 
Assembly, which is essential for its work, will also 
prevent the Assembly from fulfilling its duties. 
11. Often there are advantages in this evolu-
tion. For instance, it is easier for the 
chairmanship-in-office to take certain initiatives 
than for the Secretariat-General, particularly 
when convening meetings of government repre-
sentatives under Article VIII, paragraph 3, ofthe 
treaty. Conversely, there are serious drawbacks 
for the continuity of the Council's work and, 
above all, the statutory exchanges with the 
Assembly. As the General Affairs Committee has 
often emphasised, informal meetings with the 
Presidential Committee, a body that is only rela-
tively representative, whose political responsibili-
ties are limited and whose meetings are confiden-
tial, cannot replace normal dialogue between the 
Council and the Assembly. Increasingly this dia-
logue, and in particular the most official example, 
the annual report of the Council, has been losing 
much of its significance. A belated report devoid 
of political content is no longer the main part of a 
statutory dialogue between the two WEU bodies. 
If it is to be hoped, for instance, that the institu-
tional crisis in WEU will be overcome, at least in 
part, before the Assembly's June 1988 session, 
what sense will there then be in debating a brief, 
expurgated report on activities prior to the crisis? 
It should be added that, when they are not prod-
ded by officials concerned about the smooth run-
ning of the organisation, national administrations 
are not very scrupulous about applying the treaty, 
particularly when it is as matter of answering 
Assembly recommendations and written ques-
tions. Several committee members have com-
plained about the deteriorating quality of these 
answers and their slowness in reaching the 
Assembly since 1984. 
12. While one may therefore join the Secretary-
General in welcoming the fact that the difficulties 
stemming from the deadlock in the restructuring 
of WEU have not had serious repercussions on 
intergovernmental political activities in WEU, it 
must also be admitted that this deadlock has 
many disadvantages and dangers for further reac-
tivation of WEU. 
II. The European pillar of the alliance 
13. As the ministers stressed in the platform 
adopted in The Hague, the aim of the reactivation 
ofWEU is to form a European pillar of the Atlan-
tic Alliance. This formula, which seems to have 
been accepted by all the partners, is sufficiently 
vague, however, to cover a broad spectrum of 
facts and meet a great diversity of views. The 
adoption of the platform allowed definite prog-
ress to be made towards defining what this pillar 
might be, but from the moment it was a matter of 
passing from words to the first deeds it quickly 
became clear that this unanimity of expression 
concealed many differences as soon as tangible 
shape had to be given to European co-operation 
in all the areas within the purview of WEU. 
14. It cannot be claimed that the NATO sum-
mit meeting in Brussels on 3rd and 4th March 
1988 showed that this pillar actually existed. It 
was even the United States Delegation that 
seemed to be doing most to reconcile the views of 
representatives of the WEU member countries on 
the main question on the agenda, i.e. disarma-
ment. 
15. However, in De defensa of 1Oth March 
1988, an observer noted: 
" ... an indirect success for WEU insofar as 
certain points in the communique of the 
NATO summit meeting refer to the plat-
form of October 1987 and the strengthen-
ing of the European pillar is specifically 
approved. According to the same source, 
similarities with the platform 'are certainly 
not due to chance ... and it must be seen as 
the affirmation of a European defence iden-
tity'. Moreover, no attempt is made by the 
Americans themselves to conceal this. 
Shortly before the summit meeting, Penta-
gon officials did not hide, in informal talks, 
their favourable view of the platform 
adopted in The Hague and the parts they 
wished to be borrowed from it for the texts 
issued at the conclusion of the summit 
meeting. This fact may be viewed in vari-
ous ways: a subject of satisfaction for 
WEU, certainly, but also acknowledgment 
that, behind the apparent cohesion shown 
at the summit meeting, the alliance - or in 
any event its principal members - had 
nothing to add to what had been said in 
The Hague in the framework of WEU." 
These remarks point to the fact that for the first 
time WEU has effectively exercised this role of 
European pillar of the alliance which, according 
to the platform, is its vocation. It must be noted, 
however, that this was helped particularly 
because the United States, intent on having the 
INF agreement and its further disarmament nego-
tiations with the Soviet Union approved at the 
NATO summit meeting, showed the greatest con-
cern to meet its allies' wishes on the other matters 
and argued few of its own views on the other 
items on the agenda. In all likelihood this will not 
always be so and in other circumstances it will be 
more difficult to have NATO accept a policy 
defined beforehand in the framework of WEU. 
16. However this may be, it is in France on the 
one hand and the United Kingdom on the other 
that the most radically conflicting views have 
been expressed on what the pillar should be, in 
particular at the Franco-British summit meeting 
on 29th and 30th January 1988. At that meeting, 
Mrs. Thatcher, United Kingdom Prime Minister, 
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firmly emphasised her wish to examine the possi-
bility of Franco-British nuclear arms 
co-operation only if France again placed its forces 
and territory under NATO integrated command. 
French leaders could not be expected to share this 
view of European co-operation. An indication is 
that they readily speak of a pillar of the alliance 
whereas the British prefer the expression " pillar 
of NATO". Here to some extent the platform 
adopted in The Hague gave a ruling by referring 
to the constitution of a " pillar of the alli-
ance". 
17. It is now twenty year!1 since France with-
drew from the NATO integrated commands. For 
various reasons, this seems to meet with the 
agreement of a large majority of French public 
opinion since, in the 1988 presidential elections, 
no French political party is proposing that France 
return to the integrated commands. Conversely, 
France is proving ever more willing to co-operate 
with its allies in all aspects of European security. 
The fact that, in December 1986, Mr. Chirac pro-
posed defining a European security charter, which 
became the platform of The. Hague, that France 
has constantly strengthened its links with the Fed-
eral Republic in security matters and that it 
allowed the platform to specify that application of 
Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty would 
start " at the borders " of member countries are 
clear, repeated signs of France's will to play an 
effective part in the joint defence. The countries 
which adopted the platform subscribed to the 
idea of defining European security as outlined by 
Mr. Chirac. They expected 'that, in reactivating 
WEU, the French defence system could be 
brought closer to that of NATO. In their view, 
this is also an advantage inherent in Franco-
German co-operation thfit they explicitly 
approved in the text of the platform itself, in spite 
of some countries' wariness about the develop-
ment of bilateral relations w~ich might upset the 
balance between allies. Your Rapporteur again 
wishes the Assembly to note his concern, in 
regard to these bilateral relations between the 
large countries, or some of them, that within 
WEU there should not be two kinds of member 
countries with the smaller countries in second 
position and having to adopt, after the event, 
decisions already taken by the larger ones. 
18. Everyone must well understand, however, 
that the reactivation of WEU is not intended to 
start an independent European security system 
that might call in question the fundamental con-
cept of the Atlantic Alliance as the basis ofWest-
ern Europe's security policy and, above all, the 
deployment of the forces necessary to ensure that 
security. It is hardly probable that any present 
European government, including those of coun-
tries not taking part in NATO integrated force 
deployment, would now be prepared to endorse a 
trend which would jeopardise the close links that 
NATO ensures between Europe and the United 
States. 
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19. In this connection, it should be recalled 
that the five European security criteria proposed 
by Mr. Chirac when addressing the Assembly on 
2nd December 1986 and taken up in the charter 
adopted in The Hague include an affirmation by 
the Seven that " the substantial presence of 
United States conventional and nuclear forces 
plays an irreplaceable part in the defence of 
Europe " because they " provide the indispensa-
ble linkage with the United States strategic deter-
rent". This passage throws light on the nature of 
the relationship between Europe and the United 
States in the Atlantic Alliance and contains a 
clearly-adopted position towards the triple zero 
option and all proposals for the denuclearisation 
of Europe as well as any attempt to organise Euro-
pean defence on the basis of a military, and hence 
political, decoupling of the two shores of the 
Atlantic. 
20. Conversely, because it will make a stronger 
contribution to the Atlantic Alliance and allow a 
balanced Atlantic relationship to be formed, the 
strengthening of the European pillar of the alli-
ance should adapt the alliance to the realities of a 
world which has changed profoundly since 1954. 
21. It is from this consideration, endorsed by 
President Reagan's statement on 4th November 
1987, that the programme announced in the plat-
form stems, i.e. to: 
(a) improve procedure for consultation 
and extend co-ordination; 
(b) make the best possible use of the insti-
tutional mechanisms of WEU; 
(c) aim at a more effective use of existing 
resources by expanding bilateral and 
regional military co-operation; 
(d) concert national policies on crises out-
side the NATO area which might affect 
European security; 
(e) work out a global European concept of 
disarmament; 
(f) exploit all the possibilities of true 
detente, inter alia in the framework of 
the CSCE. 
The application of the various aspects of this pro-
gramme will allow the political activities of the 
WEU Council to be assessed. 
22. Several committee members wondered 
about the possibility of forming a true European 
pillar of the alliance in view of the ambiguities 
they believed remained in the respective roles of 
WEU and NATO. It is obviously difficult to draw 
a clear frontier between the military role of 
NATO, at least in the area it covers, and WEU's 
own area. Uncertainty still prevailing about cur-
rent developments in both organisations proba-
bly makes it impossible, a priori, to do so. How-
ever, if one considers the relationship that 
appears to exist between WEU's response to 
Spain's candidature and the evolution of Spain's 
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position towards the problem of its military rela-
tions with the United States, the positive role of 
the European organisation in favour of transat-
lantic relations can be seen. Similarly, according 
to testimonies obtained by the committee in the 
United States, operations by certain member 
countries, co-ordinated by WEU, in the Gulf 
region were a positive factor in the American 
view of burden-sharing in the alliance. 
23. Three areas remain in which the European 
pillar has not yet proved itself: the deployment of 
forces, disarmament and - as stressed by the 
Americans - the sharing ofburdens and responsi-
bilities in the alliance. These matters are covered 
in the report submitted by Mr. Pontillon on 
co-operation between Europe and the United 
States and Canada in security matters. Working 
groups are known to have been set up in WEU to 
consider the first two questions and the Assembly 
can but trust that the Council will keep it 
informed of the results achieved. 
Ill. Political activities of the Council 
24. 1987 will probably be a milestone in the 
history of WEU insofar as, for the first time, the 
Council seems to have taken truly political 
action. 
(a) The platform adopted in The Hague 
25. A feature of the year was the preparation 
and adoption of the platform on European secu-
rity interests, effectively bringing up to date the 
commitments entered into by member countries 
in the 1954 Paris Agreements. Unlike the changes 
made in 1954, this updating in no way affects the 
treaty itself but shows how member countries 
intend to apply it in vastly different circum-
stances. Your Rapporteur will examine certain 
ambiguities he has noted in this platform. These 
shortcomings must not conceal the essential con-
tribution it makes to European security policy by 
marking a new stage in the progress towards a 
European union which was revived by the single 
European act. 
26. The parallelism between the WEU and 
NATO approaches in both defence and disarma-
ment matters, burden- and responsibility-sharing 
in the alliance and detente is particularly striking. 
On all these points, the platform is an extension 
of what was proposed in the Harmel plan except 
that many problems which were only theoretical 
ten years ago have now, due to circumstances, 
become practical, urgent problems. President 
Reagan's endorsement of the platform 
emphasises this essential aspect of the reactiva-
tion ofWEU. 
27. If the seven governments take their acces-
sion to this platform seriously, it should be possi-
ble to solve many questions that have now arisen. 
As is stated in the platform: 
"To be credible and effective, the strategy 
of deterrence and defence must continue to 
be based on an adequate mix of appropriate 
nuclear and conventional forces, only the 
nuclear element of which can confront a 
potential aggressor with an unacceptable 
risk. 
The substantial presence of United States 
conventional and nuclear forces plays an 
irreplaceable part in the defence of Europe. 
They embody the American commitment 
to the defence of Europe and provide the 
indispensable linkage with the United 
States strategic deterrent. 
European forces play an essential role: the 
overall credibility of the western strategy of 
deterrence and defence cannot be main-
tained without a major European contribu-
tion not least because the conventional 
imbalance affects the security of Western 
Europe in a very direct way. " 
A start has been made on solving other problems 
such as the enlargement ofWEU, its restructuring 
and its relations with NATO and the United 
States, although there are still serious differences 
between member countries on certain aspects. 
28. Since January 1988, a Council working 
group has been examining the application of this 
platform. The only information received by your 
Rapporteur in this connection is that the first 
question tackled in this context is that of 
"defence at the borders". This fact, together with 
the recent development of bilateral Franco-
German relations in defence matters and the 
Franco-British agreement of January 1988 on the 
use of ports and infrastructure on French territory 
for the possible reinforcement of the NATO sys-
tem, indicates that one ofWEU's main tasks, i.e. 
to keep France in close contact with the NATO 
defence system, is being carried out in a more or 
less satisfactory manner. 
29. In another respect, the Assembly would 
like confirmation of the statement attributed to 
the Secretary-General in Defense News of 7th 
March 1988 that " WEU criticised the decision 
not to invite NATO Secretary-General Lord 
Carrington ", to the Franco-German Cheeky 
Sparrow manceuvres held in autumn 1987. It 
would be most important to know who expressed 
this opinion, when, in what form and exactly 
what was said. 
(b) Security and disarmament 
30. The Assembly knows that the working 
group on disarmament, which did not meet in 
1985 because of an approach by the United States, 
has started work again. Several reports that 
Agency I has been asked to prepare were designed 
to inform governments of certain aspects of the 
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question, in particular Soviet tactics in the dis-
armament negotiations. It knows no more, nor 
has it been informed of the activities of the work-
ing group on European security. 
(c) WEU and the Gulf 
31. It is about the Gulf that the Assembly has 
been the best informed thanks to the Chairman-
in-Office of the Council sending guidelines appar-
ently adopted by the Council in preparation for 
the press conferences it ha$ held after certain 
intergovernmental meetings on this subject. your 
Rapporteur covered most aspects of this in the 
report adopted by the General Affairs Committee 
in November 1987. 
32. Since then, two new pieces of information 
were transmitted by the Chairman-in-Office, fol-
lowing the meeting on 15th February 1988 and 
the ministerial meeting on 19th April. The first 
refers to the development of co-operation 
between member countries in the Gulf at several 
levels: representatives of ministries of defence 
and of naval commands on the spot. The outlines 
transmitted give only a fragmentary, incomplete 
and sometimes cryptic picture of developments 
and decisions taken. Your Rapporteur therefore 
felt he should ask the Secretary-General for an 
explanation of these matters. He received the fol-
lowing answer in a letter dated 25th March: 
"In reality, the Gulf affair is a 'first' for 
Europe. 
It is indeed the first time European coun-
tries are acting together - under the aegis of 
a European organisation to which they 
belong - on problems which do not touch 
upon the immediate area of defence but 
whose evolution may threaten their secu-
rity in the broadest sense. 
Past events prove this. 
When in 1978 European interests and per-
sons were in danger in Shaba (Zaire), the 
two European countries particularly con-
cerned, France and Belgium, reacted in a 
manner which was not only independent, 
but also in competition, not to say diver-
gent. 
In 1984, mine-sweeping operations proved 
necessary in the Red Sea. Three countries 
reacted, but in separate ways: the United 
Kingdom in the framework of an 
American-British-Egyptian operation, 
France and Italy each taking their own sep-
arate ways. 
As I said, the case ofthe Gulf was therefore 
a 'first'. 
This 'first' will be developed, as is normal 
in view of the novelty of this action, step by 
step and in a pragmatic manner. 
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First through political consultation. When 
the freedom of navigation in the Gulf 
seemed threatened, the United States 
decided to strengthen its naval presence. 
Two European countries traditionally pres-
ent in the region, the United Kingdom and 
France, decided to strengthen theirs. In 
these conditions, the Netherlands presi-
dency of Western European Union con-
vened in The Hague on 20th August 1987 a 
WEU political consultation at the level of 
political directors and their counterparts 
from the ministries of defence of the mem-
ber states. On the basis of this political con-
sultation, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium 
(the latter two countries through joint oper-
ations under the protection of the British 
fleet) decided to send naval units- mainly 
mine-sweepers and support vessels - to the 
Gulf. These were national operations. But 
they are being conducted on the basis of 
WEU political consultations which are 
since being pursued in the framework of 
meetings held approximately once each 
month. 
Subsequently, a demonstration of WEU 
solidarity was added to this political 
co-operation. The Federal Republic of Ger-
many and Luxembourg were unable to 
send naval units to the Gulf, the former 
because of the limits imposed in this 
respect by its constitution, the latter 
because it did not have the necessary units. 
The Federal Republic agreed to replace the 
units withdrawn by other countries for the 
operations in the Gulf, in the Atlantic and 
in the Mediterranean. Luxembourg took 
the initiative of making a financial contri-
bution. 
Finally, to this political consultation and 
this manifestation of solidarity was added a 
co-ordination of operations: 
- co-ordination on the spot between 
fleets, 
- co-ordination in the capitals between 
admiralties. This was what was meant by 
the 'naval points of contact' mentioned 
in the guidelines for the presidency for 
informing the press adopted after the 
meeting of senior officials held in The 
Hague on 15th February 1988 and to 
which you allude in your message. These 
'naval points of contact' are 'correspon-
dents' nominated in naval headquarters 
who maintain close contacts between 
each other in regard to operations in the 
Gulf and who may be and indeed have 
been convened at the initiative of the 
presidency. 
Political consultation meetings (political 
directors or their representatives and their 
counterparts from the defence ministries) 
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such as the 'naval points of contact' are 
generally held at the seat ofthe presidency, 
i.e. at present The Hague. The 'naval points 
of contact' were nevertheless convened to 
meet in Paris on 3rd March last. 
Everything above constitutes an important 
precedent. It indicates that the member 
countries of Western European Union 
might henceforth resort to similar proce-
dure for jointly facing up to other threats 
outside the immediate area of their defence 
but which are aimed at their security in the 
widest sense of the term. " 
33. The ministerial meeting on 18th and 19th 
April was held at a time of new crisis in the Gulf, 
due in particular to further mines having been 
laid, probably by Iran, in the central part of the 
Gulf. An American frigate had just been seriously 
damaged by one of these mines, leading the 
United States to retaliate against Iran, destroying 
three oil terminals close to the Iranian shore of 
the Gulf. An American helicopter was lost during 
this operation. The WEU member countries did 
not take part in these reprisals, but mine-sweepers 
belonging to four of them - Belgium, Italy, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom - came 
into action and detected several mines. Having 
received advance warning, they had moved out of 
the area before the American retaliatory opera-
tions took place. 
34. The declaration on recent events in the 
Gulf adopted by the Council at its ministerial 
meeting on 19th April refers to the ensuing situa-
tion and reaffirms member countries' will to safe-
guard the right to free navigation. However, it 
includes a new element compared with earlier 
statements by the WEU countries since, after 
appealing to those responsible for mining activi-
ties and attacks against merchant shipping, it 
stated that " such activities can call for measures 
for self-defence", admittedly rather timid word-
ing, but given some weight by the retaliatory oper-
ations the Americans conducted against Iran. 
35. Furthermore, the Council usefully marks 
out the responsibilities of European political 
co-operation and its own by assigning to the for-
mer the task of supporting " all endeavours 
towards the full and early implementation of Res-
olution 598 of the Security Council, which is the 
only framework for an overall solution to the 
problems raised by the Iraq-Iran conflict". This 
phrase seems to be a clear position in favour of 
the American proposal for sanctions against Iran 
if it persists in refusing to applying the resolution, 
which the Soviet Union has so far refused. One 
may wonder whether the Twelve will be as capa-
ble as the Seven of adopting a firm position on 
this question. 
36. The importance of this matter from the 
WEU point of view should be stressed. First, it 
was the first time Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the 
modified Brussels Treaty had been applied. 
Second, application was followed by action. Fur-
ther, this action is outside NATO because it is 
being conducted in an area not covered by the 
Atlantic Alliance. Finally, a form of co-ordination 
of national action has been developed corre-
sponding to what each country can do and to the 
intergovernmental nature of WEU. 
37. This co-ordination now has to be adapted 
to the changing situation in the Gulf and the 
declared intention of certain governments not to 
keep their naval forces in the region for very long. 
According to information received on 19th April, 
all the members of WEU are determined to 
remain in the area at least until July. 
38. It is difficult, however, to measure the 
effect of the action of WEU member countries in 
the Gulf. Their ships have destroyed only a few 
mines, not by any fault of their own, but because 
no more mines seem to have been laid by the bel-
ligerent parties between August 1987 and April 
1988. It may nevertheless be considered that it is 
the presence of these ships and the United States 
navy that stopped Iran continuing its mine-laying 
operations during this period because it knew 
there was every chance of the mines being 
removed before they could destroy ships. In fact, 
as soon as mine-laying started again, the mine-
sweepers resumed their operations and allowed 
the shipping lanes in contaminated areas to be 
opened again fairly quickly. This militates in 
favour ofkeeping WEU naval forces in the area as 
long as the peril remains. 
39. The General Affairs Committee consid-
ered, however, that, while each member govern-
ment tried to derive personal advantage from the 
operations carried out by its own ships, the press 
and public opinion were not sufficiently informed 
of the co-ordination of these operations by WEU 
and it expressed the wish that the Council and the 
governments represented there remedy this situa-
tion, which helps to discredit the reactivation of 
WEU. 
(d) Co-operation in armaments matters 
40. As far as your Rapporteur knows, the 
Council has done nothing to implement 
paragraph 111.3 of the Rome declaration in which 
it entrusted the WEU ministerial organs with the 
task of giving political impetus to European 
co-operation in armaments matters. There hav-
ing been no meetings of the Standing Armaments 
Committee since 1985 shows that this obligation 
has been shirked. In fact, the only impetus to such 
co-operation was provided by the Assembly, in 
particular through the colloquies organised by the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments and the Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions. This is not at all 
what the Rome declaration proposed to the 
Council. 
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(e) Informing the Assembly 
41. In several public speeches, the Secretary-
General has claimed that the reactivation of 
WEU has become a fact and that the difficulties 
encountered by restructuring were minor matters 
in view of the success of the Council's political 
activities. There are signs that he is right. How-
ever, the Council can hardly expect the Assembly 
to take note of this political activity if it does not 
report on it. In practice, it has not yet done so. 
42. One committee member regretted that the 
press cutting files on WEU prepared by the Secre-
tariat-General were not circulated on a regular 
basis to members of the Assembly, together with a 
translation into WEU's working languages. 
IV. Restructuring 
43. The 1984 decisions made it necessary to 
effect a major transformation of the WEU struc-
tures: abolition of most armaments controls, 
development of intergovernmental activities with 
the participation of defence ministers and politi-
cal impetus to co-operation in armaments mat-
ters. However, it now seems quite clear that this 
transformation was not carried out satisfactorily, 
first because requirements were not defined in 
sufficient detail, second because, for understand-
able but sometimes questionable reasons, the 
Council did not manage or did not wish to make 
staff changes too quickly, third because national 
interests relating to the seats ofthe institutions or 
the staff employed often took priority over the 
general interest and, finally, because there seem to 
have been serious differences between govern-
ments about what should be expected ofthe reac-
tivation ofWEU, a problem which was dealt with 
in the earlier chapters of this document. In a letter 
to your Rapporteur on 25th March 1988, the Sec-
retary-General, Mr. Alfred Cahen said: 
" As for the presentation of the activities of 
the various organs acting under the author-
ity ofthe Permanent Council, I confirm the 
pertinence of your expose in the excellent 
report of the General Affairs Committee 
last autumn. " 
44. It should be stressed that the Assembly had 
anticipated several of these difficulties and 
warned the governments, inter alia by frequently 
underlining that the tasks assigned to the new 
agencies, created in 1985, were far from satisfac-
tory. The Assembly has made several proposals in 
this connection and your Rapporteur emphasises 
the disarray caused by the Council's negligent 
handling of the matter. 
(a) The Council 
45. There is little to say about the activities of 
the Council of Ministers which appear to have 
been conducted correctly. We may welcome the 
efficient preparation of the ministerial meetings 
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which allowed the platform to be adopted on 27th 
October 1987. The information your Rapporteur 
has been able to obtain on the meetings of politi-
cal directors or senior officials is not detailed 
enough to allow him to assess what has been done 
in this context but, as the Secretary-General has 
stressed in several of his speeches, reactivation 
has from this point of view become an established 
fact. Its results have been considered in the pre-
vious chapter. It should be noted, however, that 
these various meetings - apart from ministerial 
meetings - are held in forms and frameworks and 
under titles which vary constantly and about 
which the Assembly is not well-informed. Your 
WEU. The Council should draw the conse-
quences of this for its own work and share 
between the Secretariat-General and representa-
tives of central administrations the administra-
tion of WEU and responsibility for exchanges 
between the Council and the Assembly. On the 
other hand, the idea of convening the Council 
organs in one capital or another pending a possi-
ble agreement on a single seat for the ministerial 
organs seems detrimental to the efficiency of the 
intergovernmental organs. 
(b) The chairmanship-in-office and the Secretariat-General 
Rapporteur asked the Secretary-General to give 48. There is still another ambiguity about the 
details on these points and has reproduced the respective roles of these two bodies. Until 1984, 
information obtained in his previous report. He the Secretary-General was responsible for run-
approached the Secretary-General again on 29th ning the organisation at every level, apart from 
February 1988 and received the answer quoted in ministerial meetings which had gradually been 
paragraph 43 of this report. reduced in number, length and content. Since 
46. Until the adoption of the platform, the Per- 1984, the chairmanship-in-office has taken over 
manent Council had no true political activities. It most of WED's activities, including, to a certain 
is now endeavouring to prepare the Council's extent, administration and relations with the 
ministerial meetings and act as an intermediary Assembly, which has allowed the development of 
between the capitals of member countries. It is "informal" relations between the Council and 
regrettable that because of the blockage referred to the Assembly and made it easier to solve certain 
in paragraph 7 of this report no recent results problems, particularly financial ones. For exam-
have been achieved by the Permanent Council or ple, we owe to the initiative of successive 
by the ministers in collocating the ministerial chairmen-in-office the application of Article VIII, 
organs. It is certain that many of the administra- paragraph 3, in the Gulf affair, the solution of the 
tive tasks that occupy it could be delegated to the budgetary problem the Assembly was facing over 
Secretary-General. Moreover, contrary to what WEU staff pensions, the participation of the 
was thought until now, it is henceforth no longer Assembly's Presidential Committee in the prepa-
the Permanent Council that has to apply Article ration of meetings of the Council ofMinisters and 
VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels the provision of better information to the public 
Treaty, but the new intergovernmental bodies on WED's activities. This new action by the 
which have at last started to do so. The introduc- chairmanship-in-office therefore responds largely 
tion of a modern communications network to the Assembly's oft-expressed wish that a 
between the capitals should provide the necessary " political secretary-general " be appointed. 
wherewithal. 49. Furthermore, the Secretary-General him-
47. It is nevertheless true that because the self has gained new authority through his initia-
administration of WEU and most of what con- tives with the press and the public, his addresses 
cerns relations between the Council and the to the Assembly and his activities in non-member 
Assembly has to pass through the ambassadors in countries ofWEU, in particular virtual or official 
London there is a screen between the active candidate countries and the United States. The 
organisation and the existing organisation. The Secretary-General has also taken in hand the 
more direct participation of representatives of the work of the agencies and, since 1st January 1988, 
ministries for foreign affairs effectively responsi- their direction and administration. 
ble for WED's political activities in its adminis- 50. It has to be noted, however, that the new 
tration and in keeping the Assembly informed of breakdown of responsibilities between the 
these activities seems highly desirable. An chairmanship-in-office and the Secretary-General 
organisation of this kind, and also the application is not wholly satisfactory. Being an international 
of Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the treaty, should organisation, the chairmanship rotates and is bet-
be made much easier by the introduction of a ter suited to taking initiatives than to ensuring the 
high-speed communications network between the continuity of an action. Moreover, the Secretary-
capitals of member countries, as announced to General's outside activities and the fact that he is 
the Assembly by the Chairman-in-Office of the the only member of the Secretariat-General to 
Council at the December 1987 session. Whatever take part in intergovernmental meetings other 
this system may be called - it was first called than those of the Permanent Council seem, so to 
" Correu " in the specialised press and then speak, to have made him an interlocutor and gov-
" WEU-Com " - its introduction was announced ernment spokesman at political level but, to some 
at the close of the ministerial meeting on 19th extent, to have detached him from the 
April. It should radically change the working of organisation itself. An outside, ill-informed 
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observer's view ofWEU must make him wonder 
about the role played by the staff of the 
Secretariat-General who have been considerably 
increased in number in recent years without it 
being clear that their duties, limited in fact to the 
secretariat of the Permanent Council, have been 
increased accordingly. 
51. Should we again ask that the post of Secre-
tary-General be assigned to a politician better pre-
pared to take political initiatives? This is not 
evident insofar as in recent years the 
chairmanship-in-office has exercised most of this 
role. But if at any time the country having the 
chairmanship was not convinced that it should 
exercise it in this way, which can always happen 
for all kinds of reasons, the organisation would be 
paralysed. Furthermore, the entire Secretariat-
General should be more closely associated with 
all the Council's political activities so as to be bet-
ter able to ensure continuity. The present crisis is 
that of an organisation which has not been 
adapted to the new direction ofWEU's activities, 
and this is the fault of the Council, which has not 
managed to define its new role. 
(c) The agency 
52. It is obviously in the case of the agencies 
that reactivation has clearly failed. In his inter-
view in The Times on 15th March, the Secretary-
General presents no other view. But, whereas 
some attribute responsibility for this failure to the 
Council, which has not managed or has not 
wished to make use of the work done by the agen-
cies, others intimate that it is the agencies that 
have not managed to prove themselves. It is even 
rather surprising that the Secretary-General 
should have announced in his interview in The 
Times that the agencies whose direction he had 
just taken over were " slowly dying " and that 
they had nothing to do whereas he is the one who 
should be assigning them tasks. 
53. The Assembly has only a fragmentary, 
inaccurate idea of the tasks assigned to the agen-
cies since 1984 and, of the forty-four studies that 
the agencies are believed to have prepared for the 
Council, only three were transmitted to members 
of the Assembly, contrary to the Council's explicit 
promises at the ministerial meeting in Bonn in 
April 1985. 
54. Several times since 1984, however, the 
Assembly has pointed out a number of facts 
which give the impression that the Council did 
not really wish to charge the agencies with tasks 
corresponding to the true requirements of WEU 
or of Europe. The Assembly has never been 
informed of a definite role being assigned to the 
agencies and it still does not really know what the 
Council expects of them. It must feel surprise at 
the Deputy Secretary-General's words in his letter 
dated 25th February 1988 transmitting Agency 
II's report on " Recent developments in Soviet 
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attitudes to Western Europe and their implica-
tions for security policy " : " These documents 
reflect the opinions of their authors alone and 
cannot be considered to engage the responsibility 
of either WEU member states or the Permanent 
Council. " This means that the agencies are no 
longer considered to be dependent organs of the 
Council and Secretariat-General although, since 
January 1988, the Secretary-General has person-
ally taken over the direction of each of the agen-
cies. From 1984 until now, the Council had in fact 
always described the agencies as organs closely 
dependent on it. It may also be wondered why, if 
this is not the case, the Council was against most 
of the agencies' reports being transmitted to the 
Assembly. This opposition implied that the 
Council, like the Assembly, attached political 
value to these reports. Should this no longer be so, 
documents from the agencies would be no more 
than information documents with far less impact 
than the Assembly's reports. In view of the 
number of subjects dealt with in these reports, the 
question of the classification of the information 
given does not seem to be a serious argument. 
55. On several occasions, the Assembly 
expressed concern at three other aspects of the 
problem. To what sources did the agencies have 
access for their studies? What means did they 
have for processing the information they 
received? What use did the Council make of these 
studies? It has never obtained any satisfactory 
information on these three questions. 
56. At the ministerial meeting in October 1987, 
two decisions concerning the agencies were 
announced: reducing them to a single agency with 
a small staff and collocating this single agency 
with the Secretariat-General. As everyone knows, 
these measures have not yet been carried into 
effect because the Council has been unable to 
reach the necessary decisions. France, which is 
apparently anxious to prevent staff being moved 
from Paris to London, has, since December, 
opposed any decision that did not cover the 
whole question. This attitude would probably 
have been welcome in 1985 because it would have 
forced the Council to state clearly what it 
expected of the agencies and to take the necessary 
steps to give them useful work. In December 
1987, the result was to add to the confusion, inter 
alia by preventing the Council from renewing the 
contracts of the directors of the agencies which 
expired on 31st December. It may be wondered, 
however, why the Council felt it could renew the 
contracts of other members of the staff of the 
WEU ministerial organs which expired on the 
same date but not those of the directors. 
57. Mr. Holzheimer's words in his letter, say-
ing that the agencies' reports reflect the opinions 
of their authors alone, remove the main reason 
for collocating the agency with the Secretariat-
General and the Permanent Council. If this 
agency is to become a more or less independent 
DOCUMENT 1138 
think tank it should, on the contrary, in order to 
work satisfactorily, be as free as possible from 
every point of view. This is not at all what was 
announced and undertaken between October 
1984 and October 1987. 
58. Everything indicates, therefore, that the 
Council still does not know what it expects of the 
agency. The Assembly for its part has always been 
sceptical about the will of the governments to 
make real use, for their information, of one or 
more WEU agencies and has said that it considers 
the only justification for a WEU agency would be 
to pursue a permanent executive rather than 
research task. The control of armaments in appli-
cation of the protocols to the Paris Agreements 
was such a task. The international secretariat of 
the SAC had another. The organisation of a Euro-
pean institute for defence studies could have been 
a third. In 1984, the governments rightly decided 
to abolish most controls. Since 1985, they have 
not wanted the SAC to meet. They left it to 
national initiatives to arrange the meeting of 
European trainees to study European defence. It 
may therefore be wondered whether the single 
agency decided upon in The Hague has more 
chance than the three previous agencies of meet-
ing needs which have not really been defined. The 
agencies' misadventures between 1984 and 1988 
indicate that more effort has been spent on spar-
ing national or individual interests than in giving 
WEU useful, effective instruments. 
59. One committee member recalled the expe-
rience acquired by the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments and proposed that the activities of 
the new agency be mainly directed towards imple-
menting the platform adopted in The Hague, with 
particular regard to working out an agreement <;m 
conventional disarmament and, subsequently, 1ts 
application. Your Rapporteur can but endorse 
this proposal in view of the role that the European 
members of the alliance will have to play in these 
negotiations. The same member proposed that 
controls be extended to include sales of arms to 
third countries, recalling the lack of such controls 
for sales to countries in the Gulf region. This pro-
posal raises quite a different kind of problem 
since, until now, sales of arms have never been 
the subject of agreement between the WEU mem-
ber countries. The experience of the Agency for 
the Control of Armaments shows that there can 
be no controls without very precise prior agree-
ment on aims and procedure for controls. Only a 
decision to boycott a country, for instance follow-
ing its refusal to comply with Security Council 
Resolution 598, might provide a juridical basis 
for such control. To date, the Soviet Union has 
accepted no measures of this kind. 
(d) Collocating the ministerial organs 
60. Collocation, decided upon in The Hague 
on 27th October, seems a matter of elementary 
logic. To the best of your Rapporteur's know-
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ledge, everyone agrees that it is logical but collo-
cation has encountered difficulties which have 
not yet been overcome and which are now 
paralysing the necessary restructuring of WEU. 
61. The facts of the problem were described 
to the Assembly at its December session by 
Mr. David Melior, the United Kingdom Minister 
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
and by Mr. Jean-Bernard Raimond, the French 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. The United King-
dom Government proposed that collocation be in 
Brussels so as better to associate WEU with 
NATO, particularly by arranging for the ~erma­
nent representatives of member countnes to 
NATO to form the Permanent Council. It had the 
explicit support of most governments. But the 
United Kingdom proposal was rejected by the 
French Government for the very reason that it 
wants to avoid a situation in which WEU might 
be too closely identified with NATO. France pro-
posed that collocation be in Paris. Since then, Sir 
Geoffrey Howe, United Kingdom Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
was reported in the Netherlands newspaper NRC 
Handelsblad of 14th March 1988 to have said that 
the United Kingdom might be content with collo-
cation in London. Your Rapporteur does not 
know how this suggestion was received by the 
other governments. 
62. The governments' attitudes probably took 
into account certain special interests. The fact 
that ministers from two countries announced 
their positions in public speeches, however, did 
not make a subsequent compromise easy. Fur-
thermore, the reasons given for the positions 
adopted show disagreement about the place of 
collocation and also about the very nature of 
WEU. For some, the reactivation ofWEU seems 
desirable only insofar as it is closely linked to 
NATO. Others consider it acceptable only if 
WEU remains independent ofNATO, even if the 
defence of Europe is primarily a matter for the 
Atlantic Alliance. This is not a new discussion. 
Only the diplomatic ability to use the same words 
to describe different facts allowed the platform to 
be adopted in The Hague and the text is ambigu-
ous on this important point. 
63. There is probably little hope of this funda-
mental discussion being resolved quickly. Appar-
ently at the meeting on 19th April1988 the Coun-
cil agreed to keep the WEU organs in their present 
premises for a further transitional period and to 
ask the Secretary-General to prepare an appropri-
ate organogram. The Assembly naturally expects 
this organogram to be communicated to it. For 
the rest, events may possibly bring about a pro-
gressive solution because of developments in the 
alliance and member countries. Enlargement of 
WEU might also change the facts of the problem. 
What the Assembly can now ask the Council is 
not to allow this quarrel about its seat govern the 
completion of the restructuring of WEU. A 
provisional solution, acceptable to all, should be 
found even if it falls short of full satisfaction. 
There would be no hope of forming a European 
pillar of the alliance if such a secondary matter 
were to continue to jeopardise it. 
V. Enlargement 
64. For reasons that the Assembly has never 
considered relevant, the Council decided to defer 
consideration of the possible enlargement of 
WEU until restructuring was completed. On 27th 
October 1987, the Council announced- admit-
tedly very prematurely - that restructuring had 
been completed. If there is enlargement, the struc-
tures of WEU will have to be re-examined since 
they cannot remain the same if the number of 
member countries is increased. 
65. Since 1985, the Assembly's position in 
favour of the accession of Portugal to WEU has 
been crystal-clear. It took the necessary steps to 
allow a Portuguese Delegation to take part in all 
its activities without delay. The Presidential 
Committee in turn visited Portugal on 22nd and 
23rd February 1988. In these two days, members 
of the Presidential Committee met members of 
the Portuguese Government and Parliament. Fol-
lowing these meetings, Mr. Charles Goerens, 
President of the Assembly, sent Mr. van den 
Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Nether-
lands, Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council, 
the following message: 
" Following its meetings with members of 
the Portuguese Government and Parlia-
ment, the Presidential Committee noted 
that there was a consensus among the prin-
cipal political parties in favour of a defence 
effort designed to allow Portugal, one of the 
founder members ofNATO, to play its full 
role in the alliance and demonstrate in an 
effective manner its solidarity with the 
other members in the event of attack. 
Portugal is equally convinced of its com-
mitment to the building of Europe. This 
has already been expressed in the frame-
work of the European Community and 
political co-operation and should be con-
firmed without delay in the framework of 
the modified Brussels Treaty. 
Portugal is clearly prepared to assume the 
undertakings embodied in this treaty and 
to apply the principles defined in the plat-
form adopted in The Hague, giving them, 
together with the other member countries, 
the full significance implied by the require-
ments of European security. 
The Presidential Committee thus confirms 
the importance the Assembly attaches to its 
Recommendation 446 and urges the Coun-
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cil, at its next ministerial meeting, to make 
the necessary arrangements for Portugal to 
take its due place in WEU. " 
The firmness of the position adopted by the Presi-
dential Committee is due inter alia to informa-
tion it has received on the trend of Portugal's 
defence policy in the last ten years. It considered 
the transformation of an army d~signed primarily 
for colonial-type action into a modern army 
designed for the defence of Europe and part of the 
North Atlantic Ocean, with the creation of a bri-
gade prepared to intervene in Northern Italy in 
the event of an emergency, a decisive argu-
ment. 
66. The Assembly has not adopted such a clear 
position in favour of the accession of other coun-
tries such as Spain or Norway mainly because it 
has received no specific information about the 
possible candidature ofNorway. Spain's candida-
ture requires explanations about how it intends to 
apply Article V of the treaty and the aspects ofthe 
platform adopted in The Hague relating to deter-
rence and the defence of allies at their borders. 
Norway's candidature would correspond per-
fectly to the framework for enlargement fixed in 
The Hague on 27th October. Your Rapporteur 
hopes that, should there be an application from 
Norway, this would also bring that country closer 
to the European Community. 
67. Conversely, your Rappprteur considers 
that the modified Brussels Treaty should in no 
event run the risk of being distorted by an enlarge-
ment ofWEU. He considers it neither necessary 
nor desirable to revise the treaty at the present 
time and feels that anything which might weaken 
Article V would jeopardise the task of reactiva-
tion that is under way. He therefore thinks it 
impossible to enlarge WEU to include Eastern 
Mediterranean countries entertaining political 
disputes and which have taken up arms against 
each other quite recently. Candidate countries 
must settle these problems between themselves; it 
is not for WEU to adapt its basic texts to suit the 
candidates. He also wonders what the undertak-
ing that defence should start on the frontiers 
would mean in the case of countries whose terri-
tory is far from the other members of WEU. 
68. One committee member stressed the inte-
rest of enlarging WEU to include all the European 
member countries ofNA TO so that it might form 
a true European pillar of the alliance. This is natu-
rally a long-term objective that might be consid-
ered, but it must be noted that the Northern Euro-
pean countries have not yet applied for 
membership. Furthermore, the policy recently 
adopted by Denmark on the passage of allied 
ships carrying nuclear weapons through its terri-
torial waters makes it impossible, as matters now 
stand, for it to accede to the platform adopted in 
The Hague. 
69. This would not be so for Norway, but as it 
is not a member of the European Community its 
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possible candidature would again raise the rather 
nebulous question of the obligation to belong to 
the Community before joining WEU. Because of 
the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty, it 
obviously conforms with the nature of WEU to 
contribute to the building of Europe, as recalled in 
the invitation addressed to Portugal and Spain, 
and this can but encourage the Assembly to 
develop its exchanges with the Community and 
the European Parliament, as the Presidential 
Committee undertook to do several years ago. It 
does not seem possible to go any further at pres-
ent either with enlargement to include the Euro-
pean members of the alliance or with the require-
ment for membership of both WEU and the 
Community, but this is obviously a problem that 
will arise in the fairly near future. 
70. In any event, the Assembly was happy to 
note the " Draft invitation for Portugal and 
Spain " adopted by the Council of Ministers on 
19th April. It is pleased the reasons given by the 
Council include not only the principles defined 
on 27th October 1987 but also the fact that the 
two countries " are fully committed to the process 
of European construction", which shows clearly 
WEU's place at the side of the European Commu-
nities in this construction. 
71. " The appropriate discussions " with Por-
tugal will probably not encounter any major diffi-
culties. Those with Spain will doubtless take 
longer since there is still some ambiguity about 
how that country intends to fulfil its joint defence 
obligations. It can already be noted, however, that 
Portugal and Spain immediately accepted the 
offer and this is probably why the Spanish Gov-
ernment immediately afterwards became more 
flexible in its interpretation of its ban on allies sta-
tioning nuclear weapons on Spanish territory. If 
this is so, it would be striking confirmation of the 
positive role played by WEU as the European pil-
lar of the alliance. 
72. It is probably too early to consider here and 
now the juridical consequences of enlarging 
WEU, but a number of questions will inevitably 
be raised and your Rapporteur proposes that the 
General Affairs Committee examine them for the 
Assembly's next part-session. 
VI. Relations between the Council 
and the Assembly 
73. Starting from Article IX of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, these relations have been devel-
oped in a new manner during the reactivation 
period although their former structure has not 
been abolished officially. Because of this situa-
tion, the Assembly has to complain that the 
Council's commitments are not respected and it 
is unable to come seriously to grips with the ques-
tion of keeping the Assembly informed. In the pre-
sent state of the reactivation ofWEU, a complete 
re-examination of this matter seems essential. 
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74. (a) Information given to the press on the 
Council's activities is still fragmentary and inade-
quate. Consequently, for much of the press, the 
Assembly remains the main source of informa-
tion about the activities of WEU as a whole, 
which is not at all satisfactory. The Assembly for 
its part is first, and sometimes only, informed of 
the Council's activities through the press and has 
no idea of the source of the information given. All 
this inevitably leads to misunderstanding, confu-
sion and suspected leaking of information to the 
detriment of the smooth running and good name 
of the organisation. 
75. Your Rapporteur understands full well the 
Council's difficulty in reaching agreement on the 
wording of a communique at the close of each of 
its meetings. He regrets, however, that the Coun-
cil ofMinisters did not issue one at the close of its 
only official meeting of the year. He notes, too, 
that, when it agrees on the text of guidelines for 
the press, they are scrappy, brief and often diffi-
cult to understand. He recalls that the Assembly 
has regularly asked the Council to set up a body 
empowered to establish the necessary exchanges 
with the press. Today, he suggests that the 
Secretariat-General be instructed to draw up a 
bulletin - on a monthly basis, for instance -
reporting on meetings held under the aegis of the 
Council, giving their agenda and the results 
achieved, to allow the general public, and the 
Assembly in particular, to know what is happen-
ing in WEU. 
76. Let there be no mistake. Public opinion, 
which in 1984 was convinced of the governments' 
will to reactivate WEU, is becoming increasingly 
sceptical. It is no longer enough for the Secretary-
General to proclaim that reactivation has become 
a fact for him to be believed. The facts must be 
made public. J:he Assembly's criticism of the 
Council's activities is at present the main source 
of information for the public and press, and this 
probably gives a distorted picture of the Council's 
activities. The Council often complains about 
this, but it should find a remedy. 
77. (b) The annual report of the Council is the 
normal, statutory means of keeping the Assembly 
informed of the Council's activities. It is the basis 
for the Assembly's assessment of the govern-
ments' action in WEU. Since 1984, it has been 
received so late that it cannot be used for the 
Assembly session following its publication and is, 
for this reason, an out-of-date document of no 
interest by the time the Assembly can debate it. 
Furthermore, it is an extremely brief text, mainly 
administrative and without political impact. Is 
this how a Council which claims to have effec-
tively reactivated WEU in the political area 
thinks it can meet the Assembly's wishes and con-
vince public opinion that reactivation is a fact? 
Whatever efforts the governments may have 
made to give effective substance to the platform 
adopted in The Hague, it will be to no avail as 
long as the Council fails to inform the Assembly 
and public opinion of its actions. 
78. (c) Everything has been said about the good 
conditions in which the informal dialogue 
between the Council and certain Assembly bod-
ies, in particular the Presidential Committee, 
takes place. This is to be welcomed, but your 
Rapporteur has to recall that a parliamentary 
assembly forms a whole and exchanges of views 
without minutes between some of its members 
and the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, while 
useful and allowing many matters to be tackled 
frankly, cannot replace official exchanges of views 
with the Assembly as a whole. 
79. (d) The last aspect of exchanges between 
the Council and the Assembly is the participation 
of ministers in sessions. They are entitled to par-
ticipate, but their attendance must be organised to 
ensure that the presence of ministers does not 
upset the orderliness of sessions which have to be 
fitted into periods that are too short. Several par-
liamentarians have complained that ministerial 
addresses unduly disturb the efficient conduct of 
sessions. Your Rapporteur believes such 
addresses are important and that the Assembly 
would lose a great deal if it changed its Rules of 
Procedure, which authorise ministers to address 
it whenever they wish. However, ministers 
should do so only when they have a special mes-
sage to convey. Thus, the presence of Mr. Melior 
and Mr. Raimond at the December 1987 session 
allowed the Assembly to hear details of their posi-
tions prior to the crisis which was to arise in the 
restructuring of WEU at the beginning of 1988. 
Your Rapporteur also wishes to stress once again 
how much the Assembly would appreciate the 
Chairman-in-Office playing an effective part in 
the debate on the annual report of the Council 
provided this were not limited to an address fol-
lowed by questions and answers or to a silent 
presence throughout the rest of the debate. 
80. Generally speaking, your Rapporteur fears 
that relations between the Council and the 
Assembly will be unable to develop satisfactorily 
until the permanent ministerial organs have been 
restructured and gained the necessary authority to 
convince the Council that it should make mean-
ingful communications to the Assembly in a satis-
factory manner: the annual report, by all means, 
but also answers to recommendations and written 
questions, the standard of which has deteriorated 
sharply since 1984. One of the permanent tasks of 
the Secretariat-General is to encourage various 
Council bodies not to make do with the easy 
solution of vague statements or evasive answers 
but to understand that Article IX is as important 
a part of the treaty as the others and that the reac-
tivation of WEU concerns it too. 
81. (e) The question of restructuring the Office 
of the Clerk is constantly deferred by the Council, 
which claims that it is linked with completion of 
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the restructuring of the ministerial organs. There 
is no longer any valid reason for this in view of 
the significant reductions in staff carried out in 
recent years at the expense of the agencies. 
Unfilled bugetary posts exist and could be trans-
ferred to the Assembly without any increase in the 
global budget of the organisation. Empty offices 
in WEU's Paris premises could easily be assigned 
to the Office of the Clerk now that it is known that 
the ministerial organs will not be collocated in 
Paris. 
82. The reactivation of WEU has led to an 
increase in the Assembly's work and hence in the 
work of the Office of the Clerk which, even after 
the completion of the restructuring it has 
requested, will remain extremely small. To gear 
this restructuring with completion of that of the 
ministerial organs, which is still very hazardous 
and probably will be delayed further, is tanta-
mount to depriving the Assembly of the means of 
work that are both essential and urgent. 
VII. Conclusions 
83. The ministerial meeting in The Hague on 
18th and 19th April threw a little more light on 
the state of the reactivation ofWEU. Certain mat-
ters which have so far held it up have been, if not 
solved, at least reduced to reasonable propor-
tions. Thus at least a provisional solution seems 
to have been found to the problem of the seat of 
the ministerial organs and above all major deci-
sions have been taken on the enlargement of 
WEU. 
84. Does this mean that the reactivation of 
WEU is thus completed? Your Rapporteur fears 
that many questions which have been outstand-
ing for a long time will remain because realistic 
governmental decisions on relations with the 
Assembly, the tasks of the agency, the role of the 
Secretariat-General and public information have 
not yet reached maturity. Concealed behind these 
questions, at first sight secondary, is another, 
more serious one: the nature of relations between 
WEU and NATO which, in spite of the platform 
adopted in The Hague, continue to perturb the 
Council's political action. 
85. Let there be no mistake: to speak of the 
reactivation of WEU solely from the standpoint 
of intergovernmental political activities is not 
enough. There cannot be effective reactivation 
without setting up structures corresponding to the 
new requirements and there is no indication that 
the governments are prepared to tackle restruc-
turing in the light of the interests of European 
security alone. 
86. The present crisis in WEU probably con-
cerns only the institutional aspect of reactivation. 
But the institutional crisis stems from more deep-
rooted causes and may swiftly lead to political 
paralysis. In the past, the Assembly has proposed 
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a number of remedial measures. Your 
Rapporteur proposes that the committee include 
the following points here and now in its recommen-
dation: 
(a) Those responsible for WEU in the min-
istries for foreign affairs of member 
countries should be associated more 
closely with the work of the Permanent 
Council through the use of modern 
means of communication. 
(b) The Secretary-General should be made 
responsible for and given greater auto-
nomy in the administration ofthe min-
isterial organs and keeping the Assem-
bly and the public informed of the 
political activities of WEU. 
(c) Action should be taken on the Council's 
decision to give political impetus to the 
production of armaments and this role 
should not be left to Assembly initia-
tives alone. 
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(d) The agencies should be kept in exis-
tence only insofar as the Council is 
determined to give them a statute and 
specific tasks and the Assembly is sent 
the text of their studies without delay. 
The Assembly should also be told how 
the Council intends to follow them up. 
(e) It should be ensured that the working 
groups on disarmament and security 
provide without delay the elements 
necessary for measures to implement 
the platform adopted in The Hague. 
87. To these points should be added those 
relating more specifically to exchanges between 
the Council and the Assembly as set out in Chap-
ter VI of the present document, and a request for a 
systematic policy for informing the press, public 
opinion and the Assembly about the activities of 
WEU, for instance through a monthly bulletin 
prepared by the Secretariat-General. 
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Amendment 1 
Organisation of European security 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Pieralli 
31st May 1988 
1. Add the following new text at the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper: 
" and take action to facilitate the accession to WEU of all the European member countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance". 
Signed: Pieralli 
l. See 2nd sitting, 7th June 1988 (amendment withdrawn). 
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Amendment 2 
Organisation of European security 
AMENDMENT 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Pieralli 
8th June 1988 
2. Add the following new text at the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper: 
" and take action to facilitate the accession to WEU of all the European member countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance who wish to join and who commit themselves in advance to the same condi-
tions as governed the Portuguese and Spanish cases; " 
Signed: Pieralli 
l. See 5th sitting, 8th June 1988 (amendment agreed to). 
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by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur 
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Introductory Note 
In preparing this report the Rapporteur had interviews as follows: 
Netherlands 
Ministry of Defence, The Hague, 2nd and 3rd July 1987 
Mr. W.F. van Eeke1en, Minister of Defence; 
Captain Eyff, Commander Klavert, Lt. Col. Bucher, Defence Staff; 
Mr. Fortuin, Public Affairs Department; 
Mr. Kreemers, Senior Policy Adviser. 
Valkenburg Naval Air Base, 3rd July 1987 
Commander W.J. Bottema, Commander Valkenburg Naval Air Base. 
France 
French Naval Staff, Paris, 9th July 1987 
Vice-Admiral Doniol, Head of French Naval Air Service; 
Captain Dubourg, Military Assistant. 
Dugny Naval Air Base, Le Bourget, 9th July 1987 
Admiral Pinelli, Commanding maritime patrol aircraft. 
Lann-Bihoue Naval Air Base, Lorient, 9th July 1987 
Rear Admiral Sajous, Commanding Lorient maritime area; 
Commander Bemaudin, Base Commander. 
Landivisiau Naval Air Base, Brest, lOth July 1987 
Captain Meysonat, Base Commander. 
United Kingdom 
Headquarters Commander-in-ChiefChannel, Northwood, 17th September 1987 
Air Vice Marshal A.L. Roberts, RAF, Chief-of-Staff 18 Group; 
Captain C.O.L. Quarrie, RN. 
RNAS Yeovilton, 9th and lOth March 1988 
Rear Admiral R.C. Dimmock, Flag Officer Naval Air Command; 
Captain C.L. MacGregor, RN, Flag Captain; 
Captain T.S. Taylor, RN; 
Commander S. Lidbetter, RN, Commanding Officer 899 Naval Air Squadron; 
Lt. Commander T.J. Eltringham, RN, Commanding Officer 846 Naval Air Squadron; 
Lt. Commander R.T. Love, RN. 
Iceland 
Headquarters Iceland Defence Force, Kejlavik, 18th September 1987 
Col. Bujalski, USAF, Second-in-command, Iceland Defence Force; 
Col. Christiansen, Danish Air Force. 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Reykjavik, 18th September 1987 
Mr. Hannes Hafstein, Secretary-General; 
Mr. Eyjolfur-Konrad Jonsson, Chairman Foreign Affairs Committee; 
Ambassador Ingolfsson, Head of the Defence Department; 
Mr. Robert T. Amason, International Department; 
MM. Hannes Heimisson, Sturla Siguljonsson, Magnus Bjamason, Defence Department. 
114 
Canada 
Greenwood Canadian Maritime Patrol Air Base, Nova Scotia, 25th September 1987 
Col. Kirkwood, Canadian forces, Base Commander; 
Lt. Col. Aube, Commanding Officer 405 MP Squadron; 
Lt. Col. Morrison, Base Operations Officer; 
Lt. Col. Jamison, Base Technical Support Officer. 
United States 
The Pentagon, Washington DC, 28th September 1987 
Vice-Admiral Dunn, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Air Warfare; 
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Rear Admiral Edwin R. Kohn, USN, Assistant Deputy Chief ofNaval Operations, Air Warfare; 
Mr. Bruce Powers, Captain B. Johnson, USN, Air Warfare Department. 
Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina, 28th September 1987 
Brig. Gen. Michael Sullivan, USMC, Commanding General Second Marine Aircraft Wing; 
Col. William Gilliland, Group Commander Marine Air Group 32; 
Col. Jerry Inos, Chief-of-Staff; 
Lt. Col. Ben Myer, Commander Training Squadron; 
Lt. Col. David Horton. 
Headquarters SACLANT, Norfolk, Virginia, 29th September 1987 
Admiral Lee Baggett, USN, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic; 
Mr. Roy Haverkamp, State Department, Special Assistant for International Affairs to SACLANT; 
Rear Admiral David G. Ramsey, USN, Chief-of-Staff SACLANT; 
Rear Admiral Joannes Wendel, Netherlands navy, Deputy Chief-of-Staff SupJ)ort; 
Rear Admiral Peter W. Cairns, Canadian forces, Deputy Chief-of-Staff Operations, ASW Plans; 
Rear Admiral Glen E. Whisler, USN, Deputy Chief-of-Staff Policy; 
Commander K. Hindle, RN. 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Glucksburg Marine Headquarters, FRG, 15th October 1987 
Rear Admiral Jiirgen Dubois, Commander-in-Chief Fleet. 
Naval Air Station, Eggebek, 15th October 1987 
Captain Volker Liche, Station Commander, Naval Air Wing 2, Eggebek. 
Spain 
Ministry of Defence, Madrid, 18th and 24th February 1988 
Rear Admiral R. Marti Narbona, Head of Naval Aviation Division; 
Commander J.A. Font, Naval Assistant; 
Major M. Montojo, Spanish Marine Corps. 
Aircraft carrier "Principe de Asturias·: El Ferrol, 19th February 1988 
Captain A. Leon Garcia, Commanding Officer. 
Portugal 
IBERLANT, Oeiras (near Lisbon), 23rd February 1988 
Rear Admiral S.E. Bump, USN, Deputy Commander-in-Chief IBERLANT; 
Commodore C.W. Gotto, RN, DCoS, Plans and Operations. 
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Norway 
AFNORTH, Kolsiis, Norway, 18th March 1988 
General Sir Geoffrey Howlett, CINCNORTH; 
Lt. General Schibbye, Norwegian Air Force, Deputy ClNCNORTH; 
Rear Admiral Steindorff, Federal German Navy, Chief..of-Staff; 
Major General Schriver, Danish Army; 
Brig. General Rowe, USMC. 
Norwegian Defence Headqwarters, Huseby, 18th March 1988 
Rear Admiral Per Sollien; 
Col. Nils Sverdrup-Thygeson; 
Lt. Col. Hans-Peter Roeder. 
Ministry of Defence, Oslo, 18th March 1988 
Mr. Chris Prebensen, Director-General Press and Information Department; 
MM. Baard Dredrup Knudsen, Harald Stoeren, Dr. Mari Heiberg. Security Policy Depart-
ment; 
MM. Finn Sollie, Tomas Ries, International Relations Institute. 
Italy 
Aircraft carrier " Garibaldi ·: La Spezia, 7th April 1988 
Captain Giorgio Biraghi, Commanding Officer; 
Commander Angelino, Commander (Air). 
Ministry of Defence, Rome, 7th April 1988 
Vice-Admiral Mario Castelletti, Plans and Policy Division; 
Captain Martinotti, Naval Assistant; 
Captain Dicieco. 
The committee as a whole held a meeting on board HMS " Ark Royal .. setting sail from Ports-
mouth on 13th October 1986 and was briefed by: 
Captain (now Rear Admiral) J.L. Weatherall, RN, Commanding Officer; 
Captain C.R.K. Cameron, RN, Head of Defence Studies (Royal Navy); 
Commander A.F. Hutchison, RN, Commander (Air). 
On 14th October 1986, the committee met at Headquarters Allied Commander-in-ChiefChannel, 
Northwood, where it was briefed by: 
Admiral Sir Nicholas Hunt, Commander-in-Chief Channel; 
Air Vice Marshal Derek Hann, RAF, Chief-of-Staff Maritime Air Forces, Eastern Atlantic; 
Rear Admiral R. den Boeft, RNLN, Chief of Allied Staff. 
The committee as a whole also visited the Tactical Fighter and Weapons Training Centre, Goose 
Bay, Canada, on 23rd and 24th September 1987 and was briefed by: 
Lt. Col. Jodouin, Canadian forces, Acting Base Commander; 
Col. Christiaans, Royal Netherlands Air Force, Commander RNAF Detachment Goose Bay; 
Col. Schneider, German Air Force, Commander German Air Force Training in Canada; 
Major Clements, United States Air Force Detachment; 
Squadron Leader Smith, Royal Air Force, Commander RAF Detachment Goose Bay. 
The committee and the Rapporteur express their special thanks to all the officials and senior offi-
cers who met the Rapporteur or briefed the committee in reply to questions. 
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Draft R«omme1Ullltion 
The Assembly, 
(i) Aware that the security of the highly-industrialised countries ofWestern Europe depends on access 
to overseas markets and sources of raw materials; 
(ii) Conscious that the defences of Western Europe and of North America are interdependent and that 
the coalition defence ofWestern Europe provided throu&h the NATO alliance depends on the mainte-
nance of secure lines of communication across the North Atlantic for the essential process of reinforce-
ment and resupply from Canada and the United States, for which SACLANT's Striking Fleet Atlantic 
with its naval air and anti-submarine assets plays a key role; 
(iii) Noting that both recent events in the Gulf and experience in other previous conflicts have demon-
strated the importance of seapower generally and of organic naval air power in particular, and not only 
lead to the recognition of the strategic and economic necessity for Western Europe to retain possession 
and availability of national merchant fleets of adequate size, but justify the suggestion that developments 
in the structure and ownership of international merchant shipping merits serious consideration; 
(iv) RecOIJlising that the strona growth and development of the Soviet navy since the !early 1960s into a 
formidable bluewater iastrument of lon&-range projection of power and political influence is one of the 
most significant strategic developments of recent years; 
(v) Approving warmly the construction of new aircraft-carrying vessels by France, Italy, Spain and the 
United Kingdom, to operate a variety of air defence, attack and STOVL aircraft as well as anti-submarine, 
assault and AEW helicopters; 
(vi) Welcomin& the enhancement of naval and maritime aviation being undertaken by the navies and 
air forces of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Portugal 
and the United Kin&dom; 
(vii) Anxious that the remarkable sophisti~tion and impressive operational capability, as well as the 
large numbers of Soviet submarines should not be allowed to affect adversely the balance of power 
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact; 
(viii) Believing that the current superiority in naval aviation and especially in strike carriers enjoyed by 
NATO is a strong factor in favour of effective deterrence and the preservation of peace which ought to be 
maintained, unless and until a multilateral and verifiable aareement with the USSR to reduce this capac-
ity is secured; 
(ix) Appreciatin& the inherent flexibility, speed ofresponse and freedom of operation without the con-
straints of fixed land bases which endow naval aviation with a uniquely important role in exerting politi-
cal influence in crisis management and limiting the escalation of conflict; 
(x) Understanding that war at sea or hostilities outside the NATO area, such as the war between Iran 
and Iraq, could precipitate wider conflict unless controlled by the appropriate application of external 
political pressure and, if necessary, force, and that consequently the western alliance must retain assets 
such as naval aviation which are as relevant to operating outside the NATO area as within it and to lim-
ited conflict as to all-out war, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Urge Western European nations to maintain their si&nificant naval force improvement plans: 
(a) by encouraain& France to pursue its aircraft carrier construction programme through the entry-
into-service of two CHARLES DE GAULLE-class ships; 
(b) by encouraging the United Kingdom to put into service at least one aviation support ship to 
complement the aviation training ship RFA ARGUS and thereby to retain a capability for 
heliborne amphibious assault, and to proceed as soon as possible to upgrade Sea Harrier aircraft 
to FRS 2 standards; 
(c) by encouragin& Italy to procure STOVL aircraft, preferably with an air defence capability, to 
supplement the ASW helicopters presently embarked in the aircraft-carrying cruiser, GARI-
BALDI; 
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(d) by encouraging the entry-into-service on the part of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal of new, or new versions of existing maritime patrol air-
craft; 
2. Persuade at least the member countries with naval forces currently in the Gulf to work together to 
create a European standing naval force with organic naval aviation including air defence, airborne early 
warning, attack, anti-submarine and heliborne assault assets for deployment under single command and 
unified control to areas outside the NATO theatre where Western Europe's security interests are at stake 
in emergency or war; 
3. Affirm its support for naval collaborative equipment programmes such as the EH-101 and NH-90 
helicopters, the T-45 Goshawk and AV-8B aircraft, and the NFR-90 anti-submarine frigate, and related 
weapon systems; 
4. Discuss with NATO governments ways of ensuring that priorities between purely air force and 
maritime air missions are so organised that: 
(a) naval commanders have a sufficiency of air assets under their direct control which cannot be 
diverted elsewhere by national air forces; 
(b) the procurement of new air force maritime attack aircraft such as a replacement for the Bucca-
neer and the A-7 Corsair in Royal Air Force and Portuguese Air Force service respectively 
receive the priority which from the naval point of view they deserve; 
5. Explore with the governments of the United States, Spain, the United Kingdom and possibly Italy, 
the feasibility of co-operation in the field ofHarrier pilot training on the lines of the tri-national Tornado 
training establishment (TTTE). 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Wilkiuon, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. Apart from reports of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments concerning 
regions where maritime considerations naturally 
apply (for example " European security and the 
Mediterranean " 1, the committee's reports over 
recent years have rarely touched on naval strategy 
and even less on such comparatively esoteric sub-
jects as aviation at sea. 
1.2. At a time when the situation on the central 
front appears fairly stable (most dynamism is 
expected to be reserved for the various arms con-
trol forums), it is appropriate to turn the spotlight 
on to an area of operations which has been stead-
ily increasing in importance within the normal 
zone of the Atlantic Alliance and elsewhere on the 
globe. This report will examine Western Europe's 
role, not only in and above her own waters, but 
also in other areas where her security interests are 
very much at stake. 
II. Dependence on the sea 
2.1. In Western Europe we must remind our-
selves just how much we need the sea. We depend 
vitally on the free use of the sea to sustain our-
selves. None of our nations is self-sufficient and 
to feed ourselves and maintain our industry we 
must import food and raw materials. To pay for 
these we need to export. 
2.2. Our populations nowadays tend to think 
mainly in terms of air travel but, as far as trade is 
concerned, the most practical and economic 
means of transport is still by sea and 95% by 
weight of our entire trade is carried in ships. 
Western Europe could not survive without a min-
imum of 1 000 shiploads every month of essential 
foods and critical raw materials. On any one day 
there are over 300 ocean-going merchant ships 
and a further 400 smaller vessels loading or dis-
charging their cargoes in ports on our coasts. 
2.3. Freedom to use the seas for the peaceful 
purpose of trading is therefore vital to us - not 
only to our economic trading position and pros-
perity, but in the case of our imports of food and 
minerals (oil especially) to our very survival. 
Ill. The potential threat 
3.1. It would be quite wrong to suggest that the 
only potential threat to our interests and security 
both at home and abroad is that posed by the 
1. "European security and the Mediterranean", Document 
1073, 14th October 1986, Rapporteur: Mr. Kittelmann. 
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Soviet Union (indeed the most immediate threat, 
recognised by the WEU Council, is currently that 
posed to the free movement of our shipping in the 
Gulf, as a result of the Iran-Iraq war). But mili-
tarily there is no escaping the fact that the Soviet 
Union has devoted a relentless effort towards 
improving the strength and capability of her 
armed forces. Despite serious economic problems 
and moves towards greater openness in other 
realms, Soviet defence expenditure still accounts 
for some 14-16% of her GNP: nearly three times 
the level of the average in the western alliance. 
(i) The Soviet Union 
3.2. The position of the So~et Union is very 
different from that ofWestern Europe. The Soviet 
Union is a great continental power, one of the 
largest oil producers in the world, and the major-
ity of her raw materials and other essential needs 
are found within her own borders. Her lines of 
communication, unlike those qfWestern Europe, 
are not dependent on the sea but are all internal 
roads, railways, canals and her ~eat rivers. As she 
has a long land border, she m~ntains, as always 
in her history, a large army With today its large 
supporting air force. The history of Russia has 
been characterised by a succession of overland 
invasions from both East and West and we should 
not forget that 20 million of her citizens died in 
the last world war. This experience accounts to 
some extent for the Soviet leaders' preoccupa-
tions with military strength and their suspicion 
and distrust of the outside world. 
3.3. Such arguments however cannot totally 
justify the extent of Soviet power generally and 
the development of the Soviet navy in particular. 
Yet the growth of Soviet maritime power repre-
sents one of the most significant shifts in the bal-
ance of world power over the last 25 years. This 
massive build-up of the Soviet fleet in both 
strength and quality is visible evidence that the 
Soviet Union understands the value of sea-power 
to exploit any opportunities that the possession of 
such power presents. The Soviet Navy has been 
transformed into a major foroe 1capable of project-
ing Soviet power and threatening western eco-
nomic and security interests worldwide. 
(ii) The Soviet Navy 
3.4. Before 1960, Soviet warships were seldom 
seen on the high seas, but today the Soviet Union 
has established a wide-ranging pattern of ship and 
submarine deployments. They now provide a 
worldwide presence with the world's largest sub-
marine force, a growing number of fast, well-
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armed modern warships and an increasing num-
ber of embarked as well as land-based naval air-
craft. Why should this be? 
3.5. Twenty years ago, in 1968, Marshal 
Sokolovsky of the Soviet Union wrote in his 
book, " Military Strategy ": 
"The main aim of fleet operations in naval 
theatres is to defeat the enemy's navy and 
to disrupt his maritime communications. It 
may be necessary to deliver nuclear missile 
attacks on coastal targets, carry out joint 
operations with ground forces, provide 
transport and protect one's own sea com-
munications. Nuclear submarines ... armed 
with missiles will make decisive naval 
operations possible against a powerful mar-
itime enemy. 
One of the navy's main tasks ... will be to 
sever the enemy's ocean and sea transport 
routes. Eighty to one hundred large cargo 
~hips would arrive daily at European ports 
m the event of war. Operations against 
enemy sea-lines of communication should 
be developed on a large scale ... " 
And this has remained the naval philosophy of 
the Soviet Union, guided with remarkable conti-
nuity by the Head of the Soviet navy for most of 
the post-war era, Admiral Gorshkov. As a result 
unlike the predominantly coastal defence navy of 
the past, the Soviet Navy today is a powerful 
ocean-going fleet, capable of operating worldwide 
(a "bluewater" navy). 
3.6. The largest ships of the Soviet fleet are the 
aircraft carriers of the KIEV class. These four 
ships carry a mix of vertical take-off and landing 
(VTOL) aircraft and anti-submarine helicopters. 
They are armed with powerful anti-ship cruise 
missiles with a range of 300 miles. A new class of 
larger aircraft carriers of about 65 000 tons is in 
production with the first unit fitting out and a sec-
ond following closely behind. Other surface forces 
include two helicopter carriers, 40 cruisers and 
265 destr?yers and frigates, many of them capable 
of operatmg the latest naval helicopter. 
3.7. Soviet amphibious forces are also conti-
nuing to improve. The specialist class of ship, 
IV AN ROGOV, can carry hovercraft for landing 
assault troops over the beach as well as an entire 
naval infantry battalion and supporting vehicles 
tanks and helicopters. ' 
3.8. All these ships provide the Soviet Navy 
wit~ an inc~ea~ed flexibility and the capability to 
prqJect theu mfluence worldwide. To support 
these operations, composite replenishment ships 
like BEREZINA or fleet oilers such as the BORIS 
CHILl KIN -class are in service. 
3.9. The Soviet submarine fleet is the world's 
largest, ~th nearly 450 submarines (including 
about 80 m reserve). 77 carry ballistic missiles 
and about 65 are fitted with 300-mile range anti-
ship cruise missiles; 300 others are attack sub-
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marines, both conventional and nuclear-
powered. Their job is to protect their own missile-
firing submarines, sink shipping and lay mines. 
On average, over recent years, a new submarine 
has been launched every six weeks. 
3.1 0. The Soviet naval air force supports naval 
operations and together with some elements of 
the long-range air force provides a formidable 
reconJ?-~issance, anti-submarine and anti-ship 
capability. A force of over 900 fixed-wing combat 
aircraft, including more than 400 bombers, plus 
over 300 combat helicopters, continues to be 
strengthened with the regular entry-into-service 
of additional swing-wing, supersonic bombers 
and now also has 100 VTOL aircraft. 
3.11. The Soviet merchant fleet has also been 
expanded considerably. In 1960 it consisted of 
less than 800 ships; today, after a massive invest-
ment programme, it is more than six times that 
number. Their ships operate with subsidies at 
much lower costs than the West could contem-
plate, and provide a growing economic threat to 
our OWJ?- merchant marine, whose numbers, by 
companson have fallen from 2 700 to around 800 
today. Potential military requirements are taken 
into account in Soviet design and construction 
resulting in speeds and capabilities not dictated 
solely by commercial considerations. 
3.12. The Soviet Union also possesses the 
world's largest fishing fleet and deploys a greater 
hydrographic research effort than any other coun-
try. All four fleets, navy, merchant, fishing and 
research, come under central national control 
from Moscow and, together with a vast fleet of 
special intelligence-pthering vessels, provide a 
worldwide network, unparallelled in peacetime 
of readily-available eyes, ears and logistic support 
wherever required to project Soviet influence and 
political pressure. 
3.13. What makes these developments in Soviet 
potential so serious for us in the West is that the 
challenge is on the seas: an element which is not 
essentia~ to t~e h~alth of the Soviet economy, but 
one which IS vital to our economic survival. 
Soviet maritime policy aims to develop maritime 
resources compatible with superpower status. 
This involves challenging western maritime 
power, projecting the Soviet Union's image 
worldwide, developing trade: in short taking full 
advantage of sea-power in the traditional 
sense. 
IV. Meeting the challenge 
4.1. How do we meet this challenge and what 
part do the Western European navies play? The 
first point to remember is that the business of all 
our aiT?.ed fo:ces is not primarily "war", it is 
rather keepmg the peace "· in other words 
"exercising deterrence", and to do it we have t~ 
show any opponent that the risks he will run in 
using force against us are not worth any gain he is 
likely to achieve. To be effective, deterrence 
means displaying the ability and will to fight and 
to win - if necessary. Deterrence is a matter of 
perception by a would-be aggressor. To be credi-
ble, the forces of our nations must be seen to be 
sufficient, well-trained, well-equipped and ready 
to fight at short notice. 
4.2. The Brussels and Washington Treaties 
were signed and our alliance created to deter 
aggression through military readiness and to 
maintain peace. This has been achieved for the 
past forty years in Europe. Our forces are inter-
locking and interdependent (or at least comple-
mentary where not participating in the unified 
command structure). 
4.3. Just as the alliances's maritime forces face a 
powerful Soviet fleet of growing strength and 
complexity, so on land and in the air, the Warsaw 
Pact poses a similar challenge to alliance ground 
and air forces. To show our determination to 
defend ourselves our armed forces must be seen 
to be prepared and to this end, Belgian, British, 
Dutch, French and, of course, German forces are 
stationed together with Canadians and Ameri-
cans on the central front in West Germany to 
form a powerful forward line of defence. But these 
" in place " conventional forces are considerably 
outnumbered by those of the Warsaw Pact and 
would need to be increased if hostilities appeared 
"imminent". Such reinforcement would require 
over a million American servicemen, 9 million 
tons of equipment and ammunition and 14 mil-
lion tons of fuel to be transported across the 
Atlantic. Five hundred shiploads a month would 
be needed to sustain thex reinforcements. This is 
in addition to the shiploads required each month 
to support the basic economic and civilian popu-
lation needs of Western Europe. 
4.4. An evident ability to reinforce and resup-
ply Europe is a key factor in maintaining an effec-
tive deterrent to Warsaw Pact military adventur-
ism in Europe and in sustaining the confidence of 
the United States and Canada, and of the Western 
European nations in the alliance itself. If the 
Soviets ever thought that they could successfully 
cut Europe off from North America in war and 
that they would have only to deal with" in place " 
forces, they might be much more ready to try their 
hand. If the West Europeans came to believe this 
also, their will to resist could be greatly weakened. 
And without it the Americans might be much 
more reluctant to leave their ground and air 
forces as " hostages " in Europe. In war itself of 
course, any weakening of the alliance's capability 
to reinforce across the Atlantic would inevitably 
lead to a very dangerous lowering of the nuclear 
threshold. It is therefore eminently obvious that 
maritime forces are crucial to the whole of alli-
ance strate&Y, on land as well as on the sea itself. 
4.5. In a period of rising tension, control of 
most of the forces belonging to those nations 
which participate in the integrated command 
structure would pass to NATO. A special feature 
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of naval forces during such a period is that their 
early deployment to an operation area or their 
declaration to NATO may not necessarily be seen 
as a provocative or agressive act because of the 
neutral nature of the high seas, but in displaying 
military capability, readiness and political will, 
they could make a very important contribution to 
deterrence. 
4.6. The aim would be to maintain control of 
the sea to allow the reinforcement and economic 
shipping to transit safely across the Atlantic, 
across the Channel or through the Mediterranean, 
and to enable us to deploy our maritime and land 
forces wherever they may be needed to counter 
any threat apinst the countries1ofthe alliance. In 
particular, Western European navies would oper-
ate with and give support to the United States car-
rier strike fleet, primarily by "'hunting and kill-
ing " enemy submarines. 
4.7. There are two major pOtential threats to 
our ships at sea. The major , one is posed by 
torpedo-firing attack submarinbs, the other by a 
formidable array of ship, submarine and air-
launched missiles designed specifically to sink 
surface ships. To counter such threats 'Ne need to 
maintain a number of different types of forces. 
And fortunately for the present, we in Western 
Europe are mana&ina to maintaia a reasonably-
balanced fleet. The need for this balance is well-
illustrated in the team necessary for huntini sub-
marines. 
4.8. One of the principal anti-submarine war-
fare vessels is the submarine itxlf. Fruce and the 
United Kingdom operate nuclear-powered attack 
submarines which can remain submet)ed for 
weeks at a time and dive to great depths; they are 
faster than most surface shipls and are lar&ely 
unaffected by surface weather ~ditions. These 
submarines are armed with bbth anti-ship and 
anti-submarine torpedoes andi some have anti-
ship missiles as well. Wo~ alongside the 
nuclear submarines are the diesel-powered sub-
marines. Although slower and: of less endurance 
than the nuclears, they are extremely quiet and 
difficult to detect and ideal for operations in 
shallower waters. Most navies iln Western Europe 
are equipped with such submarines. 
5.1. The most versatile assets possessed by the 
European nations are however on the surface and, 
especially, alx>ve it. For airpower, lx>th sea- and 
land-based, has a role to play in the maritime con-
text. Naval aviation fiaures largely in the reper-
toire of European nations. Ten countries in 
Europe possess" naval air forces" or" air forces 
operating in the maritime role ": France, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom of the WEU members, 
plus Denmark, Greece, Norway, Spain and 
Turkey from the rest of NATb. Together these 
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countries could field over 200 combat aircraft, 
375 helicopters and some 150 maritime patrol air-
craft. As to the aviation-capable ships involved, 
the European countries possess 10 fixed-wing 
and/or helicopter carriers, plus approximately 
100 frigates and destroyers which are able to oper-
ate anti-submarine helicopters (see Appendix 1). 
5.2. Naval fixed-wing aircraft are based either 
on land, as are the Tornadoes belonging to the 
Federal Republic of Germany's naval air arm 
(which operate over the sea areas of the southern 
Baltic or the North Sea), or are embarked in the 
six carriers operated by the European navies: 
FOCH, CLEMENCEAU (France); INVINCI-
BLE, ILLUSTRIOUS, ARK ROYAL (United 
Kingdom); and PRINCIPE DE ASTURIAS 
(Spain). (See Appendix 11 for details.) 
5.3. The Spanish carrier would be used either in 
the western Mediterranean, or more likely in the 
Atlantic, operating the AV-8B version ofthe Har-
rier. The Italian "aircraft-carrying cruiser", 
GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI, is at present equipped 
only with helicopters, and as such has an anti-
submarine role in the central Mediterranean. 
5.4. The United Kingdom's anti-submarine air-
craft carriers, with their sophisticated communi-
cations, command and control equipment and 
the facilities for the co-ordination of widely-
spread maritime forces engaged in complex anti-
submarine operations, are fully integrated into 
the NATO structure for operations in the eastern 
Atlantic, especially in the Greenland-Iceland-
United Kingdom gaps. The battle is controlled 
from the operations room where computerised 
tactical display systems enable decisions to be 
made rapidly and accurately. These carriers 
deploy highly-capable Sea King anti-submarine 
helicopters to search out submarines, with either 
sonobuoys, which listen and transmit to the heli-
copter any underwater noise they detect, or with 
an active sonar which is lowered into the water. 
Submarines would be attacked with homing tor-
pedoes. 
(i) Helicopter-carrying frigates and destroyers 
5.5. Other ships involved primarily in anti-
submarine warfare are the frigates and destroyers, 
the most modem of which are fitted with the 
latest submarine detection devices. If a subma-
rine is detected close to, the ship will attack using 
her own ship-launched acoustic torpedoes. For 
delivering torpedoes further away, quickly and 
accurately, frigates carry their own embarked hel-
icopters. One of the most effective such helicop-
ters is the Lynx, a highly manoeuvrable naval hel-
icopter which can operate day or night in nearly 
all weather conditions and is, without doubt, one 
of the finest deck-landing helicopters in the world. 
The Lynx, armed with anti-ship missiles, is also 
an effective anti-surface vehicle. 
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(ii) Maritime patrol aircraft 
5.6. The final member of the anti-submarine 
team is provided by maritime patrol aircraft: the 
British" Nimrod", the Franco-German" Atlan-
tic" and the American" P3 "(which in its differ-
ent versions is sometimes known as the " Orion " 
or by the Canadians " Aurora "). These land-
based aircraft are used to detect and track subma-
rines at long range from the force, using 
sonobuoys or maybe " magnetic anomaly detec-
tion" (MAD). To sink submarines, they drop tor-
pedoes which, once in the water, home in on their 
target. Patrol times are often in excess of ten 
hours, and many such aircraft are now fitted with 
an in-flight refuelling capability to increase time 
on task. 
5.7. Operating zones for the Netherlands and 
the Federal Republic of Germany are the North 
Sea and the Baltic, although Holland has an 
Orion based in Keflavik in peacetime and would 
probably deploy a number of aircraft to the west 
coast of Scotland in time of tension. Italy looks 
after the central Mediterranean area, including 
the Adriatic. Spain's zone is the axis through the 
Straits of Gibraltar from the eastern Atlantic 
through to the western Mediterranean. 
5.8. The United Kingdom operates maritime 
patrol aircraft over the North Sea, up into the 
Norwegian Sea and out into the eastern Atlantic. 
French aircraft look after both western Mediterra-
nean and eastern Atlantic areas. In addition, the 
French navy operates the Alize aircraft which is 
carrier-borne. Originally this aircraft had an anti-
submarine role, but with the advent of the nuclear 
submarine, the Alize has been assigned more of 
an anti-surface task as well as surveillance. 
5.9. All these maritime patrol aircraft, even in 
peacetime, have virtually a permanent opera-
tional mission, monitoring and updating the posi-
tions ofSoviet vessels, both naval (especially sub-
marines), and merchant marine. This enormous 
and growing task is shared amongst the navies of 
the western alliance, especially when it is a ques-
tion of tracking Soviet naval forces deploying 
over long distances. There are regular exchanges 
of intelligence between the allies and co-operation 
in this domaine is excellent. For the future, there 
may be a case for cheaper aircraft to work at closer 
ranges to the shoreline, patrolling Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zones (EEZ). The Netherlands example, 
using two Fokker 27 (maritime) aircraft in the 
Caribbean might be worth adopting. The British 
Department of Trade and Industry is responsible 
for the operation of civilian aircraft in this role, a 
role which incidentally would be eminently suit-
able for the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. 
(iii) Aircraft ashore and afloat 
5.1 0. Embarked fixed-wing aircraft are the first 
line of defence against air attack. Where the alli-
ance is concerned, our air defence will be aug-
mented by American aircraft from the United 
States carrier strike fleet or aircraft operating 
from ashore (although often shore-based fighter 
aircraft are something of an unknown quantity 
for the naval commander). Even when such air-
craft have a definite maritime capability, they are 
not necessarily totally dedicated to such a role 
and their operational controller could potentially 
use them for more immediate needs, such as pro-
tection of bases and home installations. The 
United Kingdom air force's" Buccaneer" aircraft 
are another case to examine, quite apart from the 
questionmark regarding their replacement as they 
reach the end of their useful lives. The naval com-
mander may prefer such assets to be directly 
under his control as with the Tornadoes in 
Schleswig-Holstein operated by the German 
Navy. Whether this is the most rational use of air 
power is another question. 
5.11. Airborne early warning (AEW) to detect 
targets beyond or beneath the cover of the ships' 
radars is an essential part of defence against air-
craft or missile attack and NATO now has its own 
AWACS aircraft to try and take care of this pro-
blem, supplemented by American " Hawkeye " 
aircraft embarked in the strike fleet carriers. The 
British and the Spanish also operate modified 
naval "Sea King" helicopters carrying the 
Searchwater radar to provide a useful if more 
local airborne early warning facility within the 
fleet when other allied aircraft are not avail-
able. 
(iv) Aircraft carriers 
5.12. The two French aircraft carriers are the 
only two traditional purveyors of airpower at sea 
" owned " in Europe. With the Crusader F-8E air-
craft for air defence, Super-Etendards for strike 
attack, photo-reconnaissance Etendards IVP and 
the Alizes mentioned earlier, these carriers could 
contribute significantly to sway the balance of 
power in any future conflict in European 
waters. 
5.13. Aircraft carriers have contributed greatly to 
most naval conflicts since being " invented " in 
1917. But this contribution has changed consider-
ably over the years. To begin with, carriers were 
considered an extension of traditional maritime 
power: being used in particular to attack and 
destroy enemy naval forces and merchant ship-
ping, or, by providing air cover over task forces 
and convoys, preventing the enemy from trying 
to do the same. 
5.14. By the end of the second world war, the 
carrier was fully established as a fleet unit and had 
taken over the role formerly played by the battle-
ship. At the time of Korea and later, in the Viet-
nam war, the threat to the carrier was minimal 
and aircraft were used increasingly for attacking 
land targets. The conflict in the South Atlantic in 
1982 could certainly not have been fought and 
won without carrier airpower, (the Sea Harrier 
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and the Harrier were used extensively for ground 
attack as well as air defence). On the other side, 
however, the carrier " 25 DE MAYO " was effec-
tively neutralised because of British submarine 
superiority. 
5.15. In 1982 it became obvious for the first time 
that " short take-off, vertical-landing " (STOVL) 
aircraft were not only extremely useful in combat 
but could bring new dimensions to naval 
airpower. In addition to being able to take off 
without their platform having to make all the 
complex manoeuvres which characterise tradi-
tional fixed-wing carriers, Sea Irlarriers could also 
"land on" in visibility so poor as to defeat con-
ventional aircraft. The fleet was reinforced by air-
craft ferried to the war zone aboard a commercial 
container ship, a concept which has been further 
elaborated with the recent entry into Royal Naval 
service of the RFA ARGUS (incidentally the 
same name as the Royal Navy's first carrier). 
5.16. During amphibious op~rations in 1982, 
Harriers flew from a temporary metal hard stand-
ing laid on boggy ground (as they do regularly 
when dispersed in West Germany). Perhaps the 
most remarkable exploit was the flight of four 
Harriers from the United Kingdom, via Ascen-
sion Island, to the South Atlantic where the pilots 
made their first ever shipboard landings .... No. 1 
(Harrier) Squadron of the RAF began operations 
in the South Atlantic from a Royal Naval aircraft 
carrier before going ashore. This would be the pat-
tern of operations for the USMC AV-8Bs (see 
paragraphs 6.1 and 6.2 below). 
5.17. The world of naval aviation is still divided, 
however, between the advocates of conventional-
carrier aircraft and those navies which have 
become enthusiastic about STOVL. The United 
States navy and the French navy are determined 
to acquire new generations of'traditional carrier 
aircraft. The Soviet Navy is prQducing a new class 
oflarge carrier (c. 65 000 tons>r.although it is not 
certain yet how traditional it will be. Britain and 
Spain in Europe are maintaiqing and renewing 
their STOVL aircraft; Italy is all set to begin, 
(India has a sizeable force of Sea Harriers, with 
two carriers). The world's second largest seagoing 
air force, the US Marine Corps~ has announced its 
intention to convert completely to STOVL by the 
year 2015. 
VI. Current developments in llllval aviation 
(i) United States Marine Corps 
6.1. In the last ten years the US Marine Corps 
has taken the lead in the development of STOVL 
aircraft. The A V -8B Harrier has already demon-
strated a great advance in performance and safety 
over the AV-8A. Just over 90 aircraft have been 
delivered to operational units. In simulated air 
combat the A V -8B has demonstrated a kill/loss 
ratio of2:1 over the F-18 and 4.5:1 over the F-14. 
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In addition the AV-8B costs less to maintain than 
other aircraft A night-attack capability is planned 
and a more powerful more durable engine - the 
Pegasus 11-61 - which should be introduced in 
1990. Nevertheless, for the time being, the USMC 
operates a mix of STOVL and conventional air-
craft: AV-8Bs, F-18s, F-4s and A-4s in both 
the regular force and the reserves, all optimised 
for establishin& and defending a beach-head 
ashore. 
6.2. McDonnell Douglas, the United States 
manufacturer, and British Aerospace are studyina 
a further development - the International Harrier 
11 Plus with a biaer engine and a multimode 
radar. This is intended to provide gruter capa-
bility for the USMC as well as producin& a multi-
role shipboard STOVL aircraft which could be 
offered to other customers. In the lone term the 
USMC would like to replace all its current com-
bat aircraft AV-8Bs, F-18s, F-4s and A-4s with a 
sinale STOVL advanced combat aircraft (~CA) 
starting, perhaps, in 2005. The tar&et operational 
capabilities would include a mission radius of 300 
to 400 nautical miles and a speed of Mach 1.4. 
(ii) Spanish Navy 
6.3. The Spanish navy first conducted trials 
with the Harrier in 1972 and has been operatin& 
the A V -SA Harrier (Matador) at sea in the canier 
DEDALO for nearly ten yean. The carrier avia-
tion component of the Spanish navy is CUITently 
being completely renewed. Two of the first A V -8B 
Harrier (Bravo) aircraft flew directly to Spain in 
October 1987 from the United States while the 
first sea trials of the aircraft carrier PRINCIPE 
DE ASTURIAS staned in early November 1987 
and are still takin& place with very satisfactory 
results. The total order of twelve aircraft is 
expected to be completed by midsummer this 
year and landiq trials will then be&in on the 
PRINCIPE DE ASTURIAS which will be their 
normal operational platform. The ground base for 
the aircraft (which will be flown by the 9th 
Escuadron) will be at Rota near Cadiz on the 
southern coast of Spain. 
6.4. Three Sea Kin& helicopters of the Spanish 
navy are CUITently undergoing an AEW conver-
sion with installation of the British Thorn-EM! 
searchwater radar. These three aircraft (which 
will be part of the 5th Escuadron) will be carried 
on board the PRINCIPE DE ASTURIAS to pro-
vide advanced radar cover for the future battle 
group. 
6.5. In addition, the first Sikorsky Seahawk 
LAMPS Ill ASW helicopters are expected this 
year. Spain has ordered~ of them for its frisa~ 
The Spanish air group will be expected to partiCI-
pate in NATO naval deployments and 
man<Euvres and should prove an excellent asset. 
For budgetary reasons, the Spanish navy has had 
to drop its plans to create a second battle group, at 
least for the time bein&. 
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(iii) Italian Navy 
6.6. A further potential asset for NATO belongs 
to Italy. The aircraft-carrying cruiser GIUSEPPE 
GARIBALDI was handed over to the Italian 
navy in July 1985 but, since under a 19~3 law the 
air force is the only branch of the Italian armed 
forces allowed to operate fixed-wing aircraft, the 
GARIBALDI was ori&inally desi&ned to carry 
ASW helicopters. However, changes to this law 
would allow the navy to operate STOVL aircraft 
which is why the GARIBALDI is already 
equipped with a ski-jump ramp. 
6.7. Fortunately, helicopter pilots in the Italian 
navy already undergo fixed-win& trainin& before 
obtainin& their rotary-wing q~cations, so. a 
transition period once Sea Harrier or A V -8B m-
craft have been agreed need not necessarily be too 
extensive. (An interesting idea would be to form a 
Harrier-pilot traininJ unit, jointly between ~e 
United Kingdom, United States, Italy and Spam, 
to ensure a common approach for the exploita-
tion of this aircraft's unique features.) 
6.8. It is obviously too early to decide exactly 
which STOVL aircraft is likely to be procured by 
Italy althouJb one with a definite air defence 
capabmty is to be prefened, Jiven the likely role 
of GARIBALDI protectin& reinforcement ship-
ping in the Meditmanean. The ship's b.anpr can 
accommodate twelve Sea King helicopters or 
potentially ten Hanier aircraft. In addition, the 
GARIBALDI possesses excellent command and 
control facilities and already makes a significant 
contribution to NATO assets. Long-term plans 
envisqe a sister ship if the budget allows. 
(iv) Royal Navy (United Kingdom) 
6.9. Finance is also the determining factor in 
the United Kin&dom, where the Ministry of 
Defence is aimin& for bud&etary approval in 1988 
for a conversion of the Royal Navy's fleet of 
FRS-1 Sea Harriers to FRS-2 standard. The Royal 
Navy successfully pressed its case for organic 
STOVL airpower at sea in the 1970s, but ~ 
authorised to acquire Sea Harriers only on condi-
tion that chances from the Royal Air Force's Har-
rier GR-3 were kept to a minimum. The naval air-
craft was accordin&lY fitted with a Ferranti Blue 
Fox radar and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles 
which restricted it to clear air combat. This limi-
tation was something of a drawback during the 
1982 South Atlantic conflict when the Sea Har-
riers were confined to visual combat air patrol 
below the cloud base. As a result of that expe-
rience, the Royal Navy doubled the number of 
Sidewinders carried to four and replaced the 100 
pllon drop tanks with 190 pllon units, thus 
extendin& patrol times. The up-grade to FRS-2 
standard represents a much more comprehensive 
improvement. The AMRAAM missile operating 
in conjunction with the new Blue Vixen pulse-
doppler radar will allow the aircraft to engage tar-
Jets beyond visual ran&e in all weathers. A Pega-
sus Mark 106 turbofan will provide longer engine 
life than the present Mark 104. 
6.1 0. Recent budget constraints have already 
resulted in the cancellation of the radar 
modernisation plan for the Lynx helicopter which 
was to be fitted with a Super Searcher 360-degree 
system. Eventually of course the Lynx in RN 
service is to be replaced with the Anglo-Italian 
EH -101 helicopter, but the new radar would have 
provided an interim updating of capability at 
comparatively minimal cost, and this cancella-
tion is undoubtedly to be regretted. 
6.11. The Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RF A) ARGUS 
(22 ~ tons) has recently been accepted into 
service as the Royal Navy's new aviation training 
ship. Laid down as MY " Contender Bezant " a 
container ship which was used in support 'of 
United Kingdom operations in the South Atlantic 
and converted for her new role, RF A ARGUS will 
replace the current helicopter training ship RF A 
ENGADINE. ' 
6.12. This ship will support a training through-
put of. some 1 ~0 pilots and observers per year, 
operating a vanety of naval helicopters. In addi-
tion the ship has facilities for the operation of up 
to twelve Sea Harriers (although the presence of 
the ship's superstructure forward prevents the fit-
ting of a ski-jump). 
6.13. Even if not specifically designed to operate 
assault helicopters in their amphibious role, RF A 
ARGUS could perhaps be useful in this respect 
until the two projected aviation support ships are 
procured to replace the capability to land a Royal 
Marines Commando (using assault helicopters) 
lost when HMS HERMES was sold to India. 
(v) French Navy 
6.14. It is the French naval air arm which pre-
sently has the greatest all-round capability in 
Europe. The potential ship-borne component 
comprises 60+ Super Etendard attack aircraft, 12 
F-8E Crusader interceptors, 20 Etendard IVP 
reconnaissance aircraft, 21 Alize anti-ship and 
tactical surveillance aircraft, and 26 Lynx ASW 
and anti-ship helicopters. These aircraft are 
mainly operated from the two aircraft carriers, 
CLEMENCEAU and FOCH, while some of the 
helicopters are used on frigates and corvettes. In 
service also are 16 Super Frelon helicopters used 
today mainly for transport and search and ;escue 
missions. They are scheduled to be phased out of 
service from 1995 onwards. 
~.15. The coming decade will be an important 
time for French naval aviation. During this per-
iod, several major modernisation programmes 
should be implemented. The Crusaders, the 
Etendard IVPs, the Super Frelon and the aircraft 
carrier CLEMENCEAU will have to be replaced 
and successors to the Super Etendard and the air-
craft carrier FOCH will need to be decided on if a 
modem carrier force is to be maintained. There is 
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a further requirement - to replace the fleet of 
Brquet Alize with a fully-AEW -capable aircraft. 
The Alize will reach the end of its useful life 
between 1995 and 2000. An AEW aircraft at sea is 
an .absolute must (more than 40 years ago this 
maJor lesson was learned during the great carrier 
battles of the last war, Midway and the Coral Sea: 
much of the action took place over the horizon) 
but there is no obvious purely national option 
available. 
6.16. The replacement of the Crusaders and the 
Etendard IVPs is doubtless one of the most diffi-
cult problems facing the French navy today. The 
main difficulty lies in the timetable. Ordered in 
1963, but first flown in the United States in 1956 
and delivered shortly thereafter, the Crusade~ 
should be deactivated in 1993. The same applies 
to the Etendard IVP. However, the ACM (" avion 
de co!Obat ffiB:rine " • naval qombat aircraft), a 
navalised verswn of the ACT('' avion de combat 
tactique "-tactical combat aiNraf\) will not enter 
service before 1996 to ensure the transition. 
Therefore a number of soluti~ns are still under 
consideration. In 2003 to ,2005 the Super 
~tendard will also reach its ag4: limit. To replace 
It, the French navy plans to acquire some 80 
ACMs, i.e. about 25% of the 330 aircraft of the 
ACT I ACM programme. In the meantime some 
20 Super Etendards are being modernised to 
e~able them to ~ the ASMP medium-range 
air-to-surface missile and also to increase their 
electronic support measure5 capability. 
6.17. To embark these aircraft, the new carrier, 
CHARLES DE GAULLE, is planned to enter 
service in 1996, followed perhaps by a sister ship 
after 2000. Nuclear-powered and of similar size to 
the current French carriers(~ same dock as at 
present ~11 ~used and is a dttermining factor), 
these ships will presumably be based, as now, in 
the Mediterranean, although t.Q.ey could certainly 
play a very definite role in tije North Atlantic 
especially if there was any del~y to the arrival of 
the US strike fleet. 
Yll.~ 
7.1. The French navy operates an interestina 
system where its pilots are concerned. Many of 
them serve on an " active service, reserve officer " 
list, " officier de reserve en situation d'activite " 
(ORSA), and this might well be worth developing 
in other navies. 
7 .2. One of the greatest problems in the world 
of naval aviation is that of having enough pilots 
to keep aircraft flying during a conflict of any 
length. (Even in 1982's short battles in the South 
Atlantic, the pilots were at the limits of physical 
endurance, with very few reserves to call on.) 
7.3. Buildina up the reserves must be a priority 
for all West European navies operating aircraft. 
And this might even have an effect on regular 
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pilots' retention in the service: the possibility of 
joining a reserve instead of making a complete 
break with military flying could help in the effort 
to retain at least a pool of available expertise. 
7.4. In the United States, a determined effort is 
in progress to update the aircraft available for 
reserve squadrons. The plan is for the US Navy to 
have two full air wings in the reserves, with cur-
rent carrier qualifications, and another reserve air 
wing for the US Marine Corps. It must be said 
that the reserve system in the USN/USMC has 
worked very well over the years. Indeed the 
fourth squadron to receive the F-18 Hornet was a 
USN reserve squadron. 
VIII. European procurement 
8.1. The recent WEU colloquy held by the 
Assembly in London at the beginning of March 
1988 on European co-operation in armaments 
research and development 2, underlined the 
advantages of such co-operation and pointed the 
possible way ahead. In the field of naval and 
maritime aviation, a number of successful joint 
projects have been developed over recent years, 
the Anglo-French " Lynx " being a particularly 
good example. 
8.2. Advancing technology is bringing helicop-
ters with improved aerodynamic performance. 
The British experimental rotor programme 
(BERP) is yielding dramatic improvements: a 
Lynx using BERP blades has established a new 
helicopter airspeed record. Using this technology, 
the Anglo-Italian EH-101, an aircraft 50% heavier 
and 50% faster than the Sea King it is replacing, is 
being built with the same rotor diameter and con-
figuration. Other collaborative helicopter projects 
such as the NATO helicopter for the 1990s 
(NH-90) will also benefit from similar advances 
in technology. Fruitful co-operation across the 
Atlantic on fixed-wing aircraft includes the 
A V -8B Harrier and the T -45 Goshawk trainer. 
8.3. For the future, many alliance nations will 
be constrained to replace their maritime patrol 
aircraft and there may be the possibility of doing 
this by developing the European multi-role sup-
2. " European co-operation in armaments research and devel-
opment - guidelines drawn from the colloquy", Document 
1141, 1Oth May 1988, Rapporteur: Mr. Wilkinson. 
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port aircraft for the purpose. The idea of a 
" NATO-sponsored " tanker programme for air-
to-air refuelling is presently gaining credence; 
why not take the concept a stage further, into the 
maritime patrol arena? 
IX. European co-operation 
9.1. In 1987, the WEU Council invoked Article 
VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty 
for the first time. The reason for this precedent 
was the threat perceived by member governments 
to European interests in the Gulf and has resulted 
not only in political co-operation between WEU 
nations, but in practical measures to give life to 
that co-operation. 
9.2. Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom all have naval forces in 
the Gulf area; the Federal Republic of Germany 
has agreed to replace alliance naval units with-
drawn from European waters; Luxembourg, with 
no naval forces is making a financial contribu-
tion. Political and naval consultation now takes 
place between national capitals and on-the-spot 
practical common-sense co-operation is practised 
by national naval commanders. 
9.3. Present in the Gulf zone and Indian Ocean 
is a de facto Western European naval force opera-
ting to protect European interests by a combina-
tion of mine-hunting and escort duty for 
nationally-flagged shipping. Assets include mine-
sweepers, frigates and destroyers, plus the French 
aircraft carrier, CLEMENCEAU, and associated 
support vessels. 
9.4. "Here is an indication that the member 
countries of WEU might henceforth resort to 
similar procedure for jointly facing up to other 
threats outside the immediate area of their 
defence, but which are aimed at their security in 
the widest sense of the term " - thus wrote the 
Secretary-General of WEU on 25th March 
1988. 
9.5. What better way could there be but to build 
on this present experience by the creation of a 
European standing naval force, with all the versa-
tility implicit in maritime operations, for deploy-
ment to areas outside the NATO theatre where 
Western Europe's security interests are at stake in 
emergency or war? 
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APPENDIX I 
NATO naval air assets 
Country Carriers Ships Aircraft 
Belgium NIL NIL 3 x Alouette Ill Helos; 5 x Sea King (SAR) 
Canada NIL 14 x DDH 35 x Sea King Helos; 18 x Aurora MPA; 
29 x Tracker MPA 
Denmark NIL 5 x OPVs 8 x Lynx (fishery protection) 
France 2 x CVAs lOxFFHjDDH 61 x Super Etendard; 12 x Etendard (recce); 
1 x LPH 22 x Crusader; 20 x Alize; 36 x Atlantic MPA; 
5 x GardianMPA; 37 x Lynx; 17 xSuperFrelon 
FR Germany NIL 6 X FFH 72 x Tornado; 19 x Atlantic MPA; 
14 x Lynx (ASW); 22 x Sea King (SAR) 
Greece NIL 5 X FFH/DDH 13 x AB212 Helos (ASW/ECM); 4 x Alouette Ill 
(ASM) 
Italy 2 x LPH 2 X CCH/2 X 36 x Sea King (ASW); 62 x AB212 (ASW); 
DDH/14xFFH 14 x Atlantic MPA 
Netherlands NIL 16 X FFH 22 x Lynx (17 x ASW, 5 x SAR); 13 x Orion MPA 
Norway NIL NIL 5 x Orion MPA; 6 x Lynx (coas~guard) 
Spain 2 x CVA 6 x DDH/FFH 10 x " Harrier " (FGA); 13 x Sea King (ASW I 
AEW); 
11 x Hughes; 12 x AB212 (CMND/RECCE); 
6 x P3A MPA 
Turkey NIL 2 X FFH 22 x Tracker MPA; 6 x AB212 (ASW); 3 x AB204 
(ASW) 
UK 3 x CVSA 13 X DDH 37 x Sea Harrier; 76 x Sea King (ASW); 24 x Sea 
35 X FFH King (CDO); 8 x Sea King (AEW); 78 x Lynx; 31 x 
Nimrod MPA; 25 Buccaneer 
(All totals global) 
Sub total 10 130 240 x Combat F/W; 410 x Armed helos; 200 x 
MPA 
USA 15 219 1300 x Combat F/W; 310 x Armed helos; 400 x 
MPA 
NATO total 25 349 1540 x Combat F/W; 720 x Armed helos; 600 x 
MPA 
Warsaw Pact 
total 6(+2) 52 100 x VTOL; 550 shore-based F/W; 320 x Armed 
helos; 180 x MPA) 
Source: IISS Military Balance 1987-88 (modified) 
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APPENDIX 11 
"Invincible-class" " Giuseppe Garibaldi " .. Principe de Asturias .. 
Displacement 19 500 t 13 858 t 16 200 t 
Length 206m 180 m 196 m 
Beam 27.5 m 23.4 m 24.4 m 
Flight deck area 168 x 32 m 174 x 33 m 175x29m 
Propulsion sys1em 4 RR Olympus TM3B 4 FlAT GE LM-2500 2 GE LM-2500 
gas turbines ; gas turbines ; gas turbines ; 
2 shafts 2 fixed-pitch single variable-pitch 
(reversible gear box) 5-bladed propellers propeller 
(reversible couplings) 
Speed 28 kt 30kt 26 kt 
Ranae (miles) 5 000 at 18 kt 7 000 at 20 kt 7 500 at 20 kt 
Radar/Sonar Full radar and Full radar and Full radar fit 
sonar fit sonar fit 
Annament SSM: 4 Teseo 
2 launchers 
for Otomat Mk 2 
SAM: 2 Albatros 
SAM: Twin Sea Dart x 8 launchers for Guns: 4 x Meroka 
Guns: 2/3 Phalanx CIWS Apside missile 20mm 
2 x 20 mm single (48 missiles) (12 barrels) CIWS 
Guns: 6 x 40 mm 
(70 Breda) 
MB guns (twin) 
A/S: 6 Mk 
32 A/S torpedo 
tubes (2 triple) 
Complement 670 (+ 284 air JI'OUP) 550 (+ 230 air group) 790 ( + air group) 
Aircraft (in banpr) 8 Sea Harriers 
9 ASW } Sea kings 12 Sea Kings 17 (AV-8B/Sea Kin&s/ 
3AEW AB 212) 
( 1 ~ ski-jump) (6° ski-jump) (12° ski-jump) 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Maritime patrol aircraft 
Atlantic Nimrod "P3" 
Maximum speed: 355 kt (high altitude) 500 kt 411 kt 
(658 km/h) (926 km/h) (761 km/h) 
Weight: 43.5 t 87 t 61 t 
Service ceiling: 32 800ft 42 000 ft 28 300ft 
(10 000 m) (12 800 m) (8 625 m) 
Range: 4 854 nm 5 000 nm 4 150 nm 
(8 995 km) (9 266 km) (7 670 km) 
Time on task: 8 hat 600 nm 7 hat 600 nm 8 hat 600 nm 
4 hat 1300 nm 5 hat 1000 nm 3 hat 1300 nm 
Endurance: Up to 18 hours 12 hours approx 15 hours 
(typical sortie) 
Power plant: 2 x Rolls-Royce 4 x Rolls-Royce 4 x Allison 
Tyne Mk 21 Spey Mk 250 T56-A-14 
turboprops turbofans turboprops 
Armament: Bombs; Bombs; Mines 
Depth charges; Torpedoes; Depth bombs 
Homing torpedoes; AS missiles; Torpedoes 
Rockets Sidewinder air-to- AS missiles 
air missiles 
(Magnetic anomaly 
detection (MAD); 
Full-range ASW 
detection equipment) 
Operated by: France (navy) Canada (air force) 
FRG (navy) UK (air force) Netherlands (navy) 
Italy (air force/navy) Norway (air force) 
Spain (air force) 
USA (navy) 
Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 1986-87. 
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French carriers 
Clemenceau/Foch Charles de Gaulle 
(1996) 
Displacement (full load): 32 780 t 36 000 t 
Length: 265 m 262 m 
Beam: 32 m 32 m 
Flight deck area: 265 x 51 m 262 x 64 m 
Propulsion system: 2 x Parsons Nuclear propulsion 
geared turbines (2 x K15 PWRs) 
Speed: 32 28 
Range (miles): 7 500 at 18 kt (45 days' endurance) 
Radar/sonar: Full fit Full fit 
Armament: SAM: 2 x Crotale SAM: 2 x Crotale 
2 x Sadral 
Complement: 1 338 1 150 (+ 550 air group) 
(+ 580 air group) (accommodation for 1 950) 
Aircraft: 16 Super Etendard up to 40 (23 in hangar) 
3 Etendard IVP (provision for 
10 F-8E Crusader ski-jump in design, 
7 Alize in addition 
2 Alouette Ill to catapult) 
Source: " Flottes de combat ", 1986-87 (modified). 
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Country by country 3 
(a) Western European Union 
Belgium 
He!: 3 SA-316 A1ouette Ill; 5 Sea King 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Frigates: 6 Bremen (Type 122) with 2 Lynx hel 
Naval air arm: 
FGA: 3 sqns with Tornado 
FGA/recce: 1 sqn with Tornado 
MR/ELINT: 2 sqns with Atlantic 
Liaison: 1 sqn with Do-28-02 
ASW hel: 1 sqn with Sea Lynx Mk 88 
SAR hel: 1 sqn with Sea King Mk 41 
Equipment: 91 combat ac, 14 armed hel 
Aircraft 
Tornado: 72 (54 FGA, 18 FGA/recce) 
Atlantic: 19 (14 MR, 5 ELINT) 
Do-28: 19 ( 17 liaison, 2 environmental protection) 
Helicopters 
Sea Lynx: 14 (ASW) 
Sea King: 22 (SAR) 
(On order: 40 Tornado, 8 Sea Lynx hel) 
Carriers: 3 
France 
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2 attack: Clemenceau : capacity 40 ac (2 fits with 20 Super Etendard, 1 with 7 F-8E Crusader, 
1 with 6 Alize, 1 det with 4 Etendard lVP, 2 Super Frelon, 2 Alouette Ill hel) 
1 ASW (LPH): Jeanne d'Arc (trg): capacity 8 Lynx hel 
Destroyers (hel): 11 
5 Leygues (C-70) ASW with 2 Lynx hel 
3 Tourville (F-67) with 2 Lynx 
1 T -56 with 1 hel 
1 T -53 with 1 Lynx 
1 C-70 (AA) with 1 Lynx 
Amphibious assault ships (hel): 2 
2 Ouragan with 3 SA-321 Super Frelon or 6 Gazelle/ Alouette he1 
Naval air force: 
Strike: 3 fits with Super Etendard (AN-52 nuclear weapons) 
Ftr: 1 fit with F-8E (FN) Crusader 
ASW: 2 fits with Alize (mod) 
3. Source: IISS Military Balance 1987-88 (modified). 
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MR: 6 fits, 4 with Atlantic, 2 (in Pacific) with Gardian (Mystere-Fa1con 20) 
Recce: 1 fit with Etendard IVP 
OCU: Etendard IVM; Alize, ZCphir 
Trg: 5 units with N-262 Fregate, Piper Navajo, EMB-121 Xingu, MS-760 Paris, Mystere Falcon 
1 OMER, Rail ye 880 
Mise: 3 comms/1iaison units (1 VIP) with Falcon 10MER, N-262, 
Xingu, Navajo; 
1 trial unit; 
2 lt ac units with 15 Rallye 880, 8 CAP-10 
ASW hel: 3 sqns with Lynx 
Cdo hel: 2 assault sqns with SA-321 Super Frelon 
Trg hel: SA-316/319 Alouette 11/111 
Mise hel: 2 comms/SAR units with Alouette 11/111, 1 Dauphin (civil-manned); 1 trials unit with 
Alouette 11/111, Lynx, Super Frelon 
Equipment: 149 combat ac, 54 armed hel 
Aircraft 
Super Etendard: 61 (strike); 22 in store/maintenance. Total of 50 to be mod for ASMP 
Etendard: 35 - IVP: 12 (recce); IVM: 23 (trg) 
Crusader: 22 (ftr) 
Alize: 27 (20 ASW - 5 trg - 1 mise) 
Atlantic: 36 (MR) (2 ATL 2) 
Gardian: 5 (MR) 
Zephir: 1 7 ( trg) 
Nord 262: 25 (15 trg, 10 mise) 
Navajo: 12 (3 trg, 9 mise) 
Xingu: 16 (9 trg, 7 mise) 
Rallye 880: 16 (trg) 
CAP-10: 8 (trg) 
MS-760: 9 (mise) 
Mystere-Falcon 10MER: 6 (mise) 
Helicopters 
Lynx: 38 (37 ASW, 1 mise) 
Super Frelon: 20 (17 cdo, 3 mise) 
Alouette: 50 (12 trg, 38 mise) 
Dauphin: 1 
(On order: 1 nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, 16 Atlantique ASW ac (total of 42 to be bought)) 
Italy 
Carrier (hel): 2 
1 Garibaldi with 14 SH-3D hel (to get AV-8 ac) 
1 Vittorio Veneto with 9 AB-212 ASW hel 
Cruisers: 2 Andrea Doria with 4 AB-212 ASW hel 
Destroyers: 2 Audace with 2 AB-212 ASW hel 
Frigates: 14 
8 Maestrale with 2 AB-212 hel 
4 Lupo with 1 AB-212 hel 
2 Alpino with 2 AB-212 hel 
Naval air arm: 83 armed hel 
ASW: 5 hel sqns with 36 SH-3D Sea King, 62 AB-212 
Trg: 20 AB-204 hel 
ASM: Marte Mk 2 
Luxembourg 
No navy or naval air arm 
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Frigates: 
2 Tromp (flagships) with 1 hel 
2 Van Heemskerk AD with 1 hel 
10 Kortenaer ASW with 1-2 Lynx hel 
2 Van Speijk ASW with 1 Lynx hel 
Naval air arm: 
Netherlands 
MR: 3 sqns (1 trg) with P-3C Orion Il, F-27 (assigned to navy by 
air force) 
ASW hel: 1 sqn with Lynx SH-14B/C 
SAR hel: 1 sqn with Lynx UH-14A 
Equipment: 13 combat ac, 17 armed hel 
Aircraft 
P-3: 13 (MR) 
Helicopters 
Lynx: 22 
SH-14: 17 
SH-14B: 9 (ASW) 
SH-14C: 8 (ASW) 
UH-14A: 5 (SAR) 
Carriers: 3 Invincible ASW each with: 
ac: 8 Sea Harrier V /STOL 
he1: 12 Sea King: 9 ASW, 3 AEW 
Destroyers (hel): 13 
United Kingdom 
1 County with 1 Lynx HAS-2 hel (retired 1987) 
12 Birmingham (Type-42) with 1 Lynx hel 
Frigates (hel): 35 
8 Broadsword (Type-22, 1 trials) with 2 Lynx hel 
6 Amazon (Type-21) with 1 Lynx hel 
19 Leander with 1 Wasp/Lynx 
2 Rothesay with 1 Wasp hel 
Fleet air arm (F AA): 
AD/attack ac: 3 sqns with Sea Harrier FRS-1 
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ASW hel: 8 sqns: 7 with Sea King HAS-5, 1 with Wasp HAS-1 (in indep fits, Lynx HAS-
2/-3 replacing) 
ASW /attack hel: 2 sqns with Lynx HAS-2/-3 (in indep fits) 
AEW hel: 1 sqn with Sea King AEW-2 
Cdo/assau1t tpt hel: 3 sqns with Sea King HC-4 
Trg: 3 sqns: 1 with Jetstream ac, 1 with SA-341 Gazelle HT-2 hel, 1 with Wessex HU-5 hel, Chip-
munk T-10, Sea Devon C-20 ac 
Flt spt: Canberra T-18/-22, Hunter T-7 /-8, GA-11, PR-11, 3 Mystere-Falcon 10 (civil registration, 
operated under contract) 
Liaison: HS-125 (VIP, operated by RAF), Sea Heron, Sea Devon 
Equipment: 37 combat ac, 160 armed hel 
Aircraft 
Sea Harrier /Harrier: 3 7 
Sea Harrier- FRS-1: 34 (some being mod to FRS-2) 
T-4N: 2 (trg) 
Harrier - T-4A: 1 (trg) 
Canberra: 10 (3 spt, 7 store); Hunter: 26 (spt); HS-125: 2 (VIP tpt); Mystere-Falcon 20: 3 (spt); 
Jetstream: 20; T-2: 16 (trg); T-3: 4 (trg); Sea Heron: 4 (liaison); Heron: 1 (liaison); Sea 
Devon: 3 (2 liaison, 1 in reserve); Chipmunk: 14 (trg) 
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H e/icopters 
Sea King: 111. HAS-5: 76 (56 ASW, 20 trg); HC-4: 24 (cdo); AEW-2: 11 
Lynx: 78. HAS-2: 45; HAS-3: 33 
Wasp HAS-1: 15 (to be retired by 1988) 
Gazelle HT-2/-3: 22 (trg) 
Royal Marines 
Hel: 12 SA-341 Gazelle AH-1, 6 Lynx AH-1 
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(On order: 1 bel carrier trg auxiliary ship, 9 Sea Harrier FRS-1, 4 Jetstream Mk 3 ac, 14 Sea King (5 
HAS-5, 9 HC-4), 7 Lynx HAS-3 bel) 
Royal Air Force: 
2 sq Buccaneer S-2A/B (assigned maritime, with Sea Eagle ASM), 52 ac (25 attack, 9 ocu, 
18 reserve) 
4 sq Nimrod MR-1/-1A/-2 (Harpoon ASM, Sidewinder AAM), 34 ac (3 ECM, 31 MR-2) 
(b) Other European NATO countries 
Denmark 
Frigates: 5 fishery protection (4 Hvidbjomen, 1 Beskytteren) with 1 Lynx bel 
He!: 8 Lynx (up to 4 embarked) 
Greece 
Destroyers (bel): 
2 Gearing with 1 SA-316 Alouette Ill bel 
1 Sumner (facilities for 1 Alouette Ill bel) 
Frigates (bel): 2 Kortenaer each with 2 AB-212 bel 
ASW· 1 bel div: 3 sqns: 
2 with 13 AB-212 (10 ASW, 3 ECM) 
1 with 4 Alouette Ill (with ASM) 
Norway 
SAR/recce: 1 bel sqn with 6 Westland Lynx (coastguard) 
Portugal 
No naval air arm 
Spain 
Carriers: 2 
1 Principe with 20 ac: 6-8 AV-8B ac, 6-8 Sea King, 4-8 AB-212 bel 
1 Dedalo (9 AV-8A, 24 bel) 
Destroyers (bel): 
5 US FRAM with 1 ASROC, 1 Hughes 500 bel 
Frigates (bel): 
1 Santa Maria (US FFG-7) with 2 Sea Hawk (LAMPS Ill) bel 
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Naval air arm: 
FGA: 1 sqn with AV-SA Matador (Harrier 11), TA V-SA 
Liaison: 1 sqn with 6 Comanche, Citation 
Hel: 5 sqns: 
ASW: 2 sqns: 1 with Hughes 500; 1 with SH-3D/G Sea King 
(modified to Delta standard) 
AEW: 1 unit with SH-3D (Searchwater radar) 
comdjrecce: 1 sqn with AB-212 (marines) 
Equipment: 10 combat ac, 40 armed hel 
Aircraft 
A V-S: 10 (S AV-SA; 2 TA V-SA) FGA 
Citation 11: 4 (liaison) 
Helicopters 
AB-212: 12 (comdjrecce) 
Sea King: 13 (10 ASW, 3 AEW) 
Hughes 500M: 11 (ASW) 
AH-1G: 4 (tac) · 
Bell 47G: S (liaison) 
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(On order: 4 FFG-7 frigates (2 Lamps Ill (Seahawk) helos); 12 "Bravo" (AV-SB) ac; 1S SH-60B 
helos (Seahawk Lamps Ill)) 
(N.B.: Maritime Patrol - The Air Force operates 6 Orion P-3A for maritime reconnaissance and has 
acquired some Fokker F-27. Of the 10 P-3B Orion LRMP aircraft returned to Lockhead, 5 will be 
modernised and transferred to Spain.) 
Turkey 
Frigates (hel): 
2 Berk each with 1 hel 
Naval aviation: 22 combat ac, 9 armed hel 
ASW: 1 sqn with 22 S-2A/E/TS-2A Tracker ac (Air Force owned, Air Force and Navy crews); 3 AB-
204AS, 6 AB-212 ASW hel 
(On order: 12 AB-212 hel) 
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APPENDIX VI 
European naval air-to-surface missiles 
Country/ Name No. Launch Power Guidance Max. Warhead Remarks Manufacturer weight plant range 
<ki> .(km) (kg) 
France 
Aerospatiale Exocet AM39 650 2 stage Inertial 50-70 165 Variants: 
solid fuel cruise HE MM39 ship 
rocket Active launched 
radar version of 
homer AM39 with 
40 nm range; 
SM39, 
projected 
submarine-
launched 
MM39 
Aerospatiale - AS20 140 2 stage Radio 7 30 In service 
solid fuel command HE 
rocket 
Aerospatiale - AS30 520 2 stage Radio ll 240 In service 
solid fuel command 
rocket or laser 
Aerospatiale - AS15TI lOO 2 stage Radar and 15 30 Anti-ship 
solid fuel radio alt 
rocket 
FRG 
Messerschmitt- Kormoran - 600 3 stage Active 37 160 Suitable for 
Bolkow-Blohm solid fuel radar HE all fixed -
rocket and rotary-
wing aircraft. 
Antiship 
Italy 
OTO-Melara Sea Killer - 300 2 stage Radar or 20 70 For use in 
Mk2/Marte solid rocket optical HE helicopters 
(Vulcano/ motor "Mariner" 
Marte) version for 
small ships. 
Sea-skimmer 
UK 
British Sea Eagle P3T - Gas Radar/radio clOO - Carried in 
Aerospace turbine control Buccaneer, 
Dynamics radar Tornado and 
Group homing Sea Harrier 
aircraft 
British Sea Skua CL 834 145 2 stage Radar/radio 20 320 Developed for 
Aerospace solid fuel control HE use from 
Dynamics rocket radar helicopters 
Group homing 
European 
co-operation 
FrancejUK 
Matra-British Martel AS37/ 530 Solid fuel TV on 60 HE Carried by 
Aerospace AJ168 rocket AJ168; Atlantic MPA; 
passive superseded 
radar by Sea 
homing Eagle in UK 
on AS37 
FRG/France 
Messerschmitt- - Air- 910 Rocket Inertial/ lOO - Anti-ship 
Bolkow-Blohm launched and booster active radar successor to 
Aerospatiale ANS AM39 
Exocet and 
Kormoran 
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ac 
ACA 
ACM 
ACT 
AEW 
AMRAAM 
ASM 
ASMP 
ASW 
AWACS 
CCH 
cdo 
CIWS 
comd 
CVA 
CVSA 
DDH 
det 
div 
ECM 
ELINT 
FFH 
FGA 
fit 
fir 
F/W 
HE 
hel 
kt 
LPH 
m 
MAD 
Mk 
mod 
MPA 
MR 
ocu 
OPV 
recce 
SAR 
sqn 
STOVL 
t 
tac 
trg 
V(/S)TOL 
GLOSSARY 
aircraft 
advanced combat aircraft 
naval combat aircraft 
tactical combat aircraft 
airborne early warning 
advanced medium-range air-to-air missile 
air-to-surface missile(s) 
medium-range air-to-surface missile 
anti-submarine warfare 
airborne warning and control system 
helicopter carrier 
commando 
close-in weapon system 
command 
traditional aircraft carrier 
light aircraft carrier 
destroyer operating helicopters 
detachment 
division 
electronic counter-measures 
electronic intelligence 
frigate operating helicopters 
fighter(s), ground-attack 
flight 
fighter (aircraft) 
fixed-wing 
high explosive 
helicopter( s) 
knot 
landing platform, hel 
metre 
magnetic anomaly detection 
mark (model number) 
modified/modification 
maritime patrol aircraft 
maritime reconnaissance 
operational conversion unit(s) 
offshore patrol vessel 
reconnaissance 
search and rescue 
squadron 
short take-off, vertical-landing 
tons 
tactical 
training 
vertical(/short) take-off and landing 
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I. Activities of the Council 
The intergovernmental organs of WEU 
have continued their work of reflection and 
concertation on major issues affecting European 
security, both in the framework of defence, East/ 
West relations and arms control, and in connec-
tion with crises outside Europe. This has included 
diverse subjects such as European co-operation in 
the field of armaments, and security in such spe-
cific regions as the Gulf and the Mediterranean. 
They also exchanged information on other activi-
ties such as the initiatives taken within the frame-
work of bilateral co-operation. Thus, the French 
and German ministers briefed their colleagues at 
The Hague about the efforts being made to 
strengthen Franco-German military co-ope-
ration. 
1. European security interests: Platform 
The most significant event in WEU of the 
six-month period from July-December 1987 was 
the adoption by ministers at their meeting on 
26th and 27th October in The Hague of the plat-
form on European security interests 1• This 
resulted from work undertaken by the Special 
Working Group of the Council- comprising sen-
ior representatives (or their deputies) from for-
eign and defence ministries- in fulfilment of the 
mandate handed to them by ministers at their 
meeting at Luxembourg on 27th-28th April. 
The purpose of the platform was to define 
the conditions and criteria for European security 
and the consequent responsibilities for the WEU 
partners in respect of western defence, arms con-
trol and disarmament and the East-West dialogue 
and co-operation. 
This document also mapped out WEU's 
work programme for the foreseeable future. 
The introductory section of the platform 
emphasises the twin foundations of WEU reacti-
vation: in the process of creating a security 
dimension to European integration on the one 
hand, and in the reaffirmation and strengthening 
of alliance solidarity on the other: 
"We recall our commitment to build a 
European union in accordance with the sin-
gle European act, which we all signed as 
members of the European Community. We 
are convinced that the construction of an 
integrated Europe will remain incomplete 
as long as it does not include security and 
defence. " (point 2) 
"We intend therefore to develop a more 
cohesive European defence identity which 
will translate more effectively into practice 
l. See Annex I. 
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the obligations of solidarity to which we are 
committed through the modified Brussels 
and North Atlantic Treaties." (point 4) 
The theme of Europe and the alliance is 
repeated throughout the platform. The member 
states declared that it was" our conviction that a 
more united Europe will make a stronger contri-
bution to the alliance, to the benefit of western 
security as a whole. This will enhance the Euro-
pean role in the alliance and ensure the basis for a 
balanced partnership across the Atlantic ". The 
member states were " resolved to strengthen the 
European pillar of the alliance". (III,a,2). 
The Worldnet speech delivered by Presi-
dent Reagan on 4th November 1987 proved that 
the attachment to this link was reciprocated 
across the Atlantic: the President welcomed the 
platform and emphasised the unshakeable nature 
ofthe United States' commitment to the alliance 
and to European security. The platform itself is 
unambiguous about the significance of the North 
American presence in Europe:" ... the security of 
the Western European countries can only be 
ensured in close association with our North 
American allies. The security of the alliance is 
indivisible". (1.4). And "The substantial pres-
ence of United States conventional and nuclear 
forces plays an irreplaceable part in the defence of 
Europe. They embody the American commit-
ment to the defence of Europe and provide the 
indispensable linkage with the United States stra-
tegic deterrent". (11.3). 
The platform also sets ·out WEU member 
governments' " conviction that the balanced pol-
icy of the Harmel report remains valid. Political 
solidarity and adequate military strength within 
the Atlantic Alliance, arms control, disarmament 
and the search for genuine detente continue to be 
integral parts of this policy. Military security and 
a policy of detente are not contradictory but com-
plementary". (!.5). 
The North Atlantic Council, at its meeting 
on 11th December 1987, also welcomed the adop-
tion of the WEU platform, which underlined a 
number of basic principles and affirmed" a posi-
tive identity in the field of European security 
within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, 
conducive to the strengthening of the transatlan-
tic partnership and of the alliance as a whole". 
(point 10 of the communique). 
The media paid particular attention to The 
Hague ministerial Council on 26th-27th October, 
and to the platform 2• The platform marked an 
important step in the media's growing awareness 
of the role ofWEU in European defence and secu-
rity, as reflected by the coverage of the ministerial 
meeting. 
2. A press review of the ministerial Council on 26th-27th 
October at The Hague is available at the Office of the Clerk of 
the Assembly. 
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2. Situation in the Gul/3 
The practical value of co-operation within 
WEU for European security and western solidar-
ity has been exemplified in relation to the crisis in 
the Gulf. At the invitation of the Netherlands 
presidency, senior officials from the WEU minis-
tries of foreign affairs and defence met in The 
Hague on 20th August to consider the different 
aspects of the situation in the Gulf area. The 
meeting was held pursuant to Article VIII of the 
modified Brussels Treaty and, more recently, to 
the decisions taken by ministers in Rome in Octo-
ber 1984 to consider, whenever appropriate, the 
implications for Europe of crises in other regions 
of the world. This was the first meeting of its kind 
held within the reactivated WEU. 
The representatives had a thorough and 
useful exchange of views. They stressed that 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 598 
should be fully implemented forthwith so as to 
bring the conflict between Iraq and Iran to an end 
and that the WEU member countries would con-
tinue to support all efforts aimed at achieving 
this. And they affirmed that Europe's vital inter-
ests required that the freedom of navigation in the 
Gulf be assured at all times and that member 
states strongly condemned all actions contrary to 
that principle. 
The participants also took note of the mea-
sures already undertaken or envisaged by individ-
ual member countries. They agreed to continue to 
consult each other and to exchange information 
in order to develop further the progress of 
concertation and co-operation. 
Since this meeting, the Governments of 
Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium have each 
decided to send naval forces to the Gulf. France 
and the United Kingdom had already decided to 
strengthen their naval presence in the region. Sub-
sequently, the two WEU member countries not 
present in the Gulf expressed their solidarity with 
their partners. Although the constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Germany precludes it from 
taking part in such operations, the German Gov-
ernment agreed to deploy replacements in the alli-
ance area to cover for partners' forces sent to the 
Gulf. The Government of Luxembourg made a 
financial contribution to the maintenance of the 
Belgian and Netherlands naval forces in the 
region. 
The 20th August meeting was followed by 
two others in The Hague on 15th September and 
14th October, during which participants dis-
cussed in particular ways of improving their con-
tacts in order to enhance co-ordination on the 
practical-technical level, fully respecting the 
national character of their respective activities. 
3. See Annex 11: letter from Chairman-in-Office of the Coun-
cil to the Assembly President informing him of the 20th 
August meeting; press guidelines issued by the presidency for 
the meetings on 20th August, 15th September and 14th Octo-
ber. 
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WEU ministers reviewed in some detail the 
Gulf situation at their meeting in The Hague on 
26th-27th October. They noted with satisfaction 
the consultations between WEU member coun-
tries and instructed their officials to continue and 
improve this work at all appropriate levels. 
Accordingly - and again at the initiative of 
the Netherlands presidency - other meetings 
were held between senior officials from the for-
eign and defence ministries of the Seven and, on 
the basis of a British proposal, a consultation 
process initiated between the chiefs of staff in the 
capitals. Furthermore, regular on-the-spot con-
tacts and exchanges of information between the 
naval commanders of the five WEU countries 
present in the Gulf were established. 
This process of co-operation and 
concertation has continued into 1988. 
This contribution of Western European 
Union to improving political and military 
co-ordination of various national activities is 
viewed positively by the member states. It is to be 
hoped that it will continue and develop further, as 
it can serve as a model for future co-operation. 
3. East- West reliltiou 
Member states continued consultations 
covering East-West relations in general and arms 
control issues in particular in the regular sessions 
of the Permanent Council as well as in the meet-
ings of the enlarged Council (comprising the 
political directors of foreign ministries and appro-
priate representatives of defence ministries). On 
this base ministers in The Hague reviewed devel-
opments in East/West relations and arms control, 
particularly in relation to negotiations between 
the United States and the Soviet Union on the 
global, verifiable elimination of intermediate 
nuclear forces. They recalled that the allies con-
cerned at Reykjavik in June had agreed to 
develop further a comprehensive concept of arms 
control and disarmament and to work within the 
framework of this concept as envisaged in para-
graphs 7 and 8 of the NAC communique of 12th 
June 1987. 
4. Statrity in tu Metlitwra~~e~~n 
A working group on Mediterranean secu-
rity, comprising representatives of the foreign and 
defence ministries of the Seven, was set up follow-
ing the ministerial mandate formulated at Lux-
embourg in April. It met twice during the second 
half of 1987, and examined in detail a preliminary 
joint study submitted by the French and Italian 
delegations. This recognised that some conflicts 
in the Mediterranean region could seriously affect 
the security interests of Western Europe, and that 
analysis of these conflicts could usefully take 
place within WEU. An interim report based on 
this study was submitted to ministers at their 
meeting in The Hague who took note and 
instructed the sub-group to continue its activi-
ties. 
5. De/etU:e resources 
The group of defence ministry representa-
tives met during the second half of 1987 to discuss 
various aspects of the management of defence 
resources. This was followed by a workshop 
organised by Agency II. Ministers at The Hague 
stressed the need to aim at a more effective use of 
existing resources. 
6. Defence seminars 
A Netherlands proposal to host a seminar 
on the management of defence resources in the 
spring of 1988 was welcomed by ministers at The 
Hague. 
The Council has also been informed of the 
plan of the French Institut des Hautes Etudes de 
Defense Nationale (IHEDN) to organise in Paris 
a first European session of a defence teach-in in 
November 1988. 
11. Activities of the ministerial organs 
The Council and its working groups contin-
ued in the reporting period to receive the assist-
ance and support of the same teams as before at 
the Secretariat-General and the agencies. They 
have fulfilled the tasks requested of them by the 
Council. 
1. The Secretariat-General's workload 
increased in the second half of last year, in line 
with the growing number of meetings of the 
Council and its working groups. This reflected the 
development of WEU in the post-reactivation 
period, and the establishment of its place in the 
European security framework. The greater public 
consciousness ofWEU has also led to a growth in 
the press and public information activities carried 
out by the Secretariat on behalf of the Council. 
The Secretary-General continued his pub-
lic relations activities in the form of conferences, 
articles and interviews. 
2. The Agencies for Security Questions conti-
nued to carry out the tasks assigned to them by 
the Council. The Assembly was informed of these 
in a letter dated 24th March 1987 from the Secre-
tary-General to the President ofthe Assembly. A 
copy of this letter was included in Annex II of the 
first part of this report 4• 
4. See Document 1123, Annex II. 
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3. Annexed to this document are notes about 
the institutional tasks connected with: 
(a) the implementation of Protocol No. II 
of the modified Brussels Treaty 5; 
(b) the control procedures for A, B, C 
weapons 6; 
(c) the activities of the Standing Arma-
ments Committee's working groups 7• 
Ill. Institutional reforms 
1. In response to the mandate for work on 
institutional reform and possible collocation of 
the WEU ministerial organs handed down by 
ministers at their April 1987 meeting in Luxem-
bourg, the Permanent Council tasked an institu-
tional working group to examine these issues in 
detail. On the basis ofthe group's work, ministers 
took two important decisions in The Hague on 
26th and 27th October, one to merge the three 
Agencies for Security Questions into a single unit 
under the direct authority . of the Secretary-
General, the other to collocate the WEU minister-
ial organs in one capital. They also required the 
Secretary-General to submit a draft organi-
gramme for a collocated WEU to the Permanent 
Council before 1st December. This was done. 
2. No consensus emerged from subsequent 
Permanent Council discussions on the timing of 
the implementation of these decisions. In the 
meantime, the mandates of two of the three 
agency directors came to an end on 31st Decem-
ber 1987, as implied in the decision reached in 
Bonn on 23rd April 1985; the third director 
retired in September 1987. Neither was there a 
consensus during the reporting period on the 
choice of capital in which to collocate. At the end 
of December 1987, there were four candidatures: 
Brussels, London, Luxembourg, Paris (Luxem-
bourg subsequently withdrew its candidature). 
The Council called on the institutional working 
group to produce an agreed organigramme for a 
collocated organisation, to draw up a detailed 
comparison of the technical dossiers of the candi-
date capitals for collocation, and to prepare an 
appropriate paper with recommendations for 
ministers to consider at their meeting in The 
Hague on 18th-19th April 1988. 
3. In order to ensure the orderly implementa-
tion of any reorganisational decisions taken or w 
be taken, the Council agreed to extend until 30th 
June 1988 the fixed-duration contracts of agency 
staff which were originally to terminate at the end 
of December 1987. The Council also agreed to 
5. See Annex IV. 
6. See Annex V. 
7. See Annex VI. 
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block funds fm posts in the agencies which 
became vacant by the end of 1987, or would 
become vacant in 1988. 
IV. Enlargement 
Ministers in The Hague in October also 
addressed the question of possible enlargement. 
They agreed, inter alia, that in principle WEU 
should not be a closed shop, but that the objective 
of any enlargement should be to strengthen the 
organisation. 
On the basis of the conclusions on enlarge-
ment reached at that meeting, ministers may, at 
their spring 1988 meeting, in conformity with 
Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, invite 
Portugal and Spain to open the appropriate dis-
cussions with a view to their possible acces-
sion. 
V. Relations between the Council 
and the Assembly 
There has been a growing number of con-
tacts between representatives of the Council and 
the Assembly, with a welcome increase in the sub-
stantive content of their discussions. 
In the platform adopted in The Hague, the 
member states paid tribute to the role of the WEU 
Assembly in the development of a more cohesive 
European defence identity: they " highly valued 
the continued involvement in this endeavour of 
the WEU Assembly which is the only European 
parliamentary body mandated by treaty to dis-
cuss all aspects of security including defence". 
1. Main meetings between representati11es of the 
Council and those of the Assembly organs 
(i) 7th July in The Hague: official visit to the 
Netherlands by Mr. Goerens, President of the 
Assembly; Her Majesty the Queen of the Nether-
lands granted him an audience; in addition Mr. 
Goerens met Mr. van den Broek (Chairman-in-
Office of the Council) and Mr. van Eekelen, the 
Netherlands Foreign and Defence Ministers. He 
also met the Prime Minister, Mr. R. Lubbers, the 
Presidents of the two houses of parliament and 
representatives of the WEU presidency. 
(ii) 13th October in The Hague: meeting 
between Mr. van den Broek and Mr. van Eekelen 
and the Presidential Committee of the Assem-
bly. 
(iii) 16th October: visit ofMr. Goerens to Bonn. 
Mr. Goerens had conversations with Foreign 
Minister Mr. Hans Dietrich Genscher and 
Defence Minister Dr. Manfred Womer. Further-
more, he met Mr. Heinz Westphal, Vice-
President of the Bundestag, and other prominent 
parliamentarians of the Bundestag. 
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(iv) 22nd-23rd October: Mr. Goerens' visit to 
London: during his bilateral visit to London on 
22nd-23rd October, Mr. Goerens was received by 
the Speaker of the House of Commons; he held 
discussions with the Defence Secretary, Mr. 
George Younger, the Foreign Secretary, Sir Geof-
frey Howe, and the Minister of State at the For-
eign Office, Mr. David Melior. He also met mem-
bers of parliament and the media. 
(v) 27th October in The Hague(afterthe minis-
terial Council): meeting between the presidency 
of the Council, represented by MM. van den 
Broek and van Eekelen, and the Presidential 
Committee of the Assembly. 
(vi) 30th November to 2nd December in Paris: 
second part ofthe thirty-third ordinary session of 
the Assembly. Speeches by MM. van den Broek, 
van Eekelen, Raimond, Melior, each followed by 
discussions. 
2. Documents transmitted to the Assembly 
(i) The first part of the thirty-third annual 
report of the Council to the Assembly on the 
Council's activities for the period 1st January to 
30th June 1987. 
(ii) Replies of the Council to Recommenda-
tions 442 to 445 adopted by the Assembly at its 
extraordinary session in Luxembourg on 27th 
and 28th April 1987 and to Recommendations 
446 to 448 adopted by the Assembly at the first 
part of its thirty-third ordinary session. 
(iii) Replies of the Council to Written Ques-
tions 274 to 279. 
VI. Activities of the Public Administration 
Committee 
(Period covered: 1987) 
The Public Administration Committee, 
which meets once every six months, held its two 
meetings of 1987 in Winchester, from 27th to 
29th May, and in Alghero, from 30th September 
to 2nd October. These meetings were as usual 
devoted to exchanges of information on adminis-
trative developments in the member countries 
during the preceding months and to the prepara-
tion of the annual seminar for government offi-
cials. In 1987, the XXXVIth seminar was held at 
Taormina in Italy from 9th to 14th November. 
Meanwhile, six study visits were made during 
1987 by officials between WEU countries. 
VII. Budgetary and administrative questions 8 
(Period covered: 1987) 
1. Separate consideration ofthe pensions and 
operating budgets of the WEU Assembly was ini-
8. Concerning the activities of the co-ordinated organisations, 
see Annex VII. 
tiated as a result of a ministerial decision at Lux-
embourg in April. The Council took this decision 
with retroactive effect from January 1987. The 
pensions budget follows its own natural rate of 
increase or decrease, determined by the legal obli-
gation of applying the pension scheme rules; the 
operating budget follows the rate of zero real 
growth. 
2. Unforeseen departures caused extra 
expenditure not forecast in the pensions budget of 
the ministerial organs, and this led to the submis-
sion of a revised 1987 budget; supplementary 
funds were required for the pensions budget only, 
the operating budgets remaining - after transfers 
- neutral. 
3. The Budget and Organisation Committee 
met three times during the year and discussed 
inter alia: 
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the effects of separate consideration of 
the Assembly's pension and operating 
budgets for the purposes of agreeing a 
growth rate for the latter, and the 
Assembly's greater autonomy in budget-
ary matters, unblocking the Agencies' 
travel allowances, the Assembly's 1987 
supplementary budgets, the ministerial 
organs's revised budget for 1987 and the 
WEU budgets for 1988. 
4. While discussions are continuing in the 
Council on reorganisation an<l collocation, it was 
agreed that the 1988 ministerial organs' budget 
would be based, in so far as possible, on the main-
tenance of the existing situation in London and 
Paris. The submission of revised budgets would 
take place at the appropriate time. Meanwhile, 
funds for vacant posts in the agencies were frozen. 
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ANNEX I 
WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION 
Platform on European security interests 
The Hague, 27th October 1987 
ANNEX I 
1. Stressing the dedication of our countries to the principles upon which our democracies are based 
and resolved to preserve peace in freedom, we, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the member states 
of WEU, reaffirm the common destiny which binds our countries. 
2. We recall our commitment to build a European union in accordance with the single European act, 
which we all signed as members of the European Community. We are convinced that the construction of 
an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence. 
3. An important means to this end is the modified Brussels Treaty. This treaty, with its far-reaching 
obligations to collective defence, marked one of the early steps on the road to European unification. It 
also envisages the progressive association of other states inspired by the same ideals and animated by 
the like determination. We see the revitalisation of WEU as an important contribution to the broader 
process of European unification. 
4. We intend therefore to develop a more cohesive European defence identity which will translate 
more effectively into practice the obligations of solidarity to which we are committed through the mod-
ified Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties. 
5. We highly value the continued involvement in this endeavour of the WEU Assembly which is the 
only European parliamentary body mandated by treaty to discuss all aspects of security including 
defence. 
• 
• • 
I. Our starting point is the present conditions of European security. 
1. Europe remains at the centre of East-West relations and, forty years after the end of the second 
world war, a divided continent. The human consequences of this division remain unacceptable, 
although certain concrete improvements have been made on a bilateral level and on the basis ofthe Hel-
sinki final act. We owe it to our people to overcome this situation and to exploit in the interest of all 
Europeans the opportunities for further improvements which may present themselves. 
2. New developments in East-West relations, particularly in arms control and disarmament, and 
also other developments, for example in the sphere of technology, could have far-reaching implications 
for European security. 
3. We have not yet witnessed any lessening of the military build-up which the Soviet Union has sus-
tained over so many years. The geostrategic situation of Western Europe makes it particularly vul-
nerable to the superior conventional, chemical and nuclear forces of the Warsaw Pact. This is the funda-
mental problem for European security. The Warsaw Pact's superior conventional forces and its 
capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action are of special concern in this context. 
4. Under these conditions the security of the Western European countries can only be ensured in 
close association with our North American allies. The security of the alliance is indivisible. The part-
nership between the two sides of the Atlantic rests on the twin foundations of shared values and 
interests. Just as the commitment of the North American democracies is vital to Europe's security, a 
free, independent and increasingly more united Western Europe is vital to the security of North 
America. 
5. It is our conviction that the balanced policy of the Harmel report remains valid. Political soli-
darity and adequate military strength within the Atlantic Alliance, arms control, disarmament and the 
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search for genuine detente continue to be integral parts of this policy. Military security and a policy of 
detente are not contradictory but complementary. 
* 
* * 
II. European security should be based on the following criteria: 
1. It remains our primary objective to prevent any kind of war. It is our purpose to preserve our 
security by maintaining defence readiness and military capabilities adequate to deter aggression and 
intimidation without seeking military superiority. 
2. In the present circumstances and as far as we can foresee, there is no alternative to the western 
strategy for the prevention of war, which has ensured peace in freedom for an unprecedented period of 
European history. To be credible and effective, the strategy of deterrence and defence must continue to 
be based on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces, only the nuclear element 
of which can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk. 
3. The substantial presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces plays an irreplaceable 
part in the defence of Europe. They embody the American commitment to the defence of Europe and 
provide the indispensable linkage with the United States strategic deterrent. 
4. European forces play an essential role: the overall credibility of the western strategy of deterrence 
and defence cannot be maintained without a major European contribution not least because the conven-
tional imbalance affects the security of Western Europe in a very direct way. 
The Europeans have a major responsibility both in the field of conventional and nuclear defence. 
In the conventional field, the forces of the WEU member states represent an essential part of the 
alliance. As regards nuclear forces, all of which form a part of deterrence, the co-operative arrangements 
that certain member states maintain with the United States are necessary for the security of Europe. The 
independent forces of France and the United Kingdom contribute to overall deterrence and security. 
5. Arms control and disarmament are an integral part of western security policy and not an alter-
native to it. They should lead to a stable balance of forces at the lowest level compatible with our 
security. Arms control policy should, like our defence policy, take into account the specific European 
security interests in an evolving situation. It must be consistent with the maintenahce of the strategic 
unity of the alliance and should not preclude closer European defence co-operation. Arms control agree-
ments have to be effectively verifiable and stand the test of time. East and West have, a common interest 
in achieving this. 
* 
* * 
HI. The member states of WEU intend to assume fully their responsibilities: 
(a) In the field of western defence 
1. We recall the fundamental obligation of Article V ofthe modified Brussels Treaty to provide all 
the military and other aid and assistance in our power in the event of armed attack on any one of us. 
This pledge, which reflects our common destiny, reinforces our commitments under the Atlantic 
Alliance, to which we all belong, and which we are resolved to preserve. 
2. It is our conviction that a more united Europe will make a stronger contributiQn to the alliance, to 
the benefit of western security as a whole. This will enhance the European role in the alliance and ensure 
the basis for a balanced partnership across the Atlantic. We are resolved to strengthen the European 
pillar of the alliance. 
3. We are each determined to carry our share of the common defence in both the conventional and 
nuclear field, in accordance with the principles of risk- and burden-sharing which are fundamental to 
allied cohesion: 
- in the conventional field, all of us will continue to play our part in the on-going efforts to 
improve our defences; 
- in the nuclear field also, we shall continue to carry our share: some of us by pursuing appro-
priate co-operative arrangements with the United States; the United Kingdom and France by 
continuing to maintain independent nuclear forces, the credibility of which they are deter-
mined to preserve. 
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4. We remain determined to pursue European integration including security and defence and make a 
more effective contribution to the common defence of the West. 
To this end we shall: 
- ensure that our determination to defend any member country at its borders is made clearly 
manifest by means of appropriate arrangements, 
- improve our consultations and extend our co-ordination in defence and security matters and 
examine all practical steps to this end, 
- make the best possible use of the existing institutional mechanisms to involve the defence min-
isters and their representatives in the work of WEU, 
- see to it that the level of each country's contribution to the common defence adequately reflects 
its capabilities, 
- aim at a more effective use of existing resources, inter alia by expanding bilateral and regional 
military co-operation, pursue our efforts to maintain in Europe a technologically advanced 
industrial base and intensify armaments co-operation, 
- concert our policies on crises outside Europe in so far as they may affect our security interests. 
5. Emphasising the vital contribution of the non-WEU members of the alliance to the common 
security and defence, we will continue to keep them informed of our activities. 
(b) In the field of arms control and disarmament 
1. We shall pursue an active arms control and disarmament policy aimed at influencing future 
developments in such a way as to enhance security and to foster stability and co-operation in the whole 
of Europe. The steadfastness and cohesion of the alliance and close consultations among all the allies 
remain essential if concrete results are to be brought about. 
2. We are committed to elaborate further our comprehensive concept of arms control and disarm-
ament in accordance with the alliance's declaration of 12th June 1987 and we will work within the 
framework of this concept as envisaged particularly in paragraphs 7 and 8 of this declaration. An 
agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for the global elimination ofland-based INF 
missiles with a range between 500 and 5 500 km will constitute an important element of such an 
approach. 
3. In pursuing such an approach we shall exploit all opportunities to make further progress towards 
arms reductions, compatible with our security and with our priorities, taking into account the fact that 
work in this area raises complex and inter-related issues. We shall evaluate them together, bearing in 
mind the political and military requirements of our security and progress in the different negotia-
tions. 
(c) In the field of East- West dialogue and co-operation 
1. The common responsibility of all Europeans is not only to preserve the peace but to shape it cons-
tructively. The Helsinki final act continues to serve as our guide to the fulfilment ofthe objective of gra-
dually overcoming the division of Europe. We shall therefore continue to make full use of the CSCE 
process in order to promote comprehensive co-operation among all participating states. 
2. The possibilities contained in the final act should be fully exploited. We therefore intend: 
- to seek to increase the transparency of military potentials and activities and the calculability of 
behaviour in accordance with the Stockholm document of 1986 by further confidence-building 
measures; 
- vigorously to pursue our efforts to provide for the full respect of human rights without which 
no genuine peace is possible; 
- to open new mutually beneficial possibilities in the fields of economy, technology, science and 
the protection of the environment; 
- to achieve more opportunities for the people in the whole of Europe to move freely and to 
exchange opinions and information and to intensify cultural exchanges, 
and thus to promote concrete improvements for the benefit of all people in Europe. 
* 
* * 
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It is our objective to further European integration. In this perspective we will continue our efforts 
towards closer security co-operation, maintaining coupling with the United States and ensuring condi-
tions of equal security in the alliance as a whole. 
We are conscious of the common heritage of our divided continent, all the people of which have 
an equal right to live in peace and freedom. That is why we are determined to do all in our power to 
achieve our ultimate goal of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. 
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ANNEX II 
Meeting of 20th August 1987 on the situation in the Gulf 
Letter dated 31st August 1987 from Mr. H. van den Broek, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 
to Mr. Charles Goerens, President of the Assembly of Western European Union 
ANNEX II 
The Hague, 31st August 1987 
Dear President, 
In view ofthe interest often expressed by the Assembly in the implications that crises occurring in 
other regions may have for Europe and bearing in mind our discussions in The Hague on 7th July 1987, I 
wish to inform you personally as follows. 
On 20th August, the presidency convened a group of senior officials from the ministries for foreign 
affairs and defence of the member states of WEU to consider the situation in the Gulf. The presidency 
acted in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and the decision taken in Rome in 
October 1984 to hold consultations whenever necessary on the implications for Europe of crises in other 
regions of the world. To my knowledge, this is the first time such a meeting has been held. We agreed to 
consider these matters in more depth in order to bring about greater co-operation. 
For your information and that of the Assembly, I enclose the guidelines for the press agreed upon at 
the close of the meeting on 20th August. 
Yours sincerely, 
signed: Hans van den Broek 
Press guidelines for the presidency 
l. At the invitation of the Netherlands, which chairs Western European Union, high officials from the 
ministries for foreign affairs and defence of the member states met in The Hague on 20th August 1987 to 
consider the different aspects of the situation in the Gulf area in the context of the current efforts of the 
United Nations to bring an end to the Iraq-Iran conflict. This meeting was held pursuant to Article VIII of 
the WEU treaty and, more recently, to the decision taken by ministers in Rome in October 1984 to con-
sider whenever appropriate the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world. 
2. We had a thorough and useful exchange that contributed to a harmonisation of views. It was agreed 
to continue this process of concertation. 
3. It was stressed that Security Council Resolution 598 should be fully implemented forthwith so as to 
bring the conflict between Iraq and Iran to an end. Member countries ofWEU will continue to support all 
efforts aimed at achieving this. In this context they reiterated their support for the efforts of the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. 
4. Europe's vital interests require that the freedom of navigation in the Gulfbe assured at all times. 
The member states strongly condemned all actions contrary to that principle. 
5. Participants took note of the measures already undertaken or envisaged by individual member 
countries. They agreed to continue to consult each other and exchange information in order to further 
develop their co-operation. 
Meeting of 15th September 1987 on the situation in the Gulf 
Press guidelines for the presidency 
At the invitation of the Netherlands, which chairs the Western European Union, and pursuant to 
the decision they took at their meeting of 20th August 1987 to continue to consult each other and 
exchange information in order to further develop their co-operation, high officials of the ministries for 
foreign affairs and defence of the member states met in The Hague on 15th September 1987. 
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They had a thorough exchange of views on recent developments in the Gulf and the efforts being 
undertaken by the United Nations to bring to an end the conflict between Iraq and Iran. They again 
stressed that Security Council Resolution 598 should be fully implemented forthwith. They will continue 
to support the efforts of the Secretary-General and of the Security Council. 
They underlined the importance they attach to the principle of freedom of navigation. They noted 
the decisions taken by some member countries since the last meeting to commit naval forces to the Gulf 
region. 
Participants reiterated their decision to continue the process of concertation. It was agreed that rep-
resentatives of the member countries ofWEU will continue to meet to exchange inforlnation and to dis-
cuss related issues. 
Meeting of 14th October 1987 on the situation in the Gulf 
Press guidelines 
High officials from the ministries of foreign affairs and defence of the member states of WEU met 
in The Hague on 14th October 1987 to pursue their consultations on matters pertaining to the situation in 
the Gulf area. 
They noted that the navies of five member countries will be active in the region. They discussed 
how to improve their contacts in order to enhance co-ordination on the practicalftechnicallevel, fully 
respecting the national character of their respective activities. 
They agreed to continue their consultations. 
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ANNEX Ill 
Summary of conclusions drawn up by the Netherlands presidency of the WEU 
ministerial Council in The Hague on 26th-27th October 1987 
1. Platform: the document was agreed upon and released for publication. 
2. Report on European security interests: ministers took note of the report. 
ANNEX Ill 
3. French-German military co-ordination: France and FRG will keep the partners informed on new 
developments in this field. 
4. The Gulf: consultation and concertation by high-level officials, as initiated in The Hague on 20th 
August, will be continued and improved. The presidency will call a meeting of the contact points at the 
navy staffs (appointed in conformity with the meeting of 14th October in The Hague) whenever needed. 
5. Interim report on security in the Mediterranean: ministers took note of the interim report. The 
working group was instructed to continue its activities. 
6. Restructuring of the ministerial organs: the three agencies will be merged into one new entity. The 
new entity will resort directly under the Secretary-General. There is a consensus on the principle of 
eo-location, but as yet no agreement on the location itself. As to this last issue, it was agreed that the presi-
dency would further look into matter and revert to it at a later stage. The Secretary-General would on the 
basis of the foregoing, work out an organigramme to be submitted to the Permanent Council before 1st 
December 1987. 
7. Enlargement: WEU is not a closed shop. Enlargement should strengthen the organisation and not 
jeopardise its cohesion. The following general principles were formulated: 
- candidates should accept the WEU treaty; 
- candidates should accept the platform and express their readiness to give concrete expression to 
the obligations contained therein; 
- candidates should settle their outstanding problems on defence issues within NATO. 
8. WEU communication system: the desirability of the system was acknowledged, the Permanent 
Council would revert to this matter at its next meeting. 
9. Management of defence resources: the Netherlands will host a seminar on this subject in March 
1988. 
10. Information to NATO allies: Briefing of the non-WEU allies following ministerial Councils as pro-
vided in III,5 of the platform. 
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Application of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty 
on forces of Western European Union 
(Period covered: 1987) 
(i) Levels of forces of member states 
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For the year under review, the Council has continued with its customary tasks of forces control in 
implementation of Protocol No. II. As indicated in the 32nd report, and in accordance with the Rome 
declaration of 27th October 1984, the control of conventional weapons listed in Annex IV to Protocol No. 
Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty has been abolished as from 1st January 1986. 
(a) Forces under NATO command 
The maximum levels of ground, air and naval forces which member states of WEU place under 
NATO command are fixed in Articles I and II ofProtocol No. II to the modified Bruss~ls Treaty. So that it 
may satisfy itself that the limits laid down in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II are not exceeded, the 
Council receives information every year concerning the levels in question, in accordance with Article IV 
of that Protocol. This information is obtained in the course of inspections carried out by the Supreme 
Allied Commander, Europe, and is transmitted to the Council by a high-ranking officer designated by him 
to that end. The information, as at the end of 1986, was conveyed at the appropriate time. The same pro-
cedure is under way for the information as at the end of 1987. 
Furthermore, the Council takes the necessary steps to implement the procedure laid down in its 
resolution of 15th September 1956, whereby the levels of forces ofWEU member states under NATO 
command are examined in the light of the annual review. 
For the year 1986, the permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council of Belgium, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom examined 
the level of forces of WEU member states and reported to the Council. 
The Council noted that the level offorces of the member states ofWEU, as set out in the NATO 
force plan, fell within the limits specified in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II, as at present in force. It 
also took note of a declaration on French forces made by the representative of France. 
The same procedure is under way for the year 1987. 
(b) Forces under national command 
As stated above, the Council is continuing with its control of forces of member states maintained on 
the mainland of Europe, and remaining under national command - internal defence and police forces, 
forces for the defence of overseas territories, and common defence forces - specified in the agreement of 
14th December 1957. 
(ii) United Kingdom forces stationed on the mainland of Europe 
The Government of the United Kingdom has informed the Council that the average number of 
British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in 1987 in accordance with the commitment in 
Article VI of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty was 54 334. The continued need for the pres-
ence of troops in Northern Ireland made it necessary for units of the British Army ofthe Rhine to be rede-
ployed for short tours of duty there. In 1987, there were on average 949 men redeployed in this way to 
Northern Ireland. As has been previously stated, these units would be speedily returned to their duty sta-
tion in an emergency affecting NATO. 
Furthermore, the Government of the United Kingdom has informed the Council that the strength 
of the United Kingdom's contribution to the second allied tactical air force in 1987 was: 
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Role Aircraft/equipment Squadrons 
Strike/ attack ............ Tornado 7 
Offensive support ........ Harrier 2 
Reconnaissance .......... Jaguar 1 
Air defence ............. Phantom 2 
Rapier surface-to-air 
missiles 4 
Air transport ............ Puma 1 
Chinook 1 
Ground defence ......... RAF regiment 1 
152 
ANNEX V 
ANNEX V 
Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
(Period covered: 1987) 
(i) Conventional weapons 
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For the reasons already given, the Agency's controls on conventional weapons have been abolished. 
(ii) Situation concerning the control of atomic, chemical and biological weapons 
(a) Atomic weapons 
Since the situation has remained the same as in previous years, the Agency did not exercise any con-
trol in the field of atomic weapons. 
(b) Biological weapons 
All the member countries again gave their agreement, for 1987, to the renewal of the list ofbiologi-
cal weapons subject to control as accepted by the Council in 1981. The Council noted the fact. 
As in previous years, however, the Agency did not exercise any control in the field of biological 
weapons. 
(c) Chemical weapons 
The Agency asked member countries for their agreement to renew in 1987 the list of chemical weap-
ons subject to control. This agreement was given and the Council noted the fact. The Agency therefore 
continued to use this list for its control activities in 1987. 
In implementation of Article Ill of Protocol No. Ill, which lays down conditions to enable the 
Council to fix levels of chemical weapons that may be held on the mainland of Europe by those countries 
which have not given up the right to produce them, and in accordance with the Council decision of 1959, 
the Agency asked the countries concerned, in its questionnaire, whether production of chemical weapons 
on their mainland territory had passed the experimental stage and entered the effective production stage. 
As in the past, all these states replied in the negative. 
In addition, the Agency asked all the member states to declare any chemical weapons that they 
might hold. Since all the member states replied in the negative, the Agency carried out no quantitative 
controls of chemical weapons in 1987. 
The competent authorities of the country concerned provided the Agency with a detailed, precise 
and complete reply to the request for information- aimed at facilitating the control of non-production of 
chemical weapons - which was sent to them by the Agency in accordance with the resolution adopted by 
the Council in 1959 and with the directive received from the Council in 1960. In addition, the procedure 
applied with these authorities since 1973 was again used. 
The information thus provided helped to determine at which chemical plants agreed controls 
would be carried out in 1987. 
The Agency continued to carry out the agreed controls in accordance with established procedures. 
Four controls were carried out in 1987. A delegation from the national authorities took part in each con-
trol operation. 
None of these controls revealed any evidence of manufacture of chemical weapons within the 
meaning of Annex 11 to Protocol No. Ill. 
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ANNEX VI 
Activities of the Standing Armaments Committee 
(Period covered: 1987) 
1. The Standing Armaments Committee did not meet during the period covered by this report. 
2. Nevertheless, the working group on the updating ofWEU Agreement 4.Ff.6 on trials methods for 
wheeled vehicles continued its work with regular meetings. After a total of seven meetings, the working 
group 4.Ff.6 completed its updating work in November 1987. Its remaining activities will be taken over 
by the relevant NATO working group. 
3. Working Group No. 8 on operational research has also continued its activities. It met twice in 1987, 
the second meeting being combined with a seminar on methods and software for decision-making, partic-
ularly for the selection of projects or weapons systems or personnel. 
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ANNEX VII 
Co-ordinated organisations 
(Period covered: 1987) 
1. The Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts held nine meetings in 1987. In addi-
tion, there were eleven meetings ofthe Committee ofHeads of Administration, nine joint meetings ofthe 
Standing Committee of Secretaries-General with the Standing Committee ofStaff Associations, as well as 
one meeting of the Committee of Secretaries-General. 
The main subjects dealt with in the framework of co-ordination, some of which are still under 
review, were as follows: 
- the triennial review of salaries incorporating a review of the salary adjustment procedure and the 
allowances; 
- the updating of the purchasing power parities (in co-operation with the European Communities) 
for the member countries, and the reference towns or regions to be established to conduct proper 
and equitable comparisons; 
- the functioning of the framework of co-ordination; 
- the periodic adjustment of salaries and allowances. 
2. The European Patent Office withdrew its ten-year old application for full membership of the 
co-ordinated organisations' framework, and now enjoys temporarily a special observer status. 
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(i) Recognising the importance of maintaining a strong defence industrial base within the member 
nations ofWEU and within Western Europe as a whole as a fundamental political, economic and strategic 
objective; 
(ii) Conscious that the budgetary allocations for defence are not likely to grow as much as the cost of 
new defence equipment in real terms, and that therefore better use needs to be made within Western 
Europe of existing financial provisions for defence; 
(iii) Aware that new technologies offer improved solutions to some of the security problems facing the 
western alliance; 
(iv) Believing that the IEPG has proved itself an effective instrument for harmonising the operational 
requirements and re-equipment timescales of the armed forces of Western Europe and that, without 
detracting from the political responsibilities of the WEU Council of Ministers and A.ssembly, it is now 
ready to be assigned a greater role in promoting joint military research; 
(v) Concerned that in spite of numerous successful collaborative equipment projects, governments in 
Western Europe have proved themselves unsuccessful as yet in organising a unified military research 
effort to eliminate the wastefulness of duplicated national research programmes; 
(vi) Hopeful that a more rational utilisation can be achieved of national armamemts research, testing, 
trials and development establishments by opening them to use by the armed forces and armaments com-
panies of other countries, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge member governments: 
1. To fulfil their role, repeatedly emphasised by the Council, as members ofWEU to provide political 
impetus to bodies concerned with arms co-operation by taking decisive action to accelerate the formula-
tion of a common policy in IEPG for military research and more cost-effective armaments development 
in Western Europe; 
2. To establish a European advanced defence research agency funded from a common budget initially 
provided by WEU nations and later by other European NATO member countries as well; 
3. To help the IEPG to meet its goals more rapidly by: 
(a) affording the IEPG better political support through a regular institutionalised dialogue with the 
Assembly of WEU; 
(b) granting it a small permanent international specialist secretariat as recommended in the EDIS 
report "Towards a stronger Europe"; 
4. To encourage individual countries to collaborate in the use of each other's armaments research, 
testing, trials and development establishments; 
5. To mobilise more effectively the work of the universities and of the civilian research community 
for defence research with a corresponding mechanism to permit civilian industry to benefit commercially 
from the results of military research; 
6. To involve defence manufacturers much more closely in the formulation of operational require-
ments both on a national and European basis. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. In his address to the WEU Assembly in 
December 1986, Lord Carrington, the NATO 
Secretary General expressed his belief that 
Europe should try to achieve more co-operation 
in armaments research and development. This 
challenging suggestion was taken up by the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aero-
space Questions which organised a colloquy on 
the subject in London from 7th to 8th March 
1988. 
2. The purpose was to focus opinions from 
governments, industry, administration and the 
scientific community on this issue. It was hoped 
that from this wide range of opinions new views 
might emerge to provide a fresh impetus for 
enhanced collaboration which has long been an 
objective of the Assembly ofWEU. The contribu-
tors emphasised the problems, which are clearly 
formidable. 
3. Judging from the excellent attendance and 
the reactions of the media, the committee was not 
mistaken about the topical character of the sub-
ject chosen. On the other hand, it cannot be 
denied that many contributions also paid atten-
tion to armaments co-operation in general rather 
than to the specific subject of the colloquy, clearly 
indicating that there are still a number of basic 
problems to be solved, especially in the areas of 
industrial collaboration in the armaments field 
and in the definition of common operational 
requirements and re-equipment timescales 
between the armed forces of different nations and· 
hence joint armament programmes. 
4. This report will seek to review all the main 
problems discussed at the colloquy. The recom-
mendation will focus only on the clear questions 
which deserve priority attention. 
II. An integrated long-term strategy for Europe 
5. It is well-known that research and develop-
ment programmes for new weapons systems 
encompass an ever-larger time span as modem 
weapons become increasingly sophisticated. 
These systems, whose research and development 
have to be initiated in the next few years, will 
have to serve the military forces of the western 
alliance well into the 21st century, in some cases 
at least until the year 2010 and even occasionally 
beyond that date. 
6. The weapons procured for the democratic 
nations of Western Europe have to match the 
evolving security of the members of the NATO 
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alliance. This requires a clear assessment of the 
strategic and geopolitical developments of the 
next few decades. Only in this context will 
defence planners and military staff produce an 
integrated long-term strategy and hence define 
appropriate weapons systems and their require-
ments. The weapons procurement process cannot 
sensibly be carried out in a strategic vacuum. For-
eign policy considerations and political as well as 
economic judgment must have an input in addi-
tion to a military assessment of threat. 
7. Mr. Fred C. Ikle, eo-Chairman ofthe Com-
mission which presented the Discriminate Deter-
rence report, delivered a stimulating address. He 
pointed out that apart from the classical contin-
gencies of an all-out conventional war on the Cen-
tral Front of the NATO alliance in Western 
Europe or the ultimate horror of an all-out 
nuclear attack, the comity of western nations will 
have to be prepared for other, probably less obvi-
ous, contingencies. These might be limited but 
specifically targeted attacks by Soviet forces, 
designed to isolate the victims of aggression and 
to deny them the security guarantee of NA TO's 
common response. It should also be kept in mind 
that the security of Western Europe depends on 
defending what are called the NATO flanks such 
as Norway and the Baltic or Turkey and the Bal-
kans, as well as critical regions beyond the area of 
responsibility of the NATO alliance, such as the 
Gulf. 
8. An inordinate focus on crises on the central 
front might prepare for weapons systems whose 
range, speed of response and striking power are 
too limited to serve the defence of Western 
Europe in these more remote areas of threat and 
military imbalance. Given the wide range of pos-
sible conflicts for which NATO needs to prepare 
in the coming decades, Western Europe will need 
more versatile, flexible and mobile capabilities. 
New technologies will make feasible new military 
operations and missions. These new technologies 
will include greatly enhanced accuracy of delivery 
systems, intelligent munitions, stealth and a cru-
cial range of capabilities in space. 
9. It will certainly not be easy to introduce 
these strategies and the new technologies 
required. Not least because military establish-
ments are conservative and find it far easier to 
continue well-trodden paths, especially since 
national and international bureaucracies are 
cumbersome by nature. In this respect it was 
interesting to note the criticism of European stra-
tegic experts of the Discriminate Deterrence 
report, partly owing to some deeply-rooted ways 
of thinking which the report is trying to change. 
However such reactions were not surprising in the 
light of past European responses to the enhanced 
radiation weapon, follow-on forces attack, 
increased use of helicopters on the battlefield, not 
to mention strategic defence against ballistic mis-
sile attacks. 
lO. It is however dangerous to assume - as 
some people in the West are doing - that 
Gorbachev's Soviet Union no longer presents a 
military threat. Recent developments indicate 
that in parallel with a process of economic change 
and industrial modernisation, the Soviet Union is 
becoming more unstable. Potential ethnic con-
flicts have broken out. Islamic consciousness is 
growing and raised expectations of improved liv-
ing standards and more political openness will 
prove very difficult to satisfy. A Soviet empire in 
decline could prove almost as great a risk to its 
neighbours as a Soviet empire that is vigorous. 
The West's abilities for peaceful coexistence and 
crisis management will be tested to the full to 
ensure that a declining and fissiparous Soviet 
empire implodes rather than explodes to the det-
riment of its neighbours. 
Ill. Collective security requires 
a collective response to threats 
11. A prerequisite for full European arma-
ments co-operation is comprehensive harmo-
nisation of operational requirements. Part of this 
process is a generally-accepted, credible, objective 
and consistent assessment of the threat, which at 
this moment does not exist within the framework 
of NATO. The Stokes report (WEU Assembly 
Document 1115) recently paid attention to this 
deficiency. At the colloquy, Sir Donald Hall in 
particular expressed the view that there should be 
an agreed set of criteria for evaluating intelligence 
data, for conducting threat analysis and for test-
ing the sensitivity of the assumptions used. 
12. Many speakers agreed that national mili-
tary staffs are too accustomed to writing their 
requirements for new defence equipment in a 
context of full and unfettered national sover-
eignty. Even if they know that they will have to 
deter the same threat as their neighbouring allies, 
and that their forces should be interoperable in an 
alliance framework they all too often differ in 
their assessment of the equipments required. 
13. It was also pointed out that very detailed 
requirements focusing on the highest possible 
performance, combined with overoptimism 
about the cost and programme implications as 
well as inflexibility over unduly ambitious speci-
fications during development itself easily lead to 
the production of" gold-plated " weapons, whose 
capabilities are not cost-effective. Here, Mr. 
Chevallier made a sensible suggestion, proposing 
that military requirements should be expressed in 
outline descriptive parameters according to a 
scale of desirability rather than in terms of fixed 
159 
DOCUMENT 1141 
performance absolutes. Expressing the broad out-
lines and cardinal points required allows industry 
to grasp the essentials whilst leaving it more scope 
for initiative in seeking solutions. 
14. In defining their requirements, military 
staffs should also bear in min~ that their search 
for the ultimate in equipment performance often 
leads to hopelessly unrealistic !SOlutions as far as 
cost is concerned and all too often to very late 
entry into service for new equipment. This, com-
bined with shrinking defence budgets, could lead 
to a dramatic quantitative reduction in equip-
ment which Europe can ill afford to permit in 
view of the present imbalance with the Warsaw 
Pact, America's economic and military power 
decline and Western Europe's growing responsi-
bilities. Increasing emphasis on" design-to-cost" 
practices for weapons systems and subsystems, 
where the client asks for the best equipment possi-
ble for a fixed price, will therefore be inevita-
ble. 
15. If military staffs from different nations are 
brought together at an early stage in the planning 
process - which fortunately is increasingly the 
case in both NATO and the IEPG - industry 
should be allowed to make an early contribution 
to the debate before the outline operational 
requirement is agreed as was nightly pointed out 
by Mr. Dassault among others. Agreement on the 
type of weapon system required should then be 
followed up by a rigorous analysis of the neces-
sary performance, particularly with regard to the 
last few per cent of performance as against value 
for money. Such a procedure might prevent long 
drawn-out debates on the performance required 
which, in practice, might not be achieved by 
industry or might even be a reason for built-in 
unreliability. 
IV. Interchange of technology between civil 
and military programmes 
16. Every year no less than a quarter of the 
world research and development resources is allo-
cated for military purposes, which in financial 
terms amounts to about $100 000 million, keep-
ing 1.5 million people employed. With all the 
finance and manpower involved, it is worth 
examining if this money is well spent and if there 
is enough interchange of know-how and recipro-
cal benefit between the civil and military field. 
1 7. Mr. Curien in his address pointed out that 
in some sectors, in particular major aeronautical 
programmes, many space and some nuclear pro-
grammes, there is enough interaction between 
military and civil to make sure that money is not 
wasted. This is not the case in major data-
processing programmes, mainly due to the funda-
mentally different economic constraints between 
military and civil programmes. 
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18. In general, however; even if .there is 
enough interaction, major military programmes 
at the moment do not have much direct spin-off 
for major civil programmes. Although there are 
some clear examples such as the use of com-
posite materials which has been extended from 
military to civil aircraft construction and active 
controls as well which are a feature of the A-320 
Airbus, no opportunity should be neglected of 
exploiting such spin-offs, and EEC Commis-
sioner Narjes drew attention to the Defence 
Te~hnology Enterprise in the United Kingdom 
which has developed ways of facilitating 
transfers from defence to civil uses. He rightly 
argued that it may be useful to consider the esta-
blishment of similar arrangements at European 
level. 
19. Another interesting British initiative is the 
9vil. Industrial Access Scheme (CIAS), whose 
aim Is to broaden industry's access to the faci-
lities and expertise of the Ministry of Defence. 
Facilities are offered for experimentation and the 
scientific staff of companies may be allowed to 
participate in research programmes of mutual 
benefit to industry and the ministry. Users will 
be charged for the use of facilities and for the 
time of ministry staff members who are 
consulted, but the charges will also take account 
of the benefits for the Ministry of Defence itself. 
20. On the other hand, as was rightly argued 
by Mr. Gergorin of MATRA, some civil tech-
nology as in certain fields of microelectronics or 
computers can have an impact in the military 
field and allow time and money to be saved in 
developing military systems. 
21. In this context it is interesting to mention 
that a recent study published by the United 
States . Defence Science Board concerning the 
potential for greater use of commercial compo-
nents and systems in military equipment has 
demonstrated that in doing so costs could be 
reduced by 10 to 1 at the component level and by 
between 4 and 8 to 1 at the system level 1• This 
fact blunts the edge of the argument that com-
mercial electronic components would not be sui-
table for military systems. Indeed, such com-
mercial components can have even higher 
performance and are of higher quality than 
military components because of the large volume 
of production and extensive field experience 
achieved with commercial systems. 
V. Fair return 
22. One of the most difficult and perhaps deli-
cate problems in European arms co-operation is 
~he qu~stion of fair return whereby national 
mdustnes are compensated by being attributed a 
fair share of each programme on a case by case 
basis, the division of the industrial workload 
1. Defence Science Board summer study on commercial 
components, Washington, DC, July 1986. 
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reflecting each individual nation's investment in 
a collaborative programme. 
23. It is quite understandable that high 
spending on armaments is more easily accepted 
by the electorate when a national government 
can guarantee the maximum involvement of its 
own national armaments industry and a fair 
return system, on first thoughts, seems to be an 
attractive solution. However, Mr. Chevallier, Sir 
Donald Hall and Mr. Dassault firmly criticised 
this system. 
2.4. According to Mr. Chevallier, it is a ques-
tiOnable form of protectionism, especially within 
an alliance of developed countries whose global 
trade balances o~t. Also in the defence industry, 
European countnes should make use of the inno-
vative potential of their economies the 
dynamism of their firms and the politic~! and 
economic liberalism which is the basis of their 
societies. It is very important therefore to lower 
protectionist barriers in the defence industry. 
25. Sir Donald Hall likewise argued that the 
~~ncip~e of fair return militates against compe-
titiOn m the market. The suggestion in the 
European Defence Industry Study (EDIS) report 
"Towards a stronger Europe" that the European 
members of NATO should adopt the European 
Space Agency formula of the return coefficient 
did not find favour in his eyes because the 
promise of future balance would require 
excessive faith on the part of all concerned. 
26. Moreover, he made it clear that even the 
device of competing consortia as a means of 
achieving fair return in practice might lead to a 
bizarre form of competition. Here the companies 
which are their nation's sole representative 
cannot lose and competition would be restricted 
to companies which have national rivals. This in 
turn would not necessarily eliminate the least 
efficient or the least capable industries on a 
European scale. 
27. Altogether it seems very difficult to 
reconcile the maintenance of the principle offair 
re~um in collaborative procurement programmes 
With the search for rationalisation, more effi-
ciency and the greatest possible savings as Mr. 
Dassault believed. The European agricultural 
policy is an alarming example of the way well-
intended protectionist measures can totally run 
out of control. 
28. Within Europe, the only solution at least 
for vital branches of the defence industry will 
be gradually to lower protectionist barriers. In 
general, this should not cause insurmountable 
problems for nations with an all-round, well-
developed, modem economy. In order to avoid 
unduly abrupt economic repercussions such as a 
disproportionate increase in unemployment or 
the loss of national bases for emergency industrial 
mo~il.isation, Mr. Barattieri suggested providing 
traditional escape clauses on the model of Article 
226 of the EEC treaty. 
29. The gradual lowering of protectionist 
barriers does not provide a solution, however, for 
nations with a less-developed defence industry. 
Mr. Gimelli rightly pointed out that the need to 
pay closer attention to the requirements of the 
southern flank is becoming increasingly clear. 
The defence burden of the southern flank weighs 
differently and more heavily on certain countries, 
which frequently are also those with a lower eco-
nomic capability. Collaborative arms procure-
ment programmes should be designed to meet the 
particular needs of these countries and no doubt 
this is a case where the strong should help the 
weak. The committee will pay further attention to 
this specific issue in a subsequent report, follow-
ing its projected visit to Portugal. It is an issue 
which the IEPG is already addressing, following a 
study submitted to it by Greece. A number of spe-
cific measures have been implemented by the 
IEPG to support member countries with less-
developed defence industries and these will be 
reviewed on a regular basis by the IEPG. 
VI. Reciprocal purchasing arrangements 
30. Several speakers mentioned the issue of 
reciprocal purchasing, which means that coun-
tries buy each other's defence equipment on a 
reciprocal basis. A great advantage of such a sys-
tem would be that it can offer the benefits of 
increased scale without the overheads of classical 
collaborative programmes which also easily lead 
to overcapacity. Moreover, it was mentioned that 
this is a way of collaborative procurement which 
could be conducted satisfactorily on the basis of 
national research and development. 
31. On the other hand, it should not be forgot-
ten that the ideal reciprocal purchasing system 
can be achieved only in a common defence mar-
ket with open competition and with joint long-
term defence equipment planning. Failure to 
achieve a correct balance over a given number of 
years could quickly ruin all good intentions and 
disturb relations between partners. 
32. While in principle reciprocal purchasing 
seems to offer a most cost-effective solution, the 
resulting specialisation might finally work against 
the original objective. Specialisation indeed tends 
to create or strengthen monopoly positions 
which, in the long run, are detrimental to eco-
nomic efficiency. 
33. Under present conditions individual com-
panies will, for reasons of competition, try to 
maintain a high level of ability over the full spec-
trum of skills required for their sector. Without 
specific programmes, Europe is still a long way 
from systematic specialisation of manpower and 
facilities between the various national indus-
tries. 
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VII. The role of bureaucracy 
34. The EDIS report recommended that minis-
ters examine their procurement organisations 
with a view to reducing government involve-
ment. Criticism was vented of the practice of 
defence ministries setting up multi-discipline 
project management to mirror the one established 
by the prime contractor. Such teams carry out 
contract negotiation and cost monitoring and, 
even worse, second guess the prime contractor on 
technical and management issues. If the contract 
is well negotiated and adequate periodic reporting 
arrangements are made, the report continued, it is 
in the best interest of the customer to leave indus-
try to do its job. 
35. This argument was elaborated by Sir 
Donald Hall and Mr. Fichtmiiller who agreed that 
at present too many officials are engaged in 
micromanagement of projects, implying that 
much of industry's time and etfort is devoted to 
servicing their demands. Both industrialists 
pointed out that there will always be a need for 
continuous dialogue with the customers' repre-
sentatives, but they argued that the increasing 
application of fixed and ceiling prices should 
facilitate restraint on the side of the govern-
ments. 
VIII. Research and development, 
the attitude of industry 
36. It was rightly pointed out at the colloquy 
that there is a distinction between pure research, 
mainly a task for universities and research estab-
lishments, applied research, cQnducted by indus-
try to transfer the results of pure research into 
marketable products, and development, the activ-
ity concerned with evolving technology or dem-
onstrating technological feasibility. On the other 
hand, it was agreed that there was absolutely no 
doubt that, for the sake of efficiency, this whole 
system of resources should be closely 
co-ordinated, especially in the defence procure-
ment process. 
37. All industrialists made it quite clear that a 
prime objective of their companies is to make a 
profit, without which they cannot exist. An indus-
trial company will always try to exploit the fruits 
of its research and development. This means that 
having the full property rights of patents is of pri-
mordial importance for any industry. Unique 
technological knowledge is one of the main means 
of gaining a lead over competing companies and 
consequently making a profit. Sharing knowledge 
with other companies at an early stage of research 
and development is therefore, in fact, a contradic-
tory activity in a situation of competition. 
38. Even more complicated questions arise for 
property rights of patents which are the result of 
applied research and development funded by 
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governments but in fact critically dependent on 
accumulated company knowledge and expertise. 
Here the interests of a sound industry require that 
a clear distinction be made between government-
and privately-funded work and that the condi-
tions applying be well defined. Whatever propo-
sals governments make for collaborative research 
and development should allow industry to reap 
the rewards of its own investment. 
39. At the moment, the defence industry is not 
inclined to make the inevitably long-term and 
high-risk investments in the research and devel-
opment of advanced technologies, the more so 
because of the considerable uncertainty regarding 
future defence budgets and government procure-
ment programmes. 
40. In general, there seems to be little chance of 
collaborative armaments research and develop-
ment programmes being conducted by industry 
without government funding or without collabo-
rative procurement programmes. The investment 
needed for applied research and development in 
advanced technology is so extremely high that it 
will be necessary to set up complementary pro-
grammes rather than parallel and competing 
efforts. This in turn will force nations to give up 
the classical objective of autarky in defence pro-
curement, which is in fact out of date since the 
establishment of the collaborative defence of 
Western Europe after the second world war. 
IX. No military Eureka 
41. There was frequent conjecture whether it 
would not be useful to establish a military Eureka 
programme. Although opinions at the colloquy 
diverged slightly, there was no general enthusi-
asm for a military Eureka. The idea behind 
Eureka is essentially to promote projects for the 
liighly-competitive short- and middle-term mar-
ket, concentrating on marketable products or con-
cepts, a philosophy quite alien to arms procure-
ment programmes. It has been clearly spelled out 
in the recent Fourre report (WEU Assembly Doc-
ument 1118, paragraphs 193-197) that the Eureka 
structure, which has no working programme and 
no common budget, is not compulsory and does 
not specifically favour the exchange of technol-
ogy. It therefore is not suitable for a European 
defence research and development programme. 
X. IEPG 
42. Both the United Kingdom Secretary of 
State George Younger and the Netherlands Min-
ister of State Jan van Houwelingen proudly men-
tioned IEPG's achievements. Indeed, progress 
has been made and there are fifteen harmonised 
staff targets. One of the more promising is the 
staff target for a future tactical transport air-
craft to come into service at the end of the next 
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decade and which might also be used as a mari-
time patrol and airborne refuelling aircraft. At the 
moment it is not quite clear if this IEPG activity 
is dovetailed with the conventional armaments 
planning system now being introduced in NATO 
for a two-year experimental period. In order to 
achieve a better understanding of the plans and 
planning methods of national defence research 
and development institutions so that duplications 
may be reduced and existing testing facilities 
made available for common use, the directors of 
these national institutions have been meeting 
every year since 1986. The final goal should be the 
harmonisation of the various national research 
plans. 
43. Work is in progress on ten co-operative 
technology projects (CTPs), but it should be 
noted that the process of defining these projects 
has not yet been completed. Meanwhile, work is 
continuing on an inventory of technological areas 
which could be of interest for the various member 
countries and might lead to new CTPs. In the 
framework of a different parallel approach, coun-
tries have, on the basis of their national priorities, 
designated certain technology areas as priority 
areas. 
44. The EDIS report presented a basket of use-
ful recommendations and suggestions but signifi-
cantly many speakers and participants agreed that 
the most useful proposal, namely a common 
European military research fund, was buried at 
Seville last year notwithstanding the vehement 
protestations to the contrary of the ministers pres-
ent, who argued that they went as far as is practi-
cal. The common research fund, they believed, 
would be premature. It would also require a per-
manent secretariat within IEPG for its adminis-
tration and the idea of a permanent IEPG secre-
tariat was turned down by ministers yet again at 
Seville. 
45. At a recent meeting in Rome at the end of 
March, the National Armaments Directors of 
IEPG provisionally agreed to a proposal for an 
action plan based on a number of recommenda-
tions from the EDIS report. Later this year the 
IEPG ministers are expected to give it their final 
approval. The contents of this action plan are not 
known for the moment and there is still reason for 
scepticism. 
46. Reviewing the whole spectrum of activities 
in the IEPG, it cannot be denied that, in principle, 
it has chosen to tackle the right issues. In particu-
lar the harmonisation of operational require-
ments has rightly been seen as the prerequisite for 
progress in European arms collaboration. More-
over, with all the West European allies as mem-
bers, there seems to be ample reason to pursue 
further European co-operation in armaments 
research and development through the IEPG. The 
IEPG has a good record of achievement on which 
to build. 
4 7. It is a serious miscalculation, however, for 
European defence ministers to believe they can 
attain the ambitious goals set for the IEPG with-
out the full political endorsement of their national 
governments and the consequent backing of the 
electorate through members of parliament. 
Staffed by officials of national defence ministries, 
the IEPG has no collective entity to which it is 
responsible and the national defence ministers 
who give it direction have not as yet mobilised 
and informed European political constituency in 
support of the IEPG's work, which is what the 
Assembly of WEU can uniquely contribute. 
48. WEU, apart from being a forum for discus-
sion and harmonisation of European security pol-
icy, should also play its role in providing 
enhanced political direction to the IEPG. If it is 
accepted that the IEPG is to pursue more vigor-
ously the harmonisation of defence collaboration 
in its widest sense to include defence research, it 
should be made certain, on behalf of the national 
electorates of at least the seven countries ofWEU, 
that individual national governments do it effec-
tively. Only the elected members of the Assembly 
of WEU can do this. 
49. The role in armaments co-operation of the 
Standing Armaments Committee and the agency 
for security questions of WEU was not discussed 
at the colloquy. Until now, the Council of Minis-
ters has not been able to conclude its process of 
reflection or decide on the future location ofthese 
bodies, thus tacitly extending the transitional per-
iod which should have ended on 31st December 
198 7. It should be stated here that in this matter 
the committee still fully abides by the text of Rec-
ommendation 454 adopted by the Assembly in 
December 1987 to which the Council has given 
only a partial and evasive reply. 
XI. The legal framework 
50. Even if the internal open market of the 
European Community is accomplished by 1992, 
it will not apply to the national defence industries. 
According to Article 223 of the Rome Treaty, 
" Any member state may take whatever measures 
it considers necessary for the protection of the 
essential interests of its security and which are 
connected with the production of or trade in 
arms, munitions and war material ". On the other 
hand, the single European act in Title 11, Article 
130 F reads as follows: " The Community's aim 
shall be to strengthen the scientific and technolog-
ical bases of European industry and to encourage 
it to become more competitive at international 
level". More specifically, in Title Ill, Article 30, 
paragraph 6 it is stated that the member states 
•• ... are ready to co-ordinate their positions more 
closely on the political and economic aspects of 
security". 
51. Clearly there is a peculiar discrepancy 
between the objective formulated in Title Ill, 
Article 30, paragraph 6 of the single act and the 
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text of Article 223 of the Rome Treaty which has 
not been amended by the single act. Here one 
should not forget that the single act describes a 
non-binding long-term objective in a fairly gen-
eral manner. It hardly needs to be explained that 
at the moment opinions of member states in the 
European Community differ widely on the need, 
way and timing for achieving this goal. Govern-
ments may continue to deliberate on the best pos-
sible solutions for collaborative European arms 
procurement, but meanwhile industry does not 
want to be pinned down by too tight a straitjacket. 
It therefore seems appropriate for the time being 
to take less far-reaching steps on a more practical 
level and in a more restricted framework to 
ensure short-term progress. 
52. Nevertheless, harmonisation of some basic 
rules of company law seems essential, whatever 
course armaments co-operation in Europe may 
take. Here Mr. Barattieri mentioned for instance 
that not all IEPG countries have company law 
allowing the use of consortium-type structures 
meeting the needs of co-operation. He referred to 
European Community directiye 2137/85 of 25th 
July 1985 as a small step in the right direction, but 
that still leaves too much choice to individual 
member states. It is thus still very difficult to con-
stitute collaborative management structures in 
countries other than the United Kingdom, France 
and Germany. It is therefore desirable, as Mr. 
Barattieri argued, for the EEC to return to the idea 
of recognising the validity of forming the legal 
entities allowed in the legislation of one member 
state for actions in another. 
XII. Export to third markets 
53. An issue where the policies of different 
national governments and economic interests 
may diverge is the export of armaments. It is not 
the intention to discuss this subject in full here, 
which was not the main topic of the colloquy and 
which is subject to wide policy differences 
between the member states of the alliance. Sev-
eral industrialists made it clear that the export of 
armaments has often allowed industry to recover 
development costs and provide it with an ade-
quate baseload of work. Exploiting overseas mar-
kets will remain an essential factor in reaching 
financial viability for many military projects. 
While at present political and security clearance 
to export is largely a matter for national govern-
ments, closer European arms collaboration could 
result in vetoes on proposed exports. A binding 
arrangement regarding the issue of exportability 
should therefore be built into any industrial 
agreement on arms collaboration. 
XIII. More effective and co-operative use 
of facilities 
54. Mr. Curien called for more effective and 
co-operative use of facilities. His suggestion has 
much to recommend it, especially because success 
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is possible here in the short term and without a 
grand design. In this way, the United Kingdom, 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Netherlands have a joint programme for design-
ing a new type of wind tunnel for aerodynamic 
tests. Several participants will finance it from 
both civil and military budgets, as it will be used 
for both military and civil applications. 
55. National research establishments could be 
used effectively by other members of the alliance. 
Mention should be made here of a feasibility 
study for a defence research agency being carried 
out in the United Kingdom. The aim is to place 
the six non-nuclear research establishments 
under the Ministry of Defence in a more contrac-
tual relationship with their customers both within 
and outside the ministry and to create the kind of 
management environment where they can more 
easily exploit their intellectual and physical 
assets. 
56. As Mr. Curien rightly pointed out, there are 
many areas such as flight test centres, propulsion 
test centres, maritime test facilities, that might 
very reasonably be suitable for international civil 
and military co-operation. Investment including 
both material and intellectual elements should be 
stimulated on a transnational basis in order to 
create networks of action in Europe, linking the 
best engineers and the best scientists for emerging 
technology in such fields as electronics, comput-
ers and artificial intelligence. 
57. Nor should it be forgotten that universities 
are an impressive intellectual resource of which 
more use could be made. Universities are better 
adapted to the demands of modem industry than 
many industrialists might suspect. They are pre-
pared to co-operate in programmes even if these 
have to be protected to a certain degree. Their 
contribution to pure research needs to be more 
effectively harnessed. 
XIV. No abuse of secrecy in defence-oriented 
research and development 
58. The issues of data inter-change between 
military and civil research and development, 
transnational investments and the use of univer-
sities in defence programmes cannot be discussed 
without touching upon questions of secrecy, secu-
rity classification and intellectual property rights. 
Several speakers, in particular Mr. Narjes and Mr. 
Curien, stressed that those concerned should 
resist the temptation to overclassify or exces-
sively restrict defence-funded research and devel-
opment. 
XV. Towards a joint European 
research programme 
59. As has been advocated many times before, 
a joint European defence research programme 
should be established if grave waste in financial 
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and human resources owing to unnecessary dupli-
cation is to be avoided. Recently, similar propo-
sals were advocated extensively in both the EDIS 
report and the Fourre report already mentioned. 
At the colloquy, Mr. Gergorin advocated it with 
compulsive logic. To achieve this, a transnational 
defence research agency would have to be formed. 
(a) The creation of a technology base 
60. Until now, the larger part of European 
defence research effort has been directed towards 
individual or collaborative major weapon sys-
tems programmes. Industrialists have made it 
abundantly clear that for them there is little rea-
son to conduct collaborative armaments research 
without a collaborative procurement programme. 
Supranational procurement is still regarded as 
very futuristic because it assumes a degree ofloss 
of national sovereignty which individual coun-
tries are unwilling to accept. 
61. For an officially-sponsored joint European 
defence research programme, a prime objective 
should be to develop and maintain a European-
scale technological base, which, as pointed out by 
Mr. Narjes, should also allow equitable trade in 
technology with main competitors in the United 
States, Japan and possibly other highly-
industrialised countries. It is not difficult to 
choose the technologies most appropriate for 
research. They should be technologies of general 
use in military applications such as subsystems, 
components and materials. Advanced manufac-
turing technology is another basic area where, in 
the long term, spectacular results could be 
achieved. 
62. Mr. Gergorin specifically mentioned 
microelectronics, where parallel and duplicated 
programmes are being conducted in at least four 
WEU member states and where all endeavours to 
integrate or at least connect these national pro-
grammes have so far failed. Other sectors might 
be lasers, advanced materials, stealth technology 
and military applications of space. 
(b) A light and jlexibk structure 
63. The new fashion in international collabora-
tion is to have light structures which can easily be 
adapted to changing circumstances. There is no 
reason why the European advanced defence 
research agency, as the managing organisation 
might be called, should not follow this trend. 
64. The agency could be formed with the gov-
ernments of the WEU member countries, which 
are after all the most highly-industrialised in 
Western Europe, taking the lead. All member 
countries could be represented on the board 
which should decide programmes unanimously. 
There would be a chief executive with full author-
ity to implement the policy guidelines and select 
the best competitive bid for a research pro-
gramme. The IEPG would be responsible for set-
ting the agency policy directives and should 
report on progress in this field as in others to the 
Assembly of WEU. The democratic accountabil-
ity of the IEPG is negligible at present. 
65. It is essential, however, to have some form 
of international secretariat to support the IEPG in 
its expanded responsibilities. The lack of an inter-
national secretariat has deprived the IEPG of the 
machinery to sustain a role of growing impor-
tance for European defence, however laudable the 
idea of not building a bureaucracy. 
(c) A quick start 
66. The European advanced defence research 
agency should be established soon and start oper-
ation with a modest programme. The chances of 
success are enhanced if, at the start, only one or 
two research programmes are launched. Impor-
tant decisions about creation and organisation 
have to be made, staff appointed and working 
practices established. A relatively light workload 
in the early years would be prudent until the new 
agency has proved its effectiveness. 
XVI. Conclusions 
67. There is no doubt that economic necessi-
ties force Western European countries to 
rationalise their arms procurement. The political 
climate is not favourable for increased defence 
spending so better value for money is more 
important than ever. The notion that any proce-
dure chosen for the rationalisation process will 
have unpleasant side effects for several of the 
countries and industries concerned makes many 
governments hesitate to take the decisive steps 
which are essential. 
68. Although much progress has been made, 
and although there is hardly a major arms pro-
curement programme in Europe without some 
bilateral or multilateral co-operation, there are 
still too many shortcomings. Most such 
co-operative programmes are still established on 
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a case-by-case basis, with every programme 
involving difficult negotiations for harmonising 
requirements and in-service dates, ensuring fair 
financial return, an equitable workshare, appro-
priate design authority and industrial manage-
ment structures. 
69. On the government side a permanent struc-
ture for harmonising threat assessment and the 
ensuing equipment requirements is needed. 
Industry has shown that it is not afraid of open 
competition on the European market, but it 
should be involved much earlier in the formula-
tion of new requirements. To this end, govern-
ments should adopt a more open European rather 
than national approach to procurement and lower 
protectionist barriers within Europe. 
70. European co-operation in research and 
development is still in its infancy. One major step 
forward which could easily be achieved would be 
to make more effective and co-operative use of 
existing facilities. This would be progress of great 
significance but governments should exercise 
more active political and financial support for 
this relatively straightforward idea to create the 
pressure necessary for real progress to be 
made. 
71. However, if the European defence industry 
is not to become less competitive in global terms 
and if it is to be able to meet the demanding oper-
ational requirements of the next century, quick 
and decisive action should be taken now. It is a 
prime responsibility of governments to establish a 
joint European defence research programme in 
order to create an advanced technology base for 
industry. Prerequisites for such a programme are 
a common research budget and a small but per-
manent and international managing staff, work-
ing for a joint defence research agency. This 
requires above all an act of political will to which 
WEU itself can contribute. Enhanced arms col-
laboration has long been one of the most 
persistant themes of the Assembly ofWEU. The 
Assembly's preoccupation with this subject has 
been shown to be fully justified and should be 
accompanied by action on the part of the Council 
of Ministers which should give continued and for-
mal support both to the work of a strengthened 
IEPG and to the establishment of the new Euro-
pean defence research agency and its common 
budget. 
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APPENDIX 
PROGRAMME OF THE COLLOQUY 
Monday, 7th March 1988 
Mr. Charles GoERENS, President of the Assembly of Western European Union 
Mr. John WILKINSON, Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aero-
space Questions and General Rapporteur 
Mr. Alfred CAHEN, Secretary-General of WEU 
Theme: The need for co-operation in armaments research and development 
Mr. George YouNGER, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom 
Mr. Fred C. IKLE, Former Under-Secretary of Defence of the United States 
Mr. Jacques CHEVALLIER, Armaments Director-General, France 
Second sitting 
Theme: Patterns of co-operation 
Mr. Jan van HouwELINGEN, Minister of State for Defence of the Netherlands 
Mr. Karl-Heinz NARJES, Vice-President of the European Commission 
Mr. Vittorio BARATTIERI m SAN PIETRO, Counsellor for Community Affairs to the Minister for 
Industry and Trade of Italy 
Mr. Jean-Louis GERGORIN, Senior Vice-President, Corporate Strategy, Matra, France 
Tuesday, 8th March 1988 
9.30 a.m. Third sitting 
Theme: prospects, advantages and disadvantages for the industry 
Sir Donald HALL, Chairman, Marconi Defence Systems, United Kingdom 
Mr. Serge DASSAULT, President, Director-General, Avions Marcel Dassault, France 
Mr. Enrico GIMELLI, President of the Association of Aerospace Industries, Italy 
Dr. Carl Peter FlcHTMOLLER, Executive Vice-President, MBB; President, Helicopters and 
Military Aircraft Group, Federal Republic of Germany 
2.30 p.m. Fourth sitting 
Theme: Defence research and development. A closed shop? (Spin-off to and exchange of 
technology with civilian industry) 
Mr. Hubert CuRIEN, President of the Defence Science Council, France 
General discussion 
Summing up by the Chairman of the committee and General Rapporteur 
Farewell and closing remarks by the President of the Assembly 
4.30 p.m. Press conference 
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Amendments 1 and 2 
European co-operation in armaments research and development -
guidelines drawn from the colloquy 
AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 1 
tabled by Mrs. Francese and others 
31st May 1988 
1. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragr~ph as follows: 
" Concerned by the increase in clandestine sales of arms to belligerent countries, " 
2. Leave out paragraphs 5 and 6 of the draft recommendation proper and insert a new paragraph as 
follows: 
" To take measures, co-ordinated between members of WEU and with the various international 
organisations and groups of countries, to put an end to clandestine sales of arms to belligerent 
countries, in particular Iran and Iraq, and to countries on which the United Nations has imposed 
an embargo. " 
Signed: Francese, Pieralli, Pecchioli, Rubbi 
l. See 2nd sitting, 7th June 1988 (amendment 1 agreed to; amendment 2 withdrawn). 
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Amendments 3, 4 and 5 
European co-operation in armaments research and development -
guidelines drawn from the colloquy 
AMENDMENTS 3, 4 and 5 1 
tabled by Mr. Hardy and others 
6th June 1988 
3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after " research agency " insert " concerned 
with conventional capacities". 
4. Leave out paragraph 3 (b) of the draft recommendation proper. 
5. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, at the end, add " but without effecting any 
reduction in research and development for non-military purposes". 
Signed: Hardy, Stoffe/en, Coleman, Ruddock, Lambie, Ewing, Litherland, Redmond, Scheer, 
Baarvelt-Schlaman, Thompson, Parry 
l. See 2nd sitting, 7th June 1988 (amendments 3 and 5 agreed to; amendment 4 negatived). 
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Amendment 6 
European co-operation in armaments research and development -
guidelines drawn from the colloquy 
AMENDMENT 6 1 
tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski 
6th June 1988 
6. Leave out paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert: 
" Recognising the importance of maintaining a defence industrial base within the member nations 
of WEU based on an economic division of work and adapted to the relevant threat; " 
Signed: Klejdzinski 
1. See 2nd sitting, 7th June 1988 (amendment agreed to). 
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Amendments 7, 8 and 9 
European co-operation in armaments research and development -
guidelines drawn from the colloquy 
AMENDMENTS 7, 8 and 9 1 
tabled by Mrs. Francese and others 
7. Leave out paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper. 
8. Leave out paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper. 
6th June 1988 
9. Insert a new paragraph at the end of the draft recommendation proper as follows: 
"To take measures, co-ordinated between members ofWEU and with the various international 
organisations and groups of countries, to put an end to clandestine sales of arms to belligerent 
countries, in particular Iran and Iraq, and to countries on which the United Nations has imposed 
an embargo. " 
Signed: Francese, Pieralli, Pecchioli, Rubbi 
l. See 2nd sitting, 7th June 1988 (amendments negatived). 
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DRAFT OPINION ON THE BUDGETS OF THE MINISTERIAL ORGANS 
OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION 
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEARS 1987 (REVISED) AND 1988 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 2 
by Mr. Morris, Rapporteur 
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VII. Recommendation 447 on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western 
European Union for the financial years 1986 (revised) and 1987 
Reply of the Council to Recommendation 44 7 
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Linster (Chairman); Mr. Sinesio, Mrs. Pack (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Biefnot, Mrs. Blunck (Alter-
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Draft Recommendation 
on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Westem European Union 
for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988 
The Assembly, 
(i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1987 (revised) and 
1988, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter; 
(ii) Recognising that: 
(a) future development of the budgets is stymied whilst there is no positive decision on timing and 
place for collocation; 
(b) the Council has thankfully removed pension payments outside the expenditure of the Assem-
bly, thereby enabling the Assembly to prepare realistic budgets; 
(iii) Nevertheless noting that: 
(a) the budgets of the ministerial organs, based on the former organograms of the Secretariat-
General and the Paris agencies, take no account of the many posts that have become vacant in 
recent years; 
(b) consequently, estimates for "Personnel costs" in the budgets of the ministerial organs are 
excessive and lead to the build-up of a reserve that can be used subsequently for other purposes, 
as was the case in 1987; 
(c) for the budget of the Paris agencies alone, the Council has decided to block a sum of 
F 4 926 000 (corresponding to six posts already vacant in 1987 and seven others which will 
become vacant in 1988), thereby making this sum unavailable for other requirements such as 
the creation of four new posts in the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly; 
(d) the Council has also reserved the right to consider the Assembly's request for these four posts in 
the general context of the collocation of the ministerial organs and their restructuring, although 
no political decision on this point seems imminent; 
(e) application of the zero growth criterion is meaningless when related to budgets which do not 
reflect the true financial implications of the activities of the organs concerned or, in general, 
their requirements, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Without further delay, follow up the decision taken by the Council of Ministers in The Hague on 
27th April1987 to collocate the ministerial organs ofWEU and give them a new organogram with new 
terms of reference and new tasks; 
2. Decide consequently: 
(a) to have a general revision made of the budget of the ministerial organs for 1988 to take account 
of this new integrated single agency situation; 
(b) to separate the pensions budget of the ministerial organs from the operating budget; 
(c) to ensure greater clarity in the budget of the ministerial organs and prevent sums earmarked for 
staff salaries and allowances being used for other purposes; 
3. In the meantime, give urgent consideration to the Assembly's proposal to create four new posts in 
the Office of the Clerk; 
4. Agree to study the problem of twin-grading at every level of the hierarchy in order to determine the 
conditions for possible promotions so as to improve the staff's career prospects; 
5. Above all, recognise that the reactivation and credibility ofWEU is dependent on these decisions. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Morris, Rapporteur) 
I. Preliminary considerations 
1. According to Article VIII (c) of the Charter 
of the Assembly, " the Assembly shall express its 
views in the form of an opinion or recommenda-
tion on the annual budget ofWestern European as 
soon as it has been communicated". 
2. The present report has been prepared in 
application of this provision and relates to the 
budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for the 
financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988. 
3. In accordance with the criteria followed in 
preparing reports on earlier financial years, the 
present report should consider only the financial 
implications of the activities of the Council and 
its subsidiary organs since the Presidential Com-
mittee has referred examination of these activities 
and related problems to the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments, the General 
Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scien-
tific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
4. In this context, an opinion on the 
abovementioned budgets can be valid only if it 
takes account of the structure of the organisation 
and its programme of work because it is in this 
light that the budget as a whole can be justi-
fied. 
5. It has to be noted, however, that details of 
these factors are not yet known. On the one hand, 
the structure is uncertain because, in accordance 
with the decision taken by the Council of Minis-
ters in The Hague on 27th October 1987, it is 
strictly linked with the collocation of all the WEU 
ministerial organs, whereas member countries are 
still far from unanimous on the choice of a single 
seat; on the other hand, it is hard to see how the 
financial implications of activities which can but 
suffer from the delay in restructuring can be con-
sidered. 
6. This is particularly true since, in the first 
part of its annual report to the Assembly for the 
period January to June 1987 (Document 1123, 
Chapter 1.1 ), the Council gives only fairly vague 
information about the activities of the ministerial 
organs, as follows: 
"(vi) The Secretary-General has, in addi-
tion to his other activities, continued to 
play a vital part in the reactivation process 
by supporting and serving the Permanent 
Council and the above groups on a daily 
basis. 
(vii) The agencies, in close contact with the 
secretariat, have provided the Council with 
studies and work which they have been man-
dated to carry out. The Assembly was 
informed of this work in a letter from the Sec-
retary-General dated 24th March 1987. " 
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7. While appreciating the major contribution 
made by the Secretary-General to the Council and 
its various working groups, your Rapporteur can 
but note that the activities of the Secretariat-
General and the agencies consisted of preparing 
studies which are still unknown to the Assembly. 
In his letter of 24th March 1987, the Secretary-
General mentioned only the mandates of the 
three agencies while specifying that these "may 
be revised once the governments have reached an 
agreement on their final structure". 
8. Your Rapporteur therefore has to note that 
in view of the objective difficulties involved in 
making budgetary proposals fbr 1988 on sound 
bases, the ministerial organs adopted the solution 
of prolonging into 1988 the transitional period 
which should have ended in 1987 and conse-
quently quite simply renewing the budgets for the 
previous financial year except for minor adjust-
ments subject to revision during the year as soon 
as the Council takes a decision on collocation and 
restructuring. 
9. It is evident that for these reasons the 
Assembly is not able to give a real opinion on the 
budgets in question. However, your Rapporteur 
considers it is still possible to comment on these 
budgets. 
11. The budgets of the Secretariat-General 
10. There were two reasons for submitting a 
supplementary budget in 1987: 
- to carry over unexpended credits from 
the financial year 1986 in order to meet 
expenditure under the same heads in 
1987; 
- to take account of new factors such as the 
considerable additional cost of pen-
sions. 
11. The table at Appendix I, which is an extract 
from document C-B (87) 10; shows the adjust-
ments in the initial budget for 1987 proposed by 
the Secretariat-General and approved by the 
Council with a view to attaiJning the two aims 
mentioned above. However, when examined 
closely, the figures given represent only the final 
result of operations that have been completed and 
the basic budget document B (87) 17 has to be 
consulted in order to ascertain the reasons for 
these operations and their interdependence. 
12. An analysis of the revised budget of the 
Secretariat-General has allowed your Rapporteur 
DOCUMENT 1142 
to summarise the adjustment operations that are 
the subject of this budget as follows: 
(a) the bringing forward from the financial 
year 1986 to the financial year 1987 of a 
net sum (income less receipts) of 
£139 770 corresponding to expenditure 
on staff and premises committed in 
1986 but which could not be paid 
before 31st March 1987; 
(b) an estimate of possible savings 
(£47 871), in particular under Head A.I 
" Personnel costs ", and use of this sum 
to cover expenditure that was unfore-
seen or underestimated in the initial 
budget for 1987. 
13. Information given in the budget document 
gives no clear picture of how far the two 
abovementioned operations are connected, in 
other words, whether part of the sum brought for-
ward from 1986 was taken into account in esti-
mated expected savings in 1987. If so, your 
Rapporteur, while recognising the legitimacy of 
the abovementioned carrying forward operation 
since it conforms with Article 10 (c) ofthe Finan-
cial Regulations of Western European Union, 
could but point out the irregularity of using sums 
brought over from the financial year 1986 for 
expenditure of another kind relating to the finan-
cial year 1987. 
14. In this connection, the abovementioned 
Article 10 (c) of the Financial Regulations is quite 
definite: 
" If payment of a commitment for the pre-
vious year has not been made before 1st 
April, the credits concerned shall be can-
celled automatically and corresponding 
credits will be taken up in the budget of the 
current financial year. Such action shall be 
regularised by notification to the Budget 
Committee. " 
15. The meaning of this article is so clear that 
no further comment seems necessary. But your 
Rapporteur's attention was also drawn to the fact 
that it was possible to make considerable savings 
in 1987 thanks to the vacancies of a number of 
posts included in the organogram of the 
Secretariat-General and that it was indeed these 
savings that were earmarked for offsetting the def-
icit in other sectors of expenditure. Thus, the 
revised budget for 1987 shows a reduction of 
£12 379 in the net total operating budget and an 
increase of £16 489 in the net grand total (includ-
ing pensions). 
16. As stressed in reports on earlier financial 
years, this practice allows a reserve to be built up 
which can be drawn upon during the financial 
year for purposes that were unforeseen or, in any 
event, not specifically taken into account in the 
ordinary budgets. 
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17. This practice, which has become current in 
the WEU ministerial organs in recent years, has 
the following drawbacks: 
- it makes generally unavailable large sec-
tions of the overall budget that the gov-
ernments of member countries intend to 
be used for financing the activities of all 
the WEU organs, including the Assem-
bly; 
- it includes the use of sums earmarked for 
salaries to finance other activities 
whereas it is a general principle, univer-
sally recognised and often referred to by 
the WEU Budget and Organisation 
Committee, that such operations should 
not be allowed; 
- it distorts budgetary data and affects the 
growth rates of the budgets concerned 
which consequently do not reflect accu-
rately enough the true requirements 
devolving from the programme of work 
of the WEU ministerial organs. 
18. Your Rapporteur therefore wishes this 
practice to be abandoned once and for all. Since 
the forthcoming restructuring of all the ministe-
rial organs also involves updating the organogram 
of the Secretariat-General, this will be a unique 
opportunity to make estimates under Head A.I 
more accurate and in conformity with true 
requirements. Moreover, compared with this 
privileged situation, it must be borne in mind that 
the Assembly for its part has been waiting for 
years for the Council to grant it the funds neces-
sary to add four new posts to the establishment of 
the Office of the Clerk. Your Rapporteur will 
revert to this question in the conclusions to this 
report. 
19. The budget of the Secretariat-General for 
1988 - as shown in the table from document C-B 
(87) 18 given at Appendix Ill- has evolved in a 
way that at first sight might seem surprising since 
its growth rate compared with the revised budget 
for 1987 (2.07%) appears to be lower than the 
expected rate of inflation in the United Kingdom 
of 3.4%. It would thus appear to show a decline 
and an actual reduction in activities. But this is 
not so: in the explanatory memorandum to the 
budget it is specified that these activities are likely 
to increase considerably. 
20. In fact, the budgets of the ministerial 
organs are presented in accordance with criteria 
which do not allow them to be grasped imme-
diately and, if they- and in particular their trend 
- are to be interpreted correctly, at least two 
consecutive budgets have to be compared in 
depth. 
21. Thus, the 1988 growth rate of 2.07% is 
merely nominal and becomes far higher if it is 
borne in mind that: 
(a) the revised budget for 1987 (first ele-
ment of comparison between 1987 and 
1988) has a grand total increased by 
large sums brought forward from the 
previous financial year; 
(b) the same revised budget for 1987 
includes very considerable expenditure 
for the leaving allowances paid to offi-
cials leaving the organisation. 
22. It should be recalled that this problem was 
already raised in Recommendation 433 in which 
the Assembly proposed that the Council show in 
the two parts ofthe budget (operating budget and 
pensions budget) two categories of expenditure: 
ordinary and extraordinary expenditure, to make 
it easier to follow the evolution of the budgets. 
However, in its reply the Council said " govern-
ments have preferred to maintain the present sys-
tem on the assumption that a substantial and 
detailed explanation for each item of expenditure 
is given in Part 11 of the budget". 
23. Perhaps, when the ministerial organs have 
found their final configuration and are working 
normally, the Council will be able to return to the 
Assembly's proposal and take it into account for 
reasons of clarity and efficiency. 
Ill. The budgets of the Paris agencies 
24. In the general comments on the revised 
budget for 1987 of the agencies for security ques-
tions, it is stated that " the drafting of a 1987 
revised budget for the agencies is prompted by the 
financial repercussions of a certain number of 
measures and facts which arose after the approval 
of the original budget, the effects of which the 
agencies have merely been able to register. On the 
one hand, this has led to additional, sometimes 
quite considerable, expenditure while, on the 
other hand, it has led to appreciable savings 
which reduce the revised net total of the two 
budgets (operating and pensions) together, 
although the total does show a net increase of 
F 1 066 300, i.e. 3.26%, which is due entirely to 
the pensions budget relative to the net total of the 
same initial budgets for 1987. " 
25. In fact, the very large savings made due to 
several posts that were vacant in 1987 not being 
filled (F 1 192 500), plus the balance of other 
minor adjustments in the operating budget 
(F 7 200), allowed a rise in staff salary scales to be 
met (F 700 000) and, in particular, part of the 
exceptional expenditure for the payment of leav-
ing allowances (F 815 000), an indemnity for loss 
of job (F 611 500) and a new pension (F 139 500). 
Thus, it was possible to bring the grand total in 
the supplementary budgets of the agencies (ope-
rating budget and pensions budget) down to 
F 1 066 300. 
26. In regard to the ordinary budget for 1988, it 
should be specified that at the present juncture 
with the Council ofMinisters' decision ofprinci-
ple to collocate all the ministerial organs - the 
place and date of collocation are still being dis-
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cussed at political level - three possibilities were 
considered for the preparation of this budget, i.e.: 
(a) to prepare updated budgets in the usual 
manner on the basis of the present 
organogram and location of the WEU 
organs; 
(b) to approve an updated budget as above 
but to block part of it bearing in mind 
possible changes in the London and 
Paris establishments; 
(c) not to approve the budget for 1988 and 
to adopt the one-twelfth per month rule 
set out in Article 7 (b) of the Financial 
Regulations. 
27. Since the bodies concerned chose the 
second solution, estimates in the budget under 
consideration were based on the old organogram, 
but, in order to block credits, relating to vacant 
posts, the latter were estimated at F 4 926 000 for six 
posts already vacant in 1987 and seven which will 
become vacant in 1988. Funds for the second post 
of Director (approximately F 660 000) were main-
tained pending a final decisiolll on the matter. 
28. Apart from estimates for staff, minor 
adjustments were made in other heads of the bud-
get, as shown in the tables at Appendices V and VI. 
29. As a whole, the budget of the Paris agencies 
for 1988 shows a growth rate of 3.75% in opera-
ting expenditure and receipts and a reduction of 
7.57% in pensions expenditure and receipts. As a 
result, taken together, the two parts (operating 
budget and pensions budget) show a growth rate 
of 1.41 %. In reality, these growth rates are not 
significant because they take no account of sums 
blocked which alone represent 12.70% ofthe total 
of Head B.I, 17.69% of the net total operating 
budget and 14.37% of the net grand total budget 
(including pensions). 
30. The anomaly of this situation, which the 
foregoing considerations help to underline, is 
quite clear. As for the criteria adopted by the Paris 
agencies, i.e. to base estimateS under Head B.I on 
all staff as if there were no vacancies, your 
Rapporteur can but refer to the comments in 
paragraphs 15 to 18 of the present report. 
IV. Conclusions 
31. In accordance with his preliminary consi-
derations, your Rapporteur has tried to analyse 
the budgets of the ministerial organs in order to 
bring out the essential aspects and reach general 
conclusions. 
32. It now seems beyond doubt that these 
budgets do not give an accurate picture of the 
present situation of the ministerial organs - in 
particular the Paris agencies - or of the future 
situation as envisaged on the basis of more realis-
tic working hypotheses. Your Rapporteur consi-
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ders that merely on the basis of the decision to 
merge the three Paris agencies under the authority 
of the Secretary-General budget estimates could 
have been better calculated on the basis of a pro-
visional organogram of that single agency taking 
account of the present situation, it being under-
stood that this organogram would be valid until 
all the organs are collocated. 
33. In this way, the budgets of the ministerial 
organs, although still temporary, would at least 
have shown the real situation in which these 
organs are now operating. 
34. Furthermore, the large amounts blocked by 
Council decision but which might here and now 
be considered almost wholly appropriated would 
have allowed the Assembly's pressing request for 
the creation of four new posts, on which the 
Council has reserved the right to take a decision 
in the context of the reorganisation ofWEU, to be 
examined. 
35. Your Rapporteur emphasises that it is 
essential for the ministerial organs to terminate as 
soon as possible the precarious situation prevail-
ing at the beginning of 1988: both the reactivation 
and the credibility of WEU are at stake. 
V. Action taken 
on Assembly Recommendation 447 
36. In adopting Recommendation 447 (see 
Appendix VII), apart from the question of the sin-
gle seat - often referred to in the present report -
the Assembly drew the Council's attention to two 
other points, i.e.: 
- application to WEU budgets of the 
growth rate used by the EEC in drawing 
up its budgets; 
- dual-grading at every level of the hierar-
chy. 
37. In its reply to this recommendation, the 
Council said criteria for establishing European 
Community budgets could not be applied to 
WEU. In substance, this confirmed its will to con-
tinue to apply the zero growth criterion. For the 
Assembly itself, this criterion was to be applied to 
the operating budget, the pensions budget hence-
forth being drawn up in application of the juridi-
cal commitments stemming from the pension 
scheme. 
38. Your Rapporteur does not wish to repeat 
all the arguments against applying this criterion 
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or to recall its adverse effects. Previous 
rapporteurs have studied them in great detail and 
it is therefore enough to refer to their reports. 
However, he considers it necessary to stress that 
because the decision to separate the pensions bud-
get from the operating budget was not extended to 
the ministerial organs, a problem of equity arises 
and also the official responsible for budgetary 
management has to show considerable ingenuity 
in finding the wherewithal to meet the new pen-
sions which become payable over the years. 
39. The reserve of artificially built-up amounts 
created by maintaining vacant posts in the 
organogram is only one example. Your 
Rapporteur commented above on their impact 
and the use made of them, inter alia to meet 
expenditure under the pensions budget. He there-
fore considers that if the budgets of the minis-
terial organs are to retain due clarity and accuracy 
the Council's decisions on separating the pen-
sions budget from the operating budget should be 
extended to these budgets. Your Rapporteur 
believes this provision and the establishment of a 
carefully worked-out new organogram to allow 
the ministerial organs to carry out their tasks are a 
sine qua non if their budgets are to express the 
true financial implications of their activities. 
40. On dual grading, the Council's reply seems 
unsatisfactory insofar as it does not tackle the 
problem of the promotion of deserving long-
serving officials. These are officials who have 
been at the ceiling of their grade for years without 
the organisation, because of its small size, being 
able to offer them the possibility of applying for 
more senior duties as is the case in the other 
co-ordinated organisations. It is worth stressing 
that in the past the Council examined this ques-
tion but never reached any conclusions since it 
appeared, at the level of co-ordination, that the 
problem could be solved only in the framework of 
each organisation which should deal with it sepa-
rately and independently. 
41. Aware of the working conditions and 
morale ofWEU officials and recognising the legit-
imate expectations of those who, for many years, 
have been working efficiently and with devotion 
for the organisation through thick and thin, your 
Rapporteur wishes the Council, once the bound-
aries offuture development are decided, to under-
take a study on the problem of how to recom-
pense adequately officers of long service who 
have reached the maximum grade for their 
position. 
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APPENDIX I 
WEU revised budget for 1987 1 
Section A (Secretariat-General) 
Budget Brought Amendments Revised forward 1987 from 1986 proposed estimates 
(£) (£) (£) (£) 
Personnel costs •••••••••• 0 ••• 0 0 0 0 •• 0 •• 0. 1 809 323 111 925 - 36 170 1 885 078 
Travel ••••••• 0 0 0 0 •••••••••••••••••• 0 ••• 49 545 4 893 54 438 
Other operating costs .................... 165 030 64 000 3 077 232 107 
Purchases 0 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 8 234 8 234 
Buildings ............................... 10 000 10 000 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE •••••• 0 ••••••••••••••• 2 042 132 175 925 - 28 200 2 189 857 
WEU tax ............................... 654 342 45 539 - 15 821 684 060 
Other receipts .......................... 32 360 544 32 904 
TOTAL INCOME ........................... 686 702 46 083 - 15 821 716 964 
Net ordinary budget ..................... 1 355 430 129 842 - 12 379 1 472 893 
Net pensions •••••••••••••• 0 •••••••••••• 236 396 9 928 28 868 275 192 
NET TOTAL BUDGET ....................... 1 591 826 139 770 16 489 1 748 085 
National contributions 
600ths £ + £ = £ 
Belgium ................................ 59 13 744 1 621 15 365 
France ••••••••••••••••• 0 ••••••••••••••• 120 27 954 3 298 31 252 
Germany ............................... 120 27 954 3 298 31 252 
Italy •••••••••••••••• 0 •• 0 ••••••••••••••• 120 27 954 3 298 31 252 
Luxembourg ............................ 2 466 55 521 
Netherlands •••••••••••• 0 ••••• 0 ••••••••• 59 13 744 1 621 15 365 
United Kingdom ........................ 120 27 954 3 298 31 252 
600 139 770 16 489 156 259 
1. C-B (87) 10. 
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APPENDIX II 
WEU revised budget for 1987 1 
Section B (Paris agencies) 
Budget 1987 Amendments Revised proposed Estimates 
(F) (F) (F) 
Salaries and allowances ....................... 36 936 300 53 000 36 989 300 
Travel ....................................... 500 000 - 500 000 
Other operating costs ......................... 2 255 000 (-) 121 900 2 133 100 
Purchase of furniture, etc ...................... 30000 - 30000 
Buildings .................................... 78 400 - 78 400 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE ••••••••••••• 0 ••••••••••••• 39 799 700 (-) 68 900 39 730 800 
WEU Tax 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 •• 0. 0 0 ••• 0. 0 •••••••• 0. 0 0 0. 12 773 000 (-) 68 900 12 704 100 
Other receipts ................................ 197 100 - 197 100 
TOTAL INCOME 0 •• 0 ••••••••••••••• 0 •••••••••••• 12 970 100 (-) 68 900 12 901 200 
Net •• 0 0 0 0 •• 0. 0 ••• 0 0. 0 ••• 0 ••• 0 ••••••••• 0. 0 ••• 26 829 600 - 26 829 600 
Net pensions ••••••••• 0. 0 0 0 •••••••• 0 0 0 0 0 ••••• 5 914 000 1 066 300 6 980 300 
NET TOTAL 0 ••••••••••••••••••••• 0 •••• 0 ••••••• 32 743 600 1 066 300 33 809 900 
National contributions 
600ths (F) 
Belgium •••••••••• 0 •••••••••••••••••••• 0 ••••• 59 104 853 
France 0. 0 •••• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0 •••• 0 0 0. 0. 0 ••••• 0. 120 213 260 
Germany ••••••••••••••••••• 0 ••••••• 0 0 ••••• 0 0 120 213 260 
Italy 0 ••• 0 0 0 •••••• 0 0 ••• 0 0 0 ••••••••••••••••••• 120 213 260 
Luxembourg ••••••••••••••••••••••• 0 0 0 0 0 ••••• 2 3 554 
Netherlands •••• 0. 0 0. 0. 0 0 0 •• 0 •• 0 0. 0 0 0. 0 •••••• 59 104 853 
United Kingdom • 0 0 0 0 •• 0 0. 0. 0 0 •• 0. 0 0 •• 0. 0 •••• 120 213 260 
600 1 066 300 
I. C-B (87) 10. 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Secretariat-General' 
Summary of estimated expenditure and income for 1988 
Expenditure Credits Credits Difference 
/income revised proposed between 1988 
1986 for 1987 for 1988 and 1987 
(£) (£) (£) (£) (%) 
Expenditure 
Personnel costs .......... 1 531196 1 885 078 1 953 510 68 432 3.63 
Travel ................... 59 230 54438 51 540 - 2 898 - 5.32 
Other operating costs ..... 168 609 232 107 215 495 - 16 612 - 7.16 
Purchases ................ 5 302 8 234 12 000 3 766 45.74 
Buildings ................ - 10000 10000 - -
Total .................... 1 764 337 2 189 857 2 242 545 52 688 2.41 
Income 
WEU tax ................ 541 988 684 060 703 944 19 884 2.91 
Other receipts ............ 35 293 32 904 28 860 - 4044 - 12.29 
Total .................... 577 281 716 964 732 804 15 840 2.21 
NET TOTAL ............... 1 187 056 1 472 893 1 509 741 36 848 2.50 
Pensions ................ 217 717 275 192 274 595 - 597 - 0.22 
ToTAL ................... 1 404 773 1 748 085 1 784 336 36 251 2.07 
1. C-B (87) 18. 
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Expenditure 
B. I. Personnel costs ...... 
B.II. Travel .............. 
B. Ill. Other operating costs 
B.IV. Purchases ........... 
B. V. Buildings ........... 
Total ...................... 
Income 
B. VI. WEU tax ........... 
B.VII. Other receipts ....... 
Total ...................... 
NET TOTAL ................. 
Pensions .................. 
GENERAL NET TOTAL ......... 
1. C-B (87) 18. 
*. Of which F 4 926 000 are blocked. 
APPENDIX IV 
Agencies in charge of security questions 1 
Budget estimates for 1988 
Summary 
Expenditure Revised Credits 
/income credits proposed 
1986 for 1987 for 1988 
(F) (F) (F) 
35 111 413.83 37 000 100 38 787 200 
425 738.17 500 000 400000 
1917 511.05 2 122 300 2 225 700 
47 245.00 30000 30000 
70 000.00 78 400 0 
37 571 908.05 39 730 800 41 442 900 
12 066 458.11 12 704 100 13 413 000 
418 400.81 197 100 195 000 
12 484 858.92 12 901 200 13 608 000 
25 087 049.13 26 829 600 27 834 900 
5 764 027.07 6 980 300 6 452 000 
30 851 076.20 33 809 900 34 286 900 * 
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Difference 
between 1988 
and 1987 
(F) (%) 
1 787 100 4.83 
(-) 100 000 (-) 20.00 
103 400 4.87 
0 0.00 
(-)78 400 - 100.00 
1 712 100 4.31 
708 900 5.58 
(-) 2100 - 1.07 
706 800 5.48 
1 005 300 3.75 
(-) 528 300 - 7.57 
477 000 1.41 
APPENDIX V 
Trend of budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU between 1987 and 1988 
Secretariat-General (£) Paris agencies (French francs) 
1987 1987 revised 1988 1987 1987 revised 1988 
A. Operating budget 
I. Staff ............... 1 809 323 1 885 078 1 953 510 36 936 300 36 989 300 38 787 200 
11. Travel .............. 49 545 54 438 51 540 500 000 500 000 400 000 
Ill. Other operating costs 165 030 232 107 215 495 2 255 000 2 133 100 2 225 700 
IV. Purchase of furniture 
and equipment ...... 8 234 8 234 12 000 30000 30000 30000 
-00 V. Buildings ........... 10 000 10 000 10000 78400 78 400 -
Total expenditure ....... 2042132 2 189 857 2 242 545 39 799 700 39 730 800 41 442 900 
Receipts ................ 686 702 716 964 732 804 12 970 100 12 901 200 13 608 000 
NET TOTAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 355 430 1 472 893 1 509 741 26 829 600 26 829 600 27 834 900 
B. Pensions budget 
Pensions and allowances . 299 065 341 757 342 249 6 999 000 8 025 800 7 642 000 
Pensions receipts ........ 62 669 66 565 67 654 1 085 000 1 045 500 1 190 000 
NET TOTAL ...•.•.....••• 236 396 275 192 274 595 5 914 000 6 980 300 6 452 000 
NET GRAND TOTAL 
(A+ B) ................. 1 591 826 1 748 085 1 784 336 32 743 600 33 809 900 34 286 900 
-~ 
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Variations in the budgets of the ministerial organs 
for 1987 (revised) and 1988 compared with previous budgets -~ N 
Secretariat-General (£) Paris agencies (French francs) 
1987 revised 1988 1987 revised 1988 
1987 (+ or-) (%) (+ or-) (%) 1987 (+ or-) (%) (+ or-) (%) 
A. Operating budget 
I. Staff ............ 1 809 323 + 75 755 + 68 432 36 936 300 + 53000 +1 797 900 
11. Travel .......... 49 545 + 4 893 - 2 898 500 000 - - 100 000 
Ill. Other operating 
costs ........... 165 030 + 67 077 - 16 612 2 255 000 - 121 900 + 92 600 
IV. Purchase of 
-00 furniture and 
N equipment ...... 8 234 - + 3 766 30000 - -
V. Buildings ....... 10000 - - 78 400 - - 78 400 
Total expenditure ... 2 042 132 + 147 725 7.23 +52 688 2.41 39 799 700 - 68 900 - 0.17 + 1 712 100 + 4.31 
Receipts ............ 686 702 + 30 262 + 15 840 12 970 100 68 900 + 706 800 
NET TOTAL .......... 1 355 430 + 117 463 8.66 + 36 848 2.50 26 829 600 - 0.00 + 1 005 300 + 3.75 
B. Pensions budget 
Pensions and 
allowances .......... 299 065 + 42 692 14.27 + 492 6 999 000 + 1 026 800 - 383 800 
Pensions receipts .... 62 669 + 3 896 + 1 089 1 085 000 39 500 + 144 500 
NET TOTAL .......... 236 396 + 38 796 16.41 - 597 -0.21 5 914 000 + 1 066 300 + 18.03 - 528 300 -7.57 
NET GRAND TOTAL 
(A+ B) ............. 1 591 826 + 156 259 9.81 + 36 251 + 2.07 32 743 600 + 1 066 300 + 3.25 + 477 000 + 1.41 ~ 
>< 
< 
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APPENDIX VII 
RECOMMENDATION 447 1 
on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union 
for the financial years 1986 (revised) and 1987 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1986 (revised) and 
1987, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter; 
(ii) Considering that: 
(a) the presentation of the budgets for 1986 (revised) and 1987 has been simplified by reducing 
the number of sub-heads and grouping all social charges under one sub-head and all expend-
iture on staff under one head but that ordinary expenditure has not been separated from 
extraordinary expenditure as recommended by the Assembly in Recommendation 433; 
(b) consequently, because of the effect of extraordinary expenditure, the growth rate of these 
budgets cannot be accurately compared with the rate of inflation fixed for applying the zero 
growth criterion; 
(c) furthermore, the evolution ofbudgets since 1985 shows an increase above the zero growth rate 
since the requirements of reactivating WEU - including the restructuring of the ministerial 
organs - have been taken into account in this budget; 
(d) in addition, the payment of pensions to newly-retired officials could no longer be included in 
the operating budget without jeopardising the activities of the various organs; 
(e) the zero growth rate obviously no longer being of any value, the Council should establish a 
more objective and effective criterion for preparing WEU budgets; 
(f) analysis of the various categories of expenditure in the budgets of the ministerial organs of 
WEU shows that expenditure on staff alone represents about 90% of total operating expend-
iture; 
(g) this percentage could be improved considerably and amounts under Head I " Permanent 
staff" could be used for other operating expenditure if the two seats in London and Paris were 
combined to allow their now separate services to be merged; 
(iii) Regretting that: 
(a) three posts assigned to the Secretariat-General remained vacant throughout 1986 whereas the 
Council refused the creation of new posts in the WEU Assembly; 
(b) the Council has given a new interpretation of criteria for dual grading which entirely ignores 
the wishes ofthe staffto achieve career prospects subject to certain conditions of seniority; 
(iv) Welcoming the fact that at the close of the ministerial meeting on 28th April 1987 Mr. Poos, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, informed the Assembly that the Council of Ministers had decided to 
agree to a separate budget for pensions and to recognise the Assembly's budgetary independence within 
the limits of agreed appropriations, this decision to take effect immediately, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Apply the same criterion for increasing WEU budgets as is applied by the EEC in esta~lishing its 
budget; 
2. Apply to the operating budget ofthe Assembly for 1987 the growth rate of2.79% agreed upon for 
its budget as a whole, including pensions, i.e. an increase ofF 379 983; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd June 1987 during the first part of the thirty-third ordinary session (4th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the reports tabled by Mr. Linster on behalf of the Committee on Bu<lgetary Affairs and Admin-
istration (Documents 1088 and 1105). 
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3. Examine the possibility of: 
(a) uniting the ministerial organs of WEU in a single seat and preparing one table of estab-
lishment integrating the services now divided between the two seats; 
(b) establishing dual grading at every level of the hierarchy to improve the staffs career possibil-
ities. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 447 
1. After due consideration, the Council has concluded that the criteria for determining the budgets 
of the European Communities should not be applicable to WEU. 
2. When the Council agreed to a growth rate of 2. 79% for the 1987 Assembly budget, which was 
above the anticipated rate of inflation of 2% for France, it did so in order to compensate partially for the 
high pension budget (Part II of the budget). Because of this high pension expenditure, the increase of the 
operating budget (Part I of the budget) was only 0.49%. 
When the Council of Ministers decided on 28th April 1987 that the pension budget of the 
Assembly should, with immediate effect, be separated from the operating budget, the result was that: 
- the pension budget would be determined in accordance with the legal obligations resulting from 
the application of the pension scheme rules; 
- the operating budget would be determined according to the zero real growth principle. 
In the light ofthis decision, the Council would refer the Assembly to the Secretary-General's letter 
dated 15th July 1987, a copy ofwhich is annexed hereto. (See annex to reply ofthe Council to Recom-
mendation 445). 
3. (a) The possibility of collocating the ministerial organs is part of the current deliberations on the 
reorganisation of WEU. 
In examining collocation, the Council is mindful, amongst other considerations, of the overall 
increase in efficiency which could result. 
(b) As stated in its reply to Recommendation 433, the Council recalls that the general principle of 
dual grading is that the higher of the two grades represents the approved position in the establishment 
table. The lower of the two grades is added to enable the organisation to recruit staff who are judged to 
possess the basic qualifications called for but may not have had previous experience. 
Dual grading, therefore, is not intended to create promotion possibilities over and above the 
approved establishment table, but to facilitate recruitment. 
The Council also recalls that the marked difference of 30 to 33% between the minimum and 
maximum salaries in a grade (seniority steps) exists, amongst other things, to compensate financially for 
limited career possibilities in international organisations. The Council also takes the view that the 
common grading and salary system, as well as the common pension scheme, for the co-ordinated 
organisations encourage job mobility. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 23rd October 1987 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 30th October 1987. 
185 
Document 1143 2nd June 1988 
Action by the Presidential Committee 
REPORT 
submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee 
by Mr. Sarti, Vice-President of the Assembly 
1. The Presidential Committee, which is 
composed of the President and Vice-Presidents 
of the Assembly and the Chairmen of commit-
tees and political groups, has a permanent man-
date and also carries out specific tasks. 
2. Statutorily, the Presidential Committee is 
a think-tank responsible for defining the broad 
lines of the Assembly's work. It pursues a dia-
logue with the committees so as to be able to 
decide which subjects should be debated in ple-
nary sitting, subject to any modifications to the 
Assembly's agenda due to a previous question 
being put or a motion being tabled with a request 
for urgent procedure. 
3. Under the Rules of Procedure, the Presi-
dential Committee also ensures the continuity of 
the Assembly's action and in this context may 
take any initiatives it considers desirable subject 
to their being submitted to the Assembly for rati-
fication. 
4. Finally, the Assembly may instruct the 
Presidential Committee to carry out specific 
tasks between sessions and it has to report on 
their implementation, as is done in the present 
report. 
5. Because of a combination of orders from 
the Assembly and initiatives of its own, the Pres-
idential Committee's work since the last session 
has followed two main lines, i.e. the strengthen-
ing of relations with the United States and the 
affirmation of a European personality. In these 
areas, it has had some success, but remains most 
concerned about the structure of the organisation 
since there have been no positive results in this 
respect. 
* 
* * 
6. The Washington INF agreement and the 
problem of its ratification by the United States 
Senate, the declaration of 4th November 1987 in 
which the President of the United States, after 
contradictory statements by United States 
administration spokesmen, proclaimed his sup-
port for the reactivation ofWEU and all its polit-
ical implications, including the achievement of a 
European union with security and defence 
responsibilities, and, finally, the discussion about 
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burden-sharing which has spread in the United 
States in the context of the presidential election: 
all these circumstances have led the Assembly 
and the Presidential Committee, at the request of 
the former, to take action to strengthen relations 
with the United States. 
7. In Order 70, the Assembly, considering 
that priority should be given to consolidating 
links with the United States, invited the Presi-
dential Committee "to promote a regular dia-
logue " between the Assembly and Congress. The 
Presidential Committee was instructed "to 
avoid the reactivation ofWEU adding to transat-
lantic misunderstanding". It was incumbent 
upon it to make American congressmen and 
public opinion understand that the sole purpose 
of building the European pillar was to strengthen 
the alliance and that, by pulling together, the 
Europeans' sole aim was to improve the dialogue 
with the United States whose contribution to 
joint security remained essential. 
8. But the alliance is strong only if none of its 
parties feels imperilled. Europeans, who are par-
ticularly exposed because of the division of 
Europe as instanced by the division of Germany, 
must concert their approach to specific security 
concerns. Following a debate on disarmament, 
the Assembly came to the conclusion that the 
treaty on intermediate nuclear forces signed 
between the United States and the Soviet Union 
was in the interests of both Europe and the alli-
ance as a whole. It therefore decided, in Resolu-
tion 77, to urge the United States Senate to ratify 
that treaty as soon as possible. 
9. In this context, the President of the 
Assembly decided to make an official visit to the 
United States and the Presidential Committee 
decided to join the General Affairs Committee 
on the occasion of its visit to the United States 
capital. At the request of the American authori-
ties, the two visits were held simultaneously 
from 11th to 13th April 1988. 
10. In the United States the President had a 
different programme of meetings from the Gen-
eral Affairs Committee. In the absence of Mr. 
Shultz, Secretary of State, he met his deputy, Mr. 
Whitehead, and Mr. Holmes, Assistant Secretary 
of State. He also had talks in Congress. During 
this time, the Presidential Committee had talks 
at the State Department, the Department of 
Defence and Congress and with members of the 
Atlantic Institute in Washington, including Gen-
eral Goodpaster. 
11. Burden-sharing was clearly one of the 
Americans' main concerns. Together with the 
members of the General Affairs Committee, the 
Presidential Committee endeavoured to show 
the people it met the importance of the part 
played by Western Europe in the defence of the 
alliance and that, by strengthening co-operation 
between its members, WEU allowed Europeans 
to make an even more substantial contribution 
to joint security. 
12. The Presidential Committee noted how 
necessary it was for the Assembly to send one of 
its three political committees to Washington 
each year to examine with American congress-
men problems of joint interest. It is to be hoped 
that these visits will be balanced by visits by 
American congressmen to our Assembly. The 
proposal made by the President of the Assembly 
to members of Congress in this sense was given a 
warm welcome and the latter believed Congress 
should be represented at Assembly sessions by a 
permanent delegation of observers. This would 
meet our wish to institutionalise Euro-American 
relations. However, this idea must be followed 
up in American political circles which are, at 
pr~sent, fully taken up with the electoral cam-
paign. 
13. Relations with Congress should be com-
pleted by relations between the Assembly and the 
United States administration. Before his tour of 
European capitals, Mr. Taft, Under-Secretary of 
State for Defence, addressed the Presidential 
Committee and the General Affairs Committee. 
The first steps were taken by Mr. Goerens for 
representatives of the administration to address 
the Assembly and give the United States Gov-
ernment's views when matters relating specifical-
ly to the American contribution to the security of 
the alliance are debated by the Assembly. 
14. Relations between Europe and the United 
States are of particular importance since the 
United States has bilateral relations with the 
Soviet Union, the outcome of which necessarily 
affects our security. We should therefore be grati-
fied that, in the past year, the United States has 
consulted its allies on these questions. For 
instance, the agreement on intermediate nuclear 
forces was the subject of in-depth talks in various 
alliance bodies. The Assembly considered this to 
be a first step towards balanced, controlled dis-
armament and that the agreement should not 
jeopardise the strategy of deterrence on which 
European security is based. It therefore urged the 
United States to ratify the treaty as soon as possi-
ble. 
15. The Americans were reminded of the 
Assembly's point of view and they conveyed to 
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the President of the Assembly, during his talks, 
the American authorities' satisfaction at the sup-
port they thus received from the European 
assembly with defence responsibilities. 
16. Our talks with the United States authori-
ties often related to WEU's action in the Gulf. 
They were particularly satisfied to see Europe's 
support for their action in that region of the 
world. They were told that the Assembly had 
congratulated the Netherlands presidency on tak-
ing the initiative of making use of the potential 
of Article VIII of the Brussels Treaty. The provi-
sions of this article allow the Council to examine 
measures to be taken to counter a threat to peace, 
in whatever area of the world it may arise, pro-
vided a member country so requests. The 
co-ordination of naval operations by member 
countries and Luxembourg's financial support 
have thus allowed tangible action to be taken in 
the framework of WEU. It can consequently be 
seen that WEU is a body in which reflection and 
consultation can lead to acti0n. 
1 7. Our American allies informed us that they 
would welcome similar action being developed 
in other regions of the world. I believe we should 
welcome the coincidence of American and Euro-
pean interests in the Gulf which is of crucial 
importance for Europe's oil supplies. But such a 
fortunate convergence will perhaps not be so 
easy in other regions. It will therefore be for the 
Council to determine, case l!>y case, the condi-
tions in which new forms of Euro-American 
co-operation might be devel~ped. However this 
may be, the burden-sharing to which United 
States congressmen pay so mpch attention is not 
confined to a mere strengthening of conventional 
forces in Europe. Burden-sharing also means 
responsibility-sharing. 
18. The Assembly for its part is continuing to 
make Europe's voice heard. When it asserts itself 
in the exercise of its responsibilities, Europe is 
asserting its personality at the same time. The 
Assembly does not just encourage the Council to 
take action. It pursues its own action in favour of 
joint objectives and sets an example. 
* 
* * 
19. The Committee on Scientific, Technologi-
cal and Aerospace Questions had proposed to the 
Presidential Committee that a colloquy be held 
in London at the beginning of March 1988. The 
Presidential Committee gave its full support to 
an initiative which corresponded so well to the 
concern always felt by the Assembly to promote 
European defence industries. 
20. The colloquy was held in ideal conditions 
thanks to the twofold support of the Foreign 
Office and of the United Kingdom Delegation 
through Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. The standard of 
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papers and the response to them in the press 
show that the colloquy was a definite success. 
21. It was a salutatory reaction at a time when 
Japanese competition is becoming stronger, new 
countries are taking their share of the armaments 
market and the United States is calling on Euro-
peans to procure equipment whose development 
it has already amortised and which, it says, only 
needs to be modernised to adapt it to the require-
ments of European military headquarters. For 
Europe is not composed of institutions alone. It 
is a body of research workers, engineers and tech-
nicians who are waiting for us to give them an 
opportunity to make the most of their imagina-
tion and work and to give substance to the idea 
of Europe. 
22. If the European pillar is to be strength-
ened, it must also be enlarged. 
23. The Assembly had underlined the value it 
attached to the early accession of Portugal to the 
modified Brussels Treaty. The Presidential Com-
mittee therefore decided to visit Lisbon on 22nd 
and 23rd February 1988. It was given a particu-
larly warm welcome. But above all it was able to 
see from its talks with the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, the Minister of Defence, the President of 
the Assembly and representatives of the main 
Portuguese political parties that they unanimous-
ly considered their country had already started to 
adapt its armed forces to the defence effort corre-
sponding to its role in the alliance. 
24. Portugal's commitment to Europe seemed 
as firm as its Atlantic solidarity. As a member of 
the European Economic Community and playing 
a full part in the work of political co-operation, 
Portugal is obviously prepared to give the build-
ing of Europe the dimension it lacks in security 
matters. The Portuguese authorities all told us 
that Portugal intended to shoulder all the under-
takings provided for in the modified Brussels 
Treaty, including the most binding one, i.e. com-
pulsory assistance in the event of aggression. 
They also showed that they were anxious to 
apply the principles defined in the platform 
adopted in The Hague, giving them, as the Presi-
dent of the Assembly wrote to the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council, " together with the other 
member countries, the full significance implied 
by the requirements of European security". 
25. Confirming the importance the Assembly 
attaches to its Recommendation 446 on the 
accession of Portugal, the Presidential Commit-
tee therefore urged the Council, at its next minis-
terial meeting, to make the necessary arrange-
ments for Portugal to take its due place in WEU. 
26. At the ministerial meeting in The Hague, 
it was satisfied to see that the Council had fol-
lowed its opinion and that the Council's state-
ment on the subject took up the arguments 
expressed by the President of the Assembly on 
behalf of the Presidential Committee. 
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27. The Presidential Committee also wel-
comed the Council's decision simultaneously to 
invite Spain to hold the necessary discussions on 
its possible accession, the same arguments being 
invoked in favour of the accession ofboth coun-
tries of the Iberian peninsula. This decision cor-
responds to the wish expressed by the Assembly 
in June 1986 in Recommendation 432. 
28. It is already clear that one of the Presiden-
tial Committee's tasks will be to ensure that the 
enlargement of WEU to include these two coun-
tries is achieved without delay. The President of 
the Assembly has already established contacts 
with a view to organising talks between the Presi-
dential Committee and the Spanish authorities. 
Furthermore, the Presidential Committee had 
already decided to invite Mr. Serra, Minister of 
Defence of Spain, Chairman of the IEPG, to 
address the Assembly during the debate on the 
report to be presented by Mr. Wilkinson on 
behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions on European 
co-operation in armaments research and devel-
opment - guidelines drawn from the colloquy. 
The Presidential Committee is happy to note 
that the Spanish Government has accepted its 
invitation. Thus, for the first time, the Assembly 
will be addressed by a representative of the gov-
ernment of a country which is not yet a member 
of the organisation. Clearly, in what we hope will 
be the near future, Spain is prepared to play a 
vital role in the IEPG, of which it now has the 
chairmanship, and WEU should give the politi-
cal impetus necessary to ensure that its action is 
wholly successful and its potential fully devel-
oped. 
29. In Order 70, the Assembly instructed the 
Presidential Committee to pursue its exchanges 
of views with the Supreme Soviet. The Presiden-
tial Committee stressed the fundamental differ-
ence between our relations with the United 
States and any contacts that may be made with 
Soviet authorities. The Bureau of the Assembly 
was not offered an official platform in Moscow 
and there is no question of inviting Soviet speak-
ers to address the Assembly. However, useful 
working meetings might be organised in order to 
discuss ways of guaranteeing Europe's security 
and international peace at a lower level of arma-
ments. The Presidential Committee will there-
fore endeavour to work out appropriate means of 
pursuing the exchanges of views with members 
of the Supreme Soviet that began in April 1987. 
It will not fail to keep the Assembly informed of 
its conclusions. 
* 
* * 
30. The state of the Presidential Committee's 
external relations can therefore be considered 
favourable. It is unfortunately not possible to say 
the same for the internal problems of the 
organisation. 
31. These problems were set out in a petition 
submitted by Mr. Hintermann, former Assistant 
Secretary-General ofWEU. It was the first time a 
petition had been addressed to the President of 
the Assembly. The Presidential Committee 
declared the petition in order and referred it to 
the General Affairs Committee. The questions it 
raises are dealt with in the report to be presented 
by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General 
Affairs Committee. 
32. Mr. van der Sanden's report clearly 
de~cribes the contrast between praiseworthy 
action by the Council and officials of the seven 
member countries meeting periodically under 
the aegis of WEU and the present deadlock in 
regard to structural matters. The delay in com-
municating the annual report, which did not 
reach the Assembly until after the last committee 
meetings, is probably due to this situation. 
33. The Presidential Committee has never held 
the chairmanship-in-office responsible for the 
blameworthy aspects of relations between the 
Council and the Assembly. On the contrary, it has 
endeavoured to assist the chairmanship-in-office 
in its delicate task and it was in view of the Neth-
erlands Government's commitments that it post-
poned the date of the present session by one week. 
It wishes to congratulate the chairmanship-in-
office on the standard of the dialogue it has devel-
oped with the Assembly, the impetus it has given 
to the activities of WEU, in particular the imple-
mentation of the provisions of Article VIII of the 
treaty in the Gulf, and, finally, the opening of dis-
cussions on the accession to WEU of the two 
countries of the Iberian peninsula. 
34. The Presidential Committee has to note, 
however, the Council's inability to introduce the 
administrative means of pursuing long-term 
action. The Assembly had expressed the wish 
that the reorganisation of WEU be completed 
swiftly. The Presidential Committee pursued its 
dialogue with the Council on this question. It 
could but note that the governments found it 
impossible to agree on the place where the minis-
terial organs would be collocated, on their 
organogram and on the mandate of the single 
agency. 
35. Pending reorganisation, the Council, while 
recognising the Assembly's needs, on the one 
189 
DOCUMENT 1143 
hand, and the existence of vacant posts in the 
budgets of the ministerial organs, on the other, 
has nevertheless not authorised the Assembly to 
complete the structure of the Office of the Clerk 
set out in its organogram. In the circumstances, 
the Presidential Committee therefore had to 
remind the Council of its wholehearted disap-
proval of the link the Permanent Council has 
established between the structure of the Office of 
the Clerk and that of the ministerial organs. 
36. Thankfully, the draft recommendation in 
the report by Mr. Morris repeats the Assembly's 
position on a problem which should already 
have been settled. It is now for the Assembly to 
urge the Council as strongly as poss~ble to put an 
immediate end to an absurd SituatiOn. 
37. The Assembly has specific requirements 
and cannot agree to bear the burden of the Coun-
cil's inability to complete the task it set _itself. If 
the Council fails to find an early solutiOn to a 
problem that has been outstanding for so lof:lg, 
its relations with the Assembly can but deteno-
rate seriously. 
38. Nothing would be more regrettable just 
when the dialogue between the governmental 
and parliamentary bodies of the organisation has 
so far been harmonious. 
39. More than ever, we must work together to 
allow WEU to play a now essential part in the 
building of Europe. 
* 
* * 
40. The need to define European interest~ in 
disarmament, controversy over burden-shru:tng, 
the essential enhancement of the Euro-Amencan 
dialogue, dangers arising outside ~he NATO area 
and, in short, all the internatiOnal problems 
looming up at the approach of the twenty-first 
century make it incumbent upon WEU to 
enlarge and strengthen itself, failing which it ~ill 
be impossible to establish the European umon 
necessary to complete and establish a balance in 
the Atlantic Alliance. It must now be agreed to 
give Europe the necessary mea~s. The ~ssembly 
and the Presidential Committee wtll work 
together to ensure that Europe takes shape in 
answer to the call of the future. 
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Paris, 23rd December 1988 
As the New Year draws close, the members of the Presidential Committee, wpo met in Paris on 
Thursday, 17th December, join me in conveying to you their best wishes for success in the accomplish-
ment of your important duties and express the wish that the New Year will allow you to complete the 
task which started so well in the year that has just ended. 
The Presidential Committee has asked me to confirm the value it attaches to organising meetings 
with the presidency before ministerial meetings. This will allow a dialogue to be held on matters on the 
Council's agenda and any problems which may arise in relations between the Council and the Assembly 
to be examined jointly. 
For this purpose, I venture to suggest holding a meeting between 1st and 18th March 1988 when 
we might discuss the implementation ofthe platform, which is an expression of Europe's defence identi-
ty. It is indeed particularly important, following the conclusion of the Washington agreement, to define 
Europeans' common interests on complex disarmament matters and to harmonise member countries' 
views on the various problems that affect European security. 
If you agree, this meeting would be held just before the colloquy on European co-operation on 
armaments research and development in London on 7th and 8th March 1988 with the participation of 
the Presidential Committee. My colleagues and I would particularly appreciate examining with you the 
way in which the Council intends to give political impetus to such European co-operation. 
Another of the Council's successes in 1987 was the introduction of procedure for harmonising 
member countries' policies in the Gulf and co-ordinating their operations. My colleagues and I wish to 
examine developments in this connection with you and your colleague, Mr. van Eekelen. 
This meeting would also allow us to assess the extent of the efforts that still have to be made to 
settle outstanding problems: on the one hand, the completion of the restructuring and collocation of the 
ministerial organs and, on the other hand, the enlargement of WEU to include Portugal and Spain. 
Finally, the Assembly wishes to recall that there are still gaps in the structure of its secretariat 
since the Council subjected the creation of four new posts to the completion of the restructuring of the 
ministerial organs. It would be paradoxical for the Assembly to have to continue to endure the conse-
quences of the governments' difficulty in reaching agreement on the organisation and seat of the minis-
terial organs. 
My colleagues and I attach the greatest importance to this preparatory meeting between the Presi-
dential Committee and the presidency being followed by a meeting between the Presidential Committee, 
the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the General Affairs Committee and the 
Council at the close of the ministerial meeting. Thus, the Assembly would be able to obtain early, sub-
stantial information about the results of the Council's work and analyse it and draw its own conclusions 
during the session that is to be opened on 30th May. 
I should therefore be very grateful if you would present the conclusions ofthe ministerial meeting 
to the Presidential Committee, Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and General Affairs 
Committee at the close of the Council meeting. Such a dialogue would be of even greater interest if it 
could include representatives of governments of other member states who might agree to remain a few 
hours in The Hague to take part in this meeting with the Assembly committees. 
Finally, I have great pleasure in inviting you to present the annual report of the Council at our 
forthcoming session and your colleague, Mr. van Eekelen, Minister of Defence, to take part in our 
debates. 
I should be pleased to know whether you could arrange to speak during the morning of Tuesday, 
31st May 1988. I enclose the agenda of the session. 
Charles GOERENS 
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Letter from Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, 
to Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly 
APPENDIX I 
The Hague, 22nd January 1988 
First, allow me to thank you for the good wishes you conveyed to me on behalf of the Presidential 
Committee. I in turn send you my most sincere wishes for 1988. You can be sure that the Netherlands 
presidency will continue its efforts to maintain close, constructive relations with the Assembly and keep 
you informed as fully as possible of developments in WEU. 
Like you, I think it desirable for us to meet before the meeting of the Council of Ministers this 
spring to discuss the matters referred to in your letter. I can therefore confirm that my defence colleague, 
Mr. van Eekelen, and I will, with the greatest pleasure, receive the Presidential Committee at the Minis-
try for Foreign Affairs on 17th March at 10 a.m. 
Furthenn.ore, the Assembly will, as usual, be informed of the results ofthe meeting of the Council 
of Ministers. For this purpose, I propose that we meet on Tuesday, 19th April, at 3 p.m. I have informed 
the Permanent Council in London of your wish for other ministers, who are able, to take part in these 
discussions. 
I also wish to thank the Assembly for having postponed its forthcoming plenary session in Paris 
to allow the presidency to present the annual report of the Council and take part in the debates. I pro-
pose to address the Assembly on Tuesday, 7th June, at 11 a.m.; my colleague, Mr. van Eekelen, proposes 
to do so the next day, also at 11 a.m. 
You may be sure that I shall have great pleasure in taking part in the discussions at our forthcom-
ing meetings. 
Hans van den BROEK 
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Letter from Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, 
to Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
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Lisbon, 24th February 1988 
Following its meetings with members of the Portuguese Government and Parliament, the 
Presidental Committee noted that there was a consensus among the principal political parties in favour 
of a defence effort designed to allow Portugal, one ofthe founder members ofNATO, to play its full role 
in the alliance and demonstrate in an effective manner its solidarity with the other members in the event 
of attack. 
Portugal is equally convinced of its commitment, to the building of Europe. This has already been 
expressed in the framework of the European Community and political co-operation' and should be con-
firmed without delay in the framework of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
Portugal is clearly prepared to assume the undertakings embodied in this treaty and to apply the 
principles defined in the platform adopted in The Hague, giving them, together with the other member 
countries, the full significance implied by the requirements of European security. 
The Presidential Committee thus confirms the importance the Assembly at~ches to its Recom-
mendation 446 and urges the Council, at its next ministerial meeting, to make th~ necessary arrange-
ments for Portugal to take its due place in WEU. 
Charles GOERENS 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Letter from Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, 
to Mr. Shultz, United States Secretary of State 
APPENDIX Ill 
Paris, 23rd March 1988 
Further to my letter of 8th January concerning my forthcoming visit to the United States authori-
ties, I wish to provide you with a few details about the simultaneous visits to be made by the Presiden-
tial Committee and the General Affairs Committee to Washington from 11th to 13th April 1988. 
The WEU Assembly instructed its steering body, the Presidential Committee, to promote a regu-
lar dialogue between the Assembly and the United States Congress in order to avoid the reactivation of 
WEU adding to" transatlantic misunderstandings". This committee has therefore decided to take part 
in the visit to be paid by our General Affairs Committee to the United States authorities. It will thus be 
able, during its talks with various members of Congress, to give its views on the Assembly's resolution 
on the INF treaty and to stress the value it attaches to ratification of that agreement. It will also, as invit-
ed to do by the Assembly, raise the question ofthe consequences for Europe's security of any American-
Soviet agreements on the limitation of armaments, the aims to be pursued in the CSCE and threats to 
international peace which may arise outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty. 
I personally will endeavour to show that the building of a European pillar ofthe Atlantic Alliance 
can but help to strengthen the alliance, as President Reagan proclaimed in his speech of 4th November 
1987. 
I intend to do my utmost to dispel any doubts that may remain in this respect. The reactivation of 
WEU will motivate Europeans in their defence effort, facilitate a better use of limited resources to 
increase the effectiveness of that effort and smooth out differences between member states. It must lead 
to greater cohesion and strength in the alliance. 
The fear has sometimes been expressed in Europe that the pursuit of disarmament negotiations 
may lead to the United States and Europe being decoupled and deterrence weakened. In point of fact, 
the Atlantic summit meeting's approval of the platform adopted by the WEU Council in The Hague is 
further confirmation of the western strategy for preventing war. It is nevertheless essential for the dia-
logue between the United States and Europe to be pursued in depth to allow both sides to understand 
each other better and to work together to defend peace and build a better world. 
It is in this spirit that I shall be going to Washington and I attach the utmost importance to hold-
ing talks with you yourself and Mr. Carlucci, the Secretary of Defence. 
Charles GOERENS 
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Paris, 20th May 1988 
On the eve of the first meeting between representatives of the governments ot" the WEU member 
countries and of the Spanish and Portuguese Governments, I wish to set out the Assembly's feelings on 
the matter. 
The Assembly has very good reasons for satisfaction on the announcement of this meeting since 
the decision to start discussions with Spain and Portugal is in line with the prospectS it had itself advo-
cated, in particular in Recommendation 432. Furthermore, it notes that the reasons given by the 
Council in support of its decision of 20th April are the very ones the Assembly had expressed when 
calling for the application to Spain and Portugal of Article XI of the Brussels Treaty. 
On behalf of the Assembly, I therefore trust these discussions will be concluded swiftly. The two 
countries concerned have subscribed fully to all the provisions of the treaty and all the principles set out 
in the platform adopted in The Hague. Considering that no obstacle should consequently stand in the 
way of the enlargement of WEU to include the two countries of the Iberian peninsula, the Assembly is 
determined to pursue its action to allow them to take their rightful place in developing security Europe 
as soon as possible. The Assembly is preparing to make the necessary arrangements to receive their par-
liamentary delegations. 
Charles GOERENS 
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Letter from Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, 
to Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
APPENDIX IV 
Paris, 24th May 1988 
With a view to enlightening you regarding the Assembly's feelings as the plenary session 
approaches, I first wish to thank you for the courteous way in which you have conducted the dialogue 
with it. Although, in spite of your efforts, the annual report of the Council arrived too late, the Assembly 
appreciated your constant determination to answer as fully as possible the questions put to the Council 
and the remarks presented to it. 
I also have pleasure in congratulating you on the results you have obtained while guiding the 
Council's work. With the adoption of the platform on European security interests, the co-ordination of 
action by member states to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf, the extension of the Council's 
activities and the decision to hold talks with a view to the accession of Spain and Portugal to the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty, the Netherlands presidency will have left its mark on the history of WEU. 
The Assembly merely regrets that the Council has been unable to agree on giving WEU the struc-
ture and means which are the conditions of lasting success. 
Due to the will of the Council, the Assembly feels the effects of this failure. The restructuring of 
the Office ofthe Clerk is incomplete. It has still not been granted the four posts that should have allowed 
it to carry out its tasks in less precarious conditions, although several posts are kept vacant in the minis-
terial organs. 
The Assembly will not fail to call upon the Council, this time very strongly, at last to make avail-
able to it the four posts foreseen in the memorandum to the Council dated 4th November 1986. I appeal 
to you to give your full support to the Assembly's request. 
I am convinced that the Netherlands Government will continue in the future to give the 
Assembly's recommendations all the attention they warrant. 
Once again, I convey to you my thanks and congratulations. 
Charles GOERENS 
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Written Questions 280 and 281 and replies of the Council 
QUESTION 280 
put by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
on 24th February 1988 
1. On what date or dates was The Hague 
platform communicated to either all the non-
WEU members of NATO or to those countries 
wishing to join WEU? 
2. Will they now report the replies received 
from each country concerned? 
3. In particular, what obstacle now stands in 
the way of inviting Portugal to join WEU? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
and received at the Office of the Clerk 
on 11th Apri/1988 
1. On 27th October 1987, the Netherlands 
presidency informed the ambassadors of the 
NATO countries accredited in The Hague of the 
outcome of the WEU ministerial meeting. On 
that occasion, the text of the platform on Euro-
pean security interests was made available to the 
ambassadors. 
2. The presidency was not instructed by the 
Council to solicit a reply from the NATO coun-
tries on the text of the platform. 
3. The possible enlargement ofWEU is being 
discussed within the Council and in the special 
working group. The matter will also be consid-
ered at the Ministerial Council meeting in The 
Hague on 18th-19th April. 
QUESTION 281 
put by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
on 9th May 1988 
1. On how many occasions since 1980 has 
the annual report from the Council been received 
on time and what reasons have been given for 
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such failures as have taken place in keeping to 
the timetable? 
2. What steps is the Council taking to 
instruct its officials to comply with the need to 
make its annual report available to the Assembly 
on time? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
and received at the Office of the Clerk 
on 3rd June 1988 
1. The annual reports, including the one cov-
ering 1984, used to reach the Assembly around 
February/March of the subsequent years. The 
Council is well aware of the fact that the reports 
could not be transmitted as rapidly after October 
1984, when the reactivation of the organisation 
was decided upon. It was precisely with a view to 
meeting the wishes of the Assembly as much as 
possible that the document has been divided into 
two biannual parts since 1986. The Council may 
point out that since 1984 the activities of West-
ern European Union have taken on a predomi-
nantly political character which is reflected in the 
annual and biannual raports. The reports of the 
previous period were of a largely technical and 
even routine nature and could thus be finalised 
more rapidly. 
2. The Council will continue to do every-
thing possible in order to speed up the 
finalisation of the biannual reports. It may be 
observed that the second part of the thirty-third 
annual report was approved by the Council on 
27th April last and dispatched on 28th April, i.e. 
about six weeks before the next session of the 
Assembly. The report, however, apparently 
reached the General Affairs Committee only 
after its meeting of 9th May. This unfortunate 
delay was attributable to p(>stal dispatching. In 
the future an advance copy will be sent by fac-
simile in order to avoid repetition of such delays. 
Document 1145 
The Assembly, 
Considering: 
Structure of the Office of the Clerk 
MOTION FOR AN ORDER 
tabled by Mr. Sinesio and others 1 
under Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure 
6th June 1988 
(i) That the four posts foreseen in the memorandum sent to the Council on 4th November 1986 have 
still not been filled; 
(ii) The urgency of completing the structure of the Office of the Clerk to allow the Assembly to 
respond to the reactivation of WEU; 
(iii) That corresponding credits are available in the WEU budget, 
INSTRucrs THE PREsiDENTIAL CoMMITTEE 
1. To take the necessary steps to ensure that the Council accedes to the Assembly's request as a mat-
ter of urgency; 
2. To call for a joint meeting with the Council of Ministers before the end of the Netherlands 
chairmanship-in-office if the Assembly does not obtain satisfaction on this matter. 
Signed: Sinesio, Hennicot-Schoepges, Kittelmann, Triglia, Malfatti, Linster, Sarti, Pieralli, Greco, 
Dudley Smith 
l. See 2nd sitting, 7th June 1988 (motion referred to the Presidential Committee). 
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Document 1146 
The Assembly, 
Guest speakers 
MOTION FOR AN ORDER 1 
tabled by Mr. Soell and others 
under Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure 
with a request for urgent procedure 
6th June 1988 
(i) Noting that at the first part of its thirty-fourth ordinary session there are seven non-parliamentary 
speakers and that major debates are therefore interrupted and lose their coherence; 
(ii) Recalling the repeated protests made in the Assembly about the excessive number of speakers 
from outside the Assembly, 
INSTRUCTS THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY 
To seek an agreement with the Council to limit the number of ministerial speeches at any one 
part-session of the Assembly. 
Signed: Soell, Ahrens, Klejdzinski, Linster, Redmond, Thompson, Coleman, Derycke, Hardy, 
Antretter 
1. See 6th sitting, 9th June 1988 (motion referred to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges). 
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Document 1147 
Disarmament 
(The prospects for Western Europe after the Moscow summit) 
The Assembly, 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 1 
by Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman and Rapporteur, 
with a request for urgent procedure 
7th June 1988 
(i) Welcoming the recent summit meeting in Moscow between the leaders of the United States and 
the Soviet Union as a further step towards arms limitation; 
(ii) Welcoming the ratification of the INF treaty by the Senate of the United States (as recommended 
in Resolution 77 adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1987) and the Supreme Soviet of the 
USSR; 
(iii) Disappointed that a bilateral agreement on reductions in strategic weapons systems was not ready 
in time for the summit meeting, but convinced nevertheless that there is a firm basis for such an agree-
ment, incorporating effective means of verification, and that this should be seen as of paramount impor-
tance; 
(iv) Recalling and approving the Council statement in The Hague, that Western European Union will 
pursue an active arms control and disarmament policy exploiting " all opportunities to make further 
progress towards arms reductions, compatible with our security and with our priorities "; 
(v) Convinced that the European nations and particularly Western European Union members should 
contribute substantially to the process of arms control, 
REcOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Continue to press for the earliest opening of negotiations on conventional stability concentrating 
on asymmetrical reductions in conventional forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals, 
together with associated discussions regarding human rights in the Soviet bloc; 
2. Express full support for a properly verifiable bilateral agreement between the United States and 
the Soviet Union which would provide for at least a 50% reduction in strategic missile forces; 
3. Apply the principles defined in the Hague platform to determine and uphold European security 
interests in the context of negotiations on disarmament and the control of armaments; 
4. Press member governments to initiate urgent research into verification technology so that West-
ern Europe is ready to contribute practically to conventional arms control agreements; 
5. Associate the WEU agency closely with its reflection and work on disarmament and arms control, 
ensuring that the considerable expertise and experience acquired by the Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments is not neglected and dissipated at the very moment that considerations such as verification are 
assuming paramount importance, and instruct the agency inter alia to: 
(a) study conditions for conventional disarmament respecting European security require-
ments; 
(b)- study methods of verifying conventional and chemical disarmament. 
1. Adopted in committee by 9 votes to 0 with 7 abstentions. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Kittelmann (Chairman); MM. de Beer (Alternate: Tummers), Fourre (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. 
Alloncle, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Cariglia, Cox (Alternate: Thompson), De Decker (Alternate: Vreven), Derycke, Fiandrotti, 
Fioret (Alternate: Fassmo), Hardy, lrmer, Jung, Konen, de Kwaadsteniet, Mrs. Lalumiere, MM. Lemmrich (Alternate: Buhler), 
Matraja, Pecchioli, Scheer (Alternate: Antretter), Sinesio, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Speed, Steiner, Steverlynck, Stokes. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Document 1147 
Amendment 1 
Disarmament 
(The prospects for Western Europe after the Moscow summit) 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Kittelmann and others 
1. Leave out paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
8th June 1988 
" Continue to press for the earliest opening of negotiations on conventional stability concentrat-
ing on asymmetrical reductions in conventional forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the 
Urals and for progress on all three baskets of the CSCE, particularly the one on human rights, in 
order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and understanding; " 
Signed: Kittelmann, Stoffelen, Reddemann, Finsberg, Pieralli 
1. See 6th sitting, 9th June 1988 (amendment agreed to). 
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